Re: [PATCH 8/8] ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions

On 2018-05-24 16:11, Stefan Berger wrote: > The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and > the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines > AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules. > > With this change we now call integrity_audit_msg_common() to get > common integrity auditing fields. This now produces the following > record when parsing an IMA policy rule: > > type=UNKNOWN[1806] msg=audit(1527004216.690:311): action=dont_measure \ > > fsmagic=0x9fa0 pid=1613 uid=0 auid=0 ses=2 \ > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 \ > op=policy_update cause=parse_rule comm="echo" exe="/usr/bin/echo" \ > tty=tty2 res=1 > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt; > --- > > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 3 ++- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 +++-- > 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > index 4e61a9e05132..776e0abd35cf 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ > > #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS 1802 /* Integrity enable status */ > #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH 1803 /* Integrity HASH type */ > #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */ > > -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */ > +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs > */ +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1806 /* IMA policy rules */ > > #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A

> */ > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 3aed25a7178a..a8ae47a386b4 > 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct > ima_rule_entry *entry)> > int result = 0; > > ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, > > - AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); > + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE); Is it possible to connect this record to a syscall by replacing the first parameter (NULL) by current->context?

> entry->uid = INVALID_UID; > entry->fowner = INVALID_UID; > > @@ -926,7 +926,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct > ima_rule_entry *entry)> > temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; > > else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK) > > temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; > > - audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result); > + integrity_audit_msg_common(ab, NULL, NULL, > + "policy_update", "parse_rule", result); > > audit_log_end(ab); > return result; > > } - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com&gt; Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635