On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs
<rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real
> root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
> BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root
> applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
> necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
> records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
> id.
>
> Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
> unnecessary record.
>
> Ref: commit 3fc689e96c0c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
> See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
> ---
> security/commoncap.c | 5 ++---
> 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Trying to sort this out, I've decided that I dislike the capabilities
code as much as I dislike the audit code.
Read binfmt_elf.c and your journey towards the dark side will be complete!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security