On Thu, 2006-06-29 at 11:34 -0500, Klaus Weidner wrote:
 On Tue, Jun 27, 2006 at 05:15:53PM -0400, Amy Griffis wrote:
 > Robert Giles wrote:     [Tue Jun 27 2006, 04:43:10PM EDT]
 > > So if I attempt to access /etc/shadow as a regular user, a
"success=no" 
 > > audit event is generated to indicate read failure - but if a regular user 
 > > attempts to read /var/log/audit/audit.log, nothing happens (no audit event 
 > > whatsoever is created).
 > 
 > This is because the regular doesn't have permissions to read
 > /var/log/audit.  Since the path didn't fully resolve to
 > /var/log/audit/audit.log, the user didn't actually fail to access
 > audit.log, they failed to access /var/log/audit.
 > 
 > If you would like to see a record in this case, you must add a watch
 > for /var/log/audit.
 
 CAPP etc. require audit records for unsuccessful attempts to access
 objects, but we've generally used the interpretation that there is no
 access attempt to the object if a containing directory already rejects
 the directory traversal before getting to the object. It's not ideal but
 it's the best fit to the way the path access works.
 
 If you really insist on the audit records, you could weaken the
 restrictions on the /var/log/audit/ directory (for example 711
 permissions) so that it doesn't reject the traversal. The audit files are
 still protected of course.
 
 -Klaus 
Klaus,
What you are saying is true, however I would caution against allowing
the traversal because I think my accreditors would argue that it would
open a covert channel potential.
Obviously there would need to be a participating high-side or privileged
signaler, but at least in our case I believe we can live with the
directory rejection rather than the file itself.
In short, I agree with your interpretation.
LCB.
-- 
LC Bruzenak
lenny(a)bruzenak.com