On Fri, Apr 20, 2018 at 4:02 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
 On 2018-04-18 21:46, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> > Audit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task
> > context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing
> > rule prior to being associated with a running task.  The network
> > namespace could in use by multiple containers by association to the
> > tasks in that network namespace.  We still want a way to attribute
> > these events to any potential containers.  Keep a list per network
> > namespace to track these container identifiiers.
> >
> > Add/increment the container identifier on:
> > - initial setting of the container id via /proc
> > - clone/fork call that inherits a container identifier
> > - unshare call that inherits a container identifier
> > - setns call that inherits a container identifier
> > Delete/decrement the container identifier on:
> > - an inherited container id dropped when child set
> > - process exit
> > - unshare call that drops a net namespace
> > - setns call that drops a net namespace
> >
> > See: 
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/32
> > See: 
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  include/linux/audit.h       |  7 +++++++
> >  include/net/net_namespace.h | 12 ++++++++++++
> >  kernel/auditsc.c            |  9 ++++++---
> >  kernel/nsproxy.c            |  6 ++++++
> >  net/core/net_namespace.c    | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) 
...
> > diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> > index f6c5d33..d9f1090 100644
> > --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
> > +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> > @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct
*tsk)
> >         struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;
> >         struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns);
> >         struct nsproxy *new_ns;
> > +       u64 containerid = audit_get_containerid(tsk);
> >
> >         if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
> >                               CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |
> > @@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct
*tsk)
> >                 return  PTR_ERR(new_ns);
> >
> >         tsk->nsproxy = new_ns;
> > +       net_add_audit_containerid(new_ns->net_ns, containerid);
> >         return 0;
> >  }
>
> Hopefully we can handle this in audit_net_init(), we just need to
> figure out where we can get the correct task_struct for the audit
> container ID (some backpointer in the net struct?).
 I don't follow.  This needs to happen on every task startup.
 audit_net_init() is only called when a new network namespace starts up. 
Yep, sorry, my mistake.  I must have confused myself when I was
looking at the code.
I'm thinking out loud here, bear with me ...
Assuming we move the netns/audit-container-ID tracking to audit_net,
and considering we already have an audit hook in copy_process() (it
calls audit_alloc()), would this be better handled by the
copy_process() hook?  This ignores naming, audit_alloc() reuse, etc.;
those can be easily fixed.  I'm just thinking of ways to limit our
impact on the core kernel and leverage our existing interaction
points.
-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com