On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing
setuid
application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event
really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly
records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
set*id.
See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
The first to eighth just massage the logic to make it easier to
understand. Some of them could be squashed together.
The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth.
It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of
"!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)"
to
"!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))"
but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think
I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand.
The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging
based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some
duplication in the logic.
Passes: (ltp 20170516)
./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
./runltp -f securebits
./runltp -f cap_bounds
./runltp -f filecaps
make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs)
v4
rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes
minor local func renames
v3
refactor into several sub-functions
convert most macros to inline funcs
v2
use macros to clarify intent of calculations
fix original logic error
address additional audit logging conditions
Richard Guy Briggs (10):
capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
capabilities: move audit log decision to function
capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
capabilities: invert logic for clarity
capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
security/commoncap.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
I took a quick look at this latest revision and aside from some
disagreements on style/formatting it looks okayish to me. However, I
am going to walk back my previous I-can-take-this-via-the-audit-tree
comments, I think this probably should go in via the capabilities
(Serge) and/or linux-security (James) tree.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com