Before modifying an EVM protected extended attribute or any other
metadata included in the HMAC calculation, the existing 'security.evm'
is verified. This patch adds calls to integrity_audit_msg() to audit
integrity metadata failures.
Reported-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen(a)siphos.be>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index cdbde17..df0fa45 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,9 @@
int evm_initialized;
+static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
+ "pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs",
"unknown"
+};
char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
char *evm_hash = "sha1";
int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION;
@@ -262,9 +266,15 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char
*xattr_name,
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
return 0;
- return -EPERM;
+ goto out;
}
evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+out:
+ if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+ dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+ integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+ -EPERM, 0);
return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
}
@@ -357,6 +367,9 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
return 0;
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+ dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+ integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
return -EPERM;
}
--
1.8.1.4