On Tue, Mar 17, 2020 at 06:51:38PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: I'll do that, thanks! I'll also loop in kernel-hardening folks. Yes I understand -- I view this as an auxiliary feature that helps maintainers in their duties, but certainly doesn't aim to replace due diligence. I am most worried about the following scenario: 1. a maintainer receives a long series of patches that arrives into their inbox 2. they carefully review the patches and decide to merge them 3. they use "b4 am" to grab that patch series from lore.kernel.org 4. however, the archive has been manipulated and returns patches containing malicious edits, which get merged because the maintainer assumes that what "b4 am" returns is the same as what they reviewed Cryptographic attestations helps hedge against this scenario by removing any implicit trust from the centralized system like lore.kernel.org (or patchwork.kernel.org, for that matter). All good, this is why I'm casting the net wide looking for initial adopters. :) Best regards, Konstantin