On 2025-04-11 14:14, Paul Moore wrote:
On Mar 5, 2025 Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>
> When no audit rules are in place, fanotify event results are
> unconditionally dropped due to an explicit check for the existence of
> any audit rules. Given this is a report from another security
> sub-system, allow it to be recorded regardless of the existence of any
> audit rules.
>
> To test, install and run the fapolicyd daemon with default config. Then
> as an unprivileged user, create and run a very simple binary that should
> be denied. Then check for an event with
> ausearch -m FANOTIFY -ts recent
>
> Link:
https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-1367
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 8 +-------
> kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index 0050ef288ab3..d0c6f23503a1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const
struct cred *old);
> extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags);
> extern void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how);
> extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name);
> -extern void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule
*friar);
> +extern void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule
*friar);
> extern void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset);
> extern void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad);
> extern void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
> @@ -525,12 +525,6 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
> __audit_log_kern_module(name);
> }
>
> -static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct
fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
> -{
> - if (!audit_dummy_context())
> - __audit_fanotify(response, friar);
> -}
It seems like we should at least have an audit_enabled() check, yes?
We've had people complain about audit events being generated when audit
is disabled, any while we don't currently have such a check in place
here, I believe the dummy context check is doing that for us.
static inline void audit_fanotify(...)
{
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
__audit_fanotify(...);
}
That would be consistent with other security events messages. I was
going through the selinux code to see what it does and I am missing it
if selinux checks with audit_enabled(). Are selinux messages somehow
exempt from audit_enabled()?
> static inline void audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64
offset)
> {
> /* ignore no-op events */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 0627e74585ce..936825114bae 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -2880,7 +2880,7 @@ void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
> context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
> }
>
> -void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule
*friar)
> +void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
> {
> /* {subj,obj}_trust values are {0,1,2}: no,yes,unknown */
> switch (friar->hdr.type) {
> --
> 2.43.5
--
paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
Upstream IRC: SunRaycer
Voice: +1.613.860 2354 SMS: +1.613.518.6570