Re: [PATCH 0/6][v2] audit: implement multicast socket for journald
I guess the problem would be that the sysadm_t would be able to look at
the journal which would now contain the audit content.
On 04/23/2014 10:42 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 09:40 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> Here are the capabilities we currently give to sysadm_t with
> sysadm_secadm 1.0.0 Disabled
>
> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { chown dac_override
> dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable
> net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner
> sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice
> sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write setfcap } ;
> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { setgid setuid sys_chroot }
>
> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability2 { syslog block_suspend } ;
>
> cap_audit_write might be a problem?
cap_audit_write is fine.
syslogd_t (aka journal) is going to need the new permission
cap_audit_read. Also, as steve pointed out, someone may be likely to
want to be able to disable that permission easily.
-Eric