Re: [patch] Syscall auditing - move "name=" field to the end
On Thu, 2005-03-17 at 02:25 +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
Consider:
open("/bin/true\naudit(1111008484.824:89346): ...", O_RDONLY);
I don't think this patch is enough -- either we need to escape the text
completely or just dump it as hex instead of a string. One option would
be to dump it in quotes as a string if all chars in the string are in
the range 0x20-0x7e, and as hex otherwise. That slightly complicates the
parsing, but not by much, and still gives you plain text in the majority
of cases while protecting against abuse.
I think that the same issue exists for audit_log_d_path and portions of
avc_audit. Of course, hopefully portions of avc_audit, like the exe=
information, can be pushed into audit_log_exit and redundant information
(like pid=) can be removed from avc_audit and we can just mandate that
syscall auditing be enabled when SELinux is enabled. Not clear if
avc_audit() should then be converted to just adding to a list on the
audit context for later processing by audit_log_exit like
audit_notify_watch or if it should continue immediate generation of a
partial audit message with the SELinux information.
--
Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency