[PATCH] audit: always enable syscall auditing when supported and audit is enabled
by Paul Moore
To the best of our knowledge, everyone who enables audit at compile
time also enables syscall auditing; this patch simplifies the Kconfig
menus by removing the option to disable syscall auditing when audit
is selected and the target arch supports it.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore(a)redhat.com>
---
init/Kconfig | 11 +++--------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index c24b6f7..d4663b1 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -299,20 +299,15 @@ config AUDIT
help
Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another
kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for
- logging of avc messages output). Does not do system-call
- auditing without CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL.
+ logging of avc messages output). System call auditing is included
+ on architectures which support it.
config HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
bool
config AUDITSYSCALL
- bool "Enable system-call auditing support"
+ def_bool y
depends on AUDIT && HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
- default y if SECURITY_SELINUX
- help
- Enable low-overhead system-call auditing infrastructure that
- can be used independently or with another kernel subsystem,
- such as SELinux.
config AUDIT_WATCH
def_bool y
5 years, 10 months
[PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V4 00/10] audit: implement container identifier
by Richard Guy Briggs
Implement kernel audit container identifier.
This patchset is a fourth based on the proposal document (V3)
posted:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-January/msg00014.html
The first patch is the last patch from ghak81 that is included here as a
convenience.
The second patch implements the proc fs write to set the audit container
identifier of a process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP record to announce the
registration of that audit container identifier on that process. This patch
requires userspace support for record acceptance and proper type
display.
The third implements the auxiliary record AUDIT_CONTAINER if an
audit container identifier is identifiable with an event. This patch
requires userspace support for proper type display.
The 4th adds signal and ptrace support.
The 5th creates a local audit context to be able to bind a standalone
record with a locally created auxiliary record.
The 6th patch adds audit container identifier records to the tty
standalone record.
The 7th adds audit container identifier filtering to the exit,
exclude and user lists. This patch adds the AUDIT_CONTID field and
requires auditctl userspace support for the --contid option.
The 8th adds network namespace audit container identifier labelling
based on member tasks' audit container identifier labels.
The 9th adds audit container identifier support to standalone netfilter
records that don't have a task context and lists each container to which
that net namespace belongs.
The 10th implements reading the audit container identifier from the proc
filesystem for debugging. This patch isn't planned for upstream
inclusion.
Example: Set an audit container identifier of 123456 to the "sleep" task:
sleep 2&
child=$!
echo 123456 > /proc/$child/audit_containerid; echo $?
ausearch -ts recent -m container
echo child:$child contid:$( cat /proc/$child/audit_containerid)
This should produce a record such as:
type=CONTAINER_OP msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yes
Example: Set a filter on an audit container identifier 123459 on /tmp/tmpcontainerid:
contid=123459
key=tmpcontainerid
auditctl -a exit,always -F dir=/tmp -F perm=wa -F contid=$contid -F key=$key
perl -e "sleep 1; open(my \$tmpfile, '>', \"/tmp/$key\"); close(\$tmpfile);" &
child=$!
echo $contid > /proc/$child/audit_containerid
sleep 2
ausearch -i -ts recent -k $key
auditctl -d exit,always -F dir=/tmp -F perm=wa -F contid=$contid -F key=$key
rm -f /tmp/$key
This should produce an event such as:
type=CONTAINER msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : op=task contid=123459
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : proctitle=perl -e sleep 1; open(my $tmpfile, '>', "/tmp/tmpcontainerid"); close($tmpfile);
type=PATH msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : item=1 name=/tmp/tmpcontainerid inode=25656 dev=00:26 mode=file,644 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : item=0 name=/tmp/ inode=8985 dev=00:26 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=CWD msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : cwd=/root
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffffffffffff9c a1=0x5621f2b81900 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=2 ppid=628 pid=2232 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=tmpcontainerid
Includes: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/81
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/40
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
Changelog:
v4
- preface set with ghak81:"collect audit task parameters"
- add shallyn and sgrubb acks
- rename feature bitmap macro
- rename cid_valid() to audit_contid_valid()
- rename AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID to AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP
- delete audit_get_contid_list() from headers
- move work into inner if, delete "found"
- change netns contid list function names
- move exports for audit_log_contid audit_alloc_local audit_free_context to non-syscall patch
- list contids CSV
- pass in gfp flags to audit_alloc_local() (fix audit_alloc_context callers)
- use "local" in lieu of abusing in_syscall for auditsc_get_stamp()
- read_lock(&tasklist_lock) around children and thread check
- task_lock(tsk) should be taken before first check of tsk->audit
- add spin lock to contid list in aunet
- restrict /proc read to CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL
- remove set again prohibition and inherited flag
- delete contidion spelling fix from patchset, send to netdev/linux-wireless
v3
- switched from containerid in task_struct to audit_task_info (depends on ghak81)
- drop INVALID_CID in favour of only AUDIT_CID_UNSET
- check for !audit_task_info, throw -ENOPROTOOPT on set
- changed -EPERM to -EEXIST for parent check
- return AUDIT_CID_UNSET if !audit_enabled
- squash child/thread check patch into AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID patch
- changed -EPERM to -EBUSY for child check
- separate child and thread checks, use -EALREADY for latter
- move addition of op= from ptrace/signal patch to AUDIT_CONTAINER patch
- fix && to || bashism in ptrace/signal patch
- uninline and export function for audit_free_context()
- drop CONFIG_CHANGE, FEATURE_CHANGE, ANOM_ABEND, ANOM_SECCOMP patches
- move audit_enabled check (xt_AUDIT)
- switched from containerid list in struct net to net_generic's struct audit_net
- move containerid list iteration into audit (xt_AUDIT)
- create function to move namespace switch into audit
- switched /proc/PID/ entry from containerid to audit_containerid
- call kzalloc with GFP_ATOMIC on in_atomic() in audit_alloc_context()
- call kzalloc with GFP_ATOMIC on in_atomic() in audit_log_container_info()
- use xt_net(par) instead of sock_net(skb->sk) to get net
- switched record and field names: initial CONTAINER_ID, aux CONTAINER, field CONTID
- allow to set own contid
- open code audit_set_containerid
- add contid inherited flag
- ccontainerid and pcontainerid eliminated due to inherited flag
- change name of container list funcitons
- rename containerid to contid
- convert initial container record to syscall aux
- fix spelling mistake of contidion in net/rfkill/core.c to avoid contid name collision
v2
- add check for children and threads
- add network namespace container identifier list
- add NETFILTER_PKT audit container identifier logging
- patch description and documentation clean-up and example
- reap unused ppid
Richard Guy Briggs (10):
audit: collect audit task parameters
audit: add container id
audit: log container info of syscalls
audit: add containerid support for ptrace and signals
audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
audit: add containerid support for tty_audit
audit: add containerid filtering
audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces
audit: NETFILTER_PKT: record each container ID associated with a netNS
debug audit: read container ID of a process
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c | 5 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 56 ++++++++++++++
include/linux/audit.h | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++---
include/linux/sched.h | 5 +-
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 8 +-
init/init_task.c | 3 +-
init/main.c | 2 +
kernel/audit.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/audit.h | 4 +
kernel/auditfilter.c | 47 ++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
kernel/fork.c | 4 +-
kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +
net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c | 12 ++-
14 files changed, 526 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
--
1.8.3.1
5 years, 11 months
[RFC PATCH ghak100 V1 0/2] audit: avoid umount hangs on missing mount
by Richard Guy Briggs
On user and remote filesystems, a forced umount can still hang due to
attemting to fetch the fcaps of a mounted filesystem that is no longer
available.
These two patches take different approaches to address this, one by
avoiding the lookup when the MNT_FORCE flag is included, the other by
providing a method to filter out auditing specified types of filesystems.
This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.
Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable auditing
processes that touch removable filesystems.
Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100
Richard Guy Briggs (2):
audit: avoid fcaps on MNT_FORCE
audit: moar filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
fs/namei.c | 2 +-
fs/namespace.c | 3 +++
include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++--
kernel/audit.c | 5 +++--
kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
6 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--
1.8.3.1
6 years
[PATCH ghak95] audit: Do not log full CWD path on empty relative paths
by Ondrej Mosnacek
When a relative path has just a single component and we want to emit a
nametype=PARENT record, the current implementation just reports the full
CWD path (which is alrady available in the audit context).
This is wrong for three reasons:
1. Wasting log space for redundant data (CWD path is already in the CWD
record).
2. Inconsistency with other PATH records (if a relative PARENT directory
path contains at least one component, only the verbatim relative path
is logged).
3. In some syscalls (e.g. openat(2)) the relative path may not even be
relative to the CWD, but to another directory specified as a file
descriptor. In that case the logged path is simply plain wrong.
This patch modifies this behavior to simply report "." in the
aforementioned case, which is equivalent to an "empty" directory path
and can be concatenated with the actual base directory path (CWD or
dirfd from openat(2)-like syscall) once support for its logging is added
later. In the meantime, defaulting to CWD as base directory on relative
paths (as already done by the userspace tools) will be enough to achieve
results equivalent to the current behavior.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/95
Fixes: 9c937dcc7102 ("[PATCH] log more info for directory entry change events")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2a8058764aa6..4f18bd48eb4b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2127,28 +2127,27 @@ void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
if (path)
- audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, NULL, path);
else if (n->name) {
switch (n->name_len) {
case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
/* log the full path */
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
break;
case 0:
/* name was specified as a relative path and the
* directory component is the cwd */
- audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ".");
break;
default:
/* log the name's directory component */
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
n->name_len);
}
} else
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
+ audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
--
2.17.1
6 years
[PATCH V2] audit: shorten PATH cap values when zero
by Richard Guy Briggs
Since the vast majority of files (99.993% on a typical system) have no
fcaps, display "0" instead of the full zero-padded 16 hex digits in the
two PATH record cap_f* fields to save netlink bandwidth and disk space.
Simply changing the format to %x won't work since the value is two (or
possibly more in the future) 32-bit hexadecimal values concatenated and
bits in higher order values will be misrepresented.
Passes audit-testsuite and userspace tools already work fine.
Please see the github issue tracker for more details
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/101
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
---
Changelog:
v2:
- switch to cap_isclear() and condense logic
kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2a8058764aa6..55b2079145dc 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2058,11 +2058,13 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
{
int i;
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
- CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "%08x",
- cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
+ if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
+ return;
}
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
+ CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
}
static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
--
1.8.3.1
6 years
Query regarding to audit netlink call
by Avinash Patwari
Hi,
I wrote a program to listen to iptables modification through netlink
sockets, for this I used NETLINK_AUDIT family, when I execute the program
and modify the iptables rule, program doesn't receive any message from
kernel and it will be in blocking mode only. Could you help me to find what
is wrong in this program or what else I need to do to receive iptables
notification ?
I ran this program as a root user & audit deamon is also running.
ps -eaf | grep -i auditd
root 499 2 0 Nov16 ? 00:00:00 [kauditd]
root 926 1 0 Nov16 ? 00:00:00 /sbin/auditd -n
I tried configuring auditctl setting as well directly using auditctl
command & can see the modifcation with "ausearch -k iptablesChange" command
output but notification is not received in application.
Here is the program :-
#include "libaudit.h"
#include <stdio.h>#include <string.h>#include <unistd.h>
int main(){
int rc;
struct audit_message rep;
int fd;
struct sockaddr_nl sa;
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
sa.nl_groups = 0;
fd = audit_open();
bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa));
rc = audit_get_reply(fd, &rep, GET_REPLY_BLOCKING, 0);
if(rc < 0)
{
printf("Error");
}
else
{
printf("msg received %d \n",rep.nlh.nlmsg_type );
break;
}
audit_close(fd);
return 0;}
Thanks,Avinash
6 years
Q: encryted log
by Ranran
Hello,
Is there a way to encrypt the auditd logs which are saved to disk?
The system need to save logs from local into disk (not a remote
connection), but it should be saved encryped. Is there a way to do it
?
Thank you,
ran
6 years
[PATCH] audit: remove some duplicated includes
by Yangtao Li
audit.h and skbuff.h are included twice.It's unnecessary.
hence just remove them.
Signed-off-by: Yangtao Li <tiny.windzz(a)gmail.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 3 ---
1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2a8058764aa6..a677715891d0 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -62,11 +62,8 @@
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/audit.h>
-
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
-#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
#include <linux/security.h>
#endif
--
2.17.0
6 years
[PATCH v2 00/15] Prepare for PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO
by Dmitry V. Levin
syscall_get_arch() is required to be implemented on all architectures
in order to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO
request.
The primary intent is that the triple (audit_arch, syscall_nr, arg1..arg6)
should describe what system call is being called and what its arguments are.
Dmitry V. Levin (15):
Move EM_HEXAGON to uapi/linux/elf-em.h
Move EM_ARCOMPACT and EM_ARCV2 to uapi/linux/elf-em.h
Move EM_UNICORE to uapi/linux/elf-em.h
elf-em.h: add EM_NDS32
elf-em.h: add EM_XTENSA
m68k: define syscall_get_arch()
arc: define syscall_get_arch()
c6x: define syscall_get_arch()
h8300: define syscall_get_arch()
hexagon: define syscall_get_arch()
nds32: define syscall_get_arch()
nios2: define syscall_get_arch()
riscv: define syscall_get_arch()
unicore32: define syscall_get_arch()
xtensa: define syscall_get_arch()
arch/arc/include/asm/elf.h | 6 +-----
arch/arc/include/asm/syscall.h | 10 ++++++++++
arch/c6x/include/asm/syscall.h | 7 +++++++
arch/h8300/include/asm/syscall.h | 5 +++++
arch/hexagon/include/asm/elf.h | 6 +-----
arch/hexagon/include/asm/syscall.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/nds32/include/asm/syscall.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/nios2/include/asm/syscall.h | 6 ++++++
arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h | 10 ++++++++++
arch/unicore32/include/asm/elf.h | 3 +--
arch/unicore32/include/asm/syscall.h | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/xtensa/include/asm/syscall.h | 7 +++++++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/elf-em.h | 7 +++++++
15 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h
create mode 100644 arch/unicore32/include/asm/syscall.h
--
ldv
6 years
[PATCH] audit: use current whenever possible
by Paul Moore
There are many places, notably audit_log_task_info() and
audit_log_exit(), that take task_struct pointers but in reality they
are always working on the current task. This patch eliminates the
task_struct arguments and uses current directly which allows a number
of cleanups as well.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
---
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c | 13 ++--
include/linux/audit.h | 6 +-
kernel/audit.c | 34 +++++-----
kernel/audit.h | 2 -
kernel/auditsc.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 -
6 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c b/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
index 50f567b6a66e..28f87fd6a28e 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_audit.c
@@ -61,20 +61,19 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,
unsigned char *data, size_t size)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- pid_t pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
- uid_t uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(tsk));
- uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
- unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
+ pid_t pid = task_pid_nr(current);
+ uid_t uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
+ uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current));
+ unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TTY);
if (ab) {
- char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+ char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
audit_log_format(ab, "%s pid=%u uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u major=%d"
" minor=%d comm=", description, pid, uid,
loginuid, sessionid, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
- get_task_comm(name, tsk);
+ get_task_comm(name, current);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
audit_log_format(ab, " data=");
audit_log_n_hex(ab, data, size);
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 58cf665f597e..a625c29a2ea2 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -151,8 +151,7 @@ extern void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation);
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
-extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
- struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
@@ -200,8 +199,7 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
- struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{ }
#define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index d09298d3c2d2..779671883349 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1096,10 +1096,11 @@ static void audit_log_feature_change(int which, u32 old_feature, u32 new_feature
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return;
+
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE);
if (!ab)
return;
- audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " feature=%s old=%u new=%u old_lock=%u new_lock=%u res=%d",
audit_feature_names[which], !!old_feature, !!new_feature,
!!old_lock, !!new_lock, res);
@@ -2246,15 +2247,15 @@ void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
audit_log_format(ab, " exe=(null)");
}
-struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(struct task_struct *tsk)
+struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(void)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
- if (tsk->signal)
- tty = tty_kref_get(tsk->signal->tty);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(¤t->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ if (current->signal)
+ tty = tty_kref_get(current->signal->tty);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(¤t->sighand->siglock, flags);
return tty;
}
@@ -2263,25 +2264,24 @@ void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
tty_kref_put(tty);
}
-void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
+void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
const struct cred *cred;
- char comm[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+ char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
struct tty_struct *tty;
if (!ab)
return;
- /* tsk == current */
cred = current_cred();
- tty = audit_get_tty(tsk);
+ tty = audit_get_tty();
audit_log_format(ab,
" ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
" egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
- task_ppid_nr(tsk),
- task_tgid_nr(tsk),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(tsk)),
+ task_ppid_nr(current),
+ task_tgid_nr(current),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
@@ -2291,11 +2291,11 @@ void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid),
tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
- audit_get_sessionid(tsk));
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
audit_put_tty(tty);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, tsk));
- audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, tsk->mm);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
+ audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
audit_log_task_context(ab);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_info);
@@ -2316,7 +2316,7 @@ void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation)
if (!ab)
return;
audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s", operation);
- audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " res=0");
audit_log_end(ab);
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 0b5295aeaebb..91421679a168 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ extern struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old);
extern void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct mm_struct *mm);
-extern struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(void);
extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty);
/* audit watch functions */
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 51e735aedf58..6593a5207fb0 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -830,44 +830,6 @@ void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-/* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
-static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
- int return_valid,
- long return_code)
-{
- struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
-
- if (!context)
- return NULL;
- context->return_valid = return_valid;
-
- /*
- * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
- * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
- * signal handlers
- *
- * This is actually a test for:
- * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
- * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
- *
- * but is faster than a bunch of ||
- */
- if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
- (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
- (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
- context->return_code = -EINTR;
- else
- context->return_code = return_code;
-
- if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
- audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
- audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
- }
-
- audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
- return context;
-}
-
static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
{
kfree(context->proctitle.value);
@@ -1296,15 +1258,18 @@ static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
return len;
}
-static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct audit_context *context)
+static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
{
int res;
char *buf;
char *msg = "(null)";
int len = strlen(msg);
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ if (!context || context->dummy)
+ return;
+
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
@@ -1317,7 +1282,7 @@ static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (!buf)
goto out;
/* Historically called this from procfs naming */
- res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
+ res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
if (res == 0) {
kfree(buf);
goto out;
@@ -1337,15 +1302,15 @@ static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk,
audit_log_end(ab);
}
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static void audit_log_exit(void)
{
int i, call_panic = 0;
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
struct audit_names *n;
- /* tsk == current */
- context->personality = tsk->personality;
+ context->personality = current->personality;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
@@ -1367,7 +1332,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
context->argv[3],
context->name_count);
- audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1456,7 +1421,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
}
- audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
+ audit_log_proctitle();
/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
@@ -1474,22 +1439,31 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
*/
void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- struct audit_context *context;
+ struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
- context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0);
if (!context)
return;
- /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
- * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
- * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
- * in the context of the idle thread */
- /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
- if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
- audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
+ /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
+ * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
+ * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
+ * need to log via audit_log_exit().
+ */
+ if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
+ context->return_valid = 0;
+ context->return_code = 0;
+
+ audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context,
+ &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
+ audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
+ if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+ audit_log_exit();
+ }
+
if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
+ audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
audit_free_context(context);
}
@@ -1559,17 +1533,40 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
{
struct audit_context *context;
- if (success)
- success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
- else
- success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
-
- context = audit_take_context(current, success, return_code);
+ context = audit_context();
if (!context)
return;
- if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
- audit_log_exit(context, current);
+ if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
+ if (success)
+ context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
+
+ /*
+ * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
+ * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
+ * arch specific signal handlers
+ *
+ * This is actually a test for:
+ * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
+ * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
+ *
+ * but is faster than a bunch of ||
+ */
+ if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
+ (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
+ (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
+ context->return_code = -EINTR;
+ else
+ context->return_code = return_code;
+
+ audit_filter_syscall(current, context,
+ &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
+ audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
+ if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+ audit_log_exit();
+ }
context->in_syscall = 0;
context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
@@ -1591,7 +1588,6 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
kfree(context->filterkey);
context->filterkey = NULL;
}
- audit_set_context(current, context);
}
static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
@@ -2025,7 +2021,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
- tty = audit_get_tty(current);
+ tty = audit_get_tty();
audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid);
audit_log_task_context(ab);
@@ -2046,7 +2042,6 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
*/
int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
{
- struct task_struct *task = current;
unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
kuid_t oldloginuid;
int rc;
@@ -2065,8 +2060,8 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
}
- task->sessionid = sessionid;
- task->loginuid = loginuid;
+ current->sessionid = sessionid;
+ current->loginuid = loginuid;
out:
audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 99dd1d53fc35..af134588ab4e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
audit_log_format(ab, " hash=\"%s:%s\"", algo_name, hash);
- audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
6 years
