[PATCH] audit=0 appears not to completely disable auditing
by Steve Grubb
Hi,
There was a bz, 231371, reporting that current upstream kernels do not completely
disable auditing when boot with audit=0 and the audit daemon not configured to
run. You can reproduce the problem by:
service auditd stop
auditctl -e 0
auditctl -w /etc/passwd
and you'd get an event in syslog:
Mar 9 15:43:04 localhost kernel: audit(1173472984.321:982): auid=4294967295
subj=user_u:system_r:auditctl_t:s0 op=add rule key=(null) list=4 res=1
The patch below solves this problem by checking audit_enabled before creating
an audit event.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
diff -urp linux-2.6.18.x86_64.orig/kernel/audit.c linux-2.6.18.x86_64/kernel/audit.c
--- linux-2.6.18.x86_64.orig/kernel/audit.c 2007-03-09 14:08:18.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.18.x86_64/kernel/audit.c 2007-03-09 14:06:59.000000000 -0500
@@ -238,46 +238,50 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
{
- int old = audit_rate_limit;
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ int old = audit_rate_limit;
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- int rc;
- if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
- return rc;
- else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
- limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- limit, old, loginuid);
+ limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+ limit, old, loginuid);
+ }
audit_rate_limit = limit;
return 0;
}
static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
{
- int old = audit_backlog_limit;
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ int old = audit_backlog_limit;
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- int rc;
- if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
- return rc;
- else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
- limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- limit, old, loginuid);
+ limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+ limit, old, loginuid);
+ }
audit_backlog_limit = limit;
return 0;
}
@@ -289,21 +293,23 @@ static int audit_set_enabled(int state,
if (state != 0 && state != 1)
return -EINVAL;
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- int rc;
- if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
- return rc;
- else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ if (audit_enabled || state) {
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
- state, old, loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- state, old, loginuid);
+ state, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+ state, old, loginuid);
+ }
audit_enabled = state;
return 0;
}
@@ -317,21 +323,23 @@ static int audit_set_failure(int state,
&& state != AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC)
return -EINVAL;
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- int rc;
- if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
- return rc;
- else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
- state, old, loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- state, old, loginuid);
+ state, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+ state, old, loginuid);
+ }
audit_failure = state;
return 0;
}
@@ -536,22 +544,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
if (err < 0) return err;
}
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) {
- int old = audit_pid;
- if (sid) {
- if ((err = selinux_ctxid_to_string(
- sid, &ctx, &len)))
- return err;
- else
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ int old = audit_pid;
+ if (sid) {
+ if ((err = selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return err;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+ status_get->pid, old,
+ loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
- status_get->pid, old,
- loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- status_get->pid, old, loginuid);
+ status_get->pid, old,
+ loginuid);
+ }
audit_pid = status_get->pid;
}
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT)
diff -urp linux-2.6.18.x86_64.orig/kernel/auditfilter.c linux-2.6.18.x86_64/kernel/auditfilter.c
--- linux-2.6.18.x86_64.orig/kernel/auditfilter.c 2007-03-09 14:08:18.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.18.x86_64/kernel/auditfilter.c 2007-03-09 14:05:54.000000000 -0500
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ extern struct inotify_handle *audit_ih;
/* Inotify events we care about. */
#define AUDIT_IN_WATCH IN_MOVE|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE|IN_DELETE_SELF|IN_MOVE_SELF
+extern int audit_enabled;
+
void audit_free_parent(struct inotify_watch *i_watch)
{
struct audit_parent *parent;
@@ -897,7 +899,6 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct au
struct audit_watch *owatch, *nwatch, *nextw;
struct audit_krule *r, *nextr;
struct audit_entry *oentry, *nentry;
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(owatch, nextw, &parent->watches, wlist) {
@@ -937,13 +938,18 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct au
call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
}
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
- audit_log_format(ab, "op=updated rules specifying path=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, owatch->path);
- audit_log_format(ab, " with dev=%u ino=%lu\n", dev, ino);
- audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
- audit_log_end(ab);
-
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "op=updated rules specifying path=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, owatch->path);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " with dev=%u ino=%lu\n",
+ dev, ino);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
audit_remove_watch(owatch);
goto add_watch_to_parent; /* event applies to a single watch */
}
@@ -962,25 +968,28 @@ static void audit_remove_parent_watches(
struct audit_watch *w, *nextw;
struct audit_krule *r, *nextr;
struct audit_entry *e;
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
parent->flags |= AUDIT_PARENT_INVALID;
list_for_each_entry_safe(w, nextw, &parent->watches, wlist) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, nextr, &w->rules, rlist) {
e = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
-
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
- audit_log_format(ab, "op=remove rule path=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, w->path);
- if (r->filterkey) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, r->filterkey);
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
- audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
- audit_log_end(ab);
-
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=remove rule path=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, w->path);
+ if (r->filterkey) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+ r->filterkey);
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
+ audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1",
+ r->listnr);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
list_del(&r->rlist);
list_del_rcu(&e->list);
call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
@@ -1409,6 +1418,9 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return;
+
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (!ab)
return;
16 years, 7 months
Ptrace looses track of a forked child
by John D. Ramsdell
I thought I was very close to finishing up an application that uses
the audit system to perform a task formally done by a modified version
of strace. Alas, one of the programs I had working last October no
longer works.
The broken program uses ptrace to add an audit rule for each child
process forked by the traced application. It adds the rule before the
child runs by handling a SIGTRAP generated as a result of tracing the
original child with the PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK option.
I tried to follow to the changes to kernel/ptrace.c via linuxhq, but I
got little from that exercise. I ended up submitting a bug report
here:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=246330
If there is something else I should be doing, please advise.
I notice there are two other ptrace related bugs reported for Fedora
7. Both have been assigned to Roland McGrath, a primary maintainer of
strace. I bet he gets assigned this bug report too. Roland doesn't
like the changes I make to strace that allows it to display the
security contexts associated with traced objects, so he'll remember
me.
One final question. Has there been any other efforts aimed at
allowing the audit system to follow forks of traced processes?
Alternatives to my ptrace solution would be greatly appreciated at
this time.
John
16 years, 10 months
audit 1.5.4 released
by Steve Grubb
Hi,
I've just released a new version of the audit daemon. It can be downloaded
from http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit It will also be in rawhide
soon. The Changelog is:
- Add feed interface to auparse library (John Dennis)
- Apply patch to libauparse for unresolved symbols (#241178)
- Apply patch to add line numbers for file events in libauparse (John Dennis)
- Change seresults to seresult in libauparse (John Dennis)
- Add unit32_t definition to swig (#244210)
- Add support for directory auditing
- Update acct field to be escaped
Please note that the audit event dispatcher will be changing again in the next
release. This is the current area of work and this one is considered
temporary. This release is primarily to get some other needed fixes out for
people to use. I should have a new release soon.
Please let me know if there are any problems with this release.
-Steve
16 years, 10 months
[PATCH] Make IPC mode consistent
by Steve Grubb
Hi,
The mode fields for IPC records are not consistent. Some are hex, others are
octal. This patch makes them all octal.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
diff -urp linux-2.6.18.i686.orig/kernel/auditsc.c linux-2.6.18.i686/kernel/auditsc.c
--- linux-2.6.18.i686.orig/kernel/auditsc.c 2007-05-29 10:27:13.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-2.6.18.i686/kernel/auditsc.c 2007-05-29 10:33:07.000000000 -0400
@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_
case AUDIT_IPC: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+ "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
if (axi->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_
case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
+ "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
break; }
16 years, 10 months
Filesystem filling up ...
by Aaron Lippold
Hello,
I was hoping some smarter audit folks than I could look at this small
set of rules and let me know if anythings seem: 1) way too broad 2)
would fill up a file system fast 3) could use improvement
cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/audit.rules
## Submitted by JasonM at FSO.
# This file contains the auditctl rules that are loaded
# whenever the audit daemon is started via the initscripts.
# The rules are simply the parameters that would be passed
# to auditctl.
# First rule - delete all
-D
# Feel free to add below this line. See auditctl man page
# Increase the buffers to survive stress events
-b 256
-e 1
# Audit Failed opens
-a exit,always -S open -F success!=0
#
# Audit success and failure of delete
-a exit,always -S unlink -S rmdir
#
# Audit success and failure of admin actions
#-a task,always -F uid=0
-w /var/log/audit/ -k ADMIN
-w /etc/auditd.conf -k ADMIN
-w /etc/audit.rules -k ADMIN
-a exit,always -S stime -S acct -S reboot -S swapon -S settimeofday -S setrlimit
-a exit,always -S setdomainname -S sched_setparam -S sched_setscheduler
EOF
Some of my end users are saying their logging a lot of audits. We are
using the same kickstart file but my test systems are not filling up.
Thanks for the help.
Aaron
16 years, 10 months
Re: [patch 2/3] audit: rework execve audit
by Andrew Morton
On Wed, 13 Jun 2007 12:03:36 +0200
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra(a)chello.nl> wrote:
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> + {
> + .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
> + .procname = "audit_argv_kb",
> + .data = &audit_argv_kb,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> + .mode = 0644,
> + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
> + },
> +#endif
Please document /proc entries in Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
16 years, 10 months
+ audit-rework-execve-audit.patch added to -mm tree
by akpm＠linux-foundation.org
The patch titled
audit: rework execve audit
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
audit-rework-execve-audit.patch
*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***
See http://www.zip.com.au/~akpm/linux/patches/stuff/added-to-mm.txt to find
out what to do about this
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: audit: rework execve audit
From: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra(a)chello.nl>
The purpose of audit_bprm() is to log the argv array to a userspace daemon at
the end of the execve system call. Since user-space hasn't had time to run,
this array is still in pristine state on the process' stack; so no need to
copy it, we can just grab it from there.
In order to minimize the damage to audit_log_*() copy each string into a
temporary kernel buffer first.
Currently the audit code requires that the full argument vector fits in a
single packet. So currently it does clip the argv size to a (sysctl) limit,
but only when execve auditing is enabled.
If the audit protocol gets extended to allow for multiple packets this check
can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra(a)chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw(a)google.com>
Cc: <linux-audit(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 3 +
include/linux/binfmts.h | 1
kernel/auditsc.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
kernel/sysctl.c | 11 ++++
4 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff -puN fs/exec.c~audit-rework-execve-audit fs/exec.c
--- a/fs/exec.c~audit-rework-execve-audit
+++ a/fs/exec.c
@@ -1154,6 +1154,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
{
struct linux_binprm *bprm;
struct file *file;
+ unsigned long env_p;
int retval;
int i;
@@ -1208,9 +1209,11 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
+ env_p = bprm->p;
retval = copy_strings(bprm->argc, argv, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
+ bprm->argv_len = env_p - bprm->p;
retval = search_binary_handler(bprm,regs);
if (retval >= 0) {
diff -puN include/linux/binfmts.h~audit-rework-execve-audit include/linux/binfmts.h
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h~audit-rework-execve-audit
+++ a/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct linux_binprm{
unsigned interp_flags;
unsigned interp_data;
unsigned long loader, exec;
+ unsigned long argv_len;
};
#define BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP_BIT 0
diff -puN kernel/auditsc.c~audit-rework-execve-audit kernel/auditsc.c
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c~audit-rework-execve-audit
+++ a/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_execve {
struct audit_aux_data d;
int argc;
int envc;
- char mem[0];
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
};
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
@@ -831,6 +831,55 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct
return rc;
}
+static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
+{
+ int i;
+ long len, ret;
+ const char __user *p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
+ char *buf;
+
+ if (axi->mm != current->mm)
+ return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++, p += len) {
+ len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE);
+ /*
+ * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
+ * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
+ * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
+ * any.
+ */
+ if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ }
+
+ buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf) {
+ audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, len);
+ /*
+ * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
+ * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
+ * space yet.
+ */
+ if (!ret) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, buf);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
+
+ kfree(buf);
+ }
+}
+
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
int i, call_panic = 0;
@@ -971,13 +1020,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_
case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
- int i;
- const char *p;
- for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
- p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
- audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
- }
+ audit_log_execve_info(ab, axi);
break; }
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
@@ -1821,32 +1864,31 @@ int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long q
return 0;
}
+int audit_argv_kb = 32;
+
int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- unsigned long p, next;
- void *to;
if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
return 0;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ /*
+ * Even though the stack code doesn't limit the arg+env size any more,
+ * the audit code requires that _all_ arguments be logged in a single
+ * netlink skb. Hence cap it :-(
+ */
+ if (bprm->argv_len > (audit_argv_kb << 10))
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
ax->argc = bprm->argc;
ax->envc = bprm->envc;
- for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
- struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
- void *kaddr = kmap(page);
- next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
- memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
- to += next - p;
- kunmap(page);
- }
-
+ ax->mm = bprm->mm;
ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
diff -puN kernel/sysctl.c~audit-rework-execve-audit kernel/sysctl.c
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c~audit-rework-execve-audit
+++ a/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
extern int compat_log;
extern int maps_protect;
extern int sysctl_stat_interval;
+extern int audit_argv_kb;
/* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */
static int maxolduid = 65535;
@@ -946,6 +947,16 @@ static ctl_table binfmt_misc_table[] = {
{ .ctl_name = 0 }
};
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+ {
+ .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
+ .procname = "audit_argv_kb",
+ .data = &audit_argv_kb,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+ },
+#endif
static ctl_table fs_table[] = {
{
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from a.p.zijlstra(a)chello.nl are
lumpy-reclaim-v4.patch
split-mmap.patch
only-allow-nonlinear-vmas-for-ram-backed-filesystems.patch
percpu_counters-use-cpu-notifiers.patch
percpu_counters-use-for_each_online_cpu.patch
intel-iommu-dmar-detection-and-parsing-logic.patch
intel-iommu-pci-generic-helper-function.patch
intel-iommu-pci-generic-helper-function-fix.patch
intel-iommu-clflush_cache_range-now-takes-size-param.patch
intel-iommu-iova-allocation-and-management-routines.patch
intel-iommu-iova-allocation-and-management-routines-fix.patch
intel-iommu-intel-iommu-driver.patch
intel-iommu-intel-iommu-driver-fix.patch
intel-iommu-avoid-memory-allocation-failures-in-dma-map-api-calls.patch
intel-iommu-intel-iommu-cmdline-option-forcedac.patch
intel-iommu-dmar-fault-handling-support.patch
intel-iommu-iommu-gfx-workaround.patch
intel-iommu-iommu-floppy-workaround.patch
intel-iommu-iommu-floppy-workaround-fix.patch
arch-personality-independent-stack-top.patch
audit-rework-execve-audit.patch
mm-variable-length-argument-support.patch
mm-variable-length-argument-support-fix.patch
fix-raw_spinlock_t-vs-lockdep.patch
lockdep-sanitise-config_prove_locking.patch
lockdep-reduce-the-ifdeffery.patch
lockstat-core-infrastructure.patch
lockstat-core-infrastructure-fix.patch
lockstat-core-infrastructure-fix-fix.patch
lockstat-core-infrastructure-fix-fix-fix.patch
lockstat-human-readability-tweaks.patch
lockstat-human-readability-tweaks-fix.patch
lockstat-hook-into-spinlock_t-rwlock_t-rwsem-and-mutex.patch
lockdep-various-fixes.patch
lockdep-various-fixes-checkpatch.patch
lockdep-fixup-sk_callback_lock-annotation.patch
lockstat-measure-lock-bouncing.patch
lockstat-measure-lock-bouncing-checkpatch.patch
lockstat-better-class-name-representation.patch
16 years, 10 months
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL in RHEL4
by Matthew Booth
I've got my own process listening directly for audit events on the
netlink interface. I'd like to drop its privileges for normal operation.
However, under certain circumstances it has to enable or disable
auditing, which requires CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. I can't work out how to
create a cap_t with this capability. I've tried:
cap_from_text("CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL=pe") and
cap_from_text("cap_audit_control=pe") and
cap_from_text("30=pe")
However in all cases I get EINVAL. What am I doing wrong?
Thanks,
Matt
--
Matthew Booth, RHCA, RHCSS
Red Hat, Global Professional Services
M: +44 (0)7977 267231
GPG ID: D33C3490
GPG FPR: 3733 612D 2D05 5458 8A8A 1600 3441 EA19 D33C 3490
16 years, 10 months
[PATCH 1/1] audit: fix oops removing watch if audit disabled
by Tony Jones
Removing a watched file will oops if audit is disabled (auditctl -e 0).
To reproduce:
- auditctl -e 1
- touch /tmp/foo
- auditctl -w /tmp/foo
- auditctl -e 0
- rm /tmp/foo (or mv)
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj(a)suse.de>
---
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 74cc0fc..ce61f42 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct au
/* If the update involves invalidating rules, do the inode-based
* filtering now, so we don't omit records. */
- if (invalidating &&
+ if (invalidating && current->audit_context &&
audit_filter_inodes(current, current->audit_context) == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
audit_set_auditable(current->audit_context);
16 years, 11 months
Crash on Audit Failure
by Paul Whitney
Can someone please tell me if the audit flag option "-f" is set to 2 if the
system will shutdown, freeze or provide some warning that auditing has
stopped?
I am trying to get RHEL 4 U4 certified and am having to prove that the
system will "crash" once audit partition is full and auditing stops.
Thanks,
Paul Whitney
Information System Solutions
Paul.whitney(a)mac.com
16 years, 11 months
