Re: [PATCH -v2 3/4] AUDIT: collect info when execve results in caps in pE

On Tue, 2008-11-04 at 10:35 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Eric Paris (eparis(a)redhat.com): > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > > index 8bb95ed..534abb5 100644 > > --- a/security/commoncap.c > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > > @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ > > */ > > > > #include <linux/capability.h> > > +#include <linux/audit.h> > > #include <linux/module.h> > > #include <linux/init.h> > > #include <linux/kernel.h> > > @@ -373,6 +374,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) > > > > void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) > > { > > + kernel_cap_t pP = current->cap_permitted; > > + kernel_cap_t pE = current->cap_effective; > > + > > if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid || > > !cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted, > > current->cap_permitted)) { > > @@ -407,6 +411,12 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) > > } > > > > /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */ > > + if (!cap_isclear(current->cap_effective)) { > > + if (!cap_issubset(current->cap_effective, CAP_FULL_SET) || > > Hi Eric, > > can you explain what the cap_issubset() check is for here? I'm glad you noticed it, because it is backwards! should be if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, current->cap_effective) || The idea is that I don't care to audit 1) full set && 2) this is root && 3) root should have a full set

This would still consider a root without a full set because the bset had been changed to be an interesting event. I'm fine with that. I'll send -v3 once I hear comments on everything else.... -Eric