On Fri, Mar 3, 2017 at 4:14 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
On 2017-02-28 23:15, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Tuesday, February 28, 2017 10:37:04 PM EST Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > Sorry, I forgot to include Cc: in this cover letter for context to the 4
> > alt patches.
> >
> > On 2017-02-28 22:15, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > The background to this is:
> > >
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/8
> > >
> > > In short, audit SYSCALL records for *init_module were occasionally
> > > accompanied by hundreds to thousands of null PATH records.
> > >
> > > I chatted with Al Viro and Eric Paris about this Friday afternoon and
> > > they seemed to vaguely recall this issue and didn't have any solid
> > > recommendations as to what was the right thing to do (other than the
> > > same suggestion from both that I won't print here).
> > >
> > > It was reproducible on a number of vintages of distributions with
> > > default kernels, but triggering on very few of the many modules loaded
> > > at boot time. It was reproduced with fs-nfs4 and nfsv4 modules on
> > > tracefs, but there are reports of it also happening with debugfs. It
> > > was triggering only in __audit_inode_child with a parent that was not
> > > found in the task context's audit names_list.
> > >
> > > I have four potential solutions listed in my order of preference and
I'd
> > > like to get some feedback about which one would be the most acceptable.
>
> 0.5 - Notice that we are in *init_module & delete_module and inhibit
> generation of any record type except SYSCALL and KERN_MODULE ? There are some
> classification routines for -F perms=wrxa that might be used to create a new
> class for loading/deleting modules that sets a flag that we use to suppress
> some record types.
Ok, I was partially able to do this.
If I try and catch it in audit_log_start() which is the common point for
all the record types to be able to limit to just SYSCALL and
KERN_MODULE, there will already be a linked list of hundreds to
thousands of audit_names and will still print a non-zero items count in
the SYSCALL record. This also sounds like a potentially lazy way to
deal with other record spam (like setuid BRPM_FCAPS).
If I catch it in __audit_inode_child in the same place as I caught the
filesystem type, it is effective for only the PATH record, which is all
that is a problem at the moment.
It touches nine arch-related files, which is a lot more disruptive than
I was hoping.
Blocking PATH record on creation based on syscall *really* seems like
a bad/dangerous idea. If we want to block all these tracefs/debugfs
records, let's just block the fs. Although as of right now I'm not a
fan of blocking anything.
--
paul moore