On 7/22/2019 1:50 PM, James Morris wrote:
On Fri, 19 Jul 2019, Paul Moore wrote:
>> We've never had to think about having general rules on
>> what security modules do before, because with only one
>> active each could do whatever it wanted without fear of
>> conflict. If there is already a character that none of
>> the existing modules use, how would it be wrong to
>> reserve it?
> "We've never had to think about having general rules on what security
> modules do before..."
>
> We famously haven't imposed restrictions on the label format before
> now, and this seems like a pretty poor reason to start.
Agreed.
In a follow on thread
https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-security-module/msg29996.html
we've been discussing the needs of dbus-daemon in a multiple LSM
environment. I suggest that if supporting dbus well is assisted by
making reasonable restrictions on what constitutes a valid LSM
"context" that we have a good reason. While there are ways to
present groups of arbitrary hunks of data, why would we want to?