Re: auditd and CAP_AUDIT_READ

On Thu, 15 Nov 2018 08:23:46 -0500 Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > I thought that the prime audit connection requires a capability > > check to ensure a process without proper privilege does not replace > > the audit daemon...since that's now possible. Are there privilege > > checks for who can connect to the audit socket? Shouldn't that > > process also have CAP_AUDIT_READ since that is what it will be > > doing? > > The only cap that will let a daemon be checked for replacement is > CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. CAP_AUDIT_READ is only used for the unreliable > reception of multicast audit log records. > > The unicast socket is gated by CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and CAP_AUDIT_WRITE. > The multicast read-only unreliable socket is gated by > CAP_AUDIT_READ. My understanding was that CAP_AUDIT_READ was required by everything that read, including unicast. That is why it checks that capability CAP_AUDIT_READ. Shouldn't everything reading need that capability?

-Steve