There is another way we used to pass PCI-DSS.
We use an audit rule to log all EXECVE happening on production servers,
rsyslog the logs to the remote centralized logs server, then parse the
audit logs there using a cron script and rebuild the commands issued on
each server by any user id.
Hope this helps.
On Jul 13, 2012 4:53 PM, "Florian Crouzat" <gentoo(a)floriancrouzat.net>
wrote:
Le 13/07/2012 15:27, Steve Grubb a écrit :
Hmm...I thought I sent an answer. The problem from the kernel's
> perspective is
> that it has no idea what user space is doing. It can't tell a password
> from
> anything else being typed. There is a flag that can be set for the TTY to
> hide
> characters. But the issue then becomes that now you have a loophole that a
> crafty admin could use to hide what he's really doing.
>
> If anyone has ideas on how to improve this, I think we should.
>
> -Steve
>
Yeah, I was afraid of that...
At least, thanks for clarifying.
I guess I'll stick with stating: don't fire any real root shell to all my
sysadmins in the PCI-DSS scope. (as it's impossible to completely forbid
all possible case , eg: forbid sudo -*, sudo sudo *, sudo su * but hell,
you can't forbid sudo ./foo.sh where foo fires a shell, there is NOEXEC in
sudo but then you can't do anything except reading...)
Anyway, I'm getting away of the real matter, avoiding to audit-log
passwords keystrokes.
--
Cheers,
Florian Crouzat
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