On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 10:36 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com> wrote:
In case a file has an invalid context set, in an AVC record
generated
upon access to such file, the target context is always reported as
unlabeled. This patch adds new optional fields to the AVC record
(srawcon and trawcon) that report the actual context string if it
differs from the one reported in scontext/tcontext. This is useful for
diagnosing SELinux denials involving invalid contexts.
To trigger an AVC that illustrates this situation:
# setenforce 0
# touch /tmp/testfile
# setfattr -n security.selinux -v system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0 /tmp/testfile
# runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/testfile
AVC before:
type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149
comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608
scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023
tclass=file permissive=1
AVC after:
type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149
comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608
scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023
trawcon=system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
I would like us to add new fields at the end of existing records; the
recent audit config changes are a bit of a special case as discussed
previously.
Also, under what cases would we ever see a srawcon field? This is
only going to happen if we have a running process whose domain is
removed during a policy reload, correct? I'm find with including this
for the sake of completeness, but I would mention this in the patch
description for the next revision.
Cc: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh(a)redhat.com>
Link:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1135683
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com>
---
v2: Rename fields to "(s|t)rawcon".
security/selinux/avc.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 9b63d8ee1687..df5490db575b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -165,6 +165,32 @@ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32
av)
audit_log_format(ab, " }");
}
+static void avc_dump_sid(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 sid, char type)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char *context, *rcontext;
+ u32 context_len, rcontext_len;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(state, sid, &context, &context_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%csid=%d ", type, sid);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%ccontext=%s ", type, context);
+
+ /* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */
+ rc = security_sid_to_context_force(state, sid, &rcontext,
+ &rcontext_len);
+ if (!rc) {
+ if (strcmp(context, rcontext))
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%crawcon=%s ", type, rcontext);
+ kfree(rcontext);
+ }
+ kfree(context);
+}
+
/**
* avc_dump_query - Display a SID pair and a class in human-readable form.
* @ssid: source security identifier
@@ -174,28 +200,11 @@ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32
av)
static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct selinux_state *state,
u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
- int rc;
- char *scontext;
- u32 scontext_len;
-
- rc = security_sid_to_context(state, ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
- if (rc)
- audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
- else {
- audit_log_format(ab, "scontext=%s", scontext);
- kfree(scontext);
- }
-
- rc = security_sid_to_context(state, tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
- if (rc)
- audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
- else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
- kfree(scontext);
- }
+ avc_dump_sid(ab, state, ssid, 's');
+ avc_dump_sid(ab, state, tsid, 't');
BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
- audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
}
/**
--
2.20.1