On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:02PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net>
> >>
> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
> >>
> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
> >>
> >> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit
> >> rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...
> >>
> >> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net>
> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com>
> >> ---
> >> kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
> >> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >
> > Did this patch get dropped somewhere? Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I
> > miss a later conversation about this?
>
> Hmm. It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree. Crap.
>
> IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to
> security@.
That seems to be my mbox at times :)
But yes, having something "real" might be good if the load gets higher,
right now it's so low that my "sweep pending security patches" task
usually catches anything pending, which is rare.
There are currently at least two issues that I reported that are stuck
in limbo: this one and the (not-yet-public) vfs thing. And there's
the CVE-2014-0181 regression fix that almost got forgotten, but that
isn't really a security issue.
And I can't read your mbox :-/
--Andy