When no audit rules are in place, fanotify event results are unconditionally dropped due to an explicit check for the existence of any audit rules. Given this is a report from another security sub-system, allow it to be recorded regardless of the existence of any audit rules. To test, install and run the fapolicyd daemon with default config. Then as an unprivileged user, create and run a very simple binary that should be denied. Then check for an event with ausearch -m FANOTIFY -ts recent Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-1367 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com&gt; --- include/linux/audit.h | 8 +------- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 0050ef288ab3..d0c6f23503a1 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags); extern void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how); extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name); -extern void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar); +extern void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar); extern void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset); extern void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad); extern void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries, @@ -525,12 +525,6 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name) __audit_log_kern_module(name); } -static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar) -{ - if (!audit_dummy_context()) - __audit_fanotify(response, friar); -} - static inline void audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset) { /* ignore no-op events */ diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 0627e74585ce..936825114bae 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2880,7 +2880,7 @@ void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name) context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE; } -void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar) +void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar) { /* {subj,obj}_trust values are {0,1,2}: no,yes,unknown */ switch (friar->hdr.type) { -- 2.43.5

On 2025-03-06 16:06, Jan Kara wrote: Why would that break it? The part of the patch you (prematurely) deleted takes care of that. diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 0050ef288ab3..d0c6f23503a1 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags); extern void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how); extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name); -extern void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar); +extern void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar); extern void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset); extern void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad); extern void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries, - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com&gt; Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada Upstream IRC: SunRaycer Voice: +1.613.860 2354 SMS: +1.613.518.6570

On 2025-03-07 15:52, Jan Kara wrote: I'm sorry, I responded too quickly without thinking about your question, my mistake. It isn't the prototype that was changed in the CONFIG_SYSCALL case that is relevant in that case. There was already in existance in the !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case the inline wrapper to do that job: static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar) { } Did I understand correctly this time and does this answer your question? But you do cause me to notice the case that these notifications will be dropped when CONFIG_AUDIT && !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL. Thanks for persisting. - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com&gt; Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada Upstream IRC: SunRaycer Voice: +1.613.860 2354 SMS: +1.613.518.6570

When no audit rules are in place, AUDIT_ANOM_{LINK,CREAT} events reported in audit_log_path_denied() are unconditionally dropped due to an explicit check for the existence of any audit rules. Given this is a report of a security violation, allow it to be recorded regardless of the existence of any audit rules. To test, mkdir -p /root/tmp chmod 1777 /root/tmp touch /root/tmp/test.txt useradd test chown test /root/tmp/test.txt {echo C0644 12 test.txt; printf 'hello\ntest1\n'; printf \\000;} | \ scp -t /root/tmp Check with ausearch -m ANOM_CREAT -ts recent Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-9065 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com&gt; --- kernel/audit.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 53e3bddcc327..0cf2827882fc 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -2285,7 +2285,7 @@ void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - if (!audit_enabled || audit_dummy_context()) + if (!audit_enabled) return; /* Generate log with subject, operation, outcome. */ -- 2.43.5