Quoting Eric Paris (eparis(a)redhat.com):
 diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
 index 8bb95ed..534abb5 100644
 --- a/security/commoncap.c
 +++ b/security/commoncap.c
 @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
   */
 
  #include <linux/capability.h>
 +#include <linux/audit.h>
  #include <linux/module.h>
  #include <linux/init.h>
  #include <linux/kernel.h>
 @@ -373,6 +374,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
  void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
  {
 +	kernel_cap_t pP = current->cap_permitted;
 +	kernel_cap_t pE = current->cap_effective;
 +
  	if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
  	    !cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
  			  current->cap_permitted)) {
 @@ -407,6 +411,12 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
  	}
 
  	/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
 +	if (!cap_isclear(current->cap_effective)) {
 +		if (!cap_issubset(current->cap_effective, CAP_FULL_SET) || 
Hi Eric,
can you explain what the cap_issubset() check is for here?
thanks,
-serge
 +		    (bprm->e_uid != 0) || (current->uid != 0) ||
 +		    issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
 +			audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &pP, &pE);
 +	}
 
  	current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
  }