Re: [PATCH 1/1] audit: Record fanotify access control decisions

> > On Thursday, September 7, 2017 6:18:05 AM EDT Jan Kara wrote: > On Wed 06-09-17 13:34:32, Steve Grubb wrote: > > On Wednesday, September 6, 2017 12:48:21 PM EDT Jan Kara wrote: > > > On Wed 06-09-17 10:35:32, Steve Grubb wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, September 6, 2017 5:18:22 AM EDT Jan Kara wrote: > > > > > Or is it that for CCrequirements you have to implement some deamon > > > > > which will arbitrate access using fanotify and you need to have > > > > > decisions logged using kernel audit interface? > > > > > > > > Yes. And even virus scanners would probably want to allow admins to > > > > pick when they record something being blocked. > > > > > > But then if I understand it correctly, you would need to patch each and > > > every user of fanotify permission events to know about FAN_AUDIT to meet > > > those CC requirements? > > > > Not really. For CC, the mechanism just needs to be available. > > > > > That seems pretty hard to do to me and even it done, it sounds like > > > quite a bit of duplication? > > > > AFAIK, there is only one that needs to get patched. It's totally opt in. > > I see. Thanks for explanation. But still, for this feature to make a real > difference, you'll have to implement FAN_AUDIT (and corresponding > filtering) in all programs using fanotify permission events on your system, > won't you? In real life, perhaps. For common criteria, the developer defines a baseline of applications that make up the Target Of Evaluation. One would normally make sure all applications that make up the TOE correctly implement the security features and demonstrate this with a test suite. So, in this case, I know of only one application that needs patching. Out of curiosity, what other applications would need patching that you know of?

> > > So wouldn't it be better design to pipe all fanotify access decisions to > > > audit subsystem which would based on policy decide whether the event > > > should be logged or not? > > > > There can be a lot of information to wade through. Normally, we don't > > parse events in the kernel or user space. They are in a race to keep > > events flowing so that the kernel stays fast and responsive. There are > > buffer limits where if we too far behind we start losing events. The > > decision to log should be rare. So, if we get lots of events that don't > > need to be logged, it will slow down the whole kernel. > > > > But besides the performance side of it, the audit subsystem has part of > > the information to make a decision on whether or not this one should be > > logged. It doesn't know the same information as the daemon that is > > deciding to grant access. Only the daemon granting access knows if this > > one file alone should get an audit record. And based on the fanotify API > > there is no way to pass along additional information that could be taken > > into account by the audit subsystem for its decision. > > Ok, I think I'm starting to understand this. The audit event about fanotify > refusing the access is generally a supplemental information to another > event informing about access being denied, isn't it? So you want to log it > if and only if denied access event will be logged. Am I getting it right? No, it could be when an access is granted, too. Some people are paranoid and may want information on approvals and denials for specific kinds of files or users. Again, its not a blanket policy where everything denied must be recorded. We should leave that decision to the admin to determine what he wants recorded. > So the application handling fanotify permission events would parse audit > rules in /etc/audit.rules, decide whether its decision would lead to event > being logged and if yes, it would set FAN_AUDIT in its response so that > supplemental information is also logged. Right? I wouldn't imagine it like that. The way I see it, the daemon that determines access has its own set of rules. In those rules there would be some syntax about attributes of the file to match against and then what to do if it matches. It could either be deny, approve, deny with audit, or approve with audit. In the case of a virus scanner, the rule is implicit any signature match is denial. In this way, the daemon and audit system do not need to know anything about each other. AppArmor and Selinux are the same way. They have their own rules and they decide whether or not an audit event should be generated.

> One idea I had was: Couldn't we store fanotify decision in audit_context > and then if we find event needs to be emitted, we also additionally emit > the fact that fanotify is the reason? That is kind of how the patch works. When the user space daemon sees an access that the admin thought was important, it tags the decision wit an audit bit which in turn causes a call into the audit code to add an auxiliary record to the context and if the event has not be determined to be of interest to the audit system to override that and saying this is of interest generate the event on syscall exit.

> I understand the difficulty of associating fanotify response with the > object (and thus other audit events) from userspace. So I agree that > doesn't look like an easier way to go. On the other hand bear in mind there > can be several processes mediating access through fanotify and you can end > up with supplemental messages like (expanding your example): > > type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=1 > type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=1 > type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=1 > type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2 > > (or possibly without the FAN_ALLOW messages - do we want to log those?) and > you have no way to determine which process actually denied the access. I'm > not sure whether this matters or not but I can imagine some users > complaining about this so I wanted to point that out. I was also thinking about that and I think we can add that to the event easily. One other thing that I think could be helpful is if the daemon could

also write a reason code or something like the rule number that its enforcing. Would that be something useful? (I could imagine a security officer wanting the rule association.) If so, then maybe we can carve out more bits of the response to be used by the daemon for a reason code?