On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 9:22 AM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a
process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP record to document the event.
This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of
the form /proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the
newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or
an additional task added to a container.
The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
The writer must have capability CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.
This will produce a record such as this:
type=CONTAINER_OP msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209
contid=123456 old-contid=18446744073709551615
The "op" field indicates an initial set. The "opid" field is the
object's PID, the process being "contained". New and old audit
container identifier values are given in the "contid" fields.
It is not permitted to unset the audit container identifier.
A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier.
Store the audit container identifier in a refcounted kernel object that
is added to the master list of audit container identifiers. This will
allow multiple container orchestrators/engines to work on the same
machine without danger of inadvertantly re-using an existing identifier.
It will also allow an orchestrator to inject a process into an existing
container by checking if the original container owner is the one
injecting the task. A hash table list is used to optimize searches.
Please see the github audit kernel issue for the main feature:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
Please see the github audit userspace issue for supporting additions:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
Please see the github audit testsuiite issue for the test case:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
Please see the github audit wiki for the feature overview:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman(a)tuxdriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 36 +++++++++++
include/linux/audit.h | 33 ++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 +
kernel/audit.c | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/audit.h | 8 +++
5 files changed, 227 insertions(+)
...
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index c2150415f9df..2800d4f1a2a8 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -692,6 +715,16 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)
return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
}
+static inline bool audit_contid_valid(u64 contid)
+{
+ return contid != AUDIT_CID_UNSET;
+}
+
+static inline bool audit_contid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ return audit_contid_valid(audit_get_contid(tsk));
+}
This is quasi-nitpicky, but it seems like audit_contid_valid() and
audit_contid_set() should be moved to kernel/audit.h if possible
(possibly even kernel/audit.c). Maybe I'll see something later in the
patchset, but right now I'm struggling to think of why anyone outside
of audit would need to call these functions.
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 5d8147a29291..6d387793f702 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -138,6 +138,13 @@ struct auditd_connection {
/* Hash for inode-based rules */
struct list_head audit_inode_hash[AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS];
+/* Hash for contid object lists */
+struct list_head audit_contid_hash[AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS];
+/* Lock all additions and deletions to the contid hash lists, assignment
+ * of container objects to tasks. There should be no need for
+ * interaction with tasklist_lock
+ */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(audit_contobj_list_lock);
static struct kmem_cache *audit_buffer_cache;
@@ -212,6 +219,33 @@ void __init audit_task_init(void)
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
+/* rcu_read_lock must be held by caller unless new */
+static struct audit_contobj *_audit_contobj_hold(struct audit_contobj *cont)
+{
+ if (cont)
+ refcount_inc(&cont->refcount);
+ return cont;
+}
+
+static struct audit_contobj *_audit_contobj_get(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ if (!tsk->audit)
+ return NULL;
+ return _audit_contobj_hold(tsk->audit->cont);
+}
+
+/* rcu_read_lock must be held by caller */
+static void _audit_contobj_put(struct audit_contobj *cont)
+{
+ if (!cont)
+ return;
+ if (refcount_dec_and_test(&cont->refcount)) {
+ put_task_struct(cont->owner);
+ list_del_rcu(&cont->list);
You should check your locking; I'm used to seeing exclusive locks
(e.g. the spinlock) around list adds/removes, it just reads/traversals
that can be done with just the RCU lock held.
+ kfree_rcu(cont, rcu);
+ }
+}
Another nitpick, but it might be nice to have similar arguments to the
_get() and _put() functions, e.g. struct audit_contobj, but that is
some serious bikeshedding (basically rename _hold() to _get() and
rename _hold to audit_task_contid_hold() or similar).
/**
* audit_alloc - allocate an audit info block for a task
* @tsk: task
@@ -232,6 +266,9 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
}
info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ info->cont = _audit_contobj_get(current);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
The RCU locks aren't strictly necessary here, are they? In fact I
suppose we could probably just replace the _get() call with a
refcount_set(1) just as we do in audit_set_contid(), yes?
tsk->audit = info;
ret = audit_alloc_syscall(tsk);
@@ -246,6 +283,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = {
.loginuid = INVALID_UID,
.sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET,
+ .cont = NULL,
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
.ctx = NULL,
#endif
@@ -262,6 +300,9 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
struct audit_task_info *info = tsk->audit;
audit_free_syscall(tsk);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ _audit_contobj_put(tsk->audit->cont);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
/* Freeing the audit_task_info struct must be performed after
* audit_log_exit() due to need for loginuid and sessionid.
*/
@@ -1709,6 +1750,9 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&audit_inode_hash[i]);
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS; i++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&audit_contid_hash[i]);
+
mutex_init(&audit_cmd_mutex.lock);
audit_cmd_mutex.owner = NULL;
@@ -2410,6 +2454,110 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
}
+/*
+ * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid
+ * @task: target task
+ * @contid: contid value
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure.
+ *
+ * If the original container owner goes away, no task injection is
+ * possible to an existing container.
+ *
+ * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write().
+ */
+int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct audit_contobj *oldcont = NULL;
+
+ task_lock(task);
+ /* Can't set if audit disabled */
+ if (!task->audit) {
+ task_unlock(task);
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+ }
See my question/comment in patch 1/13; this check may not be needed or
it may need to be changed to something other than "!task->audit".
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ /* Don't allow the contid to be unset */
+ if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ /* if we don't have caps, reject */
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) {
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */
+ if (!list_empty(&task->children) ||
+ !(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task))) {
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ /* if contid is already set, deny */
+ if (audit_contid_set(task))
+ rc = -EEXIST;
+unlock:
Can we move the "unlock" target to the end of the function where it
just handles the unlocking and returns an error, including the
AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP record if necessary? From what I can see we only
jump to "unlock" in case of error where we are not going to set the
audit container ID, yet the "unlock" target is placed in a misleading
location in the middle of the function. It may be that everything
works correctly, but I would argue this is a bad practice that
increases the likelihood of buggy behavior in future code changes.
If you can't find way to arrange the code nicely, just duplicate the
"tasklist_lock" unlock operation in the error handlers before jumping
down to the end of the function. It isn't perfect, but I believe it
will be a lot less fragile than the current approach.
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ oldcont = _audit_contobj_get(task);
+ if (!rc) {
+ struct audit_contobj *cont = NULL, *newcont = NULL;
+ int h = audit_hash_contid(contid);
+
+ spin_lock(&audit_contobj_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, &audit_contid_hash[h], list)
+ if (cont->id == contid) {
+ /* task injection to existing container */
+ if (current == cont->owner) {
+ _audit_contobj_hold(cont);
+ newcont = cont;
+ } else {
+ rc = -ENOTUNIQ;
+ spin_unlock(&audit_contobj_list_lock);
+ goto conterror;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!newcont) {
+ newcont = kmalloc(sizeof(*newcont), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (newcont) {
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&newcont->list);
+ newcont->id = contid;
+ newcont->owner = get_task_struct(current);
+ refcount_set(&newcont->refcount, 1);
+ list_add_rcu(&newcont->list,
+ &audit_contid_hash[h]);
+ } else {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ spin_unlock(&audit_contobj_list_lock);
+ goto conterror;
+ }
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&audit_contobj_list_lock);
+ task->audit->cont = newcont;
+ _audit_contobj_put(oldcont);
+ }
+conterror:
+ task_unlock(task);
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return rc;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP);
+ if (!ab)
+ return rc;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "op=set opid=%d contid=%llu old-contid=%llu",
+ task_tgid_nr(task), contid, oldcont ? oldcont->id : -1);
+ _audit_contobj_put(oldcont);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ return rc;
+}
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com