Re: [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id

On Thu, 19 Oct 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2017-10-11 20:57, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid > > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was > > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities > > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event > > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly > > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on > > set*id. > > <crickets> > > Serge? James? Can one of you two take this via your trees since Paul > has backed down citing (reasonably) that it is mostly capabilities > patches rather than audit? Sure, I will take it.

> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 > > > > The first to eighth patches just massage the logic to make it easier to > > understand. Some of them could be squashed together. > > > > The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth. > > > > It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of > > "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)" > > to > > "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))" > > but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think > > I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand. > > > > The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging > > based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some > > duplication in the logic. > > > > Passes: (ltp 20170516) > > ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap > > ./runltp -f securebits > > ./runltp -f cap_bounds > > ./runltp -f filecaps > > make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs) > > > > Since this is mostly capabilities related rather than audit, could this go > > through the capabilites (Serge) or security (James) trees please? Thanks! > > > > v5 > > rebase on linux-security/next 4.14-rc2 > > added comment block header to handle_privileged_root() > > moved comment in handle_privileged_root() > > moved root_privileged() check back into handle_privileged_root() > > > > v4 > > rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes > > minor local func renames > > > > v3 > > refactor into several sub-functions > > convert most macros to inline funcs > > > > v2 > > use macros to clarify intent of calculations > > fix original logic error > > address additional audit logging conditions > > > > Richard Guy Briggs (10): > > capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root > > capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status > > capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap > > capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic > > capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes > > capabilities: move audit log decision to function > > capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic > > capabilities: invert logic for clarity > > capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root > > capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions > > > > security/commoncap.c | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- > > 1 file changed, 128 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) > > > > -- > > 1.8.3.1 > > > > -- > > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in > > the body of a message to majordomo(a)vger.kernel.org > > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > > - RGB > > -- > Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com&gt; > Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems > Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada > IRC: rgb, SunRaycer > Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 > -- James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com&gt;