On 2020-02-18 15:51, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
 Log information about programs connecting to and disconnecting from
the
 audit netlink multicast socket. This is needed so that during
 investigations a security officer can tell who or what had access to the
 audit trail.  This helps to meet the FAU_SAR.2 requirement for Common
 Criteria.  Here is the systemd startup event:
 
 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2020-02-18 15:26:50.775:10) : proctitle=/init
 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2020-02-18 15:26:50.775:10) : arch=x86_64 syscall=bind success=yes
exit=0 a0=0x19 a1=0x55645c369b70 a2=0xc a3=0x7fff9fedec24 items=0 ppid=0 pid=1 auid=unset
uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none)
ses=unset comm=systemd exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd subj=kernel key=(null)
 type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-02-18 15:26:50.775:10) : pid=1 uid=root auid=unset
tty=(none) ses=unset subj=kernel comm=systemd exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd nl-mcgrp=1
op=connect res=yes
 
 And the events from the test suite:
 
 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2020-02-18 15:28:01.594:307) : proctitle=/usr/bin/perl -w
amcast_joinpart/test
 type=SOCKADDR msg=audit(2020-02-18 15:28:01.594:307) : saddr={ saddr_fam=netlink
nlnk-fam=16 nlnk-pid=0 }
 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2020-02-18 15:28:01.594:307) : arch=x86_64 syscall=bind
success=yes exit=0 a0=0x7 a1=0x558ebc428be0 a2=0xc a3=0x0 items=0 ppid=642 pid=645
auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root
tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
 type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-02-18 15:28:01.594:307) : pid=645 uid=root auid=root
tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=perl
exe=/usr/bin/perl nl-mcgrp=1 op=connect res=yes
 
 type=UNKNOWN[1335] msg=audit(2020-01-17 10:36:24.051:295) : pid=674 uid=root auid=root
tty=ttyS0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=perl
exe=/usr/bin/perl nl-mcgrp=1 op=disconnect res=yes
 
 Please see the upstream issue tracker:
   
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/28
   https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Multicast-Sock...
   https://github.com/rgbriggs/audit-testsuite/compare/ghak28-mcast-part-join
 
 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> 
This was slightly premature.  I had intended to send the ghak120 (norule
missing accompanying) patch first to start a discussion.  The results
above are depending on that patch.
 ---
 Note: msg type 1334 was skipped due to BPF accepted in another tree.
 Note: v5 due to previous 2014-10-07, 2015-07-23, 2016-11-30, 2017-10-13
 Note: subj attrs included due to missing syscall record for systemd (audit=1)
 Note: tried refactor of subj attrs, but this is yet another new order.
 ---
  include/uapi/linux/audit.h |  1 +
  kernel/audit.c             | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
  2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
 index a534d71e689a..9b6a973f4cc3 100644
 --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
 +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
 @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@
  #define AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET	1332	/* Timekeeping offset injected */
  #define AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL	1333	/* NTP value adjustment */
  #define AUDIT_BPF		1334	/* BPF subsystem */
 +#define AUDIT_EVENT_LISTENER	1335	/* Task joined multicast read socket */
  
  #define AUDIT_AVC		1400	/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
  #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR	1401	/* Internal SE Linux Errors */
 diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
 index 17b0d523afb3..478259f3fa53 100644
 --- a/kernel/audit.c
 +++ b/kernel/audit.c
 @@ -1520,20 +1520,60 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sk_buff  *skb)
  	audit_ctl_unlock();
  }
  
 +/* Log information about who is connecting to the audit multicast socket */
 +static void audit_log_multicast_bind(int group, const char *op, int err)
 +{
 +	const struct cred *cred;
 +	struct tty_struct *tty;
 +	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
 +	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 +
 +	if (!audit_enabled)
 +		return;
 +
 +	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EVENT_LISTENER);
 +	if (!ab)
 +		return;
 +
 +	cred = current_cred();
 +	tty = audit_get_tty();
 +	audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%u uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
 +			 task_pid_nr(current),
 +			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
 +			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 +			 tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
 +			 audit_get_sessionid(current));
 +	audit_put_tty(tty);
 +	audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
 +	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
 +	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
 +	audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); /* exe= */
 +	audit_log_format(ab, " nl-mcgrp=%d op=%s res=%d", group, op, !err);
 +	audit_log_end(ab);
 +}
 +
  /* Run custom bind function on netlink socket group connect or bind requests. */
 -static int audit_bind(struct net *net, int group)
 +static int audit_multicast_bind(struct net *net, int group)
  {
 +	int err = 0;
 +
  	if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_READ))
 -		return -EPERM;
 +		err = -EPERM;
 +	audit_log_multicast_bind(group, "connect", err);
 +	return err;
 +}
  
 -	return 0;
 +static void audit_multicast_unbind(struct net *net, int group)
 +{
 +	audit_log_multicast_bind(group, "disconnect", 0);
  }
  
  static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net)
  {
  	struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
  		.input	= audit_receive,
 -		.bind	= audit_bind,
 +		.bind	= audit_multicast_bind,
 +		.unbind	= audit_multicast_unbind,
  		.flags	= NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV,
  		.groups	= AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX,
  	};
 -- 
 1.8.3.1
  
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635