Re: [PATCH 0/6][v2] audit: implement multicast socket for journald
Here are the capabilities we currently give to sysadm_t with
sysadm_secadm 1.0.0 Disabled
allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { chown dac_override
dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable
net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner
sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice
sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write setfcap } ;
allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { setgid setuid sys_chroot }
allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability2 { syslog block_suspend } ;
cap_audit_write might be a problem?
On 04/22/2014 11:57 PM, Eric Paris wrote:
On Tue, 2014-04-22 at 22:25 -0400, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Tuesday, April 22, 2014 09:31:52 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>> This is a patch set Eric Paris and I have been working on to add a
>> restricted capability read-only netlink multicast socket to kernel audit to
>> enable userspace clients such as systemd/journald to receive audit logs, in
>> addition to the bidirectional auditd userspace client.
> Do have the ability to separate of secadm_r and sysadm_r? By allowing this, we
> will leak to a sysadmin that he is being audited by the security officer. In a
> lot of cases, they are one in the same person. But for others, they are not. I
> have a feeling this will cause problems for MLS systems.
Why? This requires CAP_AUDIT_READ. Just don't give CAP_AUDIT_READ to
places you don't want to have read permission. Exactly the same as you
don't give CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to sysadm_r. (If we are giving
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to sysadm_r and you think that any file protections
on /var/log/audit/audit.log are adequate we are fooling ourselves!)
> Also, shouldn't we have an audit event for every attempt to connect to this
> socket? We really need to know where this information is getting leaked to.
We certainly can. What would you like to see in that event?
-Eric
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