Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT
easier to read.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 13661d3..9b8a6e7 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -695,6 +695,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_f
return rc;
}
+static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
+
/*
* handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -713,7 +715,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_fcap,
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
+ if (!root_privileged())
return;
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
@@ -838,7 +840,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
- issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
+ !root_privileged()) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
--
1.8.3.1