Re: [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org&gt; wrote: > On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:02PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org&gt; wrote: >> > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote: >> >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net&gt; >> >> >> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure. >> >> >> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing. >> >> >> >> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit >> >> rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow... >> >> >> >> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org >> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net&gt; >> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com&gt; >> >> --- >> >> kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--------- >> >> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) >> > >> > Did this patch get dropped somewhere? Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I >> > miss a later conversation about this? >> >> Hmm. It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree. Crap. >> >> IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to >> security@. > > That seems to be my mbox at times :) > > But yes, having something "real" might be good if the load gets higher, > right now it's so low that my "sweep pending security patches" task > usually catches anything pending, which is rare. > There are currently at least two issues that I reported that are stuck in limbo: this one and the (not-yet-public) vfs thing.

And there's the CVE-2014-0181 regression fix that almost got forgotten, but that isn't really a security issue.