[PATCH] audit: Use struct net not pid_t to remember the network namespce to reply in

[RFC PATCH] audit: generic compat...

scary syslog message (from audit ?)

Eric W. Biederman

Friday, 28 February 2014 Fri, 28 Feb '14

12:49 p.m.

While reading through 3.14-rc1 I found a pretty siginficant mishandling of network namespaces in the recent audit changes. In struct audit_netlink_list and audit_reply add a reference to the network namespace of the caller and remove the userspace pid of the caller. This cleanly remembers the callers network namespace, and removes a huge class of races and nasty failure modes that can occur when attempting to relook up the callers network namespace from a pid_t (including the caller's network namespace changing, pid wraparound, and the pid simply not being present). Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> --- kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++---- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditfilter.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 34c5a2310fbf..1e5756f16f6f 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ struct audit_buffer { struct audit_reply { __u32 portid; - pid_t pid; + struct net *net; struct sk_buff *skb; }; @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ int audit_send_list(void *_dest) { struct audit_netlink_list *dest = _dest; struct sk_buff *skb; - struct net *net = get_net_ns_by_pid(dest->pid); + struct net *net = dest->net; struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); /* wait for parent to finish and send an ACK */ @@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ int audit_send_list(void *_dest) while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&dest->q)) != NULL) netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk, skb, dest->portid, 0); + put_net(net); kfree(dest); return 0; @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ out_kfree_skb: static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) { struct audit_reply *reply = (struct audit_reply *)arg; - struct net *net = get_net_ns_by_pid(reply->pid); + struct net *net = reply->net; struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); @@ -552,6 +553,7 @@ static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) /* Ignore failure. It'll only happen if the sender goes away, because our timeout is set to infinite. */ netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk , reply->skb, reply->portid, 0); + put_net(net); kfree(reply); return 0; } @@ -583,8 +585,8 @@ static void audit_send_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, if (!skb) goto out; + reply->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); reply->portid = portid; - reply->pid = task_pid_vnr(current); reply->skb = skb; tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_reply_thread, reply, "audit_send_reply"); diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 57cc64d67718..8df132214606 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ extern void audit_panic(const char *message); struct audit_netlink_list { __u32 portid; - pid_t pid; + struct net *net; struct sk_buff_head q; }; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 14a78cca384e..a5e3d73d73e4 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <net/net_namespace.h> #include "audit.h" /* @@ -1083,8 +1084,8 @@ int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq) dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dest) return -ENOMEM; + dest->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); dest->portid = portid; - dest->pid = task_pid_vnr(current); skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); -- 1.7.5.4

Show replies by date

Richard Guy Briggs

Friday, 28 February Fri, 28 Feb

7:11 p.m.

On 14/02/28, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

...

Ok, so I see that avoiding pid_t in struct audit_reply and struct audit_netlink_list is necessary. Why not switch to struct pid? How does this patch solve a caller's network namespace changing?

...

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> --- kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++---- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditfilter.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 34c5a2310fbf..1e5756f16f6f 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ struct audit_buffer { struct audit_reply { __u32 portid; - pid_t pid; + struct net *net; struct sk_buff *skb; }; @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ int audit_send_list(void *_dest) { struct audit_netlink_list *dest = _dest; struct sk_buff *skb; - struct net *net = get_net_ns_by_pid(dest->pid); + struct net *net = dest->net; struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); /* wait for parent to finish and send an ACK */ @@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ int audit_send_list(void *_dest) while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&dest->q)) != NULL) netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk, skb, dest->portid, 0); + put_net(net); kfree(dest); return 0; @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ out_kfree_skb: static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) { struct audit_reply *reply = (struct audit_reply *)arg; - struct net *net = get_net_ns_by_pid(reply->pid); + struct net *net = reply->net; struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); @@ -552,6 +553,7 @@ static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) /* Ignore failure. It'll only happen if the sender goes away, because our timeout is set to infinite. */ netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk , reply->skb, reply->portid, 0); + put_net(net); kfree(reply); return 0; } @@ -583,8 +585,8 @@ static void audit_send_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, if (!skb) goto out; + reply->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); reply->portid = portid; - reply->pid = task_pid_vnr(current); reply->skb = skb; tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_reply_thread, reply, "audit_send_reply"); diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 57cc64d67718..8df132214606 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ extern void audit_panic(const char *message); struct audit_netlink_list { __u32 portid; - pid_t pid; + struct net *net; struct sk_buff_head q; }; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 14a78cca384e..a5e3d73d73e4 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <net/net_namespace.h> #include "audit.h" /* @@ -1083,8 +1084,8 @@ int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq) dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dest) return -ENOMEM; + dest->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); dest->portid = portid; - dest->pid = task_pid_vnr(current); skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); -- 1.7.5.4

- RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs(a)redhat.com> Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat Remote, Ottawa, Canada Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545

Eric W. Biederman

10:34 p.m.

Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> writes:

...

On 14/02/28, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > While reading through 3.14-rc1 I found a pretty siginficant mishandling > of network namespaces in the recent audit changes. > > In struct audit_netlink_list and audit_reply add a reference to the > network namespace of the caller and remove the userspace pid of the > caller. This cleanly remembers the callers network namespace, and > removes a huge class of races and nasty failure modes that can occur > when attempting to relook up the callers network namespace from a pid_t > (including the caller's network namespace changing, pid wraparound, and > the pid simply not being present). Ok, so I see that avoiding pid_t in struct audit_reply and struct audit_netlink_list is necessary. Why not switch to struct pid? How does this patch solve a caller's network namespace changing?

This solves the callers network namespace changing or the caller going away entirely (a much more serious concern) because we capture the network namespace at the time of the request when the caller is in the kernel. I would have simply captured the socket we want to reply on but there did not appear to be a good way to do that. Reading through it again capturing current->nsproxy->net_ns is striclty wrong. We should be capturing sock_net(NETLINK_CB(skb).sk). The network namespace of the requesting socket. That handles even weird cases of passing file descriptors between processes in different network namespaces. (An incremental patch to change to code to selct the network namespace of the requesting socket to follow in a moment). Still what my patch implements today at least means we won't oops the kernel if the audit process exits early, and causes get_net_ns_by_pid to return NULL. This whole code path is so crazy because what we really should be doing is sending the packets in nonblocking mode and just dropping packets if the receiving socket does not have enough socket buvffers. Eric

Eric W. Biederman

10:36 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH] audit: Send replies in the proper network namespace.

In perverse cases of file descriptor passing the current network namespace of a process and the network namespace of a socket used by that socket may differ. Therefore use the network namespace of the appropiate socket to ensure replies always go to the appropiate socket. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> --- This is an incremental change on top of my previous patch to guarantee that replies always happen in the appropriate network namespace. include/linux/audit.h | 3 ++- kernel/audit.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- kernel/auditfilter.c | 7 +++++-- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index aa865a9a4c4f..ec1464df4c60 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ struct mq_attr; struct mqstat; struct audit_watch; struct audit_tree; +struct sk_buff; struct audit_krule { int vers_ops; @@ -463,7 +464,7 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(int type); extern int audit_filter_type(int type); extern int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz); -extern int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq); +extern int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq); extern u32 audit_enabled; #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 1e5756f16f6f..32086bff5564 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -570,9 +570,11 @@ static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) * Allocates an skb, builds the netlink message, and sends it to the port id. * No failure notifications. */ -static void audit_send_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, +static void audit_send_reply(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq, int type, int done, int multi, const void *payload, int size) { + u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid; + struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk); struct sk_buff *skb; struct task_struct *tsk; struct audit_reply *reply = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_reply), @@ -585,7 +587,7 @@ static void audit_send_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, if (!skb) goto out; - reply->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); + reply->net = get_net(net); reply->portid = portid; reply->skb = skb; @@ -675,8 +677,7 @@ static int audit_get_feature(struct sk_buff *skb) seq = nlmsg_hdr(skb)->nlmsg_seq; - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, - &af, sizeof(af)); + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, &af, sizeof(af)); return 0; } @@ -796,8 +797,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) s.backlog = skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue); s.version = AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST; s.backlog_wait_time = audit_backlog_wait_time; - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, - &s, sizeof(s)); + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, &s, sizeof(s)); break; } case AUDIT_SET: { @@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh)); break; case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: - err = audit_list_rules_send(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq); + err = audit_list_rules_send(skb, seq); break; case AUDIT_TRIM: audit_trim_trees(); @@ -972,8 +972,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); security_release_secctx(ctx, len); } - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, - 0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, + sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); kfree(sig_data); break; case AUDIT_TTY_GET: { @@ -985,8 +985,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) s.log_passwd = tsk->signal->audit_tty_log_passwd; spin_unlock(&tsk->sighand->siglock); - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, - AUDIT_TTY_GET, 0, 0, &s, sizeof(s)); + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_TTY_GET, 0, 0, &s, sizeof(s)); break; } case AUDIT_TTY_SET: { diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index a5e3d73d73e4..e8d1c7c515d7 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #include "audit.h" /* @@ -1069,8 +1070,10 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data, * @portid: target portid for netlink audit messages * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number */ -int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq) +int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq) { + u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid; + struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk); struct task_struct *tsk; struct audit_netlink_list *dest; int err = 0; @@ -1084,7 +1087,7 @@ int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq) dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dest) return -ENOMEM; - dest->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); + dest->net = get_net(net); dest->portid = portid; skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); -- 1.7.5.4

Eric W. Biederman

10:50 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

Modify audit_send_reply to directly use a non-blocking send and to return an error on failure (if anyone cares). Modify audit_list_rules_send to use audit_send_reply and give up if we can not send a packet. Merge audit_list_rules into iaudit_list_rules_send as the code is now sufficiently simple to not justify to callers. Kill audit_send_list, audit_send_reply_thread because using a separate thread for replies is not needed when sending packets syncrhonously. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> --- I haven't properly tested and made certain this doesn't break userspace, but this is much simpler than what audit is currently doing. I really don't understand why we are using kernel threads to allow us to exceed the receiving sockets configured buffer limits. That just seems insane. If that is really what we want we should be able to force the receiving buffer limits up in audit_send_reply. include/linux/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 75 ++++++++----------------------------------------- kernel/audit.h | 14 ++------- kernel/auditfilter.c | 64 ++++++++++-------------------------------- 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index ec1464df4c60..cd2f5112822a 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(int type); extern int audit_filter_type(int type); extern int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz); -extern int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq); +extern void audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq); extern u32 audit_enabled; #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 32086bff5564..201808fc86aa 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -180,12 +180,6 @@ struct audit_buffer { gfp_t gfp_mask; }; -struct audit_reply { - __u32 portid; - struct net *net; - struct sk_buff *skb; -}; - static void audit_set_portid(struct audit_buffer *ab, __u32 portid) { if (ab) { @@ -496,26 +490,6 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy) return 0; } -int audit_send_list(void *_dest) -{ - struct audit_netlink_list *dest = _dest; - struct sk_buff *skb; - struct net *net = dest->net; - struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); - - /* wait for parent to finish and send an ACK */ - mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); - mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex); - - while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&dest->q)) != NULL) - netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk, skb, dest->portid, 0); - - put_net(net); - kfree(dest); - - return 0; -} - struct sk_buff *audit_make_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi, const void *payload, int size) { @@ -541,25 +515,9 @@ out_kfree_skb: return NULL; } -static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) -{ - struct audit_reply *reply = (struct audit_reply *)arg; - struct net *net = reply->net; - struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); - - mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); - mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex); - - /* Ignore failure. It'll only happen if the sender goes away, - because our timeout is set to infinite. */ - netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk , reply->skb, reply->portid, 0); - put_net(net); - kfree(reply); - return 0; -} /** * audit_send_reply - send an audit reply message via netlink - * @portid: netlink port to which to send reply + * @request_skb: The request skb (used to calculate where to reply) * @seq: sequence number * @type: audit message type * @done: done (last) flag @@ -570,33 +528,24 @@ static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) * Allocates an skb, builds the netlink message, and sends it to the port id. * No failure notifications. */ -static void audit_send_reply(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq, int type, int done, - int multi, const void *payload, int size) +int audit_send_reply(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq, int type, int done, + int multi, const void *payload, int size) { u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid; struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk); + struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); struct sk_buff *skb; - struct task_struct *tsk; - struct audit_reply *reply = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_reply), - GFP_KERNEL); - - if (!reply) - return; skb = audit_make_reply(portid, seq, type, done, multi, payload, size); if (!skb) - goto out; - - reply->net = get_net(net); - reply->portid = portid; - reply->skb = skb; + return -ENOMEM; - tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_reply_thread, reply, "audit_send_reply"); - if (!IS_ERR(tsk)) - return; - kfree_skb(skb); -out: - kfree(reply); + /* + * audit_send_reply runs in the context of the requesting process + * which means that a blocking send can deadlock. Peform a + * non-blocking send, and in general ignore errors. + */ + return netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk, skb, portid, 1); } /* @@ -907,7 +856,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh)); break; case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: - err = audit_list_rules_send(skb, seq); + audit_list_rules_send(skb, seq); break; case AUDIT_TRIM: audit_trim_trees(); diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 8df132214606..c7a594890950 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -240,18 +240,10 @@ extern int audit_uid_comparator(kuid_t left, u32 op, kuid_t right); extern int audit_gid_comparator(kgid_t left, u32 op, kgid_t right); extern int parent_len(const char *path); extern int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path, int plen); -extern struct sk_buff *audit_make_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, - int done, int multi, - const void *payload, int size); -extern void audit_panic(const char *message); - -struct audit_netlink_list { - __u32 portid; - struct net *net; - struct sk_buff_head q; -}; +extern int audit_send_reply(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq, int type, + int done, int multi, const void *payload, int size); -int audit_send_list(void *); +extern void audit_panic(const char *message); struct audit_net { struct sock *nlsk; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index e8d1c7c515d7..5cd05b1f3ec3 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -973,33 +973,39 @@ out: return ret; } -/* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */ -static void audit_list_rules(__u32 portid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q) +/** + * audit_list_rules_send - list the audit rules using struct audit_rule_data. + * @request_skb: The requesting skb (used to calculate where to reply) + * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number + */ +void audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq) { - struct sk_buff *skb; struct audit_krule *r; int i; + mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); /* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu * iterator to sync with list writers. */ for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) { struct audit_rule_data *data; + int err; data = audit_krule_to_data(r); if (unlikely(!data)) break; - skb = audit_make_reply(portid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, + err = audit_send_reply(request_skb, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1, data, sizeof(*data) + data->buflen); - if (skb) - skb_queue_tail(q, skb); kfree(data); + if (err < 0) + goto done; } } - skb = audit_make_reply(portid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0); - if (skb) - skb_queue_tail(q, skb); + audit_send_reply(request_skb, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0); +done: + mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); + return; } /* Log rule additions and removals */ @@ -1065,46 +1071,6 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data, return err; } -/** - * audit_list_rules_send - list the audit rules - * @portid: target portid for netlink audit messages - * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number - */ -int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq) -{ - u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid; - struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk); - struct task_struct *tsk; - struct audit_netlink_list *dest; - int err = 0; - - /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill - * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for - * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to - * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl - * trying to _send_ the stuff */ - - dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!dest) - return -ENOMEM; - dest->net = get_net(net); - dest->portid = portid; - skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); - - mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); - audit_list_rules(portid, seq, &dest->q); - mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); - - tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list"); - if (IS_ERR(tsk)) { - skb_queue_purge(&dest->q); - kfree(dest); - err = PTR_ERR(tsk); - } - - return err; -} - int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right) { switch (op) { -- 1.7.5.4

Andrew Morton

Tuesday, 4 March Tue, 4 Mar

3:30 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

On Fri, 28 Feb 2014 20:50:19 -0800 ebiederm(a)xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) wrote:

...

Nothing much seems to be happening here? In an earlier email you said "While reading through 3.14-rc1 I found a pretty siginficant mishandling of network namespaces in the recent audit changes." Were those recent audit changes a post-3.14 thing? And what is the user-visible effect of the mishandling? Thanks.

David Miller

3:51 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

From: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2014 13:30:04 -0800

...

On Fri, 28 Feb 2014 20:50:19 -0800 ebiederm(a)xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) wrote: > > Modify audit_send_reply to directly use a non-blocking send and > to return an error on failure (if anyone cares). > > Modify audit_list_rules_send to use audit_send_reply and give up > if we can not send a packet. > > Merge audit_list_rules into iaudit_list_rules_send as the code > is now sufficiently simple to not justify to callers. > > Kill audit_send_list, audit_send_reply_thread because using > a separate thread for replies is not needed when sending > packets syncrhonously. Nothing much seems to be happening here? In an earlier email you said "While reading through 3.14-rc1 I found a pretty siginficant mishandling of network namespaces in the recent audit changes." Were those recent audit changes a post-3.14 thing? And what is the user-visible effect of the mishandling?

I took a quick look at this patch yesterday, and my only suspicion is that threads are created currently by this code purely to cons up a blockable context for the netlink code. Perhaps it wants to avoid any netlink packet drops from being possible. I'm not so sure. Anyways, some investigation into perhaps figuring out the intentions of the original implementation would be nice.

Eric W. Biederman

4:41 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

David Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> writes:

...

From: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2014 13:30:04 -0800 > On Fri, 28 Feb 2014 20:50:19 -0800 ebiederm(a)xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) wrote: > >> >> Modify audit_send_reply to directly use a non-blocking send and >> to return an error on failure (if anyone cares). >> >> Modify audit_list_rules_send to use audit_send_reply and give up >> if we can not send a packet. >> >> Merge audit_list_rules into iaudit_list_rules_send as the code >> is now sufficiently simple to not justify to callers. >> >> Kill audit_send_list, audit_send_reply_thread because using >> a separate thread for replies is not needed when sending >> packets syncrhonously. > > Nothing much seems to be happening here?

Well you picked up the patch that fixes the worst of the bugs that I was complaining about. Beyond that I don't know what makes sense.

...

> In an earlier email you said "While reading through 3.14-rc1 I found a > pretty siginficant mishandling of network namespaces in the recent > audit changes." Were those recent audit changes a post-3.14 thing? And > what is the user-visible effect of the mishandling? I took a quick look at this patch yesterday, and my only suspicion is that threads are created currently by this code purely to cons up a blockable context for the netlink code. Perhaps it wants to avoid any netlink packet drops from being possible. I'm not so sure.

Looking at the history (see below) the stated reason from David Woodhouse is to prevent the removal of packets from the packet queues when we have reached our rcvbuf limit. The reasoning doesn't make a lick of sense to me and I was hoping the folks dealing with audit would comment. If we really want the ability to always appened to the queue of skb's is to just have a version of netlink_send_skb that ignores the queued limits. Of course an evil program then could force the generation of enough audit records to DOS the kernel, but we seem to be in that situation now. Shrug.

...

Anyways, some investigation into perhaps figuring out the intentions of the original implementation would be nice.

I had looked briefly and missed a few things. Here is the complete history in all of it's confusion. In brief. The code came in using non-blocking netlink writes. David Woodhouse made the writes blocking. Al Viro, and then Eric Paris patch the code to deal with deadlocks cause by the blocking writes. commit 4527a30f157fca45c102ea49a2fb34a4502264eb Author: akpm <akpm> Date: Mon Apr 12 20:29:12 2004 +0000 [PATCH] Light-weight Auditing Framework From: Rik Faith <faith(a)redhat.com> This patch provides a low-overhead system-call auditing framework for Linux that is usable by LSM components (e.g., SELinux). This is an update of the patch discussed in this thread: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=107815888100001&r=1&w=2 In brief, it provides for netlink-based logging of audit records that have been generated in other parts of the kernel (e.g., SELinux) as well as the ability to audit system calls, either independently (using simple filtering) or as a compliment to the audit record that another part of the kernel generated. The main goals were to provide system call auditing with 1) as low overhead as possible, and 2) without duplicating functionality that is already provided by SELinux (and/or other security infrastructures). This framework will work "stand-alone", but is not designed to provide, e.g., CAPP functionality without another security component in place. This updated patch includes changes from feedback I have received, including the ability to compile without CONFIG_NET (and better use of tabs, so use -w if you diff against the older patch). Please see http://people.redhat.com/faith/audit/ for an early example user-space client (auditd-0.4.tar.gz) and instructions on how to try it. My future intentions at the kernel level include improving filtering (e.g., syscall personality/exit codes) and syscall support for more architectures. First, though, I'm going to work on documentation, a (real) audit daemon, and patches for other user-space tools so that people can play with the framework and understand how it can be used with and without SELinux. Update: Light-weight Auditing Framework receive filter fixes From: Rik Faith <faith(a)redhat.com> Since audit_receive_filter() is only called with audit_netlink_sem held, it cannot race with either audit_del_rule() or audit_add_rule(), so the list_for_each_entry_rcu()s may be replaced by list_for_each_entry()s, and the rcu_read_{un,}lock()s removed. A fix for this is part of the attached patch. Other features of the attached patch are: 1) generalized the ability to test for inequality 2) added syscall exit status reporting and testing 3) added ability to report and test first 4 syscall arguments (this adds a large amount of flexibility for little cost; not implemented or tested on ppc64) 4) added ability to report and test personality User-space demo program enhanced for new fields and inequality testing: http://people.redhat.com/faith/audit/auditd-0.5.tar.gz BKrev: 407afc18IAH0yJVxEhi5ka-sbTOn8g diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..765822b03b91 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/audit.c [snip] +void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi, + void *payload, int size) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb; + struct nlmsghdr *nlh; + int len = NLMSG_SPACE(size); + void *data; + int flags = multi ? NLM_F_MULTI : 0; + int t = done ? NLMSG_DONE : type; + + skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!skb) + goto nlmsg_failure; + + nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, pid, seq, t, len - sizeof(*nlh)); + nlh->nlmsg_flags = flags; + data = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); + memcpy(data, payload, size); + netlink_unicast(audit_sock, skb, pid, MSG_DONTWAIT); + return; + +nlmsg_failure: /* Used by NLMSG_PUT */ + if (skb) + kfree_skb(skb); +} commit b7d1125817c9a46cc46f57db89d9c195e7af22f8 Author: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)shinybook.infradead.org> Date: Thu May 19 10:56:58 2005 +0100 AUDIT: Send netlink messages from a separate kernel thread netlink_unicast() will attempt to reallocate and will free messages if the socket's rcvbuf limit is reached unless we give it an infinite timeout. So do that, from a kernel thread which is dedicated to spewing stuff up the netlink socket. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> @@ -293,13 +319,16 @@ void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi, skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!skb) - goto nlmsg_failure; + return; - nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, pid, seq, t, len - sizeof(*nlh)); + nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, pid, seq, t, size); nlh->nlmsg_flags = flags; data = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); memcpy(data, payload, size); - netlink_unicast(audit_sock, skb, pid, MSG_DONTWAIT); + + /* Ignore failure. It'll only happen if the sender goes away, + because our timeout is set to infinite. */ + netlink_unicast(audit_sock, skb, pid, 0); return; nlmsg_failure: /* Used by NLMSG_PUT */ commit 9044e6bca5a4a575d3c068dfccb5651a2d6a13bc Author: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Date: Mon May 22 01:09:24 2006 -0400 [PATCH] fix deadlocks in AUDIT_LIST/AUDIT_LIST_RULES We should not send a pile of replies while holding audit_netlink_mutex since we hold the same mutex when we receive commands. As the result, we can get blocked while sending and sit there holding the mutex while auditctl is unable to send the next command and get around to receiving what we'd sent. Solution: create skb and put them into a queue instead of sending; once we are done, send what we've got on the list. The former can be done synchronously while we are handling AUDIT_LIST or AUDIT_LIST_RULES; we are holding audit_netlink_mutex at that point. The latter is done asynchronously and without messing with audit_netlink_mutex. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> commit f09ac9db2aafe36fde9ebd63c8c5d776f6e7bd41 Author: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri Apr 18 10:11:04 2008 -0400 Audit: stop deadlock from signals under load A deadlock is possible between kauditd and auditd under load if auditd receives a signal. When auditd receives a signal it sends a netlink message to the kernel asking for information about the sender of the signal. In that same context the audit system will attempt to send a netlink message back to the userspace auditd. If kauditd has already filled the socket buffer (see netlink_attachskb()) auditd will now put itself to sleep waiting for room to send the message. Since auditd is responsible for draining that socket we have a deadlock. The fix, since the response from the kernel does not need to be synchronous is to send the signal information back to auditd in a separate thread. And thus auditd can continue to drain the audit queue normally. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Eric

Andrew Morton

4:50 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

On Tue, 04 Mar 2014 14:41:16 -0800 ebiederm(a)xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) wrote:

...

David Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> writes: > From: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> > Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2014 13:30:04 -0800 > >> On Fri, 28 Feb 2014 20:50:19 -0800 ebiederm(a)xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) wrote: >> >>> >>> Modify audit_send_reply to directly use a non-blocking send and >>> to return an error on failure (if anyone cares). >>> >>> Modify audit_list_rules_send to use audit_send_reply and give up >>> if we can not send a packet. >>> >>> Merge audit_list_rules into iaudit_list_rules_send as the code >>> is now sufficiently simple to not justify to callers. >>> >>> Kill audit_send_list, audit_send_reply_thread because using >>> a separate thread for replies is not needed when sending >>> packets syncrhonously. >> >> Nothing much seems to be happening here? Well you picked up the patch that fixes the worst of the bugs that I was complaining about. Beyond that I don't know what makes sense.

Oh, so I did. I wasn't planning on merging it myself, hoping that someone who hasaclue will step in. Help.

Eric W. Biederman

Sunday, 9 March Sun, 9 Mar

10:06 p.m.

New subject: [GIT PULL] namespaces fixes for 3.14-rcX

Linus, Please pull the for-linus branch from the git tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git for-linus HEAD: d211f177b28ec070c25b3d0b960aa55f352f731f audit: Update kdoc for audit_send_reply and audit_list_rules_send Starting with 3.14-rc1 the audit code is faulty (think oopses and races) with respect to how it computes the network namespace of which socket to reply to, and I happened to notice by chance when reading through the code. My efforts to get these fixes noticed by people who care about audit seem to have landed on deaf ears, so since these are namespace related I have put them in my tree. My testing and the automated build bots don't find any problems with these fixes. Eric W. Biederman (3): audit: Use struct net not pid_t to remember the network namespce to reply in audit: Send replies in the proper network namespace. audit: Update kdoc for audit_send_reply and audit_list_rules_send include/linux/audit.h | 3 ++- kernel/audit.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++--------------- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditfilter.c | 10 +++++++--- 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) Eric

Eric Paris

Monday, 10 March Mon, 10 Mar

8:59 a.m.

New subject: [GIT PULL] namespaces fixes for 3.14-rcX

On Sun, 2014-03-09 at 20:06 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

...

This commentary sounds like a pile of crap seeing as how there was a whole discussion around how to handle this stuff, which you were a part of. And that the audit tree already picked up these 2 patches. In any case, since I haven't sent them to Linus and I'm glad that is done, so feel free to consider this me Acking the pull request.

Eric W. Biederman

2:56 p.m.

New subject: [GIT PULL] namespaces fixes for 3.14-rcX

Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com> writes:

...

On Sun, 2014-03-09 at 20:06 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > My efforts to get these fixes noticed by people who care about audit > seem to have landed on deaf ears, so since these are namespace related I > have put them in my tree. This commentary sounds like a pile of crap seeing as how there was a whole discussion around how to handle this stuff, which you were a part of. And that the audit tree already picked up these 2 patches.

My apologies for offending. Last night when I looked the audit tree had not been updated in 7 weeks, and Andrew Morton wasn't ready to push these fixes to Linus and was looking for someone who would. Keeping important bug fixes in my retransmit queue leaves me very grumpy.

...

In any case, since I haven't sent them to Linus and I'm glad that is done, so feel free to consider this me Acking the pull request.

Eric

Richard Guy Briggs

Sunday, 16 March Sun, 16 Mar

1:36 p.m.

New subject: [GIT PULL] namespaces fixes for 3.14-rcX

On 14/03/10, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

...

Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com> writes: > On Sun, 2014-03-09 at 20:06 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> My efforts to get these fixes noticed by people who care about audit >> seem to have landed on deaf ears, so since these are namespace related I >> have put them in my tree. > > This commentary sounds like a pile of crap seeing as how there was a > whole discussion around how to handle this stuff, which you were a part > of. And that the audit tree already picked up these 2 patches. My apologies for offending. Last night when I looked the audit tree had not been updated in 7 weeks, and Andrew Morton wasn't ready to push these fixes to Linus and was looking for someone who would. Keeping important bug fixes in my retransmit queue leaves me very grumpy.

Well, it is offensive. Please stick to the facts. Some of us may not be as smart as you, but continuing to suggest people don't care is starting to get abusive.

...

> In any case, since I haven't sent them to Linus and I'm glad that is > done, so feel free to consider this me Acking the pull request. Eric

David Miller

Tuesday, 4 March Tue, 4 Mar

6:21 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

From: ebiederm(a)xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 14:41:16 -0800

...

If we really want the ability to always appened to the queue of skb's is to just have a version of netlink_send_skb that ignores the queued limits. Of course an evil program then could force the generation of enough audit records to DOS the kernel, but we seem to be in that situation now. Shrug.

There is never a valid reason to bypass the socket limits. It protects the system from things going out of control. Netlink packet sends can fail, and audit should cope with that event instead of trying to bludgeon it into not happening.

Steve Grubb

Wednesday, 5 March Wed, 5 Mar

10:59 a.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

On Tuesday, March 04, 2014 07:21:52 PM David Miller wrote:

...

From: ebiederm(a)xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 14:41:16 -0800 > If we really want the ability to always appened to the queue of skb's > is to just have a version of netlink_send_skb that ignores the queued > limits. Of course an evil program then could force the generation of > enough audit records to DOS the kernel, but we seem to be in that > situation now. Shrug. There is never a valid reason to bypass the socket limits. It protects the system from things going out of control. Netlink packet sends can fail, and audit should cope with that event instead of trying to bludgeon it into not happening.

I am not sure what exactly is the problem with the code that was being patched. The audit code has been stable and working pretty well for everyone for the last 5-6 years. But lately there has been a lot of kernel code churn and I am concerned that the changes are being made without a complete understanding of the design goals. The audit system has to be very reliable. It can't lose any event or record. The people that really depend on it would rather have access denied to the system than lose any event. This is the reason it goes to such lengths. If I understand the patch, it looks like its affecting code that adds, deletes, or lists audit rules. This code is quite old and working well. It didn't at first. We found a lot of problems by writing scripts like: #!/bin/bash while [ 1 ] ; do echo "Inserting syscalls..." sys=1 while [ $sys -lt 100 ] do sys=`expr $sys + 1` echo "$sys" auditctl -a entry,always -S $sys done echo "Listing..." auditctl -l echo "Deleting..." auditctl -D done with another shell running: #!/bin/bash while [ 1 ] ; do echo "Listing..." auditctl -l done and another shell running: #!/bin/bash while [ 1 ] ; do echo "Disabling..." auditctl -e 0 echo "Enabling..." auditctl -e 1 done You can probably imagine more stress tests. But the proposed code should be well tested similar to this. Thanks, -Steve

LC Bruzenak

11:57 a.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

On 03/05/2014 10:59 AM, Steve Grubb wrote:

...

The audit system has to be very reliable. It can't lose any event or record. The people that really depend on it would rather have access denied to the system than lose any event. This is the reason it goes to such lengths.

+1 LCB -- LC (Lenny) Bruzenak lenny(a)magitekltd.com

Eric W. Biederman

12:06 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com> writes:

...

On Tuesday, March 04, 2014 07:21:52 PM David Miller wrote: > From: ebiederm(a)xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) > Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 14:41:16 -0800 > > > If we really want the ability to always appened to the queue of skb's > > is to just have a version of netlink_send_skb that ignores the queued > > limits. Of course an evil program then could force the generation of > > enough audit records to DOS the kernel, but we seem to be in that > > situation now. Shrug. > > There is never a valid reason to bypass the socket limits. > > It protects the system from things going out of control. > > Netlink packet sends can fail, and audit should cope with that > event instead of trying to bludgeon it into not happening. I am not sure what exactly is the problem with the code that was being patched. The audit code has been stable and working pretty well for everyone for the last 5-6 years. But lately there has been a lot of kernel code churn and I am concerned that the changes are being made without a complete understanding of the design goals.

The problem is that the audit code in the kernel is not using netlink correctly and which leads to mistakes when the code is updated because the code in the kernel is unnecessarily complex, and inefficient.

...

But the designers of the code didn't really go to any lengths at all. There are enormous and cumbersome hacks to avoid fixing the kernel interfaces to do what audit wants to use the kernel interfaces for. That is the audit code for transmitting replies is stupid and is causing serious maintenance issues, by growing hacks upon hacks instead of dealing with the core issues. The first approximation of what you want should have been be to set the netlink socket recvbuf to as large as the can be: setsockopt(sk, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUFFORCE, INTMAX); If/when 2GiB is shown to be not enough people should should have worked on the netlink layer to allow even larger piles of audit messages to be in flight, assuming you really do want to bring down the system when the audit client is just too slow.

...

If I understand the patch, it looks like its affecting code that adds, deletes, or lists audit rules. This code is quite old and working well. It didn't at first. We found a lot of problems by writing scripts like:

Working well does not mean implemented well, and for a security feature not implemented well means broken. And frankly since I can't see a single setsockopt to set the received buffer size for audit netlink sockets I have to stronlgy suspect that people were working around userpsace bugs with stupid kernel code.

...

#!/bin/bash while [ 1 ] ; do echo "Inserting syscalls..." sys=1 while [ $sys -lt 100 ] do sys=`expr $sys + 1` echo "$sys" auditctl -a entry,always -S $sys done echo "Listing..." auditctl -l echo "Deleting..." auditctl -D done with another shell running: #!/bin/bash while [ 1 ] ; do echo "Listing..." auditctl -l done and another shell running: #!/bin/bash while [ 1 ] ; do echo "Disabling..." auditctl -e 0 echo "Enabling..." auditctl -e 1 done You can probably imagine more stress tests. But the proposed code should be well tested similar to this.

Honestly since no one cares enough to maintain the kernel code properly I really think we should just rip audit out instead trying to present userspace with the delusion that the code works, and will continue to work properly. My apologies for being grumpy. I have no intention of breaking userspace (which is why my last patch was an rfc) but at the same time I care absolutely nothing about audit. It solves none of my problems and works at all of the wrong layers to be interesting for me. I just happened to notice that the code has been broken since 3.14-rc1 and no one understands or cares enough about audit to even accept trivial kernel patches to fix the bugs. No offense but I am not interested in testing code I care nothing about, especially when there is no one to pick up the patches. My RFC patch was supposed to be a word to the wise. Eric

Eric Paris

Friday, 7 March Fri, 7 Mar

4:52 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

As usual Eric, your commentary is anything but useful. However your technical thoughts are not off the mark. Can we stick to those? On Wed, 2014-03-05 at 10:06 -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

...

Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com> writes: > On Tuesday, March 04, 2014 07:21:52 PM David Miller wrote: >> From: ebiederm(a)xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) >> Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 14:41:16 -0800 >> >> > If we really want the ability to always appened to the queue of skb's >> > is to just have a version of netlink_send_skb that ignores the queued >> > limits. Of course an evil program then could force the generation of >> > enough audit records to DOS the kernel, but we seem to be in that >> > situation now. Shrug. >> >> There is never a valid reason to bypass the socket limits.

Audit does have some pretty crazy/wacky/dumb ways of doing things. And they've worked really well. I'm the first to agree that doesn't make them right. But also that I don't know how to do them better. I'm happy to try if I know how. Audit is non-tolerant to failure and loss. Many users of audit would prefer the system panic() than lose a message. If someone shows me how to do it better I'll happily admit there are likely places where what we do is just a 'little' too strong/foolish/crazy. Note that ALL users of these functions must have at least 1 capability (CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL). So if there is a malicious app, it is a root malicious app... The kernel audit has 3 different 'things' that send skbs to userspace. All of them work a little crazy, but similar crazy. The current task calls into the kernel via netlink, and the kernel then builds one or more skb(s) and passes those skb(s) (via differing mechanisms) to a kthread which in turn calls netlink_unicast(,,,0) sending the response back to the current task in 2 of the three cases. In all cases, since the timeout is infinite, we assume that the only possible reason this call to netlink_unicast() will fail is because the other end of the socket went away. Simple drawing of 2 of the 3 cases. +------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | auditctl (audit tool run by root) | | netlink send netlink receive | +------------------------------------------------------------------+ + ^ | | v + +----------------------------+ +------------------------+ | kernel audit generate skbs | | send skbs to userspace | +----------------------------+ +------------------------+ + ^ | +------------------------+ | +------->| send skbs to a kthread |+-----+ +------------------------+ The most important of the 3 cases and the one that people care the absolute most about 'things cannot be lost' is the actual audit messages. Messages like 'process A just did action B to object C'. These are handled by means of the current process generating an skb and passing those to an audit specific queue. This audit internal queue depth is controllable by userspace. If we overflow this queue we may call panic() (admin choice, obviously non-default). Again, the kthread on the other end of that queue assumes that all calls to netlink_unicast(,,,0) will eventually succeed (unless the receiving task died). It is actually imperative that the current process be blocked until the message is on track to userspace. Even Eric isn't trying to change this one case in his patch. This is the one case where the task receiving the skb is not (likely) the current task (but could be) The other two, the ones Eric patched, are much more flexible. In both cases a userspace task ask the kernel for a specific piece of information (by sending a netlink message). current is going to be the task draining the netlink queue. This is the reason the send is being punted to a kthread. So current can read from the netlink socket. In one case audit_send_reply_thread() the response is small and can't really grow without bound. Converting to a nonblocking socket might well make sense here. The second user Eric patched, audit_send_list(), can grow without bound. The number of skb's is going to be the size of the number of audit rules that root loaded. We run the list of rules, generate an skb per rule, and add all of them to an skb_buff_head. We then pass the skb_buff_head to a kthread so that current will be able to read/drain the socket. There really is no limit to how big the skb_buff_head could possibly grow. This doesn't necessarily absolutely have to be lossless but it can actually quite reasonably be a whole lot of data that needs to get sent. I know of no way to deliver unbounded lengths of data to the current task via netlink without blocking on more space in the socket. Even if the socket rmem was MAX_INT, how can we deliver more? The rule size is unbounded. How do I get an unbounded amount of data onto this side of the socket when I have to generate it all during the request... Tell me how to architect it better and I'll look at it.

David Miller

6:48 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

From: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2014 17:52:02 -0500

...

Audit is non-tolerant to failure and loss.

Netlink is not a loss-less transport.

Steve Grubb

9:27 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

On Friday, March 07, 2014 07:48:01 PM David Miller wrote:

...

From: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2014 17:52:02 -0500 > Audit is non-tolerant to failure and loss. Netlink is not a loss-less transport.

Perhaps. But in all our testing over the years its been very good. -Steve

David Miller

Saturday, 8 March Sat, 8 Mar

12:34 a.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2014 22:27:28 -0500

...

On Friday, March 07, 2014 07:48:01 PM David Miller wrote: > From: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com> > Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2014 17:52:02 -0500 > > > Audit is non-tolerant to failure and loss. > > Netlink is not a loss-less transport. Perhaps. But in all our testing over the years its been very good.

What I really meant by that was that there is flow control. You can push as much data reliably over it as you want, but you have to block when the socket limits are hit. And I'd say you might as well make the creator of the event do the blocking rather than making other threads do this.

Eric Paris

Friday, 7 March Fri, 7 Mar

9:56 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

On Fri, 2014-03-07 at 19:48 -0500, David Miller wrote:

...

From: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2014 17:52:02 -0500 > Audit is non-tolerant to failure and loss. Netlink is not a loss-less transport.

I'm happy to accept that (and know it to be true). How can I better architect things? It seems Eric is complaining that when we get a request for info, we queue that info up, and then use a kthread to make it available when the task next calls recv. By using blocking sockets in the kthread we have no problem with the size of the socket read buf. If we switch to non-blocking sockets how can we possibly queue up more than rmem size of data? (honestly, if userspace used INT_MAX it is almost certainly overkill for even the largest rulesets, but theoretically, it's not...) Is our design somehow wrong? Flawed? Mind you it's pretty dumb that we do basically the same thing in 3 different audit code path, but the architecture doesn't seem crazy to me. Then again, I'm not brilliant by any stretch! +------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | auditctl (audit tool run by root) | | netlink send netlink receive | +------------------------------------------------------------------+ + ^ | | v + +----------------------------+ +------------------------+ | kernel audit generate skbs | | send skbs to userspace | +----------------------------+ +------------------------+ + ^ | +------------------------+ | +------->| send skbs to a kthread |+-----+ +------------------------+

David Miller

Monday, 10 March Mon, 10 Mar

2:30 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

From: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2014 17:52:02 -0500

...

The second user Eric patched, audit_send_list(), can grow without bound. The number of skb's is going to be the size of the number of audit rules that root loaded. We run the list of rules, generate an skb per rule, and add all of them to an skb_buff_head. We then pass the skb_buff_head to a kthread so that current will be able to read/drain the socket. There really is no limit to how big the skb_buff_head could possibly grow. This doesn't necessarily absolutely have to be lossless but it can actually quite reasonably be a whole lot of data that needs to get sent. I know of no way to deliver unbounded lengths of data to the current task via netlink without blocking on more space in the socket. Even if the socket rmem was MAX_INT, how can we deliver more? The rule size is unbounded. How do I get an unbounded amount of data onto this side of the socket when I have to generate it all during the request...

This is what netlink dumps are for. It is how we are able to dump routing tables with millions of routes to userspace. By using normal netlink requests and netlink_unicast() for this, you are ignoring an entire mechanism in netlink designed specifically to handle this kind of situation. Netlink dumps track state and build one or more SKBs (as necessary), one by one, to form the reply. It implements flow control, state tracking for iteration, optimized SKB sizing and allocation, etc.

Eric Paris

4:57 p.m.

New subject: [RFC][PATCH] audit: Simplify by assuming the callers socket buffer is large enough

On Mon, 2014-03-10 at 15:30 -0400, David Miller wrote:

...

From: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2014 17:52:02 -0500 > The second user Eric patched, audit_send_list(), can grow without bound. > The number of skb's is going to be the size of the number of audit rules > that root loaded. We run the list of rules, generate an skb per rule, > and add all of them to an skb_buff_head. We then pass the skb_buff_head > to a kthread so that current will be able to read/drain the socket. > There really is no limit to how big the skb_buff_head could possibly > grow. This doesn't necessarily absolutely have to be lossless but it > can actually quite reasonably be a whole lot of data that needs to get > sent. I know of no way to deliver unbounded lengths of data to the > current task via netlink without blocking on more space in the socket. > Even if the socket rmem was MAX_INT, how can we deliver more? The rule > size is unbounded. How do I get an unbounded amount of data onto this > side of the socket when I have to generate it all during the request... This is what netlink dumps are for. It is how we are able to dump routing tables with millions of routes to userspace. By using normal netlink requests and netlink_unicast() for this, you are ignoring an entire mechanism in netlink designed specifically to handle this kind of situation. Netlink dumps track state and build one or more SKBs (as necessary), one by one, to form the reply. It implements flow control, state tracking for iteration, optimized SKB sizing and allocation, etc.

Awesome. I'll see what I can find!

Richard Guy Briggs

Sunday, 16 March Sun, 16 Mar

1:19 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH] audit: Send replies in the proper network namespace.

On 14/02/28, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

...

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)tricolour.ca>

...

--- This is an incremental change on top of my previous patch to guarantee that replies always happen in the appropriate network namespace. include/linux/audit.h | 3 ++- kernel/audit.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- kernel/auditfilter.c | 7 +++++-- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index aa865a9a4c4f..ec1464df4c60 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ struct mq_attr; struct mqstat; struct audit_watch; struct audit_tree; +struct sk_buff; struct audit_krule { int vers_ops; @@ -463,7 +464,7 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(int type); extern int audit_filter_type(int type); extern int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz); -extern int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq); +extern int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq); extern u32 audit_enabled; #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 1e5756f16f6f..32086bff5564 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -570,9 +570,11 @@ static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) * Allocates an skb, builds the netlink message, and sends it to the port id. * No failure notifications. */ -static void audit_send_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, +static void audit_send_reply(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq, int type, int done, int multi, const void *payload, int size) { + u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid; + struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk); struct sk_buff *skb; struct task_struct *tsk; struct audit_reply *reply = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_reply), @@ -585,7 +587,7 @@ static void audit_send_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, if (!skb) goto out; - reply->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); + reply->net = get_net(net); reply->portid = portid; reply->skb = skb; @@ -675,8 +677,7 @@ static int audit_get_feature(struct sk_buff *skb) seq = nlmsg_hdr(skb)->nlmsg_seq; - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, - &af, sizeof(af)); + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, &af, sizeof(af)); return 0; } @@ -796,8 +797,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) s.backlog = skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue); s.version = AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST; s.backlog_wait_time = audit_backlog_wait_time; - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, - &s, sizeof(s)); + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, &s, sizeof(s)); break; } case AUDIT_SET: { @@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh)); break; case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: - err = audit_list_rules_send(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq); + err = audit_list_rules_send(skb, seq); break; case AUDIT_TRIM: audit_trim_trees(); @@ -972,8 +972,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); security_release_secctx(ctx, len); } - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, - 0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, + sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); kfree(sig_data); break; case AUDIT_TTY_GET: { @@ -985,8 +985,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) s.log_passwd = tsk->signal->audit_tty_log_passwd; spin_unlock(&tsk->sighand->siglock); - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, - AUDIT_TTY_GET, 0, 0, &s, sizeof(s)); + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_TTY_GET, 0, 0, &s, sizeof(s)); break; } case AUDIT_TTY_SET: { diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index a5e3d73d73e4..e8d1c7c515d7 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #include "audit.h" /* @@ -1069,8 +1070,10 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data, * @portid: target portid for netlink audit messages * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number */ -int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq) +int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq) { + u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid; + struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk); struct task_struct *tsk; struct audit_netlink_list *dest; int err = 0; @@ -1084,7 +1087,7 @@ int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq) dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dest) return -ENOMEM; - dest->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); + dest->net = get_net(net); dest->portid = portid; skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); -- 1.7.5.4

Richard Guy Briggs

2:13 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH] audit: Send replies in the proper network namespace.

On 14/03/16, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:

...

On 14/02/28, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > In perverse cases of file descriptor passing the current network > namespace of a process and the network namespace of a socket used by > that socket may differ. Therefore use the network namespace of the > appropiate socket to ensure replies always go to the appropiate > socket. > > Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)tricolour.ca>

Again, sorry for the noise, please change sig to: Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>

...

> --- > > This is an incremental change on top of my previous patch to guarantee > that replies always happen in the appropriate network namespace. > > include/linux/audit.h | 3 ++- > kernel/audit.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- > kernel/auditfilter.c | 7 +++++-- > 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index aa865a9a4c4f..ec1464df4c60 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ struct mq_attr; > struct mqstat; > struct audit_watch; > struct audit_tree; > +struct sk_buff; > > struct audit_krule { > int vers_ops; > @@ -463,7 +464,7 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(int type); > extern int audit_filter_type(int type); > extern int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, > void *data, size_t datasz); > -extern int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq); > +extern int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq); > > extern u32 audit_enabled; > #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 1e5756f16f6f..32086bff5564 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -570,9 +570,11 @@ static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) > * Allocates an skb, builds the netlink message, and sends it to the port id. > * No failure notifications. > */ > -static void audit_send_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, > +static void audit_send_reply(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq, int type, int done, > int multi, const void *payload, int size) > { > + u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid; > + struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk); > struct sk_buff *skb; > struct task_struct *tsk; > struct audit_reply *reply = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_reply), > @@ -585,7 +587,7 @@ static void audit_send_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, > if (!skb) > goto out; > > - reply->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); > + reply->net = get_net(net); > reply->portid = portid; > reply->skb = skb; > > @@ -675,8 +677,7 @@ static int audit_get_feature(struct sk_buff *skb) > > seq = nlmsg_hdr(skb)->nlmsg_seq; > > - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, > - &af, sizeof(af)); > + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, &af, sizeof(af)); > > return 0; > } > @@ -796,8 +797,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > s.backlog = skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue); > s.version = AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST; > s.backlog_wait_time = audit_backlog_wait_time; > - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, > - &s, sizeof(s)); > + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, &s, sizeof(s)); > break; > } > case AUDIT_SET: { > @@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh)); > break; > case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: > - err = audit_list_rules_send(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq); > + err = audit_list_rules_send(skb, seq); > break; > case AUDIT_TRIM: > audit_trim_trees(); > @@ -972,8 +972,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); > security_release_secctx(ctx, len); > } > - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, > - 0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); > + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, > + sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); > kfree(sig_data); > break; > case AUDIT_TTY_GET: { > @@ -985,8 +985,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > s.log_passwd = tsk->signal->audit_tty_log_passwd; > spin_unlock(&tsk->sighand->siglock); > > - audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, > - AUDIT_TTY_GET, 0, 0, &s, sizeof(s)); > + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_TTY_GET, 0, 0, &s, sizeof(s)); > break; > } > case AUDIT_TTY_SET: { > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c > index a5e3d73d73e4..e8d1c7c515d7 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c > @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > #include <net/net_namespace.h> > +#include <net/sock.h> > #include "audit.h" > > /* > @@ -1069,8 +1070,10 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data, > * @portid: target portid for netlink audit messages > * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number > */ > -int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq) > +int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq) > { > + u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid; > + struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk); > struct task_struct *tsk; > struct audit_netlink_list *dest; > int err = 0; > @@ -1084,7 +1087,7 @@ int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq) > dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL); > if (!dest) > return -ENOMEM; > - dest->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); > + dest->net = get_net(net); > dest->portid = portid; > skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); > > -- > 1.7.5.4 > - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs(a)redhat.com> Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat Remote, Ottawa, Canada Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545

Richard Guy Briggs

1:15 p.m.

On 14/02/28, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

...

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)tricolour.ca>

...

--- kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++---- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditfilter.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 34c5a2310fbf..1e5756f16f6f 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ struct audit_buffer { struct audit_reply { __u32 portid; - pid_t pid; + struct net *net; struct sk_buff *skb; }; @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ int audit_send_list(void *_dest) { struct audit_netlink_list *dest = _dest; struct sk_buff *skb; - struct net *net = get_net_ns_by_pid(dest->pid); + struct net *net = dest->net; struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); /* wait for parent to finish and send an ACK */ @@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ int audit_send_list(void *_dest) while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&dest->q)) != NULL) netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk, skb, dest->portid, 0); + put_net(net); kfree(dest); return 0; @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ out_kfree_skb: static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) { struct audit_reply *reply = (struct audit_reply *)arg; - struct net *net = get_net_ns_by_pid(reply->pid); + struct net *net = reply->net; struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); @@ -552,6 +553,7 @@ static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) /* Ignore failure. It'll only happen if the sender goes away, because our timeout is set to infinite. */ netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk , reply->skb, reply->portid, 0); + put_net(net); kfree(reply); return 0; } @@ -583,8 +585,8 @@ static void audit_send_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, if (!skb) goto out; + reply->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); reply->portid = portid; - reply->pid = task_pid_vnr(current); reply->skb = skb; tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_reply_thread, reply, "audit_send_reply"); diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 57cc64d67718..8df132214606 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ extern void audit_panic(const char *message); struct audit_netlink_list { __u32 portid; - pid_t pid; + struct net *net; struct sk_buff_head q; }; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 14a78cca384e..a5e3d73d73e4 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <net/net_namespace.h> #include "audit.h" /* @@ -1083,8 +1084,8 @@ int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq) dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dest) return -ENOMEM; + dest->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); dest->portid = portid; - dest->pid = task_pid_vnr(current); skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); -- 1.7.5.4

Richard Guy Briggs

2:12 p.m.

On 14/03/16, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:

...

On 14/02/28, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > While reading through 3.14-rc1 I found a pretty siginficant mishandling > of network namespaces in the recent audit changes. > > In struct audit_netlink_list and audit_reply add a reference to the > network namespace of the caller and remove the userspace pid of the > caller. This cleanly remembers the callers network namespace, and > removes a huge class of races and nasty failure modes that can occur > when attempting to relook up the callers network namespace from a pid_t > (including the caller's network namespace changing, pid wraparound, and > the pid simply not being present). > > Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)tricolour.ca>

Sorry for the noise, please change that sig to: Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>

...

> --- > kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++---- > kernel/audit.h | 2 +- > kernel/auditfilter.c | 3 ++- > 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 34c5a2310fbf..1e5756f16f6f 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ struct audit_buffer { > > struct audit_reply { > __u32 portid; > - pid_t pid; > + struct net *net; > struct sk_buff *skb; > }; > > @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ int audit_send_list(void *_dest) > { > struct audit_netlink_list *dest = _dest; > struct sk_buff *skb; > - struct net *net = get_net_ns_by_pid(dest->pid); > + struct net *net = dest->net; > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > > /* wait for parent to finish and send an ACK */ > @@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ int audit_send_list(void *_dest) > while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&dest->q)) != NULL) > netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk, skb, dest->portid, 0); > > + put_net(net); > kfree(dest); > > return 0; > @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ out_kfree_skb: > static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) > { > struct audit_reply *reply = (struct audit_reply *)arg; > - struct net *net = get_net_ns_by_pid(reply->pid); > + struct net *net = reply->net; > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > > mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); > @@ -552,6 +553,7 @@ static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg) > /* Ignore failure. It'll only happen if the sender goes away, > because our timeout is set to infinite. */ > netlink_unicast(aunet->nlsk , reply->skb, reply->portid, 0); > + put_net(net); > kfree(reply); > return 0; > } > @@ -583,8 +585,8 @@ static void audit_send_reply(__u32 portid, int seq, int type, int done, > if (!skb) > goto out; > > + reply->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); > reply->portid = portid; > - reply->pid = task_pid_vnr(current); > reply->skb = skb; > > tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_reply_thread, reply, "audit_send_reply"); > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h > index 57cc64d67718..8df132214606 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.h > +++ b/kernel/audit.h > @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ extern void audit_panic(const char *message); > > struct audit_netlink_list { > __u32 portid; > - pid_t pid; > + struct net *net; > struct sk_buff_head q; > }; > > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c > index 14a78cca384e..a5e3d73d73e4 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ > #include <linux/sched.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > +#include <net/net_namespace.h> > #include "audit.h" > > /* > @@ -1083,8 +1084,8 @@ int audit_list_rules_send(__u32 portid, int seq) > dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL); > if (!dest) > return -ENOMEM; > + dest->net = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns); > dest->portid = portid; > - dest->pid = task_pid_vnr(current); > skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); > > mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); > -- > 1.7.5.4 > - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs(a)redhat.com> Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat Remote, Ottawa, Canada Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545

3933

days inactive

3949

days old

linux-audit@lists.linux-audit.osci.io

Manage subscription

27 comments

7 participants

tags (0)

participants (7)

Andrew Morton
David Miller
Eric Paris
Eric W. Biederman
LC Bruzenak
Richard Guy Briggs
Steve Grubb

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

[PATCH] audit: Use struct net not pid_t to remember the network namespce to reply in