If a task has CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL allow that task to unset their loginuid.
This would allow a child of that task to set their loginuid without
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. Thus when launching a new login daemon, a
priviledged helper would be able to unset the loginuid and then the
daemon, which may be malicious user facing, do not need priv to function
correctly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 14 ++++++++++----
kernel/auditsc.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 69078c7..33d0d0b 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1119,10 +1119,16 @@ static ssize_t proc_loginuid_write(struct file * file, const char
__user * buf,
goto out_free_page;
}
- kloginuid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, loginuid);
- if (!uid_valid(kloginuid)) {
- length = -EINVAL;
- goto out_free_page;
+
+ /* is userspace tring to explicitly UNSET the loginuid? */
+ if (loginuid == AUDIT_UID_UNSET) {
+ kloginuid = INVALID_UID;
+ } else {
+ kloginuid = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, loginuid);
+ if (!uid_valid(kloginuid)) {
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free_page;
+ }
}
length = audit_set_loginuid(kloginuid);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index bbc5a4f..eea28c1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2017,7 +2017,9 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
if (rc)
goto out;
- sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
+ /* are we setting or clearing? */
+ if (uid_valid(loginuid))
+ sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
task->sessionid = sessionid;
task->loginuid = loginuid;
--
1.8.2.1