On 2017-02-28 23:15, Steve Grubb wrote:
On Tuesday, February 28, 2017 10:37:04 PM EST Richard Guy Briggs
wrote:
> Sorry, I forgot to include Cc: in this cover letter for context to the 4
> alt patches.
>
> On 2017-02-28 22:15, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > The background to this is:
> >
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/8
> >
> > In short, audit SYSCALL records for *init_module were occasionally
> > accompanied by hundreds to thousands of null PATH records.
> >
> > I chatted with Al Viro and Eric Paris about this Friday afternoon and
> > they seemed to vaguely recall this issue and didn't have any solid
> > recommendations as to what was the right thing to do (other than the
> > same suggestion from both that I won't print here).
> >
> > It was reproducible on a number of vintages of distributions with
> > default kernels, but triggering on very few of the many modules loaded
> > at boot time. It was reproduced with fs-nfs4 and nfsv4 modules on
> > tracefs, but there are reports of it also happening with debugfs. It
> > was triggering only in __audit_inode_child with a parent that was not
> > found in the task context's audit names_list.
> >
> > I have four potential solutions listed in my order of preference and I'd
> > like to get some feedback about which one would be the most acceptable.
0.5 - Notice that we are in *init_module & delete_module and inhibit
generation of any record type except SYSCALL and KERN_MODULE ? There are some
classification routines for -F perms=wrxa that might be used to create a new
class for loading/deleting modules that sets a flag that we use to suppress
some record types.
Ok, I was partially able to do this.
If I try and catch it in audit_log_start() which is the common point for
all the record types to be able to limit to just SYSCALL and
KERN_MODULE, there will already be a linked list of hundreds to
thousands of audit_names and will still print a non-zero items count in
the SYSCALL record. This also sounds like a potentially lazy way to
deal with other record spam (like setuid BRPM_FCAPS).
If I catch it in __audit_inode_child in the same place as I caught the
filesystem type, it is effective for only the PATH record, which is all
that is a problem at the moment.
It touches nine arch-related files, which is a lot more disruptive than
I was hoping.
> > 1 - In __audit_inode_child, return immedialy upon detecting
TRACEFS and
> >
> > DEBUGFS (and potentially other filesystems identified, via s_magic).
XFS creates them too. Who knows what else.
Why would this happen? I would assume it is a mounted filesystem. Do
you have a sample of the extra records?
This brings me back to the original reaction I had to your suggestion
which is: Are you certain there is never a circumstance where *_module
syscalls never involve a file? Say, the module itself on loading pulls
in other files from the mounted filesystem?
-Steve
> > 2 - In __audit_inode_child, return after not finding the parent in that
> >
> > task context's audit names_list.
> >
> > 3 - In __audit_inode_child, mark the parent and its child as
"hidden"
> >
> > when the parent isn't found in that task context's audit
names_list.
> > This will still result in an "items=" count that does not match
the
> > number of accompanying PATH records for that SYSCALL record, which
> > may upset userspace tools but would still indicate suppressed
> > records.
> >
> > 4 - In __audit_inode_child, when the parent isn't found, store the
> >
> > child's dentry in the child's (new or not) audit_names structure
> > (properly refcounted with dget) and store the parent's dentry in its
> > newly created audit_names structure (via dget_parent), then if the
> > name isn't available at PATH record generation time, use that stored
> > value (with dentry_path_raw and released with dput)
> >
> > Is there another more elegant solution that I've missed that catches
> > things before they get anywhere near audit_inode_child (called from
> > tracefs' notifiers)?
> >
> > I'll thread onto this message tested patches for all four solutions.
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635