On 2018-10-19 15:38, Paul Moore wrote:
On Tue, Jul 31, 2018 at 4:11 PM Richard Guy Briggs
<rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a
> process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP record to document the event.
>
> This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of
> the form /proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the
> newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or
> an additional task added to a container.
>
> The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
>
> The writer must have capability CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.
>
> This will produce a record such as this:
> type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209
old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash
res=yes
You need to update the record type in the example above.
Yup, thanks.
> The "op" field indicates an initial set. The
"pid" to "ses" fields are
> the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the
process
> being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are
> given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
I understand Steve's concern around the "op" field, but I think it
might be a bit premature to think we might not need to do some sort of
audit container ID management in the future that would want to make
use of the CONTAINER_OP message type. I would like to see the "op"
field preserved.
I strongly agree.
> It is not permitted to unset the audit container identifier.
> A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier.
>
> See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
> See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
> See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
> See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/audit.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
> kernel/auditsc.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 131 insertions(+)
...
> @@ -2112,6 +2114,72 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
> }
>
> /**
> + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit_context contid
> + * @contid: contid value
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure.
> + *
> + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write().
> + */
> +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)
> +{
> + u64 oldcontid;
> + int rc = 0;
> + struct audit_buffer *ab;
> + uid_t uid;
> + struct tty_struct *tty;
> + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
> +
> + task_lock(task);
> + /* Can't set if audit disabled */
> + if (!task->audit) {
> + task_unlock(task);
> + return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> + }
> + oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task);
> + read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
I assume lockdep was happy with nesting the tasklist_lock inside the task lock?
Yup, I had gone through the logic and at first I had doubts, but the
function comments and other usage reassured me (as well as in-kernel
lock checks on boot) that this was the right order and approach.
> + /* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */
> + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid))
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + /* if we don't have caps, reject */
> + else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> + rc = -EPERM;
> + /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */
> + else if (!list_empty(&task->children))
> + rc = -EBUSY;
> + else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task)))
> + rc = -EALREADY;
> + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> + if (!rc)
> + task->audit->contid = contid;
> + task_unlock(task);
> +
> + if (!audit_enabled)
> + return rc;
> +
> + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP);
> + if (!ab)
> + return rc;
> +
> + uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
> + tty = audit_get_tty(current);
> + audit_log_format(ab, "op=set opid=%d old-contid=%llu contid=%llu pid=%d
uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
> + task_tgid_nr(task), oldcontid, contid,
> + task_tgid_nr(current), uid,
> + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> + tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
> + audit_get_sessionid(current));
> + audit_put_tty(tty);
> + audit_log_task_context(ab);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
> + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
> + audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !rc);
> + audit_log_end(ab);
> + return rc;
> +}
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635