[PATCH] audit: mark expected switch fall-through
by Gustavo A. R. Silva
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch fixes the following warning:
kernel/auditfilter.c: In function ‘audit_krule_to_data’:
kernel/auditfilter.c:668:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
^
kernel/auditfilter.c:674:3: note: here
default:
^~~~~~~
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
Notice that, in this particular case, the code comment is modified
in accordance with what GCC is expecting to find.
This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enable
-Wimplicit-fallthrough.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo(a)embeddedor.com>
---
kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index add360b46b38..63f8b3f26fab 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
break;
}
- /* fallthrough if set */
+ /* fall through - if set */
default:
data->values[i] = f->val;
}
--
2.20.1
4 years, 5 months
[PATCH ghak90 V7 00/21] audit: implement container identifier
by Richard Guy Briggs
Implement kernel audit container identifier.
This patchset is a seventh based on the proposal document (V3)
posted:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-January/msg00014.html
The first patch was the last patch from ghak81 that was absorbed into
this patchset since its primary justification is the rest of this
patchset.
The second patch implements the proc fs write to set the audit container
identifier of a process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP record to
announce the registration of that audit container identifier on that
process. This patch requires userspace support for record acceptance
and proper type display.
The third implements reading the audit container identifier from the
proc filesystem for debugging. This patch wasn't planned for upstream
inclusion but is starting to become more likely.
The fourth converts over from a simple u64 to a list member that includes
owner information to check for descendancy, allow process injection into
a container and prevent id reuse by other orchestrators.
The fifth logs the drop of an audit container identifier once all tasks
using that audit container identifier have exited.
The 6th limits the total number of containers on a system.
The 7th implements the auxiliary record AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID if an audit
container identifier is associated with an event. This patch requires
userspace support for proper type display.
The 8th adds audit daemon signalling provenance through audit_sig_info2.
The 9th creates a local audit context to be able to bind a standalone
record with a locally created auxiliary record.
The 10th patch adds audit container identifier records to the user
standalone records.
The 11th adds audit container identifier filtering to the exit,
exclude and user lists. This patch adds the AUDIT_CONTID field and
requires auditctl userspace support for the --contid option.
The 12th adds network namespace audit container identifier labelling
based on member tasks' audit container identifier labels.
The 13th adds audit container identifier support to standalone netfilter
records that don't have a task context and lists each container to which
that net namespace belongs.
The 14th checks that the target is a descendant for nesting and the 15th
refactors to avoid a duplicate of the copied function.
The 16th and 17th add audit netlink interfaces for the /proc
audit_containerid, loginuid and sessionid.
The 18th adds tracking and reporting for container nesting. This patch
could be split up and the chunks applied to earlier patches if this
nesting tracking and reporting approach is acceptable. Arguably this is
the only way to be able to report activity in a nested container that
also affects its parent containers.
The 19th limits the container nesting depth.
The 20th adds a mechanism to allow a process to be designated as a
container orchestrator/engine in non-init user namespaces and the 21st
adds a /proc interface for testing only.
Example: Set an audit container identifier of 123456 to the "sleep" task:
sleep 2&
child=$!
echo 123456 > /proc/$child/audit_containerid; echo $?
ausearch -ts recent -m container_op
echo child:$child contid:$( cat /proc/$child/audit_containerid)
This should produce a record such as:
type=CONTAINER_OP msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 contid=123456 old-contid=18446744073709551615 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yes
Example: Set a filter on an audit container identifier 123459 on /tmp/tmpcontainerid:
contid=123459
key=tmpcontainerid
auditctl -a exit,always -F dir=/tmp -F perm=wa -F contid=$contid -F key=$key
perl -e "sleep 1; open(my \$tmpfile, '>', \"/tmp/$key\"); close(\$tmpfile);" &
child=$!
echo $contid > /proc/$child/audit_containerid
sleep 2
ausearch -i -ts recent -k $key
auditctl -d exit,always -F dir=/tmp -F perm=wa -F contid=$contid -F key=$key
rm -f /tmp/$key
This should produce an event such as:
type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : contid=123459
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : proctitle=perl -e sleep 1; open(my $tmpfile, '>', "/tmp/tmpcontainerid"); close($tmpfile);
type=PATH msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : item=1 name=/tmp/tmpcontainerid inode=25656 dev=00:26 mode=file,644 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : item=0 name=/tmp/ inode=8985 dev=00:26 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=CWD msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : cwd=/root
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffffffffffff9c a1=0x5621f2b81900 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=2 ppid=628 pid=2232 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=tmpcontainerid
Example: Test multiple containers on one netns:
sleep 5 &
child1=$!
containerid1=123451
echo $containerid1 > /proc/$child1/audit_containerid
sleep 5 &
child2=$!
containerid2=123452
echo $containerid2 > /proc/$child2/audit_containerid
iptables -I INPUT -i lo -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j AUDIT --type accept
iptables -I INPUT -t mangle -i lo -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j MARK --set-mark 0x12345555
sleep 1;
bash -c "ping -q -c 1 127.0.0.1 >/dev/null 2>&1"
sleep 1;
ausearch -i -m NETFILTER_PKT -ts boot|grep mark=0x12345555
ausearch -i -m NETFILTER_PKT -ts boot|grep contid=|grep $containerid1|grep $containerid2
This should produce an event such as:
type=NETFILTER_PKT msg=audit(03/15/2019 14:16:13.369:244) : mark=0x12345555 saddr=127.0.0.1 daddr=127.0.0.1 proto=icmp
type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(03/15/2019 14:16:13.369:244) : contid=123452,123451
Includes the last patch of https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/81
Please see the github audit kernel issue for the main feature:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
and the kernel filter code:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/91
and the network support:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92
Please see the github audit userspace issue for supporting record types:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
and filter code:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/40
Please see the github audit testsuiite issue for the test case:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
Please see the github audit wiki for the feature overview:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
Changelog:
v7
- remove BUG() in audit_comparator64()
- rebase on v5.2-rc1 audit/next
- resolve merge conflict with ghak111 (signal_info regardless syscall)
- resolve merge conflict with ghak73 (audit_field_valid)
- resolve merge conflict with ghak64 (saddr_fam filter)
- resolve merge conflict with ghak10 (ntp audit) change AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID from 1332 to 1334
- rebase on v5.3-rc1 audit/next
- track container owner
- only permit setting contid of descendants for nesting
- track drop of contid and permit reuse
- track and report container nesting
- permit filtering on any nested contid
- set/get contid and loginuid/sessionid via netlink
- implement capcontid to enable orchestrators in non-init user
namespaces
- limit number of containers
- limit depth of container nesting
v6
- change TMPBUFLEN from 11 to 21 to cover the decimal value of contid
u64 (nhorman)
- fix bug overwriting ctx in struct audit_sig_info, move cid above
ctx[0] (nhorman)
- fix bug skipping remaining fields and not advancing bufp when copying
out contid in audit_krule_to_data (omosnacec)
- add acks, tidy commit descriptions, other formatting fixes (checkpatch
wrong on audit_log_lost)
- cast ull for u64 prints
- target_cid tracking was moved from the ptrace/signal patch to
container_op
- target ptrace and signal records were moved from the ptrace/signal
patch to container_id
- auditd signaller tracking was moved to a new AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO2
request and record
- ditch unnecessary list_empty() checks
- check for null net and aunet in audit_netns_contid_add()
- swap CONTAINER_OP contid/old-contid order to ease parsing
v5
- address loginuid and sessionid syscall scope in ghak104
- address audit_context in CONFIG_AUDIT vs CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL in ghak105
- remove tty patch, addressed in ghak106
- rebase on audit/next v5.0-rc1
w/ghak59/ghak104/ghak103/ghak100/ghak107/ghak105/ghak106/ghak105sup
- update CONTAINER_ID to CONTAINER_OP in patch description
- move audit_context in audit_task_info to CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
- move audit_alloc() and audit_free() out of CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL and into
CONFIG_AUDIT and create audit_{alloc,free}_syscall
- use plain kmem_cache_alloc() rather than kmem_cache_zalloc() in audit_alloc()
- fix audit_get_contid() declaration type error
- move audit_set_contid() from auditsc.c to audit.c
- audit_log_contid() returns void
- audit_log_contid() handed contid rather than tsk
- switch from AUDIT_CONTAINER to AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID for aux record
- move audit_log_contid(tsk/contid) & audit_contid_set(tsk)/audit_contid_valid(contid)
- switch from tsk to current
- audit_alloc_local() calls audit_log_lost() on failure to allocate a context
- add AUDIT_USER* non-syscall contid record
- cosmetic cleanup double parens, goto out on err
- ditch audit_get_ns_contid_list_lock(), fix aunet lock race
- switch from all-cpu read spinlock to rcu, keep spinlock for write
- update audit_alloc_local() to use ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64()
- add nft_log support
- add call from do_exit() in audit_free() to remove contid from netns
- relegate AUDIT_CONTAINER ref= field (was op=) to debug patch
v4
- preface set with ghak81:"collect audit task parameters"
- add shallyn and sgrubb acks
- rename feature bitmap macro
- rename cid_valid() to audit_contid_valid()
- rename AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID to AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP
- delete audit_get_contid_list() from headers
- move work into inner if, delete "found"
- change netns contid list function names
- move exports for audit_log_contid audit_alloc_local audit_free_context to non-syscall patch
- list contids CSV
- pass in gfp flags to audit_alloc_local() (fix audit_alloc_context callers)
- use "local" in lieu of abusing in_syscall for auditsc_get_stamp()
- read_lock(&tasklist_lock) around children and thread check
- task_lock(tsk) should be taken before first check of tsk->audit
- add spin lock to contid list in aunet
- restrict /proc read to CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL
- remove set again prohibition and inherited flag
- delete contidion spelling fix from patchset, send to netdev/linux-wireless
v3
- switched from containerid in task_struct to audit_task_info (depends on ghak81)
- drop INVALID_CID in favour of only AUDIT_CID_UNSET
- check for !audit_task_info, throw -ENOPROTOOPT on set
- changed -EPERM to -EEXIST for parent check
- return AUDIT_CID_UNSET if !audit_enabled
- squash child/thread check patch into AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID patch
- changed -EPERM to -EBUSY for child check
- separate child and thread checks, use -EALREADY for latter
- move addition of op= from ptrace/signal patch to AUDIT_CONTAINER patch
- fix && to || bashism in ptrace/signal patch
- uninline and export function for audit_free_context()
- drop CONFIG_CHANGE, FEATURE_CHANGE, ANOM_ABEND, ANOM_SECCOMP patches
- move audit_enabled check (xt_AUDIT)
- switched from containerid list in struct net to net_generic's struct audit_net
- move containerid list iteration into audit (xt_AUDIT)
- create function to move namespace switch into audit
- switched /proc/PID/ entry from containerid to audit_containerid
- call kzalloc with GFP_ATOMIC on in_atomic() in audit_alloc_context()
- call kzalloc with GFP_ATOMIC on in_atomic() in audit_log_container_info()
- use xt_net(par) instead of sock_net(skb->sk) to get net
- switched record and field names: initial CONTAINER_ID, aux CONTAINER, field CONTID
- allow to set own contid
- open code audit_set_containerid
- add contid inherited flag
- ccontainerid and pcontainerid eliminated due to inherited flag
- change name of container list funcitons
- rename containerid to contid
- convert initial container record to syscall aux
- fix spelling mistake of contidion in net/rfkill/core.c to avoid contid name collision
v2
- add check for children and threads
- add network namespace container identifier list
- add NETFILTER_PKT audit container identifier logging
- patch description and documentation clean-up and example
- reap unused ppid
Richard Guy Briggs (21):
audit: collect audit task parameters
audit: add container id
audit: read container ID of a process
audit: convert to contid list to check for orch/engine ownership
audit: log drop of contid on exit of last task
audit: contid limit of 32k imposed to avoid DoS
audit: log container info of syscalls
audit: add contid support for signalling the audit daemon
audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
audit: add containerid support for user records
audit: add containerid filtering
audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces
audit: NETFILTER_PKT: record each container ID associated with a netNS
audit: contid check descendancy and nesting
sched: pull task_is_descendant into kernel/sched/core.c
audit: add support for contid set/get by netlink
audit: add support for loginuid/sessionid set/get by netlink
audit: track container nesting
audit: check cont depth
audit: add capcontid to set contid outside init_user_ns
audit: add proc interface for capcontid
fs/proc/base.c | 112 ++++++-
include/linux/audit.h | 148 ++++++++-
include/linux/sched.h | 10 +-
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 16 +-
init/init_task.c | 3 +-
init/main.c | 2 +
kernel/audit.c | 728 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
kernel/audit.h | 38 +++
kernel/auditfilter.c | 64 ++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 91 ++++--
kernel/fork.c | 1 -
kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +
kernel/sched/core.c | 33 ++
net/netfilter/nft_log.c | 11 +-
net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c | 11 +-
security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 1 +
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 33 --
17 files changed, 1210 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
--
1.8.3.1
4 years, 10 months
Re: ntp audit spew.
by Paul Moore
On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:50 AM Dave Jones <davej(a)codemonkey.org.uk> wrote:
>
> I have some hosts that are constantly spewing audit messages like so:
>
> [46897.591182] audit: type=1333 audit(1569250288.663:220): op=offset old=2543677901372 new=2980866217213
> [46897.591184] audit: type=1333 audit(1569250288.663:221): op=freq old=-2443166611284 new=-2436281764244
> [48850.604005] audit: type=1333 audit(1569252241.675:222): op=offset old=1850302393317 new=3190241577926
> [48850.604008] audit: type=1333 audit(1569252241.675:223): op=freq old=-2436281764244 new=-2413071187316
> [49926.567270] audit: type=1333 audit(1569253317.638:224): op=offset old=2453141035832 new=2372389610455
> [49926.567273] audit: type=1333 audit(1569253317.638:225): op=freq old=-2413071187316 new=-2403561671476
>
> This gets emitted every time ntp makes an adjustment, which is apparently very frequent on some hosts.
>
>
> Audit isn't even enabled on these machines.
>
> # auditctl -l
> No rules
[NOTE: added linux-audit to the CC line]
There is an audit mailing list, please CC it when you have audit
concerns/questions/etc.
What happens when you run 'auditctl -a never,task'? That *should*
silence those messages as the audit_ntp_log() function has the
requisite audit_dummy_context() check. FWIW, this is the distro
default for many (most? all?) distros; for example, check
/etc/audit/audit.rules on a stock Fedora system. A more selective
configuration could simply exclude the TIME_ADJNTPVAL record (type
1333) from the records that the kernel emits.
We could also add a audit_enabled check at the top of
audit_ntp_log()/__audit_ntp_log(), but I imagine some of that depends
on the various security requirements (they can be bizzare and I can't
say I'm up to date on all those - Steve Grubb should be able to
comment on that).
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
4 years, 12 months
[PATCH] Fix 100% CPU usage (again) due to log rotate
by Steven Rostedt (VMware)
If the num_logs is set to 0 and keep_logs is set, we go back into a
loop of MAX_INT! in rotate_logs().
commit 9145e97c ("Do not rotate logs when num_logs < 2.") fixed the
issue with not going further if num_logs is less than 2, because if
num_logs is zero, we trigger this bug because of the loop:
for (i=num_logs - 1; i>1; i--) {
As i is an unsigned int, if num_logs is zero, we initialize i to
"0 - 1" or 4,294,967,295. Thus, runs this loop over 4 billion times!
But this caused a regressing if keep_logs is set, so this
num_logs < 2 was skipped if keep_logs is set, causing the huge loop
to run once again if num_logs is zero!
There's no reason i needs to be unsigned, if i is signed, then if we
pass in num_logs = 0, then i will start off as -1, and -1 > 1 will fail
the loop and fix the issue. I don't envision anyone wanting to
keep 2,147,483,648 log files around.
Fixes: a7f9f8b5 ("Fix auditd regression where keep_logs is limited by rotate_logs 2 file test")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
---
diff --git a/src/auditd-event.c b/src/auditd-event.c
index 1c93173..68eacd5 100644
--- a/src/auditd-event.c
+++ b/src/auditd-event.c
@@ -1012,8 +1012,8 @@ static void fix_disk_permissions(void)
static void rotate_logs(unsigned int num_logs, unsigned int keep_logs)
{
- int rc;
- unsigned int len, i;
+ int rc, i;
+ unsigned int len;
char *oldname, *newname;
/* Check that log rotation is enabled in the configuration file. There
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ static void rotate_logs(unsigned int num_logs, unsigned int keep_logs)
snprintf(oldname, len, "%s.1", config->log_file);
known_logs = 0;
- for (i=num_logs - 1; i>1; i--) {
+ for (i=(int)num_logs - 1; i>1; i--) {
snprintf(oldname, len, "%s.%u", config->log_file, i-1);
snprintf(newname, len, "%s.%u", config->log_file, i);
/* if the old file exists */
5 years
[PATCH] audit: remove redundant condition check in kauditd_thread()
by Yunfeng Ye
Warning is found by the code analysis tool:
"the condition 'if(ac && rc < 0)' is redundant: ac"
The @ac variable has been checked before. It can't be a null pointer
here, so remove the redundant condition check.
Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng(a)huawei.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index da8dc0db5bd3..193f3a1f4425 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
rc = kauditd_send_queue(sk, portid,
&audit_hold_queue, UNICAST_RETRIES,
NULL, kauditd_rehold_skb);
- if (ac && rc < 0) {
+ if (rc < 0) {
sk = NULL;
auditd_reset(ac);
goto main_queue;
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
rc = kauditd_send_queue(sk, portid,
&audit_retry_queue, UNICAST_RETRIES,
NULL, kauditd_hold_skb);
- if (ac && rc < 0) {
+ if (rc < 0) {
sk = NULL;
auditd_reset(ac);
goto main_queue;
--
2.7.4.3
5 years
[PATCH v10 21/25] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary
by Casey Schaufler
Add record entries to identify subject data for all of the
security modules when there is more than one.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
include/linux/audit.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++-
include/net/scm.h | 3 +-
kernel/audit.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++-
kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 +
kernel/auditfilter.c | 1 +
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++--
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 ++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 +
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 +
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 +
security/security.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
19 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 90bc4ce07cd2..cb44f59b9bbe 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3121,7 +3121,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 1e69d9fe16da..306b404d419c 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ extern void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation);
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern void audit_log_task_lsms(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4b685770c399..35b03b57bce2 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "display" slot */
+#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the default "display" slot */
/**
* lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
@@ -169,6 +171,8 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
}
+const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot);
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -473,7 +477,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int display);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1254,7 +1259,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- struct lsmcontext *cp)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp, int display)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 4a6ad8caf423..8b5a4737e1b8 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index e1dfd9c6df36..45ea36f1f1c5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old,
if (rc)
allow_changes = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", allow_changes);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
return rc;
}
@@ -1110,6 +1111,7 @@ static void audit_log_feature_change(int which, u32 old_feature, u32 new_feature
audit_log_format(ab, " feature=%s old=%u new=%u old_lock=%u new_lock=%u res=%d",
audit_feature_names[which], !!old_feature, !!new_feature,
!!old_lock, !!new_lock, res);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
@@ -1360,6 +1362,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
size--;
audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, data, size);
}
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
break;
@@ -1374,6 +1377,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
msg_type == AUDIT_ADD_RULE ?
"add_rule" : "remove_rule",
audit_enabled);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -1387,6 +1391,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab,
AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
audit_log_format(ab, " op=trim res=1");
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
break;
case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV: {
@@ -1422,6 +1427,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
audit_log_format(ab, " new=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, new);
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !err);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
kfree(old);
kfree(new);
@@ -1431,7 +1437,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
len = 0;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
- &context);
+ &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -1490,6 +1496,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
" old-log_passwd=%d new-log_passwd=%d res=%d",
old.enabled, s.enabled, old.log_passwd,
s.log_passwd, !err);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
break;
}
@@ -2068,6 +2075,33 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
}
+void audit_log_task_lsms(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ int i;
+ const char *lsm;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't do anything unless there is more than one LSM
+ * with a security context to report.
+ */
+ if (security_lsm_slot_name(1) == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ lsm = security_lsm_slot_name(i);
+ if (lsm == NULL)
+ break;
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, i))
+ continue;
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj_%s=%s", lsm, context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ }
+}
+
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
int error;
@@ -2078,7 +2112,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
@@ -2185,6 +2219,7 @@ void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation)
audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s", operation);
audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " res=0");
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
@@ -2235,6 +2270,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
audit_put_tty(tty);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
index 37ae95cfb7f4..3a00583fa7fa 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark, c
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, audit_mark->path);
audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", rule->listnr);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 8f244c98bb57..508d784413da 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1099,6 +1099,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int re
audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", action);
audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0478680cd0a8..46d7a58babd2 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1198,7 +1198,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1351,7 +1352,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
@@ -1460,6 +1461,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
@@ -2569,6 +2571,7 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
return;
audit_log_task(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
@@ -2595,6 +2598,7 @@ void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall,
in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 80ae0c5a1301..447fe60af0cd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 403307ff0fff..c870aebe99a3 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index fcb51ab2bb8b..60dd81eb6f89 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 58d5bd7a376e..ad4bb3f9c7dc 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
if (skb->secmark) {
/* Any LSM might be looking for the secmark */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 57ede7781c8f..cf34c163af20 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -450,7 +450,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -505,7 +506,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -565,7 +567,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -1136,7 +1139,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 2d1307f65250..193200955dbd 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index 8d1a898d0ba5..5a67b2e5d941 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -3996,6 +3996,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, bool task_valid)
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(task_valid, audit_buf);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(xp, audit_buf);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(audit_buf);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_policy_add);
@@ -4011,6 +4012,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(task_valid, audit_buf);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(xp, audit_buf);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(audit_buf);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_policy_delete);
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index 1bb971f46fc6..d6944123ca0e 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -2456,6 +2456,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, bool task_valid)
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(task_valid, audit_buf);
xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo(x, audit_buf);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(audit_buf);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_add);
@@ -2470,6 +2471,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, bool task_valid)
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(task_valid, audit_buf);
xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo(x, audit_buf);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(audit_buf);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_delete);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 94b2a4840d81..1e96afcb2d8d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
audit_log_format(ab, " hash=\"%s:%s\"", algo_name, hash);
audit_log_task_info(ab);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index 82c98f7d217e..aca1c6bdcccd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -57,5 +57,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
}
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result);
+ audit_log_task_lsms(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ebbe7fac48d8..4e878907f12b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -426,7 +426,31 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
* Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
-static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * security_lsm_slot_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
+ * @slot: index into the "display" slot list.
+ *
+ * Provide the name of the security module associated with
+ * a display slot.
+ *
+ * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
+ * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
+ */
+const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot)
+{
+ if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = 0;
+ else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
+}
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -2100,13 +2124,32 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int display)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int display = lsm_task_display(current);
memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+ /*
+ * display either is the slot number use for formatting
+ * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
+ */
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
+ display = lsm_task_display(current);
+ else if (display == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
+ display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ else if (display < 0) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true,
+ "LSM: security_secid_to_secctx unknown display\n");
+ display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ } else if (display >= lsm_slot) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true,
+ "LSM: security_secid_to_secctx invalid display\n");
+ display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ }
+
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
@@ -2117,7 +2160,7 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
&cp->context, &cp->len);
}
}
- return 0;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
--
2.20.1
5 years
[PATCH] kernel: convert switch/case fallthrough comments to fallthrough;
by Joe Perches
Use the new pseudo keyword "fallthrough;" and not the
various /* fallthrough */ style comments.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe(a)perches.com>
---
This is a single patch for the kernel/ source tree,
which would otherwise
be sent through as separate
patches to 19 maintainer sections.
compilation tested only.
Done by the script in this email:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/9fe980f7e28242c2835ffae34914c5f68e8268a7.cam...
kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 4 ++--
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++--
kernel/capability.c | 2 +-
kernel/compat.c | 6 +++---
kernel/debug/gdbstub.c | 6 +++---
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_keyboard.c | 4 ++--
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c | 6 +++---
kernel/events/core.c | 3 +--
kernel/futex.c | 4 ++--
kernel/gcov/gcc_3_4.c | 6 +++---
kernel/irq/handle.c | 3 +--
kernel/irq/manage.c | 5 ++---
kernel/kallsyms.c | 4 ++--
kernel/pid.c | 2 +-
kernel/power/hibernate.c | 2 +-
kernel/power/qos.c | 4 ++--
kernel/printk/printk.c | 2 +-
kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +-
kernel/sched/topology.c | 6 +++---
kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
kernel/sys.c | 3 +--
kernel/time/hrtimer.c | 2 +-
kernel/time/posix-timers.c | 4 ++--
kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c | 2 +-
kernel/time/timer.c | 2 +-
kernel/trace/blktrace.c | 2 +-
kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c | 4 ++--
28 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index b0126e9c0743..471cd680479d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
break;
}
- /* fall through - if set */
+ fallthrough; /* if set */
default:
data->values[i] = f->val;
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
index ddd8addcdb5c..955631f1b77d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ cgroup_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
case BPF_FUNC_trace_printk:
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return bpf_get_trace_printk_proto();
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
return NULL;
}
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static bool cg_sockopt_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
return prog->expected_attach_type ==
BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT;
case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optname):
- /* fallthrough */
+ fallthrough;
case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, level):
if (size != size_default)
return false;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index ffc3e53f5300..d2b6fd8545e2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
if (t == BPF_WRITE)
return false;
- /* fallthrough */
+ fallthrough;
/* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
@@ -4381,7 +4381,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src);
return -EACCES;
}
- /* fall-through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 1444f3954d75..7c59b096c98a 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy)
break;
case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
warn_deprecated_v2();
- /* fall through - v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2. */
+ fallthrough; /* v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2 */
case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3:
*tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3;
break;
diff --git a/kernel/compat.c b/kernel/compat.c
index a2bc1d6ceb57..d9c61f4317be 100644
--- a/kernel/compat.c
+++ b/kernel/compat.c
@@ -343,11 +343,11 @@ get_compat_sigset(sigset_t *set, const compat_sigset_t __user *compat)
return -EFAULT;
switch (_NSIG_WORDS) {
case 4: set->sig[3] = v.sig[6] | (((long)v.sig[7]) << 32 );
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 3: set->sig[2] = v.sig[4] | (((long)v.sig[5]) << 32 );
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 2: set->sig[1] = v.sig[2] | (((long)v.sig[3]) << 32 );
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 1: set->sig[0] = v.sig[0] | (((long)v.sig[1]) << 32 );
}
#else
diff --git a/kernel/debug/gdbstub.c b/kernel/debug/gdbstub.c
index 4b280fc7dd67..b9d8b7248964 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/gdbstub.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/gdbstub.c
@@ -1033,14 +1033,14 @@ int gdb_serial_stub(struct kgdb_state *ks)
return DBG_PASS_EVENT;
}
#endif
- /* Fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 'C': /* Exception passing */
tmp = gdb_cmd_exception_pass(ks);
if (tmp > 0)
goto default_handle;
if (tmp == 0)
break;
- /* Fall through - on tmp < 0 */
+ fallthrough; /* on tmp < 0 */
case 'c': /* Continue packet */
case 's': /* Single step packet */
if (kgdb_contthread && kgdb_contthread != current) {
@@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ int gdb_serial_stub(struct kgdb_state *ks)
break;
}
dbg_activate_sw_breakpoints();
- /* Fall through - to default processing */
+ fallthrough; /* to default processing */
default:
default_handle:
error = kgdb_arch_handle_exception(ks->ex_vector,
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_keyboard.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_keyboard.c
index 750497b0003a..f877a0a0d7cf 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_keyboard.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_keyboard.c
@@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ int kdb_get_kbd_char(void)
case KT_LATIN:
if (isprint(keychar))
break; /* printable characters */
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case KT_SPEC:
if (keychar == K_ENTER)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
return -1; /* ignore unprintables */
}
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c
index b8e6306e7e13..d636506f695a 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int kdb_getphysword(unsigned long *word, unsigned long addr, size_t size)
*word = w8;
break;
}
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
diag = KDB_BADWIDTH;
kdb_printf("kdb_getphysword: bad width %ld\n", (long) size);
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ int kdb_getword(unsigned long *word, unsigned long addr, size_t size)
*word = w8;
break;
}
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
diag = KDB_BADWIDTH;
kdb_printf("kdb_getword: bad width %ld\n", (long) size);
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int kdb_putword(unsigned long addr, unsigned long word, size_t size)
diag = kdb_putarea(addr, w8);
break;
}
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
diag = KDB_BADWIDTH;
kdb_printf("kdb_putword: bad width %ld\n", (long) size);
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 9ec0b0bfddbd..04e75b1144c5 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -9361,8 +9361,7 @@ perf_event_parse_addr_filter(struct perf_event *event, char *fstr,
case IF_SRC_KERNELADDR:
case IF_SRC_KERNEL:
kernel = 1;
- /* fall through */
-
+ fallthrough;
case IF_SRC_FILEADDR:
case IF_SRC_FILE:
if (state != IF_STATE_SOURCE)
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index bd18f60e4c6c..ab12b6229d2d 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -3639,12 +3639,12 @@ long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout,
switch (cmd) {
case FUTEX_WAIT:
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET:
return futex_wait(uaddr, flags, val, timeout, val3);
case FUTEX_WAKE:
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET:
return futex_wake(uaddr, flags, val, val3);
case FUTEX_REQUEUE:
diff --git a/kernel/gcov/gcc_3_4.c b/kernel/gcov/gcc_3_4.c
index 801ee4b0b969..32fc3278166f 100644
--- a/kernel/gcov/gcc_3_4.c
+++ b/kernel/gcov/gcc_3_4.c
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ int gcov_iter_next(struct gcov_iterator *iter)
case RECORD_COUNT:
/* Advance to next count */
iter->count++;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case RECORD_COUNT_LEN:
if (iter->count < get_func(iter)->n_ctrs[iter->type]) {
iter->record = 9;
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ int gcov_iter_next(struct gcov_iterator *iter)
get_type(iter)->offset += iter->count;
iter->count = 0;
iter->type++;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case RECORD_FUNCTION_CHECK:
if (iter->type < iter->num_types) {
iter->record = 7;
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ int gcov_iter_next(struct gcov_iterator *iter)
/* Advance to next function */
iter->type = 0;
iter->function++;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case RECORD_TIME_STAMP:
if (iter->function < iter->info->n_functions)
iter->record = 3;
diff --git a/kernel/irq/handle.c b/kernel/irq/handle.c
index a4ace611f47f..b38d2fd70fe1 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/handle.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/handle.c
@@ -165,8 +165,7 @@ irqreturn_t __handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc, unsigned int *flags
}
__irq_wake_thread(desc, action);
-
- /* Fall through - to add to randomness */
+ fallthrough; /* to add to randomness */
case IRQ_HANDLED:
*flags |= action->flags;
break;
diff --git a/kernel/irq/manage.c b/kernel/irq/manage.c
index 1753486b440c..baa86020f243 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/manage.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/manage.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ int irq_do_set_affinity(struct irq_data *data, const struct cpumask *mask,
case IRQ_SET_MASK_OK:
case IRQ_SET_MASK_OK_DONE:
cpumask_copy(desc->irq_common_data.affinity, mask);
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case IRQ_SET_MASK_OK_NOCOPY:
irq_validate_effective_affinity(data);
irq_set_thread_affinity(desc);
@@ -792,8 +792,7 @@ int __irq_set_trigger(struct irq_desc *desc, unsigned long flags)
case IRQ_SET_MASK_OK_DONE:
irqd_clear(&desc->irq_data, IRQD_TRIGGER_MASK);
irqd_set(&desc->irq_data, flags);
- /* fall through */
-
+ fallthrough;
case IRQ_SET_MASK_OK_NOCOPY:
flags = irqd_get_trigger_type(&desc->irq_data);
irq_settings_set_trigger_mask(desc, flags);
diff --git a/kernel/kallsyms.c b/kernel/kallsyms.c
index 136ce049c4ad..05ce8a4d4729 100644
--- a/kernel/kallsyms.c
+++ b/kernel/kallsyms.c
@@ -651,11 +651,11 @@ int kallsyms_show_value(void)
case 0:
if (kallsyms_for_perf())
return 1;
- /* fallthrough */
+ fallthrough;
case 1:
if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG))
return 1;
- /* fallthrough */
+ fallthrough;
default:
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index 0a9f2e437217..b2a005a6dea1 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void free_pid(struct pid *pid)
/* Handle a fork failure of the first process */
WARN_ON(ns->child_reaper);
ns->pid_allocated = 0;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 0:
schedule_work(&ns->proc_work);
break;
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index 3c0a5a8170b0..d091dcd57557 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ static void power_down(void)
break;
case HIBERNATION_PLATFORM:
hibernation_platform_enter();
- /* Fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case HIBERNATION_SHUTDOWN:
if (pm_power_off)
kernel_power_off();
diff --git a/kernel/power/qos.c b/kernel/power/qos.c
index 9568a2fe7c11..6bf5295b2ade 100644
--- a/kernel/power/qos.c
+++ b/kernel/power/qos.c
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ int pm_qos_update_target(struct pm_qos_constraints *c, struct plist_node *node,
* changed
*/
plist_del(node, &c->list);
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case PM_QOS_ADD_REQ:
plist_node_init(node, new_value);
plist_add(node, &c->list);
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ bool pm_qos_update_flags(struct pm_qos_flags *pqf,
break;
case PM_QOS_UPDATE_REQ:
pm_qos_flags_remove_req(pqf, req);
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case PM_QOS_ADD_REQ:
req->flags = val;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&req->node);
diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c
index ca65327a6de8..6b3d7c68e6fe 100644
--- a/kernel/printk/printk.c
+++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c
@@ -1531,7 +1531,7 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, int source)
/* Read/clear last kernel messages */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR:
clear = true;
- /* FALL THRU */
+ fallthrough;
/* Read last kernel messages */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:
if (!buf || len < 0)
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index dd05a378631a..050b728728f4 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -2068,7 +2068,7 @@ static int select_fallback_rq(int cpu, struct task_struct *p)
state = possible;
break;
}
- /* Fall-through */
+ fallthrough;
case possible:
do_set_cpus_allowed(p, cpu_possible_mask);
state = fail;
diff --git a/kernel/sched/topology.c b/kernel/sched/topology.c
index b5667a273bf6..7d6b84e0caca 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/topology.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/topology.c
@@ -1224,13 +1224,13 @@ static void __free_domain_allocs(struct s_data *d, enum s_alloc what,
case sa_rootdomain:
if (!atomic_read(&d->rd->refcount))
free_rootdomain(&d->rd->rcu);
- /* Fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case sa_sd:
free_percpu(d->sd);
- /* Fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case sa_sd_storage:
__sdt_free(cpu_map);
- /* Fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case sa_none:
break;
}
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index c4da1ef56fdf..73bdcc1f2561 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
*/
if (!sid || sid == task_session(current))
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
return -EPERM;
}
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index a611d1d58c7d..bad4f30e7f37 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1737,8 +1737,7 @@ void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r)
if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
break;
- /* fall through */
-
+ fallthrough;
case RUSAGE_SELF:
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime);
utime += tgutime;
diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
index 0d4dc241c0fb..8060a35682e1 100644
--- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static bool hrtimer_fixup_activate(void *addr, enum debug_obj_state state)
switch (state) {
case ODEBUG_STATE_ACTIVE:
WARN_ON(1);
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
return false;
}
diff --git a/kernel/time/posix-timers.c b/kernel/time/posix-timers.c
index 0ec5b7a1d769..6cc658391702 100644
--- a/kernel/time/posix-timers.c
+++ b/kernel/time/posix-timers.c
@@ -413,12 +413,12 @@ static struct pid *good_sigevent(sigevent_t * event)
rtn = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!rtn || !same_thread_group(rtn, current))
return NULL;
- /* FALLTHRU */
+ fallthrough;
case SIGEV_SIGNAL:
case SIGEV_THREAD:
if (event->sigev_signo <= 0 || event->sigev_signo > SIGRTMAX)
return NULL;
- /* FALLTHRU */
+ fallthrough;
case SIGEV_NONE:
return pid;
default:
diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c b/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
index e51778c312f1..36d7464c8962 100644
--- a/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
+++ b/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ void tick_broadcast_control(enum tick_broadcast_mode mode)
switch (mode) {
case TICK_BROADCAST_FORCE:
tick_broadcast_forced = 1;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case TICK_BROADCAST_ON:
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, tick_broadcast_on);
if (!cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(cpu, tick_broadcast_mask)) {
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index 4820823515e9..6512d721ef57 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static bool timer_fixup_activate(void *addr, enum debug_obj_state state)
case ODEBUG_STATE_ACTIVE:
WARN_ON(1);
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
return false;
}
diff --git a/kernel/trace/blktrace.c b/kernel/trace/blktrace.c
index 2d6e93ab0478..0a1753dc69d3 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/blktrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/blktrace.c
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ int blk_trace_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, unsigned cmd, char __user *arg)
#endif
case BLKTRACESTART:
start = 1;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case BLKTRACESTOP:
ret = __blk_trace_startstop(q, start);
break;
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
index c9a74f82b14a..78b0bfc4d72e 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ predicate_parse(const char *str, int nr_parens, int nr_preds,
ptr++;
break;
}
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_PREDS,
next - str);
@@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static int parse_pred(const char *str, void *data,
switch (op) {
case OP_NE:
pred->not = 1;
- /* Fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case OP_GLOB:
case OP_EQ:
break;
5 years
shadow: what uid to log?
by Christian Göttsche
Hi,
I am working on migrating src:shadow to today's SELinux api and
enabling audit logging for denials.
The question which uid to log with 'audit_log_user_avc_message' came up.
What is preferred for the applications like passwd, chfn, ... , which
might be setuid binaries (getuid, geteuid, 0)?
Kind regards,
Christian Göttsche
5 years
