11:37 p.m.
Administrators can write to this sysctl to set the maximum seccomp
action that should be logged. Any actions with values greater than
what's written to the sysctl will not be logged.
For example, all SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, and
SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO actions would be logged if "errno" were written to the
sysctl. SECCOMP_RET_TRACE and SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions would not be
logged since their values are higher than SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO.
The path to the sysctl is:
/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/max_action_to_log
The actions_avail sysctl can be read to discover the valid action names
that can be written to the max_action_to_log sysctl. The actions_avail
sysctl is also useful in understanding the ordering of actions used when
deciding the maximum action to log.
The default setting for the sysctl is to only log SECCOMP_RET_KILL
actions which matches the existing behavior.
There's one important exception to this sysctl. If a task is
specifically being audited, meaning that an audit context has been
allocated for the task, seccomp will log all actions other than
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW despite the value of max_action_to_log. This exception
preserves the existing auditing behavior of tasks with an allocated
audit context.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks(a)canonical.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 6 +--
kernel/seccomp.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index f51fca8d..e0d95fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -315,11 +315,7 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr);
static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
{
- if (!audit_enabled)
- return;
-
- /* Force a record to be reported if a signal was delivered. */
- if (signr || unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
+ if (audit_enabled && unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
__audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, code);
}
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 919ad9f..548fb89 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -509,6 +509,24 @@ static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+static u32 seccomp_max_action_to_log = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
+
+static void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action)
+{
+ /* Force an audit message to be emitted when the action is not greater
+ * than the configured maximum action.
+ */
+ if (action <= seccomp_max_action_to_log)
+ return __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
+
+ /* If the action is not an ALLOW action, let the audit subsystem decide
+ * if it should be audited based on whether the current task itself is
+ * being audited.
+ */
+ if (action != SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+ return audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
+}
+
/*
* Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
* To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
@@ -534,7 +552,7 @@ static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
dump_stack();
#endif
- audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
+ seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
do_exit(SIGKILL);
}
@@ -633,18 +651,19 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct
seccomp_data *sd,
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
+ seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action);
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
default:
- audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action);
+ seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action);
do_exit(SIGSYS);
}
unreachable();
skip:
- audit_seccomp(this_syscall, 0, action);
+ seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action);
return -1;
}
#else
@@ -910,18 +929,102 @@ long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long
filter_off,
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+/* Human readable action names for friendly sysctl interaction */
#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_NAME "kill"
#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME "trap"
#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME "errno"
#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME "trace"
#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow"
+/* Largest strlen() of all action names */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_MAX_NAME_LEN 5
+
static char seccomp_actions_avail[] = SECCOMP_RET_KILL_NAME " "
SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME " "
SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME " "
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME " "
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME;
+struct seccomp_action_name {
+ u32 action;
+ const char *name;
+};
+
+static struct seccomp_action_name seccomp_action_names[] = {
+ { SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME },
+ { }
+};
+
+static bool seccomp_name_from_action(const char **namep, u32 action)
+{
+ struct seccomp_action_name *cur;
+
+ for (cur = seccomp_action_names; cur->name; cur++) {
+ if (cur->action == action) {
+ *namep = cur->name;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool seccomp_action_from_name(u32 *action, const char *name)
+{
+ struct seccomp_action_name *cur;
+
+ for (cur = seccomp_action_names; cur->name; cur++) {
+ if (!strcmp(cur->name, name)) {
+ *action = cur->action;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static int seccomp_max_action_to_log_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char name[SECCOMP_RET_MAX_NAME_LEN + 1] = {0};
+ int ret;
+
+ if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!write) {
+ const char *namep;
+
+ if (!seccomp_name_from_action(&namep,
+ seccomp_max_action_to_log))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ strncpy(name, namep, sizeof(name) - 1);
+ }
+
+ table->data = name;
+ table->maxlen = sizeof(name);
+ ret = proc_dostring(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (write) {
+ u32 action;
+
+ if (!seccomp_action_from_name(&action, table->data))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ seccomp_max_action_to_log = action;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path[] = {
{ .procname = "kernel", },
{ .procname = "seccomp", },
@@ -936,6 +1039,11 @@ static struct ctl_table seccomp_sysctl_table[] = {
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_dostring,
},
+ {
+ .procname = "max_action_to_log",
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = seccomp_max_action_to_log_handler,
+ },
{ }
};
--
2.7.4