Re: Report Double Fetch Bug Found in Linux-4.6.1/kernel/auditsc.c

> 在 2016年6月20日，下午8:18，Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com&gt; 写道： > > Not that I understand this report, but > > On 06/20, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: >> >> This function is only ever called by __audit_free(), which is only ever >> called on failure of task creation or on exit of the task, so in neither >> case can anything else change it. > > How so? > > Another thread or CLONE_VM task or /proc/pid/mem can change the user-space > memory in parallel. > > Oleg. Exactly, by saying “change the data”, I mean the modification from malicious users with crafted operations on the user space memory directly, rather than the normal operations within the audit subsystem in Linux. Moreover, since the copy operations from the user space are not protected by any locks or synchronization primitives, changing the data under race condition is feasible I think. Besides, there isn’t any visible checking step in the code to guarantee the consistency between the two copy operations.

Here I would like to figure out what the consequences really are once the data is changed between the two copy operations, such as changing a none-control string to a control string but process it as a none-control string that has no control chars. I think problems will happen.

Pengfei