On Monday 03 October 2005 11:03, Dustin Kirkland wrote:
For the of completeness, can you reference the section of the
LSPP/RBAC
specification where each of these came from?
OK, This is amended. I put R for RBAC and L for LSPP. Some things are not in
the specs, like 3.1, 3.11, or 3.12. But I think these are items that we want
coverage on to make sure the system is solid. If there are no parenthesis, I
did not find it in the specs.
-Steve
1. Basic
1.1 Objects shall include: files, named pipes (fifo), sockets, devices, shared
memory, message queue, semaphores. New object: kernel keys
2 Audit User Space
2.1 Events shall contain unique session identifier and/or terminal
(R/FAU_SAR.1)
2.2 The ability to search on subject and object labels (L/FAU_SEL.1)
2.3 The ability to search based on type of access and role that enabled access
(R/FAU_SAR.3)
2.4 The ability to search based on subject and object role (R/FAU_SAR.1)
2.5 There shall be a method to audit based on keys
2.6 There shall be a way to audit based on network address
3 Kernel - Audit related
3.1 Create new audit record types for: rlimit violations, lspp subject, lspp
object, crypto, anomolies, and response to anomolies.
3.2 All Subjects and Objects shall be labeled - Network and kernel keys
needed (L/FAU_GEN.1)
3.3 Subject & Object information must be labeled in events (L/FAU_SAR.3)
3.4 Role must be identified in events (R/FAU_GEN.1)
3.5 For access control actions, the role that made access possible has to be
recorded. (R/FAU_GEN.1)
3.6 Audit events shall contain unique session identifier and/or terminal
(R/FAU_SAR.1 - This item may not be needed.)
3.7 Audit events can be filtered by Object or Subject labels (L/FAU_SEL.1)
3.8 Audit events can be filtered by host identity, event type, users belonging
to certain role, and access types. (R/FAU_SEL.1)
3.9 There shall be a method to audit based on keys
3.10 There shall be a way to audit based on network address
3.11 Loading MAC policy is auditable event
3.12 Changing policy booleans is auditable event
3.13 Service discontinuity is auditable event. (R/FPT_RCV.1)
5.1.6 Hard Copy
5.1.6.1 hard copy data must be labeled on every page (FDP_ETC)
5.1.6.2 admin shall be able to specify label associated with the
data. Overrides are an auditable event. (FDP_ETC)
7 User Space SE Linux
7.6 newrole made into suid program so that it can send audit messages
7.7 assignment of user to role/se linux user is auditable. (R/FAU_GEN.1)
9 Self Test
9.1 RBAC requires that a suite of tests be available that demonstrates that
the machine is correctly operating. (R/FPT_TST.1)
9.2 Authorized users shall also be able to verify the integrity of data and
executables called out in security target. (R/FPT_TST.1)
9.3 Tests shall produce audit records indicating that it was run and any
failures. (R/FPT_TST.1)
10.0 Postfix
10.1 Add loginuid code to set it when delivering local mail
11.0 Procmail
11.1 Add loginuid code to set it when delivering local mail
12.0 Udev
12.1 No hotplug events shall label devices. It can only make sure they are
unlabeled. (L/FDP_ETC, FDP_ITC)
13.0 initscripts
13.1 Shutdown needs hwclock call moved to before killing the audit daemon