On Tue, Jan 22, 2019 at 8:42 PM Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> wrote:
On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 10:36 AM Ondrej Mosnacek
<omosnace(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> In case a file has an invalid context set, in an AVC record generated
> upon access to such file, the target context is always reported as
> unlabeled. This patch adds new optional fields to the AVC record
> (srawcon and trawcon) that report the actual context string if it
> differs from the one reported in scontext/tcontext. This is useful for
> diagnosing SELinux denials involving invalid contexts.
>
> To trigger an AVC that illustrates this situation:
>
> # setenforce 0
> # touch /tmp/testfile
> # setfattr -n security.selinux -v system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0 /tmp/testfile
> # runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/testfile
>
> AVC before:
>
> type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149
comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608
scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023
tclass=file permissive=1
>
> AVC after:
>
> type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149
comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608
scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023
trawcon=system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
I would like us to add new fields at the end of existing records; the
recent audit config changes are a bit of a special case as discussed
previously.
Okay, I happened to find a way to do this a little differently (taking
a suggestion from Stephen about avoiding the need to do strcmp()) so
now it is actually easy to move them at the end. But I didn't expect
to get a more liberal reply from Steve (who is usually more strict
about this) than you :)
Also, under what cases would we ever see a srawcon field? This is
only going to happen if we have a running process whose domain is
removed during a policy reload, correct? I'm find with including this
for the sake of completeness, but I would mention this in the patch
description for the next revision.
I tried to find a similar reproducer as for trawcon, but it doesn't
seem to be possible to do that without reloading the policy. I will
just add a note.
> Cc: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh(a)redhat.com>
> Link:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1135683
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com>
> ---
>
> v2: Rename fields to "(s|t)rawcon".
>
> security/selinux/avc.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
> 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index 9b63d8ee1687..df5490db575b 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -165,6 +165,32 @@ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass,
u32 av)
> audit_log_format(ab, " }");
> }
>
> +static void avc_dump_sid(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct selinux_state *state,
> + u32 sid, char type)
> +{
> + int rc;
> + char *context, *rcontext;
> + u32 context_len, rcontext_len;
> +
> + rc = security_sid_to_context(state, sid, &context, &context_len);
> + if (rc) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%csid=%d ", type, sid);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%ccontext=%s ", type, context);
> +
> + /* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */
> + rc = security_sid_to_context_force(state, sid, &rcontext,
> + &rcontext_len);
> + if (!rc) {
> + if (strcmp(context, rcontext))
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%crawcon=%s ", type,
rcontext);
> + kfree(rcontext);
> + }
> + kfree(context);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * avc_dump_query - Display a SID pair and a class in human-readable form.
> * @ssid: source security identifier
> @@ -174,28 +200,11 @@ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass,
u32 av)
> static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct selinux_state *state,
> u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
> {
> - int rc;
> - char *scontext;
> - u32 scontext_len;
> -
> - rc = security_sid_to_context(state, ssid, &scontext,
&scontext_len);
> - if (rc)
> - audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
> - else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, "scontext=%s", scontext);
> - kfree(scontext);
> - }
> -
> - rc = security_sid_to_context(state, tsid, &scontext,
&scontext_len);
> - if (rc)
> - audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
> - else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
> - kfree(scontext);
> - }
> + avc_dump_sid(ab, state, ssid, 's');
> + avc_dump_sid(ab, state, tsid, 't');
>
> BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
> - audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
> + audit_log_format(ab, "tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
> }
>
> /**
> --
> 2.20.1
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com>
Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies
Red Hat, Inc.