[ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit North America 2022
by James Morris
==============================================================================
ANNOUNCEMENT AND CALL FOR PARTICIPATION
LINUX SECURITY SUMMIT NORTH AMERICA 2022
23-24 June
Austin, Texas & Virtual
==============================================================================
DESCRIPTION
Linux Security Summit North America (LSS-NA) is a technical forum for
collaboration between Linux developers, researchers, and end-users. Its
primary aim is to foster community efforts in analyzing and solving Linux
security challenges.
The program committee currently seeks proposals for:
* Refereed Presentations:
45 minutes in length.
* Panel Discussion Topics:
45 minutes in length.
* Short Topics:
30 minutes in total, including at least 10 minutes discussion.
* Tutorials
90 minutes in length.
Tutorial sessions should be focused on advanced Linux security defense
topics within areas such as the kernel, compiler, and security-related
libraries. Priority will be given to tutorials created for this conference,
and those where the presenter a leading subject matter expert on the topic.
Topic areas include, but are not limited to:
* Kernel self-protection
* Access control
* Cryptography and key management
* Integrity policy and enforcement
* Hardware Security
* IoT and embedded security
* Virtualization and containers
* System-specific system hardening
* Case studies
* Security tools
* Security UX
* Emerging technologies, threats & techniques
Proposals should be submitted via:
https://events.linuxfoundation.org/linux-security-summit-north-america/
Note that for 2022, we are returning to having both North American and
European events (LSS-EU will be held in September).
LSS-NA DATES
* CFP close: March 30
* CFP notifications: April 15
* Schedule announced: April 19
* Event: September 23-24
WHO SHOULD ATTEND
We're seeking a diverse range of attendees and welcome participation by
people involved in Linux security development, operations, and research.
LSS is a unique global event that provides the opportunity to present and
discuss your work or research with key Linux security community members and
maintainers. It's also useful for those who wish to keep up with the latest
in Linux security development and to provide input to the development
process.
WEB SITE
https://events.linuxfoundation.org/linux-security-summit-north-america/
TWITTER
For event updates and announcements, follow:
https://twitter.com/LinuxSecSummit
#linuxsecuritysummit
PROGRAM COMMITTEE
The program committee for LSS 2021 is:
* James Morris, Microsoft
* Serge Hallyn, Cisco
* Paul Moore, Microsoft
* Stephen Smalley, NSA
* Elena Reshetova, Intel
* John Johansen, Canonical
* Kees Cook, Google
* Casey Schaufler, Intel
* Mimi Zohar, IBM
* David A. Wheeler, Linux Foundation
The program committee may be contacted as a group via email:
lss-pc () lists.linuxfoundation.org
--
2 years, 2 months
Newer versions of audit missing information?
by Mark Gardner
I have setup a watch on specific directories for changes so we can report to our auditors about deployments being done by the proper staff members.
So for example -w /root/test -p ra -k test.
If I copied / removed a file in that directory, I would get audit results similar to the following:
[root@localhost test]# ausearch -k test --format text -ts recent
At 14:10:55 02/28/2022 root successfully opened-file /root/test/./hosts using /usr/bin/cp
At 14:11:37 02/28/2022 root successfully deleted /root/test/hosts using /usr/bin/rm
This worked fine in CentOS 7 and CentOS 8 (not stream).
Testing with CentOS-Stream-GenericCloud-8-20220125.1.x86_64.qcow2 also worked until I updated the audit package
[root@localhost test]# dnf list installed audit
Installed Packages
audit.x86_64 3.0-0.17.20191104git1c2f876.el8 @anaconda
[root@localhost test]# ausearch -k test --format text -ts recent
At 14:10:55 02/28/2022 root successfully opened-file /root/test/./hosts using /usr/bin/cp
At 14:11:37 02/28/2022 root successfully deleted /root/test/hosts using /usr/bin/rm
[root@localhost test]# dnf list audit
CentOS Stream 8 - AppStream 7.7 MB/s | 20 MB 00:02
CentOS Stream 8 - BaseOS 9.5 MB/s | 19 MB 00:02
CentOS Stream 8 - Extras 52 kB/s | 18 kB 00:00
Installed Packages
audit.x86_64 3.0-0.17.20191104git1c2f876.el8 @anaconda
Available Packages
audit.x86_64 3.0.7-1.el8 baseos
After Upgrade:[root@localhost test]# auditctl -l
No rules
[root@localhost test]# auditctl -w /root/test -p wa -k test
[root@localhost test]# cp /etc/hosts .
[root@localhost test]# rm hosts
rm: remove regular file 'hosts'? y
[root@localhost test]# ausearch -k test --format text -ts recent
At 14:10:55 02/28/2022 root successfully opened-file using /usr/bin/cp
At 14:11:37 02/28/2022 root successfully deleted using /usr/bin/rm
At 14:13:16 02/28/2022 system, acting as root, successfully remove_rule test using /usr/sbin/auditctl
At 14:14:11 02/28/2022 root successfully add_rule test using /usr/sbin/auditctl
At 14:14:23 02/28/2022 root successfully opened-file using /usr/bin/cp
At 14:14:30 02/28/2022 root successfully deleted using /usr/bin/rm
[root@localhost test]#
Notice no information on what file was copied / removed?
Even the earlier log entries don't show what file was copied / removed.
If I downgrade to audit 3.0-0.17, everything is there.
Is there another way to monitor a directory so we know which files were modified / removed?
2 years, 2 months
[PATCH v32 00/28] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
by Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v32: Rebase to 5.17-rc2
Incorporate additional feedback from v30.
v31: Rebase to 5.16-rc4
Incorporate feedback from Paul Moore on the audit
component changes.
v30: Rebase to 5.16-rc1
Replace the integrity sub-system reuse of the audit
subsystem event matching functions with IMA specific
functions. This is done because audit needs to maintain
information about multiple security modules in audit
rules while IMA to restricts the information to a single
security module.
The binder hooks have been changed and are no longer
called with sufficient information to identify the
interface_lsm. Pass that information in the binder
message, and use that in the compatibility decision.
Refactor the audit changes.
v29: Rebase to 5.15-rc1
Rework the supplimental audit record generation. Attach
a list of supplimental data to the audit_buffer and
generate the auxiliary records as needed on event end.
This should be usable for other auxiliary data, such as
container IDs. There is other ongoing audit work that
will require integration with this.
v28: Rebase to 5.14-rc2
Provide IMA rules bounds checking (patch 04)
Quote contexts in MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS and MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
audit records because of AppArmor's use of '=' in context
values. (patch 22,23)
v27: Fixes for landlock (patch 02)
Rework the subject audit record generation. This version is
simpler and reflects feedback from Paul Moore. (patch 22)
v26: Rebase to 5.13-rc1
Include the landlock security module.
Accomodate change from security_task_getsecid() to
security_task_getsecid_obj() and security_task_getsecid_subj().
v25: Rebase to 5.12-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v24
- The IMA team suggested improvements to the integrity rule
processing.
v24: Rebase to 5.11-rc1
Incorporate feedback from v23
- Address the IMA team's concerns about "label collisions".
A label collision occurs when there is ambiguity about
which of multiple LSMs is being targeted in the definition
of an integrity check rule. A system with Smack and
AppArmor would be unable to distinguish which LSM is
important to an integrity rule referrencing the label
"unconfined" as that label is meaningful to both.
Provide a boot option to specify which LSM will be used in
IMA rules when multiple LSMs are present. (patch 04)
Pull LSM "slot" identification from later audit patches in
in support of this (patch 03).
- Pick up a few audit events that need to include supplimental
subject context records that had been missed in the
previous version.
v23: Rebase to 5.10-rc4
Incorporate feedback from v22
- Change /proc/*/attr/display to /proc/*/attr/interface_lsm to
make the purpose clearer. (patch 0012)
- Include ABI documentation. (patch 0012, 0022)
- Introduce LSM documentation updates with the patches where
the interfaces are added rather than at the end. (patch 0012, 0022)
Include more maintainers and mail lists in To: and Cc: directives.
v22: Rebase to 5.10-rc1
v21: Rebase to 5.9-rc4
Incorporate feedback from v20
- Further revert UDS SO_PEERSEC to use scaffolding around
the interfaces that use lsmblobs and store only a single
secid. The possibility of multiple security modules
requiring data here is still a future problem.
- Incorporate Richard Guy Briggs' non-syscall auxiliary
records patch (patch 0019-0021) in place of my "supplimental"
records implementation. [I'm not sure I've given proper
attestation. I will correct as appropriate]
v20: Rebase to 5.9-rc1
Change the BPF security module to use the lsmblob data. (patch 0002)
Repair length logic in subject label processing (patch 0015)
Handle -EINVAL from the empty BPF setprocattr hook (patch 0020)
Correct length processing in append_ctx() (patch 0022)
v19: Rebase to 5.8-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v18
- Revert UDS SO_PEERSEC implementation to use lsmblobs
directly, rather than allocating as needed. The correct
treatment of out-of-memory conditions in the later case
is difficult to define. (patch 0005)
- Use a size_t in append_ctx() (patch 0021)
- Fix a memory leak when creating compound contexts. (patch 0021)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0013)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0020)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0021)
v18: Rebase to 5.8-rc3
Incorporate feedback from v17
- Null pointer checking in UDS (patch 0005)
Match changes in IMA code (patch 0012)
Fix the behavior of LSM context supplimental audit
records so that there's always exactly one when it's
appropriate for there to be one. This is a substantial
change that requires extention of the audit_context beyond
syscall events. (patch 0020)
v17: Rebase to 5.7-rc4
v16: Rebase to 5.6
Incorporate feedback from v15 - Thanks Stephen, Mimi and Paul
- Generally improve commit messages WRT scaffolding
- Comment ima_lsm_isset() (patch 0002)
- Some question may remain on IMA warning (patch 0002)
- Mark lsm_slot as __lsm_ro_after_init not __init_data (patch 0002)
- Change name of lsmblob variable in ima_match_rules() (patch 0003)
- Instead of putting a struct lsmblob into the unix_skb_parms
structure put a pointer to an allocated instance. There is
currently only space for 5 u32's in unix_skb_parms and it is
likely to get even tighter. Fortunately, the lifecycle
management of the allocated lsmblob is simple. (patch 0005)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0005)
- Improved commentary on secmark labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Reduced secmark related labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Replace use of the zeroth entry of an lsmblob in scaffolding
with a function lsmblob_value() to hopefully make it less
obscure. (patch 0006)
- Convert security_secmark_relabel_packet to use lsmblob as
this reduces much of the most contentious scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0006)
- Added BUILD_BUG_ON() for CIPSO tag 6. (patch 0018)
- Reworked audit subject information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use subj="?". (patch 0020)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0020)
- Reworked audit object information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use obj="?". (patch 0021)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0021)
- Enhanced documentation (patch 0022)
- Removed unnecessary error code check in security_getprocattr()
(patch 0021)
v15: Rebase to 5.6-rc1
- Revise IMA data use (patch 0002)
Incorporate feedback from v14
- Fix lockdown module registration naming (patch 0002)
- Revise how /proc/self/attr/context is gathered. (patch 0022)
- Revise access modes on /proc/self/attr/context. (patch 0022)
- Revise documentation on LSM external interfaces. (patch 0022)
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v12
- Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002)
- Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002)
- Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006)
- Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009)
- Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013)
- Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013)
- Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014)
- Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014)
- Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014)
- Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016)
- Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016)
- Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019)
- Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023)
- Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023)
- Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023)
v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1
Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text.
v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v10
- Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting
all use of the interface to the current process.
- Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check
v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
v9: There is no version 9
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common
append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The
availability of compound contexts reduces the need for
setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in
lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context
in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide
the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context
interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context
"display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more
meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with
otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor
stub, which does nothing useful.
Patch 01 separates the audit rule processing from the
integrity rule processing. They were never really the
same, but void pointers could hide that. The changes
following use the rule pointers differently in audit
and IMA, so keeping the code common is not a good idea.
Patch 02 moves management of the sock security blob
from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 03-04 introduce a structure "lsmblob" that will gradually
replace the "secid" as a shorthand for security module information.
At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot"
for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that
used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests
one.
Patch 05 provides mechanism for the IMA subsystem to identify
explicitly which LSM is subject to IMA policy. This includes
a boot option for specifying the default and an additional option
in IMA rules "lsm=".
Patches 06-15 change LSM interfaces to use the lsmblob instead
of secids. It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity
that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places
where it is used would have performance and/or locking
issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 15 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which
security module's hooks should be used when displaying or
converting a security context string. A new interface
/proc/self/attr/interface_lsm contains the name of the security
module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of
the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names
of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name
is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module
which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the
display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces
allow the transition. The interface LSM of other processess
can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases for
reading the interface LSM of a different process have race
conditions.
Patch 16 Starts the process of changing how a security
context is represented. Since it is possible for a
security context to have been generated by more than one
security module it is now necessary to note which module
created a security context so that the correct "release"
hook can be called. There are several places where the
module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure
which contains the context string, its length and the
"slot" number of the security module that created it.
The security_release_secctx() interface is changed,
replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext
pointer.
Patches 17-18 convert the security interfaces from
(string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer.
The slot number identifying the creating module is
added by the infrastructure. Where the security context
is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures
instead of secids in Patch 19. This is not strictly
necessary as there can only be one security module that
uses Netlabel at this point. Using a lsmblob is much
cleaner, as the interfaces that use the data have all
been converted.
Patch 20 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify
that both ends of a transaction use the same interface LSM.
Patch 21 adds a parameter to security_secid_to_secctx()
that indicates which of the security modules should be used
to provide the context.
Patches 22-24 provide mechanism to keeping a list of auxiliary
record data in an audit_buffer. The list is read when the
audit record is ended, and supplimental records are created
as needed.
Patch 25 adds a supplimental audit record for subject
LSM data when there are multiple security modules with such data.
The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction with a
"subj=?" field to identify the subject data. The
AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module
with the data: subj_selinux="xyz_t" subj_apparmor="abc".
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1420]
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor==unconfined
subj_smack=_
Patch 26 adds a supplimental audit record for object
LSM data when there are multiple security modules with such data.
The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction The
with a "obj=?" field to identify the object data.
The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module
with the data: obj_selinux="xyz_t obj_apparmor="abc". While
AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS records will always contain an entry
for each possible security modules, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
records will only contain entries for security modules for
which the object in question has data.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1421]
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
Patch 27 adds a new interface for getting the compound security
contexts, /proc/self/attr/context. An example of the content
of this file is:
selinux\0one_u:one_r:one_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023\0apparmor\0unconfined\0
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed,
Patch 28 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary
stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in
their distribution to enable stacking for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise".
The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8%
difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The
benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.17-rc2-v32
Casey Schaufler (28):
integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings
IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
LSM: Specify which LSM to display
LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation
LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection
Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
Audit: Add record for multiple object security contexts
LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 +-
.../ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display | 22 +
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 28 +
drivers/android/binder.c | 47 +-
drivers/android/binder_internal.h | 1 +
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 2 +
include/linux/audit.h | 15 +-
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 19 +-
include/linux/security.h | 243 ++++++-
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +-
include/net/scm.h | 15 +-
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 +
kernel/audit.c | 250 +++++--
kernel/audit.h | 17 +-
kernel/auditfilter.c | 29 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 128 ++--
kernel/cred.c | 12 +-
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 26 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 24 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 +-
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 +-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 105 +--
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 +-
security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +-
security/commoncap.c | 7 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 -
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 12 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 63 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 58 +-
security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +
security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 +-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +-
security/security.c | 615 ++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 99 +--
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 6 +
security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 91 +--
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +-
66 files changed, 1746 insertions(+), 624 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
--
2.31.1
2 years, 2 months
audit user space build problems
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
Recently, distributions moved to building against gcc-12 for their latest OS
composes. It's been found in at least 2 distributions that the user space
package is failing to build. It's natural to think this is related to gcc-12
since it's the obvious change.
However, the problem is a combination of 2 things:
1) SWIG is making buggy code
2) The kernel changed to using flexible array members
The issue specifically is with struct audit_rules_data. At the bottom, it was
using buf[0]; But on 5.17, it uses buf[]; It turns out that gcc-12 is just
a coincidence and anything using gcc-12 also has the newest kernel.
The options are:
1) Report this as a SWIG bug and wait
2) Rewrite the libaudit python bindings to not use SWIG
3) Ask for buf[0]; to be reinstated in the kernel.
Of these, I think option 2 is the only viable long term option. It will take
some time to write new python bindings that preserve the SWIG api.
A short term fix might be for distros to copy the kernel header into the lib
directory and patch it to restore buf[0];, then change libaudit.c to include
"audit.h" instead of <linux/audit.h>. There may be other approaches.
Just wanted to let everyone know that new builds in distributions are running
into a problem. And a real fix will take a while.
Best,
-Steve
2 years, 2 months
[PATCH -next] audit: only print records that will be dropped via printk()
by Gaosheng Cui
When an admin enables audit at early boot via the "audit=1" kernel
command line, netlink send errors seen will cause the audit subsystem
to drop some records or return records to the queue. And all records
will be printed via printk() in the kauditd_hold_skb(), but actually
only the records that will be dropped need to be printed via printk().
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 7690c29d4ee4..eb3e44c849be 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -568,10 +568,6 @@ static void kauditd_rehold_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, __always_unused int error)
*/
static void kauditd_hold_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int error)
{
- /* at this point it is uncertain if we will ever send this to auditd so
- * try to send the message via printk before we go any further */
- kauditd_printk_skb(skb);
-
/* can we just silently drop the message? */
if (!audit_default)
goto drop;
@@ -600,6 +596,11 @@ static void kauditd_hold_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int error)
/* we have no other options - drop the message */
audit_log_lost("kauditd hold queue overflow");
drop:
+ /* at this point it is uncertain if we will ever send this to auditd so
+ * try to send the message via printk before we go any further
+ */
+ kauditd_printk_skb(skb);
+
kfree_skb(skb);
}
--
2.30.0
2 years, 2 months
Re: Removing Audit-libs, Python3-audit
by Roger Moore
Hi,
Can you let me know how to remove all audit code, including audit-libs and python3-audit, and stop them from being updated by DNF update.
DNF keeps reinstalling the python3 code (audit-libs python3-audit).
I have exclude=audit-libs,python3-audit in /etc/yum.conf
But, it keeps on reinstalling.
Best Regards,
Roger Moore.
2 years, 2 months
[PATCH -next, v2] audit: only print records that will be dropped via printk()
by Gaosheng Cui
When an admin enables audit at early boot via the "audit=1" kernel
command line, netlink send errors seen will cause the audit subsystem
to drop some records or return records to the queue. And all records
will be printed via printk() in the kauditd_hold_skb(), but actually
only the records that will be dropped need to be printed via printk().
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 7690c29d4ee4..eb3e44c849be 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -568,10 +568,6 @@ static void kauditd_rehold_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, __always_unused int error)
*/
static void kauditd_hold_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int error)
{
- /* at this point it is uncertain if we will ever send this to auditd so
- * try to send the message via printk before we go any further */
- kauditd_printk_skb(skb);
-
/* can we just silently drop the message? */
if (!audit_default)
goto drop;
@@ -600,6 +596,11 @@ static void kauditd_hold_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int error)
/* we have no other options - drop the message */
audit_log_lost("kauditd hold queue overflow");
drop:
+ /* at this point it is uncertain if we will ever send this to auditd so
+ * try to send the message via printk before we go any further
+ */
+ kauditd_printk_skb(skb);
+
kfree_skb(skb);
}
--
2.30.0
2 years, 2 months
[PATCH v6] audit: log AUDIT_TIME_* records only from rules
by Richard Guy Briggs
AUDIT_TIME_* events are generated when there are syscall rules present
that are not related to time keeping. This will produce noisy log
entries that could flood the logs and hide events we really care about.
Rather than immediately produce the AUDIT_TIME_* records, store the data
in the context and log it at syscall exit time respecting the filter
rules.
Note: This eats the audit_buffer, unlike any others in show_special().
Please see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1991919
Fixes: 7e8eda734d30 ("ntp: Audit NTP parameters adjustment")
Fixes: 2d87a0674bd6 ("timekeeping: Audit clock adjustments")
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
Changelog:
v2:
- rename __audit_ntp_log_ to audit_log_ntp
- pre-check ntp before storing
- move tk out of the context union and move ntp logging to the bottom of audit_show_special()
- restructure logging of ntp to use ab and allocate more only if more
- add Fixes lines
v3
- move tk into union
- rename audit_log_ntp() to audit_log_time() and add tk
- key off both AUDIT_TIME_* but favour NTP
v4
- drop tk goto in favour of ntp if clause
- add comments to clarify calling function buffer expectations
v5
- hold my nose and swallow the audit_buffer in audit_log_time()
v6
- declare audit_log_time() and ntp_name as static
kernel/audit.h | 4 +++
kernel/auditsc.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index c4498090a5bd..58b66543b4d5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -201,6 +201,10 @@ struct audit_context {
struct {
char *name;
} module;
+ struct {
+ struct audit_ntp_data ntp_data;
+ struct timespec64 tk_injoffset;
+ } time;
};
int fds[2];
struct audit_proctitle proctitle;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fce5d43a933f..e928d94796e5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1340,6 +1340,51 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
}
+static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab)
+{
+ const struct audit_ntp_data *ntp = &context->time.ntp_data;
+ const struct timespec64 *tk = &context->time.tk_injoffset;
+ static const char * const ntp_name[] = {
+ "offset",
+ "freq",
+ "status",
+ "tai",
+ "tick",
+ "adjust",
+ };
+ int type;
+
+ if (context->type == AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL) {
+ for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) {
+ if (ntp->vals[type].newval != ntp->vals[type].oldval) {
+ if (!*ab) {
+ *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL);
+ if (!*ab)
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli",
+ ntp_name[type], ntp->vals[type].oldval,
+ ntp->vals[type].newval);
+ audit_log_end(*ab);
+ *ab = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (tk->tv_sec != 0 || tk->tv_nsec != 0) {
+ if (!*ab) {
+ *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET);
+ if (!*ab)
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
+ (long long)tk->tv_sec, tk->tv_nsec);
+ audit_log_end(*ab);
+ *ab = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1454,6 +1499,11 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
break;
+ case AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL:
+ case AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET:
+ /* this call deviates from the rest, eating the buffer */
+ audit_log_time(context, &ab);
+ break;
}
audit_log_end(ab);
}
@@ -2849,31 +2899,26 @@ void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
{
- audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
- "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
- (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
-}
-
-static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
- const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
-{
- const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
-
- if (val->newval == val->oldval)
- return;
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
- "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
+ /* only set type if not already set by NTP */
+ if (!context->type)
+ context->type = AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET;
+ memcpy(&context->time.tk_injoffset, &offset, sizeof(offset));
}
void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
{
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ int type;
+
+ for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++)
+ if (ad->vals[type].newval != ad->vals[type].oldval) {
+ /* unconditionally set type, overwriting TK */
+ context->type = AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL;
+ memcpy(&context->time.ntp_data, ad, sizeof(*ad));
+ break;
+ }
}
void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
--
2.27.0
2 years, 2 months
[PATCH v5] audit: log AUDIT_TIME_* records only from rules
by Richard Guy Briggs
AUDIT_TIME_* events are generated when there are syscall rules present that are
not related to time keeping. This will produce noisy log entries that could
flood the logs and hide events we really care about.
Rather than immediately produce the AUDIT_TIME_* records, store the data in the
context and log it at syscall exit time respecting the filter rules.
Note: This eats the audit_buffer, unlike any others in show_special().
Please see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1991919
Fixes: 7e8eda734d30 ("ntp: Audit NTP parameters adjustment")
Fixes: 2d87a0674bd6 ("timekeeping: Audit clock adjustments")
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
Changelog:
v2:
- rename __audit_ntp_log_ to audit_log_ntp
- pre-check ntp before storing
- move tk out of the context union and move ntp logging to the bottom of audit_show_special()
- restructure logging of ntp to use ab and allocate more only if more
- add Fixes lines
v3
- move tk into union
- rename audit_log_ntp() to audit_log_time() and add tk
- key off both AUDIT_TIME_* but favour NTP
v4
- drop tk goto in favour of ntp if clause
- add comments to clarify calling function buffer expectations
v5
- hold my nose and swallow the audit_buffer in audit_log_time()
kernel/audit.h | 4 +++
kernel/auditsc.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index c4498090a5bd..58b66543b4d5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -201,6 +201,10 @@ struct audit_context {
struct {
char *name;
} module;
+ struct {
+ struct audit_ntp_data ntp_data;
+ struct timespec64 tk_injoffset;
+ } time;
};
int fds[2];
struct audit_proctitle proctitle;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fce5d43a933f..53d684966350 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1340,6 +1340,51 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
}
+void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab)
+{
+ const struct audit_ntp_data *ntp = &context->time.ntp_data;
+ const struct timespec64 *tk = &context->time.tk_injoffset;
+ const char *ntp_name[] = {
+ "offset",
+ "freq",
+ "status",
+ "tai",
+ "tick",
+ "adjust",
+ };
+ int type;
+
+ if (context->type == AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL) {
+ for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) {
+ if (ntp->vals[type].newval != ntp->vals[type].oldval) {
+ if (!*ab) {
+ *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL);
+ if (!*ab)
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli",
+ ntp_name[type], ntp->vals[type].oldval,
+ ntp->vals[type].newval);
+ audit_log_end(*ab);
+ *ab = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (tk->tv_sec != 0 || tk->tv_nsec != 0) {
+ if (!*ab) {
+ *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET);
+ if (!*ab)
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
+ (long long)tk->tv_sec, tk->tv_nsec);
+ audit_log_end(*ab);
+ *ab = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1454,6 +1499,11 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
break;
+ case AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL:
+ case AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET:
+ /* this call deviates from the rest, eating the buffer */
+ audit_log_time(context, &ab);
+ break;
}
audit_log_end(ab);
}
@@ -2849,31 +2899,26 @@ void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
{
- audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
- "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
- (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
-}
-
-static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
- const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
-{
- const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
-
- if (val->newval == val->oldval)
- return;
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
- "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
+ /* only set type if not already set by NTP */
+ if (!context->type)
+ context->type = AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET;
+ memcpy(&context->time.tk_injoffset, &offset, sizeof(offset));
}
void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
{
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ int type;
+
+ for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++)
+ if (ad->vals[type].newval != ad->vals[type].oldval) {
+ /* unconditionally set type, overwriting TK */
+ context->type = AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL;
+ memcpy(&context->time.ntp_data, ad, sizeof(*ad));
+ break;
+ }
}
void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
--
2.27.0
2 years, 2 months
[PATCH v4] audit: log AUDIT_TIME_* records only from rules
by Richard Guy Briggs
AUDIT_TIME_* events are generated when there are syscall rules present that are
not related to time keeping. This will produce noisy log entries that could
flood the logs and hide events we really care about.
Rather than immediately produce the AUDIT_TIME_* records, store the data in the
context and log it at syscall exit time respecting the filter rules.
Please see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1991919
Fixes: 7e8eda734d30 ("ntp: Audit NTP parameters adjustment")
Fixes: 2d87a0674bd6 ("timekeeping: Audit clock adjustments")
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
Changelog:
v2:
- rename __audit_ntp_log_ to audit_log_ntp
- pre-check ntp before storing
- move tk out of the context union and move ntp logging to the bottom of audit_show_special()
- restructure logging of ntp to use ab and allocate more only if more
- add Fixes lines
v3
- move tk into union
- rename audit_log_ntp() to audit_log_time() and add tk
- key off both AUDIT_TIME_* but favour NTP
v4
- drop tk goto in favour of ntp if clause
- add comments to clarify calling function buffer expectations
kernel/audit.h | 4 +++
kernel/auditsc.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index c4498090a5bd..58b66543b4d5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -201,6 +201,10 @@ struct audit_context {
struct {
char *name;
} module;
+ struct {
+ struct audit_ntp_data ntp_data;
+ struct timespec64 tk_injoffset;
+ } time;
};
int fds[2];
struct audit_proctitle proctitle;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fce5d43a933f..86f1c65ac933 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1340,6 +1340,53 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
}
+void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab)
+{
+ const struct audit_ntp_data *ntp = &context->time.ntp_data;
+ const struct timespec64 *tk = &context->time.tk_injoffset;
+ const char *ntp_name[] = {
+ "offset",
+ "freq",
+ "status",
+ "tai",
+ "tick",
+ "adjust",
+ };
+ /* use up allocated ab from show_special before new one */
+ int type, first = 1;
+
+ if (context->type == AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL) {
+ for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) {
+ if (ntp->vals[type].newval != ntp->vals[type].oldval) {
+ if (first) {
+ first = 0;
+ } else {
+ audit_log_end(*ab);
+ *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL);
+ if (!*ab)
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli",
+ ntp_name[type], ntp->vals[type].oldval,
+ ntp->vals[type].newval);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (tk->tv_sec != 0 || tk->tv_nsec != 0) {
+ if (!first) {
+ audit_log_end(*ab);
+ *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET);
+ if (!*ab)
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
+ (long long)tk->tv_sec, tk->tv_nsec);
+ }
+ /* allocated ab will be ended by show_special */
+}
+
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1454,6 +1501,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
break;
+ case AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL:
+ case AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET:
+ audit_log_time(context, &ab);
+ break;
}
audit_log_end(ab);
}
@@ -2849,31 +2900,26 @@ void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
{
- audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
- "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
- (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
-}
-
-static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
- const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
-{
- const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
-
- if (val->newval == val->oldval)
- return;
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
- "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
+ /* only set type if not already set by NTP */
+ if (!context->type)
+ context->type = AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET;
+ memcpy(&context->time.tk_injoffset, &offset, sizeof(offset));
}
void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
{
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
- audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ int type;
+
+ for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++)
+ if (ad->vals[type].newval != ad->vals[type].oldval) {
+ /* unconditionally set type, overwriting TK */
+ context->type = AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL;
+ memcpy(&context->time.ntp_data, ad, sizeof(*ad));
+ break;
+ }
}
void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
--
2.27.0
2 years, 3 months
