1:46 a.m.
The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid
application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event
really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly
records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
set*id.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
The first to eighth just massage the logic to make it easier to
understand. Some of them could be squashed together.
The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth.
It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of
"!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)"
to
"!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))"
but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think
I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand.
The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging
based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some
duplication in the logic.
Passes: (ltp 20170516)
./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
./runltp -f securebits
./runltp -f cap_bounds
./runltp -f filecaps
make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs)
v4
rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes
minor local func renames
v3
refactor into several sub-functions
convert most macros to inline funcs
v2
use macros to clarify intent of calculations
fix original logic error
address additional audit logging conditions
Richard Guy Briggs (10):
capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
capabilities: move audit log decision to function
capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
capabilities: invert logic for clarity
capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
security/commoncap.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
1:46 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
Factor out the case of privileged root from the function
cap_bprm_set_creds() to make the latter easier to read and analyse.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index d8e26fb..927fe93 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -472,6 +472,39 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_c
return rc;
}
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
+ bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
+{
+ const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+ struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
+
+ if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
+ return;
+ /*
+ * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
+ * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
+ * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
+ */
+ if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid,
root_uid)) {
+ warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
+ * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
+ * capability sets for the file.
+ *
+ * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
+ */
+ if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
+ /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
+ new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
+ old->cap_inheritable);
+ }
+ if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
+ *effective = true;
+}
+
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -484,46 +517,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- bool effective, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+ bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
- effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
- if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
- /*
- * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
- * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
- * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
- */
- if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid,
root_uid)) {
- warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
- goto skip;
- }
- /*
- * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
- * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
- * capability sets for the file.
- *
- * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
- */
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
- /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
- new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
- old->cap_inheritable);
- }
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
- effective = true;
- }
-skip:
+ handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
--
1.7.1
1:05 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
On Tue, 5 Sep 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
Factor out the case of privileged root from the function
cap_bprm_set_creds() to make the latter easier to read and analyse.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
--
James Morris
<jmorris(a)namei.org>
2:42 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Factor out the case of privileged root from the function
cap_bprm_set_creds() to make the latter easier to read and analyse.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Note below...
---
security/commoncap.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index d8e26fb..927fe93 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -472,6 +472,39 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_c
return rc;
}
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
+ bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
If you do a v5 of this, I think it'd be nice to add a comment here
describing what is being checked and the side-effects (i.e.
cap_permitted changes, when effective is set, etc).
-Kees
+{
+ const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+ struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
+
+ if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
+ return;
+ /*
+ * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
+ * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
+ * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
+ */
+ if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
+ warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
+ * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
+ * capability sets for the file.
+ *
+ * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
+ */
+ if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
+ /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
+ new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
+ old->cap_inheritable);
+ }
+ if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
+ *effective = true;
+}
+
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -484,46 +517,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- bool effective, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+ bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
- effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
- if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
- /*
- * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
- * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
- * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
- */
- if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
- warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
- goto skip;
- }
- /*
- * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
- * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
- * capability sets for the file.
- *
- * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
- */
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
- /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
- new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
- old->cap_inheritable);
- }
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
- effective = true;
- }
-skip:
+ handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
1:46 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the
negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 927fe93..cf6e2b0 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -505,6 +505,12 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_cap,
*effective = true;
}
+#define __cap_gained(field, target, source) \
+ !cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field)
+#define __cap_grew(target, source, cred) \
+ !cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
+#define __cap_full(field, cred) \
+ cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -533,10 +539,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
- if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
-
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
*
@@ -544,8 +549,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid);
- if ((is_setid ||
- !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
+ if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
!ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
@@ -595,8 +599,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
- if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
- if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
+ if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
+ if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
@@ -616,7 +620,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
} else if (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
if (effective ||
- !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient))
+ __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
}
--
1.7.1
2:57 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of
the
negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
I still find these hard to read, but it IS better than it was before. ;)
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
---
security/commoncap.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 927fe93..cf6e2b0 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -505,6 +505,12 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_cap,
*effective = true;
}
+#define __cap_gained(field, target, source) \
+ !cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field)
+#define __cap_grew(target, source, cred) \
+ !cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
+#define __cap_full(field, cred) \
+ cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -533,10 +539,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
- if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
-
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
*
@@ -544,8 +549,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid,
old->gid);
- if ((is_setid ||
- !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
+ if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
!ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
@@ -595,8 +599,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
- if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
- if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
+ if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
+ if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
@@ -616,7 +620,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
} else if (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
if (effective ||
- !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient))
+ __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
}
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
1:46 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities
since the entire source file is about capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index cf6e2b0..623f251 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
struct linux_binprm *bprm,
bool *effective,
- bool *has_cap)
+ bool *has_fcap)
{
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
unsigned i;
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
*caps,
*effective = true;
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
- *has_cap = true;
+ *has_fcap = true;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct
cpu_vfs_cap_data
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
* constructed by execve().
*/
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_c
goto out;
}
- rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
+ rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_c
return rc;
}
-static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_cap,
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
- if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid,
root_uid)) {
+ if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid,
root_uid)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
return;
}
@@ -523,20 +523,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+ bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
- ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
+ ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
- handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
+ handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
- if (has_cap || is_setid)
+ if (has_fcap || is_setid)
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
/*
--
1.7.1
1:15 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file
capabilities
since the entire source file is about capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
-Kees
---
security/commoncap.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index cf6e2b0..623f251 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
struct linux_binprm *bprm,
bool *effective,
- bool *has_cap)
+ bool *has_fcap)
{
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
unsigned i;
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
*caps,
*effective = true;
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
- *has_cap = true;
+ *has_fcap = true;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct
cpu_vfs_cap_data
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
* constructed by execve().
*/
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_c
goto out;
}
- rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
+ rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_c
return rc;
}
-static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_cap,
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
- if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
+ if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
return;
}
@@ -523,20 +523,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+ bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
- ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
+ ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
- handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
+ handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
- if (has_cap || is_setid)
+ if (has_fcap || is_setid)
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
/*
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
1:46 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT
easier to read.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 9 +++++----
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 623f251..1904f49 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -472,14 +472,14 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_f
return rc;
}
+static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
+
static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
- return;
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
- handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
+ if (root_privileged())
+ handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
- issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
+ !root_privileged()) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
--
1.7.1
1:18 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT
easier to read.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 9 +++++----
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 623f251..1904f49 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -472,14 +472,14 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
*effective, bool *has_f
return rc;
}
+static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
+
static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
- return;
Seems like it'd be better to just leave this check here (with the new
inline name). But if there's no v5, then consider it:
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
-Kees
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
- handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
+ if (root_privileged())
+ handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
- issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
+ !root_privileged()) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
1:46 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
Introduce a number of inlines to make the use of the negation of
uid_eq() easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 1904f49..d37ebec 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -474,6 +474,15 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_f
static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
+static inline bool __is_real(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return uid_eq(cred->uid, uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_eff(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return uid_eq(cred->euid, uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_suid(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return !__is_real(uid, cred) && __is_eff(uid, cred); }
+
static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
{
@@ -485,7 +494,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_fcap,
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
- if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid,
root_uid)) {
+ if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
return;
}
@@ -496,12 +505,12 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_fcap,
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
+ if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
+ if (__is_eff(root_uid, new))
*effective = true;
}
@@ -511,6 +520,13 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_fcap,
!cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
#define __cap_full(field, cred) \
cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
+
+static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{ return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
+
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -548,7 +564,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*
* In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
*/
- is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid);
+ is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old);
if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
@@ -602,7 +618,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
- !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
+ !__is_eff(root_uid, new) || !__is_real(root_uid, new) ||
!root_privileged()) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -619,7 +635,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->cap_elevated = 0;
if (is_setid) {
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
- } else if (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
+ } else if (!__is_real(root_uid, new)) {
if (effective ||
__cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
--
1.7.1
1:22 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Introduce a number of inlines to make the use of the negation of
uid_eq() easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
-Kees
---
security/commoncap.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 1904f49..d37ebec 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -474,6 +474,15 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_f
static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
+static inline bool __is_real(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return uid_eq(cred->uid, uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_eff(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return uid_eq(cred->euid, uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_suid(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return !__is_real(uid, cred) && __is_eff(uid, cred); }
+
static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
{
@@ -485,7 +494,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_fcap,
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
- if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
+ if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
return;
}
@@ -496,12 +505,12 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_fcap,
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
+ if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
+ if (__is_eff(root_uid, new))
*effective = true;
}
@@ -511,6 +520,13 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_fcap,
!cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
#define __cap_full(field, cred) \
cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
+
+static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{ return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
+
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -548,7 +564,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*
* In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
*/
- is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid,
old->gid);
+ is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old);
if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
@@ -602,7 +618,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
- !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
+ !__is_eff(root_uid, new) || !__is_real(root_uid, new) ||
!root_privileged()) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -619,7 +635,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->cap_elevated = 0;
if (is_setid) {
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
- } else if (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
+ } else if (!__is_real(root_uid, new)) {
if (effective ||
__cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
1:46 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function
Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the
complexity in one place.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index d37ebec..eae7431 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -527,6 +527,32 @@ static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
+/*
+ * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
+ *
+ * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
+ * 1) cap_effective has all caps
+ * 2) we are root
+ * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
+ * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
+ *
+ * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
+ * that is interesting information to audit.
+ */
+static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
+{
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred)) {
+ if (!__cap_full(effective, cred) ||
+ !__is_eff(root, cred) || !__is_real(root, cred) ||
+ !root_privileged()) {
+ ret = true;
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -604,26 +630,10 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
- /*
- * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
- *
- * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
- * 1) cap_effective has all caps
- * 2) we are root
- * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
- * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
- *
- * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
- * that is interesting information to audit.
- */
- if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
- if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
- !__is_eff(root_uid, new) || !__is_real(root_uid, new) ||
- !root_privileged()) {
- ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- }
+ if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) {
+ ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
--
1.7.1
1:23 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the
complexity in one place.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
-Kees
---
security/commoncap.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index d37ebec..eae7431 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -527,6 +527,32 @@ static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
+/*
+ * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
+ *
+ * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
+ * 1) cap_effective has all caps
+ * 2) we are root
+ * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
+ * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
+ *
+ * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
+ * that is interesting information to audit.
+ */
+static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
+{
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred)) {
+ if (!__cap_full(effective, cred) ||
+ !__is_eff(root, cred) || !__is_real(root, cred) ||
+ !root_privileged()) {
+ ret = true;
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -604,26 +630,10 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
- /*
- * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
- *
- * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
- * 1) cap_effective has all caps
- * 2) we are root
- * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
- * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
- *
- * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
- * that is interesting information to audit.
- */
- if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
- if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
- !__is_eff(root_uid, new) || !__is_real(root_uid, new) ||
- !root_privileged()) {
- ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- }
+ if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) {
+ ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
1:46 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
Remove a layer of conditional logic to make the use of conditions
easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 23 ++++++++++-------------
1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index eae7431..cf95d73 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -543,13 +543,12 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t
root)
{
bool ret = false;
- if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred)) {
- if (!__cap_full(effective, cred) ||
- !__is_eff(root, cred) || !__is_real(root, cred) ||
- !root_privileged()) {
- ret = true;
- }
- }
+ if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
+ (!__cap_full(effective, cred) ||
+ !__is_eff(root, cred) ||
+ !__is_real(root, cred) ||
+ !root_privileged()))
+ ret = true;
return ret;
}
@@ -643,13 +642,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
/* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */
bprm->cap_elevated = 0;
- if (is_setid) {
+ if (is_setid ||
+ (!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&
+ (effective ||
+ __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
- } else if (!__is_real(root_uid, new)) {
- if (effective ||
- __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))
- bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
- }
return 0;
}
--
1.7.1
1:26 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Remove a layer of conditional logic to make the use of conditions
easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
-Kees
---
security/commoncap.c | 23 ++++++++++-------------
1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index eae7431..cf95d73 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -543,13 +543,12 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t
root)
{
bool ret = false;
- if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred)) {
- if (!__cap_full(effective, cred) ||
- !__is_eff(root, cred) || !__is_real(root, cred) ||
- !root_privileged()) {
- ret = true;
- }
- }
+ if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
+ (!__cap_full(effective, cred) ||
+ !__is_eff(root, cred) ||
+ !__is_real(root, cred) ||
+ !root_privileged()))
+ ret = true;
return ret;
}
@@ -643,13 +642,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
/* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */
bprm->cap_elevated = 0;
- if (is_setid) {
+ if (is_setid ||
+ (!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&
+ (effective ||
+ __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
- } else if (!__is_real(root_uid, new)) {
- if (effective ||
- __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))
- bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
- }
return 0;
}
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
1:46 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity
The way the logic was presented, it was awkward to read and verify.
Invert the logic using DeMorgan's Law to be more easily able to read and
understand.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++----
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index cf95d73..7e8041d 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -544,10 +544,10 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t
root)
bool ret = false;
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
- (!__cap_full(effective, cred) ||
- !__is_eff(root, cred) ||
- !__is_real(root, cred) ||
- !root_privileged()))
+ !(__cap_full(effective, cred) &&
+ __is_eff(root, cred) &&
+ __is_real(root, cred) &&
+ root_privileged()))
ret = true;
return ret;
}
--
1.7.1
1:27 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
The way the logic was presented, it was awkward to read and verify.
Invert the logic using DeMorgan's Law to be more easily able to read and
understand.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
-Kees
---
security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++----
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index cf95d73..7e8041d 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -544,10 +544,10 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t
root)
bool ret = false;
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
- (!__cap_full(effective, cred) ||
- !__is_eff(root, cred) ||
- !__is_real(root, cred) ||
- !root_privileged()))
+ !(__cap_full(effective, cred) &&
+ __is_eff(root, cred) &&
+ __is_real(root, cred) &&
+ root_privileged()))
ret = true;
return ret;
}
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
1:46 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real
root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root
applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
id.
Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
unnecessary record.
Ref: commit 3fc689e96c0c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 5 ++---
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 7e8041d..759f3fa 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
- * 2) we are root
+ * 2) we became root *OR* are were already root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
@@ -545,8 +545,7 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
!(__cap_full(effective, cred) &&
- __is_eff(root, cred) &&
- __is_real(root, cred) &&
+ (__is_eff(root, cred) || __is_real(root, cred)) &&
root_privileged()))
ret = true;
return ret;
--
1.7.1
1:34 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both
real
root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root
applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
id.
Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
unnecessary record.
Ref: commit 3fc689e96c0c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
-Kees
---
security/commoncap.c | 5 ++---
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 7e8041d..759f3fa 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
- * 2) we are root
+ * 2) we became root *OR* are were already root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
@@ -545,8 +545,7 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
!(__cap_full(effective, cred) &&
- __is_eff(root, cred) &&
- __is_real(root, cred) &&
+ (__is_eff(root, cred) || __is_real(root, cred)) &&
root_privileged()))
ret = true;
return ret;
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
5:11 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both
real
root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root
applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
id.
Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
unnecessary record.
Ref: commit 3fc689e96c0c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 5 ++---
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Trying to sort this out, I've decided that I dislike the capabilities
code as much as I dislike the audit code.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 7e8041d..759f3fa 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
- * 2) we are root
+ * 2) we became root *OR* are were already root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
@@ -545,8 +545,7 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
!(__cap_full(effective, cred) &&
- __is_eff(root, cred) &&
- __is_real(root, cred) &&
+ (__is_eff(root, cred) || __is_real(root, cred)) &&
root_privileged()))
ret = true;
return ret;
--
1.7.1
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo(a)vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
5:25 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 3:11 PM, Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> wrote:
On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs
<rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real
> root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
> BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root
> applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
> necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
> records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
> id.
>
> Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
> unnecessary record.
>
> Ref: commit 3fc689e96c0c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
> ---
> security/commoncap.c | 5 ++---
> 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Trying to sort this out, I've decided that I dislike the capabilities
code as much as I dislike the audit code.
Read binfmt_elf.c and your journey towards the dark side will be complete!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
5:27 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> wrote:
On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 3:11 PM, Paul Moore
<paul(a)paul-moore.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>> Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real
>> root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
>> BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root
>> applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
>> necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
>> records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
>> id.
>>
>> Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
>> unnecessary record.
>>
>> Ref: commit 3fc689e96c0c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
>> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
>> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
>> ---
>> security/commoncap.c | 5 ++---
>> 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> Trying to sort this out, I've decided that I dislike the capabilities
> code as much as I dislike the audit code.
Read binfmt_elf.c and your journey towards the dark side will be complete!
It's only Wednesday, I'm not sure want to inflict that much self-harm
on myself by mid-week.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
1:46 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
The existing condition tested for process effective capabilities set by
file attributes but intended to ignore the change if the result was
unsurprisingly an effective full set in the case root is special with a
setuid root executable file and we are root.
Stated again:
- When you execute a setuid root application, it is no surprise and
expected that it got all capabilities, so we do not want capabilities
recorded.
if (pE_grew && !(pE_fullset && (eff_root || real_root) &&
root_priveleged) )
Now make sure we cover other cases:
- If something prevented a setuid root app getting all capabilities and
it wound up with one capability only, then it is a surprise and should
be logged. When it is a setuid root file, we only want capabilities
when the process does not get full capabilities..
root_priveleged && setuid_root && !pE_fullset
- Similarly if a non-setuid program does pick up capabilities due to
file system based capabilities, then we want to know what capabilities
were picked up. When it has file system based capabilities we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && (has_fcap && pP_gained)
- If it is a non-setuid file and it gets ambient capabilities, we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && pA_gained
- These last two are combined into one due to the common first parameter.
Related: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 759f3fa..afebfd3 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
/*
- * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
+ * 1) Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
@@ -538,16 +538,31 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
+ *
+ * A number of other conditions require logging:
+ * 2) something prevented setuid root getting all caps
+ * 3) non-setuid root gets fcaps
+ * 4) non-setuid root gets ambient
*/
-static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
+static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ kuid_t root, bool has_fcap)
{
bool ret = false;
- if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
- !(__cap_full(effective, cred) &&
- (__is_eff(root, cred) || __is_real(root, cred)) &&
- root_privileged()))
+ if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&
+ !(__cap_full(effective, new) &&
+ (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&
+ root_privileged())) ||
+ (root_privileged() &&
+ __is_suid(root, new) &&
+ !__cap_full(effective, new)) ||
+ (!__is_setuid(new, old) &&
+ ((has_fcap &&
+ __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||
+ __cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))
+
ret = true;
+
return ret;
}
@@ -628,7 +643,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
- if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) {
+ if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
--
1.7.1
1:36 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
The existing condition tested for process effective capabilities set
by
file attributes but intended to ignore the change if the result was
unsurprisingly an effective full set in the case root is special with a
setuid root executable file and we are root.
Stated again:
- When you execute a setuid root application, it is no surprise and
expected that it got all capabilities, so we do not want capabilities
recorded.
if (pE_grew && !(pE_fullset && (eff_root || real_root) &&
root_priveleged) )
Now make sure we cover other cases:
- If something prevented a setuid root app getting all capabilities and
it wound up with one capability only, then it is a surprise and should
be logged. When it is a setuid root file, we only want capabilities
when the process does not get full capabilities..
root_priveleged && setuid_root && !pE_fullset
- Similarly if a non-setuid program does pick up capabilities due to
file system based capabilities, then we want to know what capabilities
were picked up. When it has file system based capabilities we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && (has_fcap && pP_gained)
- If it is a non-setuid file and it gets ambient capabilities, we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && pA_gained
- These last two are combined into one due to the common first parameter.
Related: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
-Kees
---
security/commoncap.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 759f3fa..afebfd3 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
/*
- * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
+ * 1) Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
@@ -538,16 +538,31 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
+ *
+ * A number of other conditions require logging:
+ * 2) something prevented setuid root getting all caps
+ * 3) non-setuid root gets fcaps
+ * 4) non-setuid root gets ambient
*/
-static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
+static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ kuid_t root, bool has_fcap)
{
bool ret = false;
- if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
- !(__cap_full(effective, cred) &&
- (__is_eff(root, cred) || __is_real(root, cred)) &&
- root_privileged()))
+ if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&
+ !(__cap_full(effective, new) &&
+ (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&
+ root_privileged())) ||
+ (root_privileged() &&
+ __is_suid(root, new) &&
+ !__cap_full(effective, new)) ||
+ (!__is_setuid(new, old) &&
+ ((has_fcap &&
+ __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||
+ __cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))
+
ret = true;
+
return ret;
}
@@ -628,7 +643,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
- if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) {
+ if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
5:22 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V4 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
The existing condition tested for process effective capabilities set
by
file attributes but intended to ignore the change if the result was
unsurprisingly an effective full set in the case root is special with a
setuid root executable file and we are root.
Stated again:
- When you execute a setuid root application, it is no surprise and
expected that it got all capabilities, so we do not want capabilities
recorded.
if (pE_grew && !(pE_fullset && (eff_root || real_root) &&
root_priveleged) )
Now make sure we cover other cases:
- If something prevented a setuid root app getting all capabilities and
it wound up with one capability only, then it is a surprise and should
be logged. When it is a setuid root file, we only want capabilities
when the process does not get full capabilities..
root_priveleged && setuid_root && !pE_fullset
- Similarly if a non-setuid program does pick up capabilities due to
file system based capabilities, then we want to know what capabilities
were picked up. When it has file system based capabilities we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && (has_fcap && pP_gained)
- If it is a non-setuid file and it gets ambient capabilities, we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && pA_gained
- These last two are combined into one due to the common first parameter.
Related: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
I really don't like how this patchset has gotten so large, I would
have preferred to see a patch (or two, or three, ...) that made the
minimal number of changes necessary to fix the audit problem and then
a follow-on patchset to do the rework you felt was worthwhile.
Reviewing this was a real pain and I have very little confidence in my
conclusions, please try to not do this again.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 759f3fa..afebfd3 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
/*
- * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
+ * 1) Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
@@ -538,16 +538,31 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
+ *
+ * A number of other conditions require logging:
+ * 2) something prevented setuid root getting all caps
+ * 3) non-setuid root gets fcaps
+ * 4) non-setuid root gets ambient
*/
-static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
+static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ kuid_t root, bool has_fcap)
{
bool ret = false;
- if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
- !(__cap_full(effective, cred) &&
- (__is_eff(root, cred) || __is_real(root, cred)) &&
- root_privileged()))
+ if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&
+ !(__cap_full(effective, new) &&
+ (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&
+ root_privileged())) ||
+ (root_privileged() &&
+ __is_suid(root, new) &&
+ !__cap_full(effective, new)) ||
+ (!__is_setuid(new, old) &&
+ ((has_fcap &&
+ __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||
+ __cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))
+
ret = true;
+
return ret;
}
@@ -628,7 +643,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
- if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) {
+ if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
--
1.7.1
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo(a)vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
12:02 p.m.
On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing
setuid
application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event
really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly
records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
set*id.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
The first to eighth just massage the logic to make it easier to
understand. Some of them could be squashed together.
The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth.
It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of
"!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)"
to
"!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))"
but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think
I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand.
The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging
based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some
duplication in the logic.
Passes: (ltp 20170516)
./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
./runltp -f securebits
./runltp -f cap_bounds
./runltp -f filecaps
make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs)
v4
rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes
minor local func renames
v3
refactor into several sub-functions
convert most macros to inline funcs
v2
use macros to clarify intent of calculations
fix original logic error
address additional audit logging conditions
Richard Guy Briggs (10):
capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
capabilities: move audit log decision to function
capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
capabilities: invert logic for clarity
capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
security/commoncap.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
I took a quick look at this latest revision and aside from some
disagreements on style/formatting it looks okayish to me. However, I
am going to walk back my previous I-can-take-this-via-the-audit-tree
comments, I think this probably should go in via the capabilities
(Serge) and/or linux-security (James) tree.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
12:54 a.m.
On 2017-09-08 13:02, Paul Moore wrote:
On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs
<rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid
> application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
> supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
> in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event
> really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly
> records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
> set*id.
>
> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
>
> The first to eighth just massage the logic to make it easier to
> understand. Some of them could be squashed together.
>
> The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth.
>
> It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of
> "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid,
root_uid)"
> to
> "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid,
root_uid))"
> but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think
> I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand.
>
> The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging
> based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some
> duplication in the logic.
>
> Passes: (ltp 20170516)
> ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
> ./runltp -f securebits
> ./runltp -f cap_bounds
> ./runltp -f filecaps
> make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs)
>
> v4
> rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes
> minor local func renames
>
> v3
> refactor into several sub-functions
> convert most macros to inline funcs
>
> v2
> use macros to clarify intent of calculations
> fix original logic error
> address additional audit logging conditions
>
> Richard Guy Briggs (10):
> capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
> capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
> capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
> capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
> capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
> capabilities: move audit log decision to function
> capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
> capabilities: invert logic for clarity
> capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
> capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
>
> security/commoncap.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
> 1 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
I took a quick look at this latest revision and aside from some
disagreements on style/formatting it looks okayish to me. However, I
am going to walk back my previous I-can-take-this-via-the-audit-tree
comments, I think this probably should go in via the capabilities
(Serge) and/or linux-security (James) tree.
"okayish"? That sounds positive. :-) Can you offer a clear ack or
reviewed-by?
paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
1:46 a.m.
On Thu, Sep 14, 2017 at 1:54 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
On 2017-09-08 13:02, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid
> > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
> > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
> > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event
> > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly
> > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
> > set*id.
> >
> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
> >
> > The first to eighth just massage the logic to make it easier to
> > understand. Some of them could be squashed together.
> >
> > The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth.
> >
> > It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of
> > "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid,
root_uid)"
> > to
> > "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid,
root_uid))"
> > but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think
> > I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand.
> >
> > The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging
> > based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some
> > duplication in the logic.
> >
> > Passes: (ltp 20170516)
> > ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
> > ./runltp -f securebits
> > ./runltp -f cap_bounds
> > ./runltp -f filecaps
> > make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs)
> >
> > v4
> > rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes
> > minor local func renames
> >
> > v3
> > refactor into several sub-functions
> > convert most macros to inline funcs
> >
> > v2
> > use macros to clarify intent of calculations
> > fix original logic error
> > address additional audit logging conditions
> >
> > Richard Guy Briggs (10):
> > capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
> > capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
> > capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
> > capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
> > capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
> > capabilities: move audit log decision to function
> > capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
> > capabilities: invert logic for clarity
> > capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
> > capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
> >
> > security/commoncap.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
> > 1 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
>
> I took a quick look at this latest revision and aside from some
> disagreements on style/formatting it looks okayish to me. However, I
> am going to walk back my previous I-can-take-this-via-the-audit-tree
> comments, I think this probably should go in via the capabilities
> (Serge) and/or linux-security (James) tree.
"okayish"? That sounds positive. :-)
It's intended to be positive~ish ;)
Parts of the patchset looked good, others I didn't really agree with,
but in general a lot of the changes seem to be subjective judgement
calls. As long as Serge is happy with it I'm okay(ish) with it.
Can you offer a clear ack or reviewed-by?
I would need to look over the patchset again before I'm comfortable
providing either and due to LSS I'm not sure I'll have the opportunity
this week. I'll add it to my todo list for next week.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
1:49 a.m.
On Thu, Sep 14, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 14, 2017 at 1:54 AM, Richard Guy Briggs
<rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> On 2017-09-08 13:02, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>> > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid
>> > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
>> > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
>> > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event
>> > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly
>> > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
>> > set*id.
>> >
>> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
>> >
>> > The first to eighth just massage the logic to make it easier to
>> > understand. Some of them could be squashed together.
>> >
>> > The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth.
>> >
>> > It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of
>> > "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid,
root_uid)"
>> > to
>> > "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid,
root_uid))"
>> > but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think
>> > I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand.
>> >
>> > The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging
>> > based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some
>> > duplication in the logic.
>> >
>> > Passes: (ltp 20170516)
>> > ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
>> > ./runltp -f securebits
>> > ./runltp -f cap_bounds
>> > ./runltp -f filecaps
>> > make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over
nfs)
>> >
>> > v4
>> > rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes
>> > minor local func renames
>> >
>> > v3
>> > refactor into several sub-functions
>> > convert most macros to inline funcs
>> >
>> > v2
>> > use macros to clarify intent of calculations
>> > fix original logic error
>> > address additional audit logging conditions
>> >
>> > Richard Guy Briggs (10):
>> > capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
>> > capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
>> > capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
>> > capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
>> > capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
>> > capabilities: move audit log decision to function
>> > capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
>> > capabilities: invert logic for clarity
>> > capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
>> > capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
>> >
>> > security/commoncap.c | 179
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
>> > 1 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
>>
>> I took a quick look at this latest revision and aside from some
>> disagreements on style/formatting it looks okayish to me. However, I
>> am going to walk back my previous I-can-take-this-via-the-audit-tree
>> comments, I think this probably should go in via the capabilities
>> (Serge) and/or linux-security (James) tree.
>
> "okayish"? That sounds positive. :-)
It's intended to be positive~ish ;)
Parts of the patchset looked good, others I didn't really agree with,
but in general a lot of the changes seem to be subjective judgement
calls. As long as Serge is happy with it I'm okay(ish) with it.
> Can you offer a clear ack or reviewed-by?
I would need to look over the patchset again before I'm comfortable
providing either and due to LSS I'm not sure I'll have the opportunity
this week. I'll add it to my todo list for next week.
Just to add, I'm "okay" with this going in - I don't remember anything
objectionable from my perspective - I just didn't look closely enough
to give it my Reviewed/Acked tag if that makes any sense.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
2598
days inactive
2613
days old
linux-audit@lists.linux-audit.osci.io
29 comments
4 participants
participants (4)
-
James Morris -
Kees Cook -
Paul Moore -
Richard Guy Briggs