Quoting Eric Paris (eparis(a)redhat.com):
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 8bb95ed..534abb5 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -373,6 +374,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
+ kernel_cap_t pP = current->cap_permitted;
+ kernel_cap_t pE = current->cap_effective;
+
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
!cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
current->cap_permitted)) {
@@ -407,6 +411,12 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
}
/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
+ if (!cap_isclear(current->cap_effective)) {
+ if (!cap_issubset(current->cap_effective, CAP_FULL_SET) ||
Hi Eric,
can you explain what the cap_issubset() check is for here?
thanks,
-serge
+ (bprm->e_uid != 0) || (current->uid != 0) ||
+ issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
+ audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &pP, &pE);
+ }
current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
}