Re: Should audit_seccomp check audit_enabled?

On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org&gt; wrote: > On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net&gt; wrote: >> On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook" <keescook(a)chromium.org&gt; wrote: >>> >>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net&gt; wrote: >>> > I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do >>> > anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide >>> > policy, and seccomp signals might be ordinary behavior that's internal >>> > to the seccomp-using application. IOW, for people with audit compiled >>> > in and subscribed by journald but switched off, I think that the >>> > records shouldn't be emitted. >>> > >>> > If you agree, I can send the two-line patch. >>> >>> I think signr==0 states (which I would identify as "intended >>> behavior") don't need to be reported under any situation, but audit >>> folks wanted to keep it around. >> >> Even if there is a nonzero signr, it could just be a program opting to >> trap and emulate one of its own syscalls. > > At present, that is a rare situation. Programs tend to be ptrace > managed externally. Is there anything catching SIGSYS itself? > I wrote one once. I also wrote a whole set of patches for libseccomp to make it easier that never went anywhere -- I should dust those off and package them into their own library.