12:17 p.m.
When there are no rules present, the event SOCKADDR record is not
generated due to audit_dummy_context() generated at syscall entry from
audit_n_rules. Store this information if there is a context present to
store it so that mandatory events are more complete (startup, LSMs...).
Please see the upstream issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/122
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
Passes audit-testsuite.
include/linux/audit.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 03c4035a532b..07fecd99741a 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static inline int audit_socketcall_compat(int nargs, u32 *args)
static inline int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr)
{
- if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
+ if (audit_context())
return __audit_sockaddr(len, addr);
return 0;
}
--
1.8.3.1
5:49 p.m.
On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:18 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
When there are no rules present, the event SOCKADDR record is not
generated due to audit_dummy_context() generated at syscall entry from
audit_n_rules. Store this information if there is a context present to
store it so that mandatory events are more complete (startup, LSMs...).
Please see the upstream issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/122
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
Passes audit-testsuite.
include/linux/audit.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Do we have any certification requirements driving this change? I ask
because if we make this change, why not do the same for PATH records?
The problem of course is that doing this for both is going to be
costly, the PATH records in particular seem like they would raise a
performance regression.
I agree it would be nice to have this information, but I fear that
gating this on audit_dummy_context() is the right thing to do unless
there is a strong requirement that we always record this information.
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 03c4035a532b..07fecd99741a 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static inline int audit_socketcall_compat(int nargs, u32 *args)
static inline int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr)
{
- if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
+ if (audit_context())
return __audit_sockaddr(len, addr);
return 0;
}
--
1.8.3.1
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
12:40 p.m.
On 2020-07-08 18:49, Paul Moore wrote:
On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:18 PM Richard Guy Briggs
<rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> When there are no rules present, the event SOCKADDR record is not
> generated due to audit_dummy_context() generated at syscall entry from
> audit_n_rules. Store this information if there is a context present to
> store it so that mandatory events are more complete (startup, LSMs...).
>
> Please see the upstream issue
> https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/122
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> ---
> Passes audit-testsuite.
>
> include/linux/audit.h | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Do we have any certification requirements driving this change? I ask
because if we make this change, why not do the same for PATH records?
I filed the issue because I noticed the SOCKADDR record missing from
configuration events required for certification.
The problem of course is that doing this for both is going to be
costly, the PATH records in particular seem like they would raise a
performance regression.
I had a minor concern about performance for SOCKADDR. I filed SOCKADDR
because I noticed it missing, but intended to file others as noticed.
I agree the PATH records would have a larger performance concern, but if
they are required to support event records that are required for
certification then either we store them when the context is present or
generate them retroactively once a required event record is generated.
In the case of SOCKADDR it may be possible to store that information
once the required record has been generated rather than whenever there
is a valid audit context, but it is currently collected earlier than
config records are emitted.
I agree it would be nice to have this information, but I fear that
gating this on audit_dummy_context() is the right thing to do unless
there is a strong requirement that we always record this information.
That would have been great feedback when the issue was filed.
However, there may be a middle ground as descirbed above.
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index 03c4035a532b..07fecd99741a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static inline int audit_socketcall_compat(int nargs, u32 *args)
>
> static inline int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr)
> {
> - if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
> + if (audit_context())
> return __audit_sockaddr(len, addr);
> return 0;
> }
paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
12:55 p.m.
On 7/13/2020 10:40 AM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
On 2020-07-08 18:49, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:18 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>> When there are no rules present, the event SOCKADDR record is not
>> generated due to audit_dummy_context() generated at syscall entry from
>> audit_n_rules. Store this information if there is a context present to
>> store it so that mandatory events are more complete (startup, LSMs...).
I don't know for sure, but this looks a lot like the issues
I have had to address for LSM stacking in
[PATCH v18 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
I don't know if the approach I took will help here, or be
acceptable at all for that matter. But it might be worth taking
a look.
>>
>> Please see the upstream issue
>> https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/122
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
>> ---
>> Passes audit-testsuite.
>>
>> include/linux/audit.h | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> Do we have any certification requirements driving this change? I ask
> because if we make this change, why not do the same for PATH records?
I filed the issue because I noticed the SOCKADDR record missing from
configuration events required for certification.
> The problem of course is that doing this for both is going to be
> costly, the PATH records in particular seem like they would raise a
> performance regression.
I had a minor concern about performance for SOCKADDR. I filed SOCKADDR
because I noticed it missing, but intended to file others as noticed.
I agree the PATH records would have a larger performance concern, but if
they are required to support event records that are required for
certification then either we store them when the context is present or
generate them retroactively once a required event record is generated.
In the case of SOCKADDR it may be possible to store that information
once the required record has been generated rather than whenever there
is a valid audit context, but it is currently collected earlier than
config records are emitted.
> I agree it would be nice to have this information, but I fear that
> gating this on audit_dummy_context() is the right thing to do unless
> there is a strong requirement that we always record this information.
That would have been great feedback when the issue was filed.
However, there may be a middle ground as descirbed above.
>> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
>> index 03c4035a532b..07fecd99741a 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
>> @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static inline int audit_socketcall_compat(int nargs, u32
*args)
>>
>> static inline int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr)
>> {
>> - if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
>> + if (audit_context())
>> return __audit_sockaddr(len, addr);
>> return 0;
>> }
> paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit(a)redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
3:02 p.m.
On 2020-07-13 10:55, Casey Schaufler wrote:
On 7/13/2020 10:40 AM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2020-07-08 18:49, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:18 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>> When there are no rules present, the event SOCKADDR record is not
>>> generated due to audit_dummy_context() generated at syscall entry from
>>> audit_n_rules. Store this information if there is a context present to
>>> store it so that mandatory events are more complete (startup, LSMs...).
I don't know for sure, but this looks a lot like the issues
I have had to address for LSM stacking in
[PATCH v18 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
I don't know if the approach I took will help here, or be
acceptable at all for that matter. But it might be worth taking
a look.
The first thing I notice is audit_stamp_context() looks pretty similar
to audit_alloc_local() in
[PATCH ghak90 V9 07/13] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
which creates a local context for limited use by the primary record and
local auxiliary records (contid) and is immediately tossed after those
records. One use case is network namespace events that are not (yet)
tied to any user context ("[PATCH ghak90 V9 10/13] audit: add support
for containerid to network namespaces"). The other is for user records
that don't need to be tied to the userspace caller ("[PATCH ghak90 V9
08/13] audit: add containerid support for user records").
How does this tie in with this situation? I would ideally like to
retroactively capture the sockaddr information in the audit context
struct (to avoid the overhead of always capturing sockaddr) to trigger a
syscall record on exit along with a sockaddr record once a manadatory
record has been triggered (such as audit or netfilter config, LSM event,
etc...), depending only on audit_enabled. There could be other
substructures of audit context that would need filling out after it is
determined that an audit event has happenned and information needs to be
collected to support its reporting.
>>> Please see the upstream issue
>>> https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/122
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
>>> ---
>>> Passes audit-testsuite.
>>>
>>> include/linux/audit.h | 2 +-
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> Do we have any certification requirements driving this change? I ask
>> because if we make this change, why not do the same for PATH records?
> I filed the issue because I noticed the SOCKADDR record missing from
> configuration events required for certification.
>
>> The problem of course is that doing this for both is going to be
>> costly, the PATH records in particular seem like they would raise a
>> performance regression.
> I had a minor concern about performance for SOCKADDR. I filed SOCKADDR
> because I noticed it missing, but intended to file others as noticed.
>
> I agree the PATH records would have a larger performance concern, but if
> they are required to support event records that are required for
> certification then either we store them when the context is present or
> generate them retroactively once a required event record is generated.
>
> In the case of SOCKADDR it may be possible to store that information
> once the required record has been generated rather than whenever there
> is a valid audit context, but it is currently collected earlier than
> config records are emitted.
>
>> I agree it would be nice to have this information, but I fear that
>> gating this on audit_dummy_context() is the right thing to do unless
>> there is a strong requirement that we always record this information.
> That would have been great feedback when the issue was filed.
> However, there may be a middle ground as descirbed above.
>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
>>> index 03c4035a532b..07fecd99741a 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
>>> @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static inline int audit_socketcall_compat(int nargs, u32
*args)
>>>
>>> static inline int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr)
>>> {
>>> - if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
>>> + if (audit_context())
>>> return __audit_sockaddr(len, addr);
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>> paul moore
> - RGB
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
6:08 p.m.
On 7/13/2020 1:02 PM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
On 2020-07-13 10:55, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 7/13/2020 10:40 AM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>> On 2020-07-08 18:49, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:18 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
>>>> When there are no rules present, the event SOCKADDR record is not
>>>> generated due to audit_dummy_context() generated at syscall entry from
>>>> audit_n_rules. Store this information if there is a context present to
>>>> store it so that mandatory events are more complete (startup, LSMs...).
> I don't know for sure, but this looks a lot like the issues
> I have had to address for LSM stacking in
>
> [PATCH v18 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
>
> I don't know if the approach I took will help here, or be
> acceptable at all for that matter. But it might be worth taking
> a look.
The first thing I notice is audit_stamp_context() looks pretty similar
to audit_alloc_local() in
Sure does, doesn't it.
[PATCH ghak90 V9 07/13] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary
records
which creates a local context for limited use by the primary record and
local auxiliary records (contid) and is immediately tossed after those
records. One use case is network namespace events that are not (yet)
tied to any user context ("[PATCH ghak90 V9 10/13] audit: add support
for containerid to network namespaces"). The other is for user records
that don't need to be tied to the userspace caller ("[PATCH ghak90 V9
08/13] audit: add containerid support for user records").
How does this tie in with this situation?
In the case where subject LSM context information is being provided
and there is more than one LSM active that uses subject contexts
(e.g. AppArmor and SELinux, or AppArmor and Smack) the audit event can't
use the old "subj=xyz" field. Instead, the field will be "subj=?" and
a new record added to the event that contains all the subject contexts.
As is true in the cases you have here, not all the events involved are
syscall events.
I would ideally like to
retroactively capture the sockaddr information in the audit context
struct (to avoid the overhead of always capturing sockaddr) to trigger a
syscall record on exit along with a sockaddr record once a manadatory
record has been triggered (such as audit or netfilter config, LSM event,
etc...), depending only on audit_enabled. There could be other
substructures of audit context that would need filling out after it is
determined that an audit event has happenned and information needs to be
collected to support its reporting.
I'm not sure that I completely understand all that you're looking at,
but it does appear that I could switch to using your audit_alloc_local().
Do you think that has achieved its final form?
7:11 p.m.
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 7:09 PM Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
... but it does appear that I could switch to using your
audit_alloc_local().
In my opinion, linking the audit container ID and LSM stacking
patchsets would seem like a very big mistake, especially since the
consolidation you are describing could be done after the fact without
any disruption to the kernel/userspace interface. I would strongly
encourage both patchsets to remain self-contained if at all possible
so as to not jeopardize each other.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
7:28 p.m.
On 7/13/2020 5:11 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 7:09 PM Casey Schaufler
<casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> ... but it does appear that I could switch to using your audit_alloc_local().
In my opinion, linking the audit container ID and LSM stacking
patchsets would seem like a very big mistake, especially since the
consolidation you are describing could be done after the fact without
any disruption to the kernel/userspace interface. I would strongly
encourage both patchsets to remain self-contained if at all possible
so as to not jeopardize each other.
Whatever helps the review/ack process best works for me. I will leave
audit_stamp_context() as is unless there is other feedback that leads
it to be changed.
7:47 p.m.
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 8:28 PM Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
On 7/13/2020 5:11 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 7:09 PM Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
wrote:
>> ... but it does appear that I could switch to using your audit_alloc_local().
> In my opinion, linking the audit container ID and LSM stacking
> patchsets would seem like a very big mistake, especially since the
> consolidation you are describing could be done after the fact without
> any disruption to the kernel/userspace interface. I would strongly
> encourage both patchsets to remain self-contained if at all possible
> so as to not jeopardize each other.
Whatever helps the review/ack process best works for me. I will leave
audit_stamp_context() as is unless there is other feedback that leads
it to be changed.
Thanks, I think that is the best path forward for both patchsets.
If/when both patchsets land in the kernel I'm happy to revisit this.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
8:08 p.m.
On 2020-07-13 20:11, Paul Moore wrote:
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 7:09 PM Casey Schaufler
<casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> ... but it does appear that I could switch to using your audit_alloc_local().
In my opinion, linking the audit container ID and LSM stacking
patchsets would seem like a very big mistake, especially since the
consolidation you are describing could be done after the fact without
any disruption to the kernel/userspace interface. I would strongly
encourage both patchsets to remain self-contained if at all possible
so as to not jeopardize each other.
I see no need to link them. The audit_alloc_local() patch could stand
on its own to be used by either patchset and doesn't need to be included
in the contid patchset. There is no mention of contid in it. Patches 8
and 11 depend on it so as long as it is already upstream that's fine.
Of course, we could send a fixup patch after both patchsets are accepted
upstream to merge the functionality of the two.
paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
8:19 p.m.
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 9:08 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
On 2020-07-13 20:11, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 7:09 PM Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
wrote:
> > ... but it does appear that I could switch to using your audit_alloc_local().
>
> In my opinion, linking the audit container ID and LSM stacking
> patchsets would seem like a very big mistake, especially since the
> consolidation you are describing could be done after the fact without
> any disruption to the kernel/userspace interface. I would strongly
> encourage both patchsets to remain self-contained if at all possible
> so as to not jeopardize each other.
I see no need to link them. The audit_alloc_local() patch could stand
on its own to be used by either patchset and doesn't need to be included
in the contid patchset. There is no mention of contid in it. Patches 8
and 11 depend on it so as long as it is already upstream that's fine.
Let me be clear, please don't do this. I really dislike that we need
audit_alloc_local(), but we do because computers are awful things and
audit is perhaps even more awful.
Someday I'll make my peace with audit_alloc_local(), and/or it will
become something more useful through consolidation, but now is not the
time to push on this issue considering where the audit container ID
patchset is at.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
9:37 p.m.
On 7/13/2020 6:19 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 9:08 PM Richard Guy Briggs
<rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> On 2020-07-13 20:11, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 7:09 PM Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
wrote:
>>> ... but it does appear that I could switch to using your
audit_alloc_local().
>> In my opinion, linking the audit container ID and LSM stacking
>> patchsets would seem like a very big mistake, especially since the
>> consolidation you are describing could be done after the fact without
>> any disruption to the kernel/userspace interface. I would strongly
>> encourage both patchsets to remain self-contained if at all possible
>> so as to not jeopardize each other.
> I see no need to link them. The audit_alloc_local() patch could stand
> on its own to be used by either patchset and doesn't need to be included
> in the contid patchset. There is no mention of contid in it. Patches 8
> and 11 depend on it so as long as it is already upstream that's fine.
Let me be clear, please don't do this. I really dislike that we need
audit_alloc_local(), but we do because computers are awful things and
audit is perhaps even more awful.
Computers *are* awful, and getting awfuller. Audit is awful beyond
comprehension because the people who wrote the audit section of the
Orange Book didn't talk to the people who wrote the access control section,
and neither talked with anyone who hadn't worked on MULTICS. I wrote three
UNIX audit systems, helped out on several others and derailed the POSIX
effort completely. I have tried to avoid understanding Linux audit so far,
but have finally gotten to the point where I have to know something about
it. It's far from the worst I've seen. There are aspects I find peculiar,
but I have my (rather firm and old fashioned) notions.
Someday I'll make my peace with audit_alloc_local(), and/or it
will
become something more useful through consolidation, but now is not the
time to push on this issue considering where the audit container ID
patchset is at.
And now I'm coming in with a similar notion for stacking. Thanks for
your forbearance. We know there's lots on your plate, and that we're
coming at you from all directions.
5:30 p.m.
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 1:40 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
On 2020-07-08 18:49, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:18 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> > When there are no rules present, the event SOCKADDR record is not
> > generated due to audit_dummy_context() generated at syscall entry from
> > audit_n_rules. Store this information if there is a context present to
> > store it so that mandatory events are more complete (startup, LSMs...).
> >
> > Please see the upstream issue
> > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/122
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> > ---
> > Passes audit-testsuite.
> >
> > include/linux/audit.h | 2 +-
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> Do we have any certification requirements driving this change? I ask
> because if we make this change, why not do the same for PATH records?
I filed the issue because I noticed the SOCKADDR record missing from
configuration events required for certification.
I guess my original question wasn't very clear, let me try again ...
Do we have any certification requirements for this that require the
SOCKADDR record without an explicit audit configuration that would
capture/generate the sockaddr information? It's been a while since
I've been involved in a certification effort, but if I remember
correctly those efforts required a specific audit configuration to be
compliant (file watches, syscall rules, etc.).
If there is a certification requirement for this, it might be a good
idea to include it in the commit description. I don't believe we've
been very good about doing that in the past, but it seems like
something that would be worthwhile.
> The problem of course is that doing this for both is going to
be
> costly, the PATH records in particular seem like they would raise a
> performance regression.
I had a minor concern about performance for SOCKADDR. I filed SOCKADDR
because I noticed it missing, but intended to file others as noticed.
I agree the PATH records would have a larger performance concern, but if
they are required to support event records that are required for
certification then either we store them when the context is present or
generate them retroactively once a required event record is generated.
In the case of SOCKADDR it may be possible to store that information
once the required record has been generated rather than whenever there
is a valid audit context, but it is currently collected earlier than
config records are emitted.
Before we go too far on this, let's track down the answer to the
question above - is this more an issue of having the proper,
certification-compliant audit configuration loaded into the kernel?
> I agree it would be nice to have this information, but I fear
that
> gating this on audit_dummy_context() is the right thing to do unless
> there is a strong requirement that we always record this information.
That would have been great feedback when the issue was filed.
However, there may be a middle ground as descirbed above.
I've mentioned before that while the GH issues are nice for tracking
issues, technical discussions should happen on list ... like they are
now.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
5:37 p.m.
On Monday, July 13, 2020 6:30:51 PM EDT Paul Moore wrote:
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 1:40 PM Richard Guy Briggs
<rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> On 2020-07-08 18:49, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:18 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
> > > When there are no rules present, the event SOCKADDR
record is not
> > > generated due to audit_dummy_context() generated at syscall entry
> > > from
> > > audit_n_rules. Store this information if there is a context present
> > > to
> > > store it so that mandatory events are more complete (startup,
> > > LSMs...).
> > >
> > > Please see the upstream issue
> > > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/122
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> > > ---
> > > Passes audit-testsuite.
> > >
> > > include/linux/audit.h | 2 +-
> > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > Do we have any certification requirements driving this change? I ask
> > because if we make this change, why not do the same for PATH records?
>
> I filed the issue because I noticed the SOCKADDR record missing from
> configuration events required for certification.
I guess my original question wasn't very clear, let me try again ...
Do we have any certification requirements for this that require the
SOCKADDR record without an explicit audit configuration that would
capture/generate the sockaddr information?
No. There is no need to include either the SYSCALL or SOCKADDR record when
logging an audit config change event because it will always be sendto and
netlink. I suppose this is being done for consistency and not due to
certification. We just need the usual minimal information logged and nothing
else.
-Steve
It's been a while since
I've been involved in a certification effort, but if I remember
correctly those efforts required a specific audit configuration to be
compliant (file watches, syscall rules, etc.).
If there is a certification requirement for this, it might be a good
idea to include it in the commit description. I don't believe we've
been very good about doing that in the past, but it seems like
something that would be worthwhile.
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Casey Schaufler -
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Steve Grubb