[PATCH] add GSS encryption to remote protocol
by DJ Delorie
Fifth in a series.
(http://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2008-September/msg00004.html)
This adds optional GSS/Kerberos encryption to the remote protocol. I
won't claim to be a Kerberos expert, but it seems to work OK for me ;-)
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/Makefile.am trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/Makefile.am
--- pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/Makefile.am 2008-08-04 12:47:28.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/Makefile.am 2008-09-05 00:00:04.000000000 -0400
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
audisp_remote_SOURCES = audisp-remote.c remote-config.c
audisp_remote_CFLAGS = -fPIE -DPIE -g -D_REENTRANT -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wundef
-audisp_remote_LDFLAGS = -pie -Wl,-z,relro
+audisp_remote_LDFLAGS = -pie -Wl,-z,relro $(gss_libs)
install-data-hook:
mkdir -p -m 0750 ${DESTDIR}${plugin_confdir}
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c
--- pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c 2008-09-09 21:45:21.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c 2008-09-10 19:46:09.000000000 -0400
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
*
*/
+#include "config.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <syslog.h>
@@ -35,6 +36,11 @@
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#include <krb5.h>
+#endif
#include "libaudit.h"
#include "private.h"
#include "remote-config.h"
@@ -64,6 +70,18 @@
static int init_transport(void);
static int stop_transport(void);
+static int ar_read (int, void *, int);
+static int ar_write (int, const void *, int);
+
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+/* We only ever talk to one server, so we don't need per-connection
+ credentials. These are the ones we talk to the server with. */
+static gss_cred_id_t service_creds;
+gss_ctx_id_t my_context;
+
+#define REQ_FLAGS GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG
+#define USE_GSS (config.gss_principal != NULL)
+#endif
/*
* SIGTERM handler
@@ -317,6 +335,294 @@
return 0;
}
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+
+/* Communications under GSS is done by token exchanges. Each "token"
+ may contain a message, perhaps signed, perhaps encrypted. The
+ messages within are what we're interested in, but the network sees
+ the tokens. The protocol we use for transferring tokens is to send
+ the length first, four bytes MSB first, then the token data. We
+ return nonzero on error. */
+
+static int recv_token (int s, gss_buffer_t tok)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char lenbuf[4], char_flags;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ ret = ar_read(s, (char *) lenbuf, 4);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error reading token length");
+ return -1;
+ } else if (!ret) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (ret != 4) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error reading token length");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ len = ((lenbuf[0] << 24)
+ | (lenbuf[1] << 16)
+ | (lenbuf[2] << 8)
+ | lenbuf[3]);
+ tok->length = len;
+
+ tok->value = (char *) malloc(tok->length ? tok->length : 1);
+ if (tok->length && tok->value == NULL) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Out of memory allocating token data %d %x", tok->length, tok->length);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = ar_read(s, (char *) tok->value, tok->length);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error reading token data");
+ free(tok->value);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (ret != (int) tok->length) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error reading token data");
+ free(tok->value);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Same here. */
+int send_token(int s, gss_buffer_t tok)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char lenbuf[4];
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ if (tok->length > 0xffffffffUL)
+ return -1;
+ len = tok->length;
+ lenbuf[0] = (len >> 24) & 0xff;
+ lenbuf[1] = (len >> 16) & 0xff;
+ lenbuf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
+ lenbuf[3] = len & 0xff;
+
+ ret = ar_write(s, (char *) lenbuf, 4);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error sending token length");
+ return -1;
+ } else if (ret != 4) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error sending token length");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = ar_write(s, tok->value, tok->length);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error sending token data");
+ return -1;
+ } else if (ret != (int) tok->length) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error sending token data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void gss_failure_2 (const char *msg, int status, int type)
+{
+ OM_uint32 message_context = 0;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status;
+ OM_uint32 min_status = 0;
+ gss_buffer_desc status_string;
+
+ do {
+ gss_display_status (&min_status,
+ status,
+ type,
+ GSS_C_NO_OID,
+ &message_context,
+ &status_string);
+
+ syslog (LOG_ERR, "GSS error: %s: %s",
+ msg, (char *)status_string.value);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &status_string);
+ } while (message_context != 0);
+}
+static void gss_failure (const char *msg, int major_status, int minor_status)
+{
+ gss_failure_2 (msg, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE);
+ if (minor_status)
+ gss_failure_2 (msg, minor_status, GSS_C_MECH_CODE);
+}
+
+#define KCHECK(x,f) if (x) { \
+ syslog (LOG_ERR, "krb5 error: %s in %s\n", krb5_get_error_message (kcontext, x), f); \
+ return -1; }
+
+#define KEYTAB_NAME "/etc/audisp/audisp-remote.key"
+#define CCACHE_NAME "FILE:/tmp/audisp-remote.ccache"
+
+/* Each time we connect to the server, we negotiate a set of
+ credentials and a security context. To do this, we need our own
+ credentials first. For other Kerbers applications, the user will
+ have called kinit (or otherwise authenticated) first, but we don't
+ have that luxury. So, we implement part of kinit here. When our
+ tickets expire, the usual close/open/retry logic has us calling
+ here again, where we re-init and get new tickets. */
+
+static int negotiate_credentials ()
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc empty_token_buf = { 0, (void *) "" };
+ gss_buffer_t empty_token = &empty_token_buf;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok, recv_tok, *token_ptr;
+ gss_ctx_id_t *gss_context = &my_context;
+ gss_buffer_desc name_buf;
+ gss_name_t service_name_e;
+ OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status, init_sec_min_stat;
+ OM_uint32 ret_flags, token_flags;
+
+ /* Getting an initial ticket is outside the scope of GSS, so
+ we use Kerberos calls here. */
+
+ int krberr;
+ krb5_context kcontext = NULL;
+ char *realm_name;
+ krb5_principal audit_princ;
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ krb5_creds my_creds;
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt options;
+ krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
+
+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+ *gss_context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+
+ krberr = krb5_init_context (&kcontext);
+ KCHECK (krberr, "krb5_init_context");
+
+ /* This looks up the default real (*our* realm) from
+ /etc/krb5.conf (or wherever) */
+ krberr = krb5_get_default_realm (kcontext, &realm_name);
+ KCHECK (krberr, "krb5_get_default_realm");
+ syslog (LOG_ERR, "kerberos principal: auditd/remote@%s\n", realm_name);
+
+ /* Encode our own "name" as auditd/remote(a)EXAMPLE.COM. */
+ krberr = krb5_build_principal (kcontext, &audit_princ,
+ strlen(realm_name), realm_name,
+ "auditd", "remote", NULL);
+ KCHECK (krberr, "krb5_build_principal");
+
+ /* Locate our machine's key table, where our private key is
+ * held. */
+ krberr = krb5_kt_resolve (kcontext, KEYTAB_NAME, &keytab);
+ KCHECK (krberr, "krb5_kt_resolve");
+
+ /* Identify a cache to hold the key in. The GSS wrappers look
+ up our credentials here. */
+ krberr = krb5_cc_resolve (kcontext, CCACHE_NAME, &ccache);
+ KCHECK (krberr, "krb5_cc_resolve");
+
+ setenv("KRB5CCNAME", CCACHE_NAME, 1);
+
+ memset(&my_creds, 0, sizeof(my_creds));
+ memset(&options, 0, sizeof(options));
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list(&options, NULL);
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(&options, 0);
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(&options, 0);
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(&options, 24*60*60);
+
+ /* Load our credentials from the key table. */
+ krberr = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab(kcontext, &my_creds, audit_princ,
+ keytab, 0, NULL,
+ &options);
+ KCHECK (krberr, "krb5_get_init_creds_keytab");
+
+ /* Create the cache... */
+ krberr = krb5_cc_initialize(kcontext, ccache, audit_princ);
+ KCHECK (krberr, "krb5_cc_initialize");
+
+ /* ...and store our credentials in it. */
+ krberr = krb5_cc_store_cred(kcontext, ccache, &my_creds);
+ KCHECK (krberr, "krb5_cc_store_cred");
+
+ /* The GSS code now has a set of credentials for this program.
+ I.e. we know who "we" are. Now we talk to the server to
+ get its credentials and set up a security context for
+ encryption. */
+
+ name_buf.value = (char *)config.gss_principal;
+ name_buf.length = strlen(name_buf.value) + 1;
+ major_status = gss_import_name(&minor_status, &name_buf,
+ (gss_OID) gss_nt_service_name, &service_name_e);
+ if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ gss_failure("importing name", major_status, minor_status);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ major_status = gss_acquire_cred(&minor_status,
+ service_name_e, GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
+ GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET, GSS_C_ACCEPT,
+ &service_creds, NULL, NULL);
+ if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ gss_failure("acquiring credentials", major_status, minor_status);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Someone has to go first. In this case, it's us. */
+ if (send_token(sock, empty_token) < 0) {
+ (void) gss_release_name(&minor_status, &service_name_e);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* The server starts this loop with the token we just sent
+ (the empty one). We start this loop with "no token". */
+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+ *gss_context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+
+ do {
+ /* Give GSS a chance to digest what we have so far. */
+ major_status = gss_init_sec_context(&init_sec_min_stat, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+ gss_context, service_name_e, NULL, REQ_FLAGS, 0,
+ NULL, /* no channel bindings */
+ token_ptr, NULL, /* ignore mech type */
+ &send_tok, &ret_flags, NULL); /* ignore time_rec */
+
+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
+ free(recv_tok.value);
+
+ /* Send the server any tokens requested of us. */
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if (send_token(sock, &send_tok) < 0) {
+ (void) gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &send_tok);
+ (void) gss_release_name(&minor_status, &service_name_e);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ (void) gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &send_tok);
+
+ if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE
+ && major_status != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ gss_failure("initializing context", major_status,
+ init_sec_min_stat);
+ (void) gss_release_name(&minor_status, &service_name_e);
+ if (*gss_context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&minor_status, gss_context,
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Now get any tokens the sever sends back. We use
+ these back at the top of the loop. */
+ if (major_status == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ if (recv_token(sock, &recv_tok) < 0) {
+ (void) gss_release_name(&minor_status, &service_name_e);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
+ }
+ } while (major_status == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ (void) gss_release_name(&minor_status, &service_name_e);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
static int init_sock(void)
{
int rc;
@@ -377,6 +683,13 @@
if (config.format == F_MANAGED)
setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (char *)&one, sizeof (int));
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ if (USE_GSS) {
+ if (negotiate_credentials ())
+ return ET_PERMANENT;
+ }
+#endif
+
transport_ok = 1;
freeaddrinfo(ai);
@@ -443,6 +756,7 @@
static int ar_read (int sock, void *buf, int len)
{
int rc = 0, r;
+ int i;
while (len > 0) {
do {
r = read(sock, buf, len);
@@ -480,6 +794,148 @@
return 0;
}
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+
+/* Sending an encrypted message is pretty simple - wrap the message in
+ a token, and send the token. The server unwraps it to get the
+ original message. */
+
+static int send_msg_gss (unsigned char *header, const char *msg, uint32_t mlen)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
+ gss_buffer_desc utok, etok;
+ int rc;
+
+ utok.length = AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE + mlen;
+ utok.value = malloc (utok.length);
+
+ memcpy (utok.value, header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
+ memcpy (utok.value+AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE, msg, mlen);
+
+ major_status = gss_wrap (&minor_status,
+ my_context,
+ 1,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+ &utok,
+ NULL,
+ &etok);
+ if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ gss_failure("encrypting message", major_status, minor_status);
+ free (utok.value);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ rc = send_token (sock, &etok);
+ free (utok.value);
+ (void) gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &etok);
+
+ return rc ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Likewise here. */
+static int recv_msg_gss (unsigned char *header, char *msg, uint32_t *mlen)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
+ gss_buffer_desc utok, etok;
+ int hver, mver, rc;
+ uint32_t type, rlen, seq;
+ int i;
+
+ rc = recv_token (sock, &etok);
+ if (rc)
+ return -1;
+
+ major_status = gss_unwrap (&minor_status, my_context, &etok, &utok, NULL, NULL);
+ if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ gss_failure("decrypting message", major_status, minor_status);
+ free (utok.value);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (utok.length < AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ sync_error_handler ("message too short");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy (header, utok.value, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
+
+ if (! AUDIT_RMW_IS_MAGIC (header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE)) {
+ sync_error_handler ("bad magic number");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ AUDIT_RMW_UNPACK_HEADER (header, hver, mver, type, rlen, seq);
+
+ if (rlen > MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH) {
+ sync_error_handler ("message too long");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memcpy (msg, utok.value+AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE, rlen);
+
+ *mlen = rlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int send_msg_tcp (unsigned char *header, const char *msg, uint32_t mlen)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = ar_write(sock, header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
+ if (rc <= 0) {
+ if (config.network_failure_action == FA_SYSLOG)
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "connection to %s closed unexpectedly",
+ config.remote_server);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (msg != NULL && mlen > 0)
+ {
+ rc = ar_write(sock, msg, mlen);
+ if (rc <= 0) {
+ if (config.network_failure_action == FA_SYSLOG)
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "connection to %s closed unexpectedly",
+ config.remote_server);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int recv_msg_tcp (unsigned char *header, char *msg, uint32_t *mlen)
+{
+ int hver, mver, rc;
+ uint32_t type, rlen, seq;
+
+ rc = ar_read (sock, header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
+ if (rc < 16) {
+ if (config.network_failure_action == FA_SYSLOG)
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "connection to %s closed unexpectedly",
+ config.remote_server);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+
+ if (! AUDIT_RMW_IS_MAGIC (header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE)) {
+ /* FIXME: the right thing to do here is close the socket and start a new one. */
+ sync_error_handler ("bad magic number");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ AUDIT_RMW_UNPACK_HEADER (header, hver, mver, type, rlen, seq);
+
+ if (rlen > MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH) {
+ sync_error_handler ("message too long");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (rlen > 0
+ && ar_read (sock, msg, rlen) < rlen) {
+ sync_error_handler ("ran out of data reading reply");
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
static int relay_sock_managed(const char *s, size_t len)
{
static int sequence_id = 1;
@@ -524,61 +980,35 @@
type = (s != NULL) ? AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_MESSAGE : AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_HEARTBEAT;
AUDIT_RMW_PACK_HEADER (header, 0, type, len, sequence_id);
- rc = ar_write(sock, header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
- if (rc <= 0) {
- if (config.network_failure_action == FA_SYSLOG)
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "connection to %s closed unexpectedly",
- config.remote_server);
- stop_transport();
- goto try_again;
- }
- if (s != NULL && len > 0)
- {
- rc = ar_write(sock, s, len);
- if (rc <= 0) {
- if (config.network_failure_action == FA_SYSLOG)
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "connection to %s closed unexpectedly",
- config.remote_server);
- stop_transport();
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ if (USE_GSS) {
+ if (send_msg_gss (header, s, len)) {
+ stop_transport ();
goto try_again;
}
- }
-
- rc = ar_read (sock, header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
- if (rc < 16) {
- if (config.network_failure_action == FA_SYSLOG)
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "connection to %s closed unexpectedly",
- config.remote_server);
- stop_transport();
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (send_msg_tcp (header, s, len)) {
+ stop_transport ();
goto try_again;
}
-
- if (! AUDIT_RMW_IS_MAGIC (header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE)) {
- /* FIXME: the right thing to do here is close the socket and start a new one. */
- if (sync_error_handler ("bad magic number"))
- return -1;
- stop_transport();
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ if (USE_GSS) {
+ if (recv_msg_gss (header, msg, &rlen)) {
+ stop_transport ();
+ goto try_again;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (recv_msg_tcp (header, msg, &rlen)) {
+ stop_transport ();
goto try_again;
}
AUDIT_RMW_UNPACK_HEADER (header, hver, mver, type, rlen, seq);
- if (rlen > MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH) {
- if (sync_error_handler ("message too long"))
- return -1;
- stop_transport();
- goto try_again;
- }
-
- if (rlen > 0
- && ar_read (sock, msg, rlen) < rlen) {
- if (sync_error_handler ("ran out of data reading reply"))
- return -1;
- stop_transport();
- goto try_again;
- }
msg[rlen] = 0;
if (seq != sequence_id) {
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.conf.5 trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.conf.5
--- pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.conf.5 2008-08-29 11:53:55.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.conf.5 2008-09-09 23:21:56.000000000 -0400
@@ -121,6 +121,20 @@
should be set, as each try may take a long time to time out. The
default value is 5 seconds. If too much time is used on a message,
the network_failure_action action is performed.
+.TP
+.I gss_principal
+If specified, GSS (via Kerberos) will be used to encrypt the
+connection to the server. The client and server will use the
+specified principal to negotiate the encryption. The client will
+use a key named like
+.I auditd/remote(a)EXAMPLE.COM
+stored in
+.I /etc/audisp/audisp-remote.key
+to authenticate itself. The format for the
+.I gss_principal
+is like somename(a)EXAMPLE.COM, see the auditd.conf man page for
+details. Note that encryption can only be used with managed
+connections, not plain ASCII.
.SH "NOTES"
Specifying a local port may make it difficult to restart the audit
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.c trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.c
--- pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.c 2008-09-09 21:45:21.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.c 2008-09-09 21:55:55.000000000 -0400
@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@
remote_conf_t *config);
static int heartbeat_timeout_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
remote_conf_t *config);
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+static int gss_principal_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
+ remote_conf_t *config);
+#endif
static int network_retry_time_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
remote_conf_t *config);
static int max_tries_per_record_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
@@ -105,6 +109,9 @@
{"max_tries_per_record", max_tries_per_record_parser, 0 },
{"max_time_per_record", max_time_per_record_parser, 0 },
{"heartbeat_timeout", heartbeat_timeout_parser, 0 },
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ {"gss_principal", gss_principal_parser, 0 },
+#endif
{"network_failure_action", network_failure_action_parser, 0 },
{"disk_low_action", disk_low_action_parser, 0 },
{"disk_full_action", disk_full_action_parser, 0 },
@@ -165,6 +172,9 @@
config->max_time_per_record = 5;
config->heartbeat_timeout = 0;
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ config->gss_principal = NULL;
+#endif
#define IA(x,f) config->x##_action = f; config->x##_exe = NULL
IA(network_failure, FA_STOP);
@@ -573,6 +583,21 @@
return parse_uint (nv, line, &(config->heartbeat_timeout), 0, INT_MAX);
}
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+static int gss_principal_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
+ remote_conf_t *config)
+{
+ const char *ptr = nv->value;
+
+ if (strcmp (ptr, "none") == 0) {
+ config->gss_principal = NULL;
+ } else {
+ config->gss_principal = strdup(ptr);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* This function is where we do the integrated check of the audispd config
* options. At this point, all fields have been read. Returns 0 if no
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.h trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.h
--- pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.h 2008-09-09 21:45:21.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.h 2008-09-09 21:48:13.000000000 -0400
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
unsigned int max_tries_per_record;
unsigned int max_time_per_record;
unsigned int heartbeat_timeout;
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ const char *gss_principal;
+#endif
failure_action_t network_failure_action;
const char *network_failure_exe;
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/configure.ac trunk/configure.ac
--- pristine/configure.ac 2008-09-09 21:45:22.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/configure.ac 2008-09-09 21:45:37.000000000 -0400
@@ -78,6 +78,28 @@
esac
fi
+#gssapi
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(gssapi_krb5,
+ [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-gssapi-krb5],[Enable GSSAPI Kerberos 5 support @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+ [case "${enableval}" in
+ yes) want_gssapi_krb5="yes" ;;
+ no) want_gssapi_krb5="no" ;;
+ *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-gssapi-krb5) ;;
+ esac],
+ [want_gssapi_krb5=yes]
+)
+if test $want_gssapi_krb5 = yes; then
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(gssapi_krb5, gss_acquire_cred, [
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(gssapi/gssapi.h, [
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_GSSAPI,,
+ Define if you want to use GSSAPI)
+ gss_libs="-lgssapi_krb5"
+ AC_SUBST(gss_libs)
+ ])
+ ])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_GSSAPI, test x$want_gssapi_krb5 = xyes)
+
ALLDEBUG="-g"
AC_ARG_WITH(debug,
[ --with-debug turn on debugging [[default=no]]],
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/docs/auditd.conf.5 trunk/docs/auditd.conf.5
--- pristine/docs/auditd.conf.5 2008-09-09 21:45:21.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/docs/auditd.conf.5 2008-09-09 23:19:48.000000000 -0400
@@ -242,6 +242,18 @@
that this is a global setting, and must be higher than any individual
client heartbeat setting, preferably by a factor of two. The default
is zero, which disables this check.
+.TP
+.I gss_principal
+If specified, GSS (via Kerberos) will be used to encrypt the
+connection with the client. The client and server will use the
+specified principal to negotiate the encryption. Given a principal
+named somename(a)EXAMPLE.COM, where somename is whatever you choose, the
+server will look for a key named like
+.I somename/hostname(a)EXAMPLE.COM
+stored in
+.I /etc/krb5.keytab
+to authenticate itself, where hostname is the canonical name for the
+server's host, as returned by a DNS lookup of its IP address.
.SH NOTES
In a CAPP environment, the audit trail is considered so important that access to system resources must be denied if an audit trail cannot be created. In this environment, it would be suggested that /var/log/audit be on its own partition. This is to ensure that space detection is accurate and that no other process comes along and consumes part of it.
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/Makefile.am trunk/src/Makefile.am
--- pristine/src/Makefile.am 2008-09-09 21:45:21.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/Makefile.am 2008-09-09 21:50:30.000000000 -0400
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
auditd_CFLAGS = -fPIE -DPIE -g -D_REENTRANT -D_GNU_SOURCE
auditd_LDFLAGS = -pie -Wl,-z,relro
auditd_DEPENDENCIES = mt/libauditmt.a libev/libev.a
-auditd_LDADD = @LIBWRAP_LIBS@ @libev_LIBS@ -Llibev -lev -lrt -lm
+auditd_LDADD = @LIBWRAP_LIBS@ @libev_LIBS@ -Llibev -lev -lrt -lm $(gss_libs)
auditctl_SOURCES = auditctl.c auditctl-llist.c delete_all.c
auditctl_DEPENDENCIES = mt/libauditmt.a
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd-config.c trunk/src/auditd-config.c
--- pristine/src/auditd-config.c 2008-09-09 21:45:21.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd-config.c 2008-09-09 21:49:41.000000000 -0400
@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@
struct daemon_conf *config);
static int tcp_client_max_idle_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
struct daemon_conf *config);
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+static int gss_principal_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
+ struct daemon_conf *config);
+#endif
static int sanity_check(struct daemon_conf *config);
static const struct kw_pair keywords[] =
@@ -141,6 +145,9 @@
{"tcp_listen_queue", tcp_listen_queue_parser, 0 },
{"tcp_client_ports", tcp_client_ports_parser, 0 },
{"tcp_client_max_idle", tcp_client_max_idle_parser, 0 },
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ {"gss_principal", gss_principal_parser, 0 },
+#endif
{ NULL, NULL }
};
@@ -246,6 +253,9 @@
config->tcp_client_min_port = 0;
config->tcp_client_max_port = TCP_PORT_MAX;
config->tcp_client_max_idle = 0;
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ config->gss_principal = NULL;
+#endif
}
static log_test_t log_test = TEST_AUDITD;
@@ -1335,6 +1345,23 @@
return 0;
}
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+static int gss_principal_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
+ struct daemon_conf *config)
+{
+ const char *ptr = nv->value;
+
+ audit_msg(LOG_DEBUG, "gss_principal_parser called with: %s", nv->value);
+
+ if (strcmp (ptr, "none") == 0) {
+ config->gss_principal = NULL;
+ } else {
+ config->gss_principal = strdup(ptr);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* This function is where we do the integrated check of the audit config
* options. At this point, all fields have been read. Returns 0 if no
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd-config.h trunk/src/auditd-config.h
--- pristine/src/auditd-config.h 2008-09-09 21:45:21.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd-config.h 2008-09-09 21:49:52.000000000 -0400
@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@
unsigned long tcp_client_min_port;
unsigned long tcp_client_max_port;
unsigned long tcp_client_max_idle;
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ const char *gss_principal;
+#endif
};
void set_allow_links(int allow);
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd-event.c trunk/src/auditd-event.c
--- pristine/src/auditd-event.c 2008-09-09 21:45:21.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd-event.c 2008-09-09 21:53:18.000000000 -0400
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@
char *buf;
int len;
- rep->ack_socket = 0;
+ rep->ack_func = 0;
+ rep->ack_data = 0;
rep->sequence_id = 0;
if (rep->reply.type != AUDIT_DAEMON_RECONFIG) {
@@ -170,8 +171,9 @@
}
len = strlen (buf);
- if (len < MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH - 1)
+ if (len < MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH - 1) {
memcpy (rep->reply.msg.data, buf, len+1);
+ }
else
{
/* FIXME: is truncation the right thing to do? */
@@ -198,7 +200,7 @@
/* This function takes a preformatted message and places it on the
queue. The dequeue'r is responsible for freeing the memory. */
-void enqueue_formatted_event(char *msg, int ack_socket, uint32_t sequence_id)
+void enqueue_formatted_event(char *msg, ack_func_type ack_func, void *ack_data, uint32_t sequence_id)
{
int len;
struct auditd_reply_list *rep;
@@ -209,7 +211,8 @@
return;
}
- rep->ack_socket = ack_socket;
+ rep->ack_func = ack_func;
+ rep->ack_data = ack_data;
rep->sequence_id = sequence_id;
len = strlen (msg);
@@ -412,7 +415,7 @@
}
}
- if (data->head->ack_socket) {
+ if (data->head->ack_func) {
unsigned char header[AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE];
if (fs_space_warning)
@@ -420,9 +423,7 @@
AUDIT_RMW_PACK_HEADER (header, 0, ack_type, strlen(msg), data->head->sequence_id);
- ar_write (data->head->ack_socket, header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
- if (msg[0])
- ar_write (data->head->ack_socket, msg, strlen(msg));
+ data->head->ack_func (data->head->ack_data, header, msg);
}
}
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd-event.h trunk/src/auditd-event.h
--- pristine/src/auditd-event.h 2008-08-15 15:52:05.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd-event.h 2008-09-08 19:20:02.000000000 -0400
@@ -26,10 +26,13 @@
#include "libaudit.h"
+typedef void (*ack_func_type)(void *ack_data, const unsigned char *header, const char *msg);
+
struct auditd_reply_list {
struct audit_reply reply;
struct auditd_reply_list *next;
- int ack_socket;
+ ack_func_type ack_func;
+ void *ack_data;
unsigned long sequence_id;
};
@@ -39,7 +42,7 @@
int init_event(struct daemon_conf *config);
void resume_logging(void);
void enqueue_event(struct auditd_reply_list *rep);
-void enqueue_formatted_event(char *msg, int ack_socket, uint32_t sequence_id);
+void enqueue_formatted_event(char *msg, ack_func_type ack_func, void *ack_data, uint32_t sequence_id);
void *consumer_thread_main(void *arg);
#endif
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd-listen.c trunk/src/auditd-listen.c
--- pristine/src/auditd-listen.c 2008-09-09 21:45:21.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd-listen.c 2008-09-10 19:24:52.000000000 -0400
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@
#ifdef HAVE_LIBWRAP
#include <tcpd.h>
#endif
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#endif
#include "libaudit.h"
#include "auditd-event.h"
#include "auditd-config.h"
@@ -59,12 +63,22 @@
struct ev_tcp *next, *prev;
int bufptr;
int client_active;
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ /* This holds the negotiated security context for this client. */
+ gss_ctx_id_t gss_context;
+#endif
unsigned char buffer [MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH + 17];
} ev_tcp;
static int listen_socket;
static struct ev_io tcp_listen_watcher;
static int min_port, max_port;
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+/* This is used to hold our own private key. */
+static gss_cred_id_t server_creds;
+static int use_gss = 0;
+static char msgbuf[MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH + 1];
+#endif
static struct ev_tcp *client_chain = 0;
@@ -107,6 +121,7 @@
static int ar_write (int sock, const void *buf, int len)
{
int rc = 0, w;
+ int i;
while (len > 0) {
do {
w = write(sock, buf, len);
@@ -122,6 +137,296 @@
return rc;
}
+static int ar_read (int sock, void *buf, int len)
+{
+ int rc = 0, r;
+ int i;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ do {
+ r = read(sock, buf, len);
+ } while (r < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r == 0)
+ break;
+ rc += r;
+ len -= r;
+ buf = (void *)((char *)buf + r);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+
+/* Communications under GSS is done by token exchanges. Each "token"
+ may contain a message, perhaps signed, perhaps encrypted. The
+ messages within are what we're interested in, but the network sees
+ the tokens. The protocol we use for transferring tokens is to send
+ the length first, four bytes MSB first, then the token data. We
+ return nonzero on error. */
+static int recv_token (int s, gss_buffer_t tok)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char lenbuf[4];
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ ret = ar_read(s, (char *) lenbuf, 4);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error reading token length");
+ return -1;
+ } else if (!ret) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (ret != 4) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error reading token length");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ len = ((lenbuf[0] << 24)
+ | (lenbuf[1] << 16)
+ | (lenbuf[2] << 8)
+ | lenbuf[3]);
+ tok->length = len;
+
+ tok->value = (char *) malloc(tok->length ? tok->length : 1);
+ if (tok->length && tok->value == NULL) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "Out of memory allocating token data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = ar_read(s, (char *) tok->value, tok->length);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error reading token data");
+ free(tok->value);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (ret != (int) tok->length) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error reading token data");
+ free(tok->value);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Same here. */
+int send_token(int s, gss_buffer_t tok)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char lenbuf[4];
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ if (tok->length > 0xffffffffUL)
+ return -1;
+ len = tok->length;
+ lenbuf[0] = (len >> 24) & 0xff;
+ lenbuf[1] = (len >> 16) & 0xff;
+ lenbuf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
+ lenbuf[3] = len & 0xff;
+
+ ret = ar_write(s, (char *) lenbuf, 4);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error sending token length");
+ return -1;
+ } else if (ret != 4) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error sending token length");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = ar_write(s, tok->value, tok->length);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error sending token data");
+ return -1;
+ } else if (ret != (int) tok->length) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "GSS-API error sending token data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void gss_failure_2 (const char *msg, int status, int type)
+{
+ OM_uint32 message_context = 0;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status;
+ OM_uint32 min_status = 0;
+ gss_buffer_desc status_string;
+
+ do {
+ gss_display_status (&min_status,
+ status,
+ type,
+ GSS_C_NO_OID,
+ &message_context,
+ &status_string);
+
+ audit_msg (LOG_ERR, "GSS error: %s: %s",
+ msg, (char *)status_string.value);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &status_string);
+ } while (message_context != 0);
+}
+static void gss_failure (const char *msg, int major_status, int minor_status)
+{
+ gss_failure_2 (msg, major_status, GSS_C_GSS_CODE);
+ if (minor_status)
+ gss_failure_2 (msg, minor_status, GSS_C_MECH_CODE);
+}
+
+/* These are our private credentials, which come from a key file on
+ our server. They are aquired once, at program start. */
+static int server_acquire_creds(const char *service_name, gss_cred_id_t *server_creds)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc name_buf;
+ gss_name_t server_name;
+ OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
+
+ name_buf.value = (char *)service_name;
+ name_buf.length = strlen(name_buf.value) + 1;
+ major_status = gss_import_name(&minor_status, &name_buf,
+ (gss_OID) gss_nt_service_name, &server_name);
+ if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ gss_failure("importing name", major_status, minor_status);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ major_status = gss_acquire_cred(&minor_status,
+ server_name, GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
+ GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET, GSS_C_ACCEPT,
+ server_creds, NULL, NULL);
+ if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ gss_failure("acquiring credentials", major_status, minor_status);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ (void) gss_release_name(&minor_status, &server_name);
+
+ audit_msg(LOG_DEBUG, "GSS creds for %s acquired", service_name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This is where we negotiate a security context with the client. In
+ the case of Kerberos, this is where the key exchange happens.
+ FIXME: While everything else is strictly nonblocking, this
+ negotiation blocks. */*/
+static int negotiate_credentials (ev_tcp *io)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok, recv_tok;
+ gss_name_t client;
+ OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat, acc_sec_min_stat;
+ gss_ctx_id_t *context;
+ OM_uint32 sess_flags;
+
+ context = & io->gss_context;
+ *context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+
+ maj_stat = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+ do {
+ int i;
+
+ /* STEP 1 - get a token from the client. */
+
+ if (recv_token(io->io.fd, &recv_tok) <= 0) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "TCP session from %s will be closed, error ignored",
+ sockaddr_to_ip (&io->addr));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (recv_tok.length == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* STEP 2 - let GSS process that token. */
+
+ maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&acc_sec_min_stat, context, server_creds,
+ &recv_tok, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &client,
+ NULL, &send_tok, &sess_flags, NULL, NULL);
+ if (recv_tok.value) {
+ free(recv_tok.value);
+ recv_tok.value = NULL;
+ }
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE
+ && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_tok);
+ if (*context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ gss_failure("accepting context", maj_stat,
+ acc_sec_min_stat);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* STEP 3 - send any tokens to the client that GSS may
+ ask us to send. */
+
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if (send_token(io->io.fd, &send_tok) < 0) {
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_tok);
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR, "TCP session from %s will be closed, error ignored",
+ sockaddr_to_ip (&io->addr));
+ if (*context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_tok);
+ }
+ } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, client, &recv_tok, NULL);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ gss_failure("displaying name", maj_stat, min_stat);
+ else
+ audit_msg(LOG_INFO, "GSS-API Accepted connection from: %s", recv_tok.value);
+ gss_release_name(&min_stat, &client);
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &recv_tok);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* USE_GSSAPI */
+
+/* This is called from auditd-event after the message has been logged.
+ The header is already filled in. */
+static void client_ack (void *ack_data, const unsigned char *header, const char *msg)
+{
+ ev_tcp *io = (ev_tcp *)ack_data;
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ if (use_gss) {
+ OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
+ gss_buffer_desc utok, etok;
+ int rc, mlen;
+
+ mlen = strlen (msg);
+ utok.length = AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE + mlen;
+ utok.value = malloc (utok.length + 1);
+
+ memcpy (utok.value, header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
+ memcpy (utok.value+AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE, msg, mlen);
+
+ /* Wrapping the message creates a token for the
+ client. Then we just have to worry about sending
+ the token. */
+
+ major_status = gss_wrap (&minor_status,
+ io->gss_context,
+ 1,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+ &utok,
+ NULL,
+ &etok);
+ if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ gss_failure("encrypting message", major_status, minor_status);
+ free (utok.value);
+ return;
+ }
+ rc = send_token (io->io.fd, &etok);
+ free (utok.value);
+ (void) gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &etok);
+
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ ar_write (io->io.fd, header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
+ if (msg[0])
+ ar_write (io->io.fd, msg, strlen(msg));
+}
+
static void client_message (struct ev_tcp *io, unsigned int length, unsigned char *header)
{
unsigned char ch;
@@ -138,15 +443,15 @@
if (type == AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_HEARTBEAT) {
unsigned char ack[AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE];
AUDIT_RMW_PACK_HEADER (ack, 0, AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_ACK, 0, seq);
- ar_write (io->io.fd, ack, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
+ client_ack (io, ack, "");
} else
- enqueue_formatted_event (header+AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE, io->io.fd, seq);
+ enqueue_formatted_event (header+AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE, client_ack, io, seq);
header[length] = ch;
} else {
header[length] = 0;
if (length > 1 && header[length-1] == '\n')
header[length-1] = 0;
- enqueue_formatted_event (header, 0, 0);
+ enqueue_formatted_event (header, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
}
@@ -200,6 +505,48 @@
total_this_call += r;
more_messages:
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ /* If we're using GSS at all, everything will be encrypted,
+ one record per token. */
+ if (use_gss) {
+ gss_buffer_desc utok, etok;
+ io->bufptr += r;
+ uint32_t len;
+ OM_uint32 major_status, minor_status;
+
+ /* We need at least four bytes to test the length. If
+ we have more than four bytes, we can tell if we
+ have a whole token (or more). */
+
+ if (io->bufptr < 4)
+ return;
+
+ len = ((io->buffer[0] << 24)
+ | (io->buffer[1] << 16)
+ | (io->buffer[2] << 8)
+ | io->buffer[3]);
+ if (io->bufptr < 4 + len)
+ return;
+ i = len + 4;
+
+ etok.length = len;
+ etok.value = io->buffer + 4;
+
+ /* Unwrapping the token gives us the original message,
+ which we know is already a single record. */
+ major_status = gss_unwrap (&minor_status, io->gss_context, &etok, &utok, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ gss_failure("decrypting message", major_status, minor_status);
+ } else {
+ /* client_message() wants to NUL terminate it,
+ so copy it to a bigger buffer. */
+ memcpy (msgbuf, utok.value, utok.length);
+ client_message (io, utok.length, msgbuf);
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &utok);
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
if (AUDIT_RMW_IS_MAGIC (io->buffer, io->bufptr+r)) {
uint32_t type, len, seq;
int hver, mver;
@@ -219,6 +566,9 @@
if (io->bufptr < i)
return;
+ /* We have an I-byte message in buffer. */
+ client_message (io, i, io->buffer);
+
} else {
/* At this point, the buffer has IO->BUFPTR+R bytes in it.
The first IO->BUFPTR bytes do not have a LF in them (we've
@@ -235,10 +585,10 @@
return;
i ++;
- }
- /* We have an I-byte message in buffer. */
- client_message (io, i, io->buffer);
+ /* We have an I-byte message in buffer. */
+ client_message (io, i, io->buffer);
+ }
/* Now copy any remaining bytes to the beginning of the
buffer. */
@@ -319,7 +669,6 @@
setsockopt(afd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *)&one, sizeof (int));
setsockopt(afd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (char *)&one, sizeof (int));
setsockopt(afd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (char *)&one, sizeof (int));
- fcntl(afd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK | O_NDELAY);
set_close_on_exec (afd);
client = (struct ev_tcp *) malloc (sizeof (struct ev_tcp));
@@ -338,10 +687,20 @@
client->client_active = 1;
ev_io_init (&(client->io), auditd_tcp_client_handler, afd, EV_READ | EV_ERROR);
- ev_io_start (loop, &(client->io));
memcpy (&client->addr, &aaddr, sizeof (struct sockaddr_in));
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ if (negotiate_credentials (client)) {
+ close (afd);
+ free (client);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ fcntl(afd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK | O_NDELAY);
+ ev_io_start (loop, &(client->io));
+
/* Keep a linked list of active clients. */
client->next = client_chain;
if (client->next)
@@ -399,14 +758,30 @@
min_port = config->tcp_client_min_port;
max_port = config->tcp_client_max_port;
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ if (config->gss_principal) {
+ use_gss = 1;
+ server_acquire_creds(config->gss_principal, &server_creds);
+ }
+#endif
+
return 0;
}
void auditd_tcp_listen_uninit ( struct ev_loop *loop )
{
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ int status;
+#endif
+
ev_io_stop ( loop, &tcp_listen_watcher );
close ( listen_socket );
+#ifdef USE_GSSAPI
+ use_gss = 0;
+ gss_release_cred(&status, &server_creds);
+#endif
+
while (client_chain) {
close_client (client_chain);
}
17 years
- 2
- 1
[PATCH 1/2] audit: fix NUL handling in untrusted strings
by Miloslav Trmač
From: Miloslav Trmac <mitr(a)redhat.com>
audit_string_contains_control() stops checking at the first NUL byte.
If audit_string_contains_control() returns FALSE,
audit_log_n_untrustedstring() submits the complete string - including
the NUL byte and all following bytes, up to the specified maximum length
- to audit_log_n_string(), which copies the data unchanged into the
audit record.
The audit record can thus contain a NUL byte (and some unchecked data
after that). Because the user-space audit daemon treats audit records
as NUL-terminated strings, an untrusted string that is shorter than the
specified maximum length effectively terminates the audit record.
This patch modifies audit_log_n_untrustedstring() to only log the data
before the first NUL byte, if any.
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr(a)redhat.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 4414e93..03b6397 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1362,6 +1362,12 @@ void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string,
skb_put(skb, slen + 2); /* don't include null terminator */
}
+static inline int
+audit_is_control_character(unsigned char c)
+{
+ return c == '"' || c < 0x21 || c > 0x7E;
+}
+
/**
* audit_string_contains_control - does a string need to be logged in hex
* @string: string to be checked
@@ -1371,7 +1377,7 @@ int audit_string_contains_control(const char *string, size_t len)
{
const unsigned char *p;
for (p = string; p < (const unsigned char *)string + len && *p; p++) {
- if (*p == '"' || *p < 0x21 || *p > 0x7e)
+ if (audit_is_control_character(*p))
return 1;
}
return 0;
@@ -1394,10 +1400,15 @@ int audit_string_contains_control(const char *string, size_t len)
void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string,
size_t len)
{
- if (audit_string_contains_control(string, len))
- audit_log_n_hex(ab, string, len);
- else
- audit_log_n_string(ab, string, len);
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ for (p = string; p < (const unsigned char *)string + len && *p; p++) {
+ if (audit_is_control_character(*p)) {
+ audit_log_n_hex(ab, string, len);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ audit_log_n_string(ab, string, p - (const unsigned char *)string);
}
/**
17 years
- 5
- 13
[PATCH] Fix a bug that use option '-p process-id' cannot search out all matched logs
by Peng Haitao
Hello steve,
Use option '-p process-id' cannot search out the log which contains the given process-id and message type is AVC.
For example:
# echo 'type=AVC msg=audit(1221036190.313:3232615): avc: denied { append } for pid=8961 comm="cupsd" path="/var/log/cups/access_log" dev=hda7 ino=1210126 scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:file_t:s0 tclass=file' | ausearch -p 8961
<no matches>
Signed-off-by: Peng Haitao <penght(a)cn.fujitsu.com>
---
src/ausearch-parse.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
1 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ausearch-parse.c b/src/ausearch-parse.c
index d2cb44d..e3ffa8c 100644
--- a/src/ausearch-parse.c
+++ b/src/ausearch-parse.c
@@ -1209,11 +1209,26 @@ static int parse_avc(const lnode *n, search_items *s)
*term = ' ';
}
+ // get pid
+ str = strstr(term, "pid=");
+ if (str) {
+ str = str + 4;
+ term = strchr(str, ' ');
+ if (term == NULL)
+ return 3;
+ *term = 0;
+ errno = 0;
+ s->pid = strtoul(str, NULL, 10);
+ if (errno)
+ return 4;
+ *term = ' ';
+ }
+
if (event_comm && s->comm == NULL) {
// dont do this search unless needed
str = strstr(term, "comm=");
if (str == NULL) {
- rc = 3;
+ rc = 5;
goto err;
}
str += 5;
@@ -1221,7 +1236,7 @@ static int parse_avc(const lnode *n, search_items *s)
str++;
term = strchr(str, '"');
if (term == NULL) {
- rc = 4;
+ rc = 6;
goto err;
}
*term = 0;
@@ -1250,7 +1265,7 @@ static int parse_avc(const lnode *n, search_items *s)
str += 9;
term = strchr(str, ' ');
if (term == NULL) {
- rc = 5;
+ rc = 7;
goto err;
}
*term = 0;
@@ -1266,7 +1281,7 @@ static int parse_avc(const lnode *n, search_items *s)
str += 9;
term = strchr(str, ' ');
if (term == NULL) {
- rc = 6;
+ rc = 8;
goto err;
}
*term = 0;
@@ -1278,7 +1293,7 @@ static int parse_avc(const lnode *n, search_items *s)
// Now get the class...its at the end, so we do things different
str = strstr(term, "tclass=");
if (str == NULL) {
- rc = 7;
+ rc = 9;
goto err;
}
str += 7;
@@ -1292,7 +1307,7 @@ static int parse_avc(const lnode *n, search_items *s)
if (audit_avc_init(s) == 0) {
alist_append(s->avc, &an);
} else {
- rc = 8;
+ rc = 10;
goto err;
}
--
1.5.3
--
Regards
Peng Haitao
17 years
- 2
- 1
[PATCH 2/2] audit: Handle embedded NUL in TTY input auditing
by Miloslav Trmač
From: Miloslav Trmac <mitr(a)redhat.com>
Data read from a TTY can contain an embedded NUL byte (e.g. after
pressing Ctrl-2, or sent to a PTY). After the previous patch, the data
would be logged only up to the first NUL.
This patch modifies the AUDIT_TTY record to always use the hexadecimal
format, which does not terminate at the first NUL byte. The vast
majority of recorded TTY input data will contain either ' ' or '\n', so
the hexadecimal format would have been used anyway.
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr(a)redhat.com>
---
tty_audit.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tty_audit.c b/drivers/char/tty_audit.c
index 3582f43..5787249 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tty_audit.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tty_audit.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void tty_audit_buf_push(struct task_struct *tsk, uid_t loginuid,
get_task_comm(name, tsk);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
audit_log_format(ab, " data=");
- audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, buf->data, buf->valid);
+ audit_log_n_hex(ab, buf->data, buf->valid);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
buf->valid = 0;
17 years
- 2
- 1
FW: Exclusion of Linux "top" command in Audit Rules
by Sincox, Anthony P
I'm still looking for suggestions.
Thanks,
Tony
-----Original Message-----
From: linux-audit-bounces(a)redhat.com [mailto:linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com] On Behalf Of Sincox, Anthony P
Sent: Tuesday, August 26, 2008 12:27 PM
To: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
Subject: Exclusion of Linux "top" command in Audit Rules
Looking for some assistance.
I am trying to keep from logging activity of a Linux command we keep running in the foreground to monitor the progress of a scripting task. We monitor the progress of this task using the Linux "top" command.
I'm trying to figure out how to use the "exclude" filter in the audit rules to exclude logging of this "top" command. I am running on the Fedora 7 O/S. I am also utilizing the nispom.rules for the audit daemon.
The logging I'm receiving is similar to this:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1219770680.762:206): arch=40000003 syscall=5 success=no exit=-13 a0=92df4b a1=8002 a2=bf82f338 a3=92df51 items=1 ppid=8076 pid=8208 auid=500 uid=500 gid=510 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=510 sgid=510 fsgid=510 tty=pts2 comm="top" exe="/usr/bin/top" key="open"
type=CWD msg=audit(1219770680.762:206): cwd="/usr/local/people/tony"
type=PATH msg=audit(1219770680.762:206): item=0 name="/var/run/utmp" inode=2074631 dev=08:02 mode=0100664 ouid=0 ogid=22 rdev=00:00
This is the type of logging I'm trying to exclude. Any ideas would be helpful.
Thanks,
Tony Sincox
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit(a)redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
17 years
- 2
- 1
log deletion of directories?
by Brian LaMere
Trying to find what is deleting a directory (/tmp/xauth). Thought I'd
start with the basics, and just putting a watch on it.
[bel@comsup]:/etc/audit > auditctl -w /testdir/checkdir -p rwxa -k
missingfiles
[bel@comsup]:/etc/audit > auditctl -l|grep missing
LIST_RULES: exit,always dir=/testdir/checkdir (0x11) perm=rwxa
key=missingfiles
[bel@comsup]:/etc/audit > ausearch -k missingfiles
<no matches>
[bel@comsup]:/etc/audit > rmdir /testdir/checkdir
[bel@comsup]:/etc/audit > ausearch -k missingfiles
<no matches>
[bel@comsup]:/etc/audit > auditctl -w /testdir/checkfile -p wrxa -k
missingfiles
[bel@comsup]:/etc/audit > rm /testdir/checkfile
[bel@comsup]:/etc/audit > ausearch -k missingfiles
----
(lots of text here)
Any suggestions on how to get it to do for a directory what it's doing
for the file? I don't want to watch /tmp for adds/removes obviously;
that would be silly. It is indeed a *directory* (regardless whether the
directory contents show up) that I want to watch.
Thanks,
Brian LaMere
17 years
- 2
- 1
[PATCH] add optional heartbeat to remote protocol.
by DJ Delorie
Fourth in a series. Ok, this is taking more patches than I originally
thought ;-)
(http://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2008-August/msg00198.html)
This patch adds a heartbeat feature to both the server and the client.
In the client, a configurable timeout triggers a heartbeat packet
being sent to the server to ensure that the connection is still alive
and that the server is OK. It has an admin-configurable action on
failure.
The server side is a bit more nebulous. It has an admin-defined
maximum idle time, but at the moment all it does if the client is idle
too long is print a message. Suggestions for what to do in that case?
(search for fprintf in the patch below)
DJ
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c
--- pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c 2008-08-29 12:13:30.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c 2008-09-02 22:43:20.000000000 -0400
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/select.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
@@ -236,6 +237,10 @@
config.generic_warning_action, config.generic_warning_exe);
}
+static void send_heartbeat ()
+{
+ relay_event (0, 0);
+}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
@@ -270,9 +275,30 @@
reload_config();
}
+ if (config.heartbeat_timeout > 0) {
+ fd_set rfd;
+ struct timeval tv;
+ int n;
+
+ FD_ZERO (&rfd);
+ FD_SET (fileno (stdin), &rfd);
+ tv.tv_sec = config.heartbeat_timeout;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+
+ n = select (fileno (stdin) + 1, &rfd, NULL, &rfd, &tv);
+
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ /* We attempt a hearbeat if select
+ fails, which may give us more
+ heartbeats than we need. This is
+ safer than too few heartbeats. */
+ send_heartbeat ();
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
- /* Now the event loop */
- while (fgets_unlocked(tmp, MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH, stdin) &&
+ /* Now read the [next] message. */
+ if (fgets_unlocked(tmp, MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH, stdin) &&
hup==0 && stop==0) {
if (!suspend) {
rc = relay_event(tmp, strnlen(tmp,
@@ -436,6 +462,9 @@
{
int rc;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
if (!transport_ok)
if (init_transport ())
return -1;
@@ -492,7 +521,9 @@
goto try_again;
}
- AUDIT_RMW_PACK_HEADER (header, 0, 0, len, sequence_id);
+ type = (s != NULL) ? AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_MESSAGE : AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_HEARTBEAT;
+
+ AUDIT_RMW_PACK_HEADER (header, 0, type, len, sequence_id);
rc = ar_write(sock, header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
if (rc <= 0) {
if (config.network_failure_action == FA_SYSLOG)
@@ -502,13 +533,16 @@
goto try_again;
}
- rc = ar_write(sock, s, len);
- if (rc <= 0) {
- if (config.network_failure_action == FA_SYSLOG)
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "connection to %s closed unexpectedly",
- config.remote_server);
- stop_transport();
- goto try_again;
+ if (s != NULL && len > 0)
+ {
+ rc = ar_write(sock, s, len);
+ if (rc <= 0) {
+ if (config.network_failure_action == FA_SYSLOG)
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "connection to %s closed unexpectedly",
+ config.remote_server);
+ stop_transport();
+ goto try_again;
+ }
}
rc = ar_read (sock, header, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.c trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.c
--- pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.c 2008-08-29 12:13:30.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.c 2008-08-29 15:53:37.000000000 -0400
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
remote_conf_t *config);
static int format_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
remote_conf_t *config);
+static int heartbeat_timeout_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
+ remote_conf_t *config);
static int network_retry_time_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
remote_conf_t *config);
static int max_tries_per_record_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
@@ -100,8 +102,9 @@
{"queue_depth", depth_parser, 0 },
{"format", format_parser, 0 },
{"network_retry_time", network_retry_time_parser, 0 },
- {"max_tries_per_record", max_tries_per_record_parser, 0 },
- {"max_time_per_record", max_time_per_record_parser, 0 },
+ {"max_tries_per_record", max_tries_per_record_parser, 0 },
+ {"max_time_per_record", max_time_per_record_parser, 0 },
+ {"heartbeat_timeout", heartbeat_timeout_parser, 0 },
{"network_failure_action", network_failure_action_parser, 0 },
{"disk_low_action", disk_low_action_parser, 0 },
{"disk_full_action", disk_full_action_parser, 0 },
@@ -161,6 +164,8 @@
config->max_tries_per_record = 3;
config->max_time_per_record = 5;
+ config->heartbeat_timeout = 0;
+
#define IA(x,f) config->x##_action = f; config->x##_exe = NULL
IA(network_failure, FA_STOP);
IA(disk_low, FA_IGNORE);
@@ -562,6 +567,12 @@
return parse_uint (nv, line, &(config->max_time_per_record), 1, INT_MAX);
}
+static int heartbeat_timeout_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
+ remote_conf_t *config)
+{
+ return parse_uint (nv, line, &(config->heartbeat_timeout), 0, INT_MAX);
+}
+
/*
* This function is where we do the integrated check of the audispd config
* options. At this point, all fields have been read. Returns 0 if no
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.h trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.h
--- pristine/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.h 2008-08-29 11:53:55.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/audisp/plugins/remote/remote-config.h 2008-08-29 13:40:15.000000000 -0400
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
unsigned int network_retry_time;
unsigned int max_tries_per_record;
unsigned int max_time_per_record;
+ unsigned int heartbeat_timeout;
failure_action_t network_failure_action;
const char *network_failure_exe;
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/docs/auditd.conf.5 trunk/docs/auditd.conf.5
--- pristine/docs/auditd.conf.5 2008-08-29 16:58:23.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/docs/auditd.conf.5 2008-09-02 17:14:07.000000000 -0400
@@ -235,6 +235,13 @@
client use a priviledged port, specify
.I 1-1023
for this parameter.
+.TP
+.I tcp_client_max_idle
+This parameter indicates the number of seconds that a client may be
+idle (i.e. no data from them at all) before auditd complains. Note
+that this is a global setting, and must be higher than any individual
+client heartbeat setting, preferably by a factor of two. The default
+is zero, which disables this check.
.SH NOTES
In a CAPP environment, the audit trail is considered so important that access to system resources must be denied if an audit trail cannot be created. In this environment, it would be suggested that /var/log/audit be on its own partition. This is to ensure that space detection is accurate and that no other process comes along and consumes part of it.
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/lib/private.h trunk/lib/private.h
--- pristine/lib/private.h 2008-08-15 15:52:05.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/lib/private.h 2008-08-29 16:08:33.000000000 -0400
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
/* Version 0 messages. */
#define AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_MESSAGE 0x00000000
+#define AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_HEARTBEAT 0x00000001
#define AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_ACK 0x40000000
#define AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_ENDING 0x40000001
#define AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_DISKLOW 0x50000001
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd-config.c trunk/src/auditd-config.c
--- pristine/src/auditd-config.c 2008-08-27 18:55:42.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd-config.c 2008-08-29 19:17:21.000000000 -0400
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@
struct daemon_conf *config);
static int tcp_client_ports_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
struct daemon_conf *config);
+static int tcp_client_max_idle_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
+ struct daemon_conf *config);
static int sanity_check(struct daemon_conf *config);
static const struct kw_pair keywords[] =
@@ -138,6 +140,7 @@
{"tcp_listen_port", tcp_listen_port_parser, 0 },
{"tcp_listen_queue", tcp_listen_queue_parser, 0 },
{"tcp_client_ports", tcp_client_ports_parser, 0 },
+ {"tcp_client_max_idle", tcp_client_max_idle_parser, 0 },
{ NULL, NULL }
};
@@ -242,6 +245,7 @@
config->tcp_listen_queue = 5;
config->tcp_client_min_port = 0;
config->tcp_client_max_port = TCP_PORT_MAX;
+ config->tcp_client_max_idle = 0;
}
static log_test_t log_test = TEST_AUDITD;
@@ -1290,6 +1294,47 @@
return 0;
}
+static int tcp_client_max_idle_parser(struct nv_pair *nv, int line,
+ struct daemon_conf *config)
+{
+ const char *ptr = nv->value;
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ audit_msg(LOG_DEBUG, "tcp_client_max_idle_parser called with: %s",
+ nv->value);
+
+ /* check that all chars are numbers */
+ for (i=0; ptr[i]; i++) {
+ if (!isdigit(ptr[i])) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "Value %s should only be numbers - line %d",
+ nv->value, line);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* convert to unsigned int */
+ errno = 0;
+ i = strtoul(nv->value, NULL, 10);
+ if (errno) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "Error converting string to a number (%s) - line %d",
+ strerror(errno), line);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Check its range. While this value is technically
+ unlimited, it's limited by the kernel, and we limit it here
+ for sanity. */
+ if (i > INT_MAX) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "Error - converted number (%s) is too large - line %d",
+ nv->value, line);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ config->tcp_client_max_idle = (unsigned int)i;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* This function is where we do the integrated check of the audit config
* options. At this point, all fields have been read. Returns 0 if no
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd-config.h trunk/src/auditd-config.h
--- pristine/src/auditd-config.h 2008-08-15 15:52:05.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd-config.h 2008-09-02 22:47:33.000000000 -0400
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
unsigned long tcp_listen_queue;
unsigned long tcp_client_min_port;
unsigned long tcp_client_max_port;
+ unsigned long tcp_client_max_idle;
};
void set_allow_links(int allow);
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@
void shutdown_config(void);
void free_config(struct daemon_conf *config);
+void periodic_reconfigure(void);
#endif
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd-event.c trunk/src/auditd-event.c
--- pristine/src/auditd-event.c 2008-08-29 11:53:55.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd-event.c 2008-09-02 22:40:12.000000000 -0400
@@ -154,28 +154,30 @@
rep->ack_socket = 0;
rep->sequence_id = 0;
- switch (consumer_data.config->log_format)
- {
- case LF_RAW:
- buf = format_raw(&rep->reply, consumer_data.config);
- break;
- case LF_NOLOG:
- return;
- default:
- audit_msg(LOG_ERR,
- "Illegal log format detected %d",
- consumer_data.config->log_format);
- return;
- }
+ if (rep->reply.type != AUDIT_DAEMON_RECONFIG) {
+ switch (consumer_data.config->log_format)
+ {
+ case LF_RAW:
+ buf = format_raw(&rep->reply, consumer_data.config);
+ break;
+ case LF_NOLOG:
+ return;
+ default:
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "Illegal log format detected %d",
+ consumer_data.config->log_format);
+ return;
+ }
- len = strlen (buf);
- if (len < MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH - 1)
- memcpy (rep->reply.msg.data, buf, len+1);
- else
- {
- /* FIXME: is truncation the right thing to do? */
- memcpy (rep->reply.msg.data, buf, MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH-1);
- rep->reply.msg.data[MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH-1] = 0;
+ len = strlen (buf);
+ if (len < MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH - 1)
+ memcpy (rep->reply.msg.data, buf, len+1);
+ else
+ {
+ /* FIXME: is truncation the right thing to do? */
+ memcpy (rep->reply.msg.data, buf, MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH-1);
+ rep->reply.msg.data[MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH-1] = 0;
+ }
}
rep->next = NULL; /* new packet goes at end - so zero this */
@@ -296,14 +298,29 @@
static unsigned int count = 0L;
static void handle_event(struct auditd_consumer_data *data)
{
+ char *buf = data->head->reply.msg.data;
+
if (data->head->reply.type == AUDIT_DAEMON_RECONFIG) {
reconfigure(data);
+ switch (consumer_data.config->log_format)
+ {
+ case LF_RAW:
+ buf = format_raw(&data->head->reply, consumer_data.config);
+ break;
+ case LF_NOLOG:
+ return;
+ default:
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "Illegal log format detected %d",
+ consumer_data.config->log_format);
+ return;
+ }
} else if (data->head->reply.type == AUDIT_DAEMON_ROTATE) {
rotate_logs_now(data);
}
if (!logging_suspended) {
- write_to_log(data->head->reply.msg.data, data);
+ write_to_log(buf, data);
/* See if we need to flush to disk manually */
if (data->config->flush == FT_INCREMENTAL) {
@@ -1203,6 +1220,11 @@
logging_suspended = saved_suspend;
}
+ // TCP listener
+
+ oconf->tcp_client_max_idle = nconf->tcp_client_max_idle;
+ periodic_reconfigure ();
+
// Next document the results
srand(time(NULL));
seq_num = rand()%10000;
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd-listen.c trunk/src/auditd-listen.c
--- pristine/src/auditd-listen.c 2008-08-29 16:58:23.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd-listen.c 2008-09-02 22:39:49.000000000 -0400
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct ev_tcp *next, *prev;
int bufptr;
+ int client_active;
unsigned char buffer [MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH + 17];
} ev_tcp;
@@ -96,6 +97,24 @@
free (client);
}
+static int ar_write (int sock, const void *buf, int len)
+{
+ int rc = 0, w;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ do {
+ w = write(sock, buf, len);
+ } while (w < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+ if (w < 0)
+ return w;
+ if (w == 0)
+ break;
+ rc += w;
+ len -= w;
+ buf = (const void *)((const char *)buf + w);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
static void client_message (struct ev_tcp *io, unsigned int length, unsigned char *header)
{
unsigned char ch;
@@ -109,7 +128,12 @@
header[length] = 0;
if (length > 1 && header[length-1] == '\n')
header[length-1] = 0;
- enqueue_formatted_event (header+AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE, io->io.fd, seq);
+ if (type == AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_HEARTBEAT) {
+ unsigned char ack[AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE];
+ AUDIT_RMW_PACK_HEADER (ack, 0, AUDIT_RMW_TYPE_ACK, 0, seq);
+ ar_write (io->io.fd, ack, AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE);
+ } else
+ enqueue_formatted_event (header+AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE, io->io.fd, seq);
header[length] = ch;
} else {
header[length] = 0;
@@ -125,6 +149,8 @@
int i, r;
int total_this_call = 0;
+ io->client_active = 1;
+
/* The socket is non-blocking, but we have a limited buffer
size. In the event that we get a packet that's bigger than
our buffer, we need to read it in multiple parts. Thus, we
@@ -289,6 +315,8 @@
memset (client, 0, sizeof (struct ev_tcp));
+ client->client_active = 1;
+
ev_io_init (&(client->io), auditd_tcp_client_handler, afd, EV_READ | EV_ERROR);
ev_io_start (loop, &(client->io));
@@ -359,3 +387,19 @@
close_client (client_chain);
}
}
+
+void auditd_tcp_listen_check_idle (struct ev_loop *loop )
+{
+ struct ev_tcp *ev;
+ int active;
+
+ for (ev = client_chain; ev; ev = ev->next) {
+ active = ev->client_active;
+ ev->client_active = 0;
+ if (active)
+ continue;
+
+ fprintf (stderr, "client %s idle too long\n",
+ sockaddr_to_ip (&(ev->addr)));
+ }
+}
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd-listen.h trunk/src/auditd-listen.h
--- pristine/src/auditd-listen.h 2008-08-27 18:55:42.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd-listen.h 2008-08-29 19:13:28.000000000 -0400
@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@
int auditd_tcp_listen_init ( struct ev_loop *loop, struct daemon_conf *config );
void auditd_tcp_listen_uninit ( struct ev_loop *loop );
+void auditd_tcp_listen_check_idle ( struct ev_loop *loop );
#endif
diff -x .svn -U 3 -r pristine/src/auditd.c trunk/src/auditd.c
--- pristine/src/auditd.c 2008-08-29 12:13:30.000000000 -0400
+++ trunk/src/auditd.c 2008-09-02 22:39:23.000000000 -0400
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
static struct auditd_reply_list *rep = NULL;
static int hup_info_requested = 0, usr1_info_requested = 0;
static char subj[SUBJ_LEN];
+static struct ev_periodic periodic_watcher;
/* Local function prototypes */
int send_audit_event(int type, const char *str);
@@ -430,6 +431,25 @@
}
}
+static void periodic_handler( struct ev_loop *loop, struct ev_periodic *per, int revents )
+{
+ if (config.tcp_client_max_idle)
+ auditd_tcp_listen_check_idle (loop);
+}
+
+void periodic_reconfigure ()
+{
+ int i;
+ struct ev_loop *loop = ev_default_loop (EVFLAG_AUTO);
+ if (config.tcp_client_max_idle) {
+ ev_periodic_set (&periodic_watcher, ev_now (loop),
+ config.tcp_client_max_idle, NULL);
+ ev_periodic_start (loop, &periodic_watcher);
+ } else {
+ ev_periodic_stop (loop, &periodic_watcher);
+ }
+}
+
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct sigaction sa;
@@ -697,6 +717,11 @@
ev_signal_init (&sigchld_watcher, child_handler, SIGCHLD);
ev_signal_start (loop, &sigchld_watcher);
+ ev_periodic_init (&periodic_watcher, periodic_handler,
+ 0, config.tcp_client_max_idle, NULL);
+ if (config.tcp_client_max_idle)
+ ev_periodic_start (loop, &periodic_watcher);
+
if (auditd_tcp_listen_init (loop, &config)) {
tell_parent (FAILURE);
stop = 1;
17 years
- 2
- 1
[PATCH] remove redundant code
by Peng Haitao
Hello steve,
AUDIT_LAST_EVENT is defined two times in libaudit.h, so the redundant code should be removed.
Signed-off-by: Peng Haitao <penght(a)cn.fujitsu.com>
---
lib/libaudit.h | 1 -
1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/libaudit.h b/lib/libaudit.h
index 9c274d8..bf9e22d 100644
--- a/lib/libaudit.h
+++ b/lib/libaudit.h
@@ -115,7 +115,6 @@ extern "C" {
#ifndef AUDIT_EOE
#define AUDIT_EOE 1320 /* End of event */
#endif
-#define AUDIT_LAST_EVENT 1399
#define AUDIT_FIRST_SELINUX 1400
#define AUDIT_LAST_SELINUX 1499
--
1.5.3
--
Regards
Peng Haitao
17 years
- 2
- 1
Re: audit for ARM arch
by Amy Griffis
OneGun Lee wrote: [Wed Aug 20 2008, 09:40:48PM EDT]
> The audit system for arm architecture doesn't exist in the Linux kernel.
> But, other architecture's audit system is available. (i386, ppc, mips...)
> and.. I think taht "audit system in kernel" is equal to "LAuS".
>
> Is it wrong?
The Linux kernel audit system is actually called Lightweight Audit
Framework. The LAuS system was maintained for a while as an
out-of-tree patch. At this point you want to enable the Lightweight
Audit Framework for the ARM architecture.
Unfortunately, there hasn't been a lot of public documentation written
that I'm aware of. Here are a couple of things that were written early
on in the project.
http://lwn.net/Articles/73623/
and
http://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2004-August/msg00000.html
A lot of features have been added since then and some things may have
been changed, but that should at least give you an overview of how it
works. Those docs don't really cover the architecture-specific
parts though.
I did a little work on the ia64 audit code, so I'll try to write a bit
about that. The two architecture-specific pieces are syscall
interception and syscall classes. Syscall interception is implemented
alongside syscall tracing. You'll need to:
1. Define the TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT flag, which indicates that syscall
auditing is active for a task. The flag is used to determine
whether to call audit_syscall_entry, and also for any special
handling required when the code doesn't follow the normal
paths: e.g. signal handling, streamlined syscalls, etc. You'll
also want to make sure the flag is properly preserved when
a child is created.
I'm not sure how fully syscall tracing has been implemented for
ARM, but if the implementation is complete, the
TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE flag should be a good indicator of where you
need to add handling for TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT.
2. Make calls to audit_syscall_entry() and audit_syscall_exit() at
the beginning and end of syscall processing.
audit_syscall_entry() requires certain parameters: architecture
flag, syscall number and syscall args from the appropriate
registers. audit_syscall_exit() requires an indication of
operation success and syscall return value. Audit expects
success values to be defined as 0=fail, 1=success. When the
syscall operation failed, the return value should be the error
code, represented as a negative number.
3. You'll also need to add AUDIT_ARCH to arch/arm/Kconfig to tell
the build system that ARM has audit support.
4. Syscall classes let you specify certain sets of system calls in
a single audit rule. They're somewhat involved, and since this
is already getting long, it might be better to get the above
parts working first and then look at syscall classes. You'll
probably have to define a few stub functions and/or comment out
some code to get things to build. But you should be able to
test a lot of audit functionality without syscall classes.
Looking at the other architectures' audit code is a good idea. I'm
also cc'ing the linux-audit mailing list, which is a good place to ask
questions and post patches. Here's the subscription information:
http://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Amy
17 years
- 2
- 1
[PATCH] Fix a bug of producing summary reports of the log which type is MAC_IPSEC_EVENT
by Peng Haitao
Hello steve,
the log which type is MAC_IPSEC_EVENT, MAC_UNLBL_STCADD or MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL, aureport cannot report it.
Signed-off-by: Peng Haitao <penght(a)cn.fujitsu.com>
---
src/aureport-scan.c | 8 ++++----
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/aureport-scan.c b/src/aureport-scan.c
index 0d880b0..7803430 100644
--- a/src/aureport-scan.c
+++ b/src/aureport-scan.c
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ static int per_event_detailed(llist *l)
if (report_detail == D_DETAILED) {
if (list_find_msg_range(l,
AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
- AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD)) {
+ AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL)) {
print_per_event_item(l);
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static int per_event_detailed(llist *l)
rc = 1;
} else if (list_find_msg_range(l,
AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
- AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD)) {
+ AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL)) {
print_per_event_item(l);
rc = 1;
}
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static void do_summary_total(llist *l)
sd.changes++;
list_first(l);
if (list_find_msg_range(l, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
- AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD))
+ AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL))
sd.changes++;
// add acct changes
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static void do_summary_total(llist *l)
// MAC
list_first(l);
if (list_find_msg_range(l, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
- AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD))
+ AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL))
sd.mac++;
if (list_find_msg_range(l, AUDIT_FIRST_USER_LSPP_MSG,
AUDIT_LAST_USER_LSPP_MSG))
--
1.5.3
--
Regards
Peng Haitao
17 years
- 2
- 1