On Monday, November 17, 2014 03:02:12 PM Tilden Doran D wrote: Well, what do you really want to do? In general, I'd look at the original auditing rule to see if its scope can be narrowed. In this case, it appears that you are wanting all calls to chmod. Why? Are you more concerned with failed calls to chmod, meaning a user is trying to change system files? Are system daemons calling chmod OK? Or do you really want everything? Or do you want no events at all for that daemon no matter what the syscall? The event you are showing is that app successfully making a directory world writable/readable. Its setting the sticky bit, so its "safe." -Steve

On Monday, November 17, 2014 10:14:59 AM LC Bruzenak wrote: OK. Missed that. Then looking at the rule, it has an exclusion for daemons because its only concerned with auid>=500. So, that means that someone restarted the daemon by hand rather than rebooting the system If a temporary fix is needed until the systems is rebooted, then one could do this: auditctl -A exit,never -S chmod -F uid=345 That will get rid of all chmod calls by user account 345. Notice the capital A, this places the rule at the beginning because the rule that matches first wins. I would not make that a permanent rule, just a workaround until it can be rebooted. But also note that it could trigger other rules because it has a user's auid. Yeah, as a daemon it should be something else. Unconfined is only from a user session. Daemons get initrc_t when they are unknown. -Steve

Hi auditctl -A exit,never -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F uid=345 auditctl -A exit,never -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F uid=345 we would require a permanent fix. If UID=345 is used, I believe that all auditing functionality will not work for user ID=345, I mean if the userId(345) is logging in manually to the system and does some operation that will also be exclude. We want User inventions logs messages to be captured but exclude the System generated logs. To be more detail. Ohasd.bin process is started by the user( while starting the database process) we want to captured this log. But after that the ohasd.bin process is running in background and it does lot of read write operations, we don't want those logs. Can you please let us know the way forward. thanks Tilden -----Original Message----- From: linux-audit-bounces(a)redhat.com [mailto:linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com] On Behalf Of Steve Grubb Sent: Monday, November 17, 2014 10:39 PM To: linux-audit(a)redhat.com Subject: Re: Excluding few executable from audit.rules in redhat6.5 On Monday, November 17, 2014 11:42:17 AM Steve Grubb wrote: A correction is in order, this likely needs arch fields to be added. It should have been: auditctl -A exit,never -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F uid=345 auditctl -A exit,never -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F uid=345 -Steve -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit(a)redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

Hi Steve, Yes, you are correct. We login as User 500 and switch user to oracle and issue the command. The User 345 is oracle user. Which is used for oracle related activities in the system. The command which we issue is srvctl stop/start database. We always install oracle and start manually for the first time. As you mentioned, on reboot the system, it not generating too many logs. But the problem is, we cannot reboot the system every time, which only requires DB restart. Because application also be hosted in the same system. The Srvctl command internally starts the ohasd.bin. So can we avoid it, I mean do we have an option to exclude the ohasd.bin by using something like "-F exe!=ohasd.bin " or "-F path!= ...." . I tried both, it is not working. Because "-F UID!=345" will restrict all the logs. Can we restrict the log which is generated by that particular process/application. ? Thanks Tilden -----Original Message----- From: Steve Grubb [mailto:sgrubb@redhat.com] Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 8:56 PM To: Tilden Doran D Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com Subject: Re: Excluding few executable from audit.rules in redhat6.5 On Tuesday, November 18, 2014 10:22:55 AM Tilden Doran D wrote: Because the events shown are not translated, I can't tell what account 345 is. I am assuming by its low number that its a system account. The rule above drops all auditing of chmod syscalls for the 345 user account. Again, I can onlt speculate what that account is. If its a daemon, then it should have auid=-1 and the system works fine. Because the auid is 500, that tells me that user 500 started it. Because uid!=auid, I assume its either setuid or user 500 changed to root and then issued, "service ohasd restart". Its one or the other. If user 500 changed to root and restarted the daemon, then a reboot will fix everything and a permanent solution is not needed. Or you can put the rule in depending on how often this happens. But if this is for more than one system, then I'd use the 345 user's name so that auditctl looks it up in case its different on each machine. reserved accounts are generally under 200. The rules you gave have this in them: -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 This is to exclude daemons because they have auid of -1 (unless restarted by hand). The database is not started by the system on boot? Is this a system daemon or a user session daemon? I am not familiar with that program, so I still need some answers to help you figure out the right way to get rid of the events. -Steve

Hi, Please find my response. Sorry for the delay, I am in different Time zone. Well, what do you really want to do? [Tilden] we want to implement audit Logging in Rhel 6.5. for the following events/actions. Login, logout, switch user (su): Rebooting the system, adding and deleting users, changing auditing and logging parameters, changing system clock:(all administrative actions), Process start and stop User executes a command In general, I'd look at the original auditing rule to see if its scope can be narrowed. In this case, it appears that you are wanting all calls to chmod. Why? [Tilden] My Audit.rules file for your reference. If possible please suggest me to narrowed down the audit rules for my requirement. ## First rule - delete all -D ## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. ## Make this bigger for busy systems -b 8192 ## Set failure mode to panic -f 2 ## Things that could affect time -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k time-change -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0 -k time-change -w /etc/localtime -p wa -k time-change ## Things that affect identity -w /etc/group -p wa -k identity -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k identity -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k identity -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k identity -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k identity ## Things that could affect system locale -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k system-locale -w /etc/issue -p wa -k system-locale -w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k system-locale -w /etc/hosts -p wa -k system-locale -w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k system-locale ## Things that could affect MAC policy -w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy ## - Logon (unsuccessful and successful) and logout (successful) -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins -w /var/run/faillock/ -p wa -k logins -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins ##- Discretionary access control permission modification (unsuccessful ## and successful use of chown/chmod) -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod ##- Unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access ##- Use of privileged commands (unsuccessful and successful) ## use find /bin -type f -perm -04000 2>/dev/null and put all those files in a rule like this -a always,exit -F path=/bin/ping -F perm=x -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k privileged ##- Export to media (successful) -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k export ## sudo cannot record the action. -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions ## Optional - could be an attempt to bypass audit or simply legacy program -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S personality -F a0!=4294967295 -k bypass Are you more concerned with failed calls to chmod, meaning a user is trying to change system files? [Tilden] Yes, I am more concern with User level auditing. i.e. what and all actions performed by the user should be logged. we don't want the System process or any executable to generate logs. Are system daemons calling chmod OK? Or do you really want everything? [Tilden] We don't want the System process / daemons logs Or do you want no events at all for that daemon no matter what the syscall? [Tilden] Yes, we found 3 daemons which is causing the issue of generating lot of logs message, so we want to restrict those daemons from generating log messages, as we want only User level audit logs. Thanks Tilden -----Original Message----- From: Steve Grubb [mailto:sgrubb@redhat.com] Sent: Monday, November 17, 2014 9:01 PM To: linux-audit(a)redhat.com Cc: Tilden Doran D Subject: Re: Excluding few executable from audit.rules in redhat6.5 On Monday, November 17, 2014 03:02:12 PM Tilden Doran D wrote: Well, what do you really want to do? In general, I'd look at the original auditing rule to see if its scope can be narrowed. In this case, it appears that you are wanting all calls to chmod. Why? Are you more concerned with failed calls to chmod, meaning a user is trying to change system files? Are system daemons calling chmod OK? Or do you really want everything? Or do you want no events at all for that daemon no matter what the syscall? The event you are showing is that app successfully making a directory world writable/readable. Its setting the sticky bit, so its "safe." -Steve