[PATCH V3 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities
since the entire source file is about capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 6f05ec0..028d4e4 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
struct linux_binprm *bprm,
bool *effective,
- bool *has_cap)
+ bool *has_fcap)
{
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
unsigned i;
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
*caps,
*effective = true;
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
- *has_cap = true;
+ *has_fcap = true;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct
cpu_vfs_cap_data
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
* constructed by execve().
*/
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_c
goto out;
}
- rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
+ rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective,
bool *has_c
return rc;
}
-void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap, bool *effective,
kuid_t root_uid)
+void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, bool *effective,
kuid_t root_uid)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
bool *effec
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
- if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid,
root_uid)) {
+ if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid,
root_uid)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
return;
}
@@ -531,20 +531,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+ bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
- ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
+ ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
- handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
+ handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
- if (has_cap || is_setid)
+ if (has_fcap || is_setid)
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
/*
--
1.7.1