[PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id

The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com&gt; --- security/commoncap.c | 5 +++-- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 14540bd..8f6bedf 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -594,16 +594,17 @@ skip: /* * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set * - * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: + * We do not bother to audit if 4 things are true: * 1) cap_effective has all caps * 2) we are root * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) + * 4) we are running a set*id binary * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. * * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think * that is interesting information to audit. */ - if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) { + if (!is_setid && !cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) { if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { -- 1.7.1