[PATCH V4 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the
negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 927fe93..cf6e2b0 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -505,6 +505,12 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
has_cap,
*effective = true;
}
+#define __cap_gained(field, target, source) \
+ !cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field)
+#define __cap_grew(target, source, cred) \
+ !cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
+#define __cap_full(field, cred) \
+ cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -533,10 +539,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
- if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
-
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
*
@@ -544,8 +549,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid);
- if ((is_setid ||
- !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
+ if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
!ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
@@ -595,8 +599,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
- if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
- if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
+ if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
+ if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
@@ -616,7 +620,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
} else if (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
if (effective ||
- !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient))
+ __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
}
--
1.7.1