[PATCH] audit=0 appears not to completely disable auditing
by Steve Grubb
Hi,
There was a bz, 231371, reporting that current upstream kernels do not completely
disable auditing when boot with audit=0 and the audit daemon not configured to
run. You can reproduce the problem by:
service auditd stop
auditctl -e 0
auditctl -w /etc/passwd
and you'd get an event in syslog:
Mar 9 15:43:04 localhost kernel: audit(1173472984.321:982): auid=4294967295
subj=user_u:system_r:auditctl_t:s0 op=add rule key=(null) list=4 res=1
The patch below solves this problem by checking audit_enabled before creating
an audit event.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
diff -urp linux-2.6.18.x86_64.orig/kernel/audit.c linux-2.6.18.x86_64/kernel/audit.c
--- linux-2.6.18.x86_64.orig/kernel/audit.c 2007-03-09 14:08:18.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.18.x86_64/kernel/audit.c 2007-03-09 14:06:59.000000000 -0500
@@ -238,46 +238,50 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
{
- int old = audit_rate_limit;
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ int old = audit_rate_limit;
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- int rc;
- if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
- return rc;
- else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
- limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- limit, old, loginuid);
+ limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+ limit, old, loginuid);
+ }
audit_rate_limit = limit;
return 0;
}
static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
{
- int old = audit_backlog_limit;
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ int old = audit_backlog_limit;
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- int rc;
- if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
- return rc;
- else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
- limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- limit, old, loginuid);
+ limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+ limit, old, loginuid);
+ }
audit_backlog_limit = limit;
return 0;
}
@@ -289,21 +293,23 @@ static int audit_set_enabled(int state,
if (state != 0 && state != 1)
return -EINVAL;
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- int rc;
- if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
- return rc;
- else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ if (audit_enabled || state) {
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
- state, old, loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- state, old, loginuid);
+ state, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+ state, old, loginuid);
+ }
audit_enabled = state;
return 0;
}
@@ -317,21 +323,23 @@ static int audit_set_failure(int state,
&& state != AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC)
return -EINVAL;
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- int rc;
- if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
- return rc;
- else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
- state, old, loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- state, old, loginuid);
+ state, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+ state, old, loginuid);
+ }
audit_failure = state;
return 0;
}
@@ -536,22 +544,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
if (err < 0) return err;
}
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) {
- int old = audit_pid;
- if (sid) {
- if ((err = selinux_ctxid_to_string(
- sid, &ctx, &len)))
- return err;
- else
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ int old = audit_pid;
+ if (sid) {
+ if ((err = selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return err;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+ status_get->pid, old,
+ loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
- status_get->pid, old,
- loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- status_get->pid, old, loginuid);
+ status_get->pid, old,
+ loginuid);
+ }
audit_pid = status_get->pid;
}
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT)
diff -urp linux-2.6.18.x86_64.orig/kernel/auditfilter.c linux-2.6.18.x86_64/kernel/auditfilter.c
--- linux-2.6.18.x86_64.orig/kernel/auditfilter.c 2007-03-09 14:08:18.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.18.x86_64/kernel/auditfilter.c 2007-03-09 14:05:54.000000000 -0500
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ extern struct inotify_handle *audit_ih;
/* Inotify events we care about. */
#define AUDIT_IN_WATCH IN_MOVE|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE|IN_DELETE_SELF|IN_MOVE_SELF
+extern int audit_enabled;
+
void audit_free_parent(struct inotify_watch *i_watch)
{
struct audit_parent *parent;
@@ -897,7 +899,6 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct au
struct audit_watch *owatch, *nwatch, *nextw;
struct audit_krule *r, *nextr;
struct audit_entry *oentry, *nentry;
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(owatch, nextw, &parent->watches, wlist) {
@@ -937,13 +938,18 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct au
call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
}
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
- audit_log_format(ab, "op=updated rules specifying path=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, owatch->path);
- audit_log_format(ab, " with dev=%u ino=%lu\n", dev, ino);
- audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
- audit_log_end(ab);
-
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "op=updated rules specifying path=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, owatch->path);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " with dev=%u ino=%lu\n",
+ dev, ino);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
audit_remove_watch(owatch);
goto add_watch_to_parent; /* event applies to a single watch */
}
@@ -962,25 +968,28 @@ static void audit_remove_parent_watches(
struct audit_watch *w, *nextw;
struct audit_krule *r, *nextr;
struct audit_entry *e;
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
parent->flags |= AUDIT_PARENT_INVALID;
list_for_each_entry_safe(w, nextw, &parent->watches, wlist) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, nextr, &w->rules, rlist) {
e = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
-
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
- audit_log_format(ab, "op=remove rule path=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, w->path);
- if (r->filterkey) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, r->filterkey);
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
- audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
- audit_log_end(ab);
-
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=remove rule path=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, w->path);
+ if (r->filterkey) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+ r->filterkey);
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
+ audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1",
+ r->listnr);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
list_del(&r->rlist);
list_del_rcu(&e->list);
call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
@@ -1409,6 +1418,9 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return;
+
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (!ab)
return;
17 years, 7 months
[RFC] NISPOM audit rules - first draft
by Steve Grubb
Hi,
Posting this in case anyone has comments good or bad. This is aimed at current
upstream kernels as of 2.6.19 or later.
-Steve
##
## This file contains the a sample audit configuration intended to
## meet the NISPOM Chapter 8 rules.
##
## This file should be saved as /etc/audit/audit.rules.
##
## Remove any existing rules
-D
## Increase buffer size to handle the increased number of messages.
## Feel free to increase this if the machine panic's
-b 8192
## Audit 1, 1(a) (a) Enough information to determine the date and time
## of action (e.g., common network time), the system locale of the action,
## the system entity that initiated or completed the action, the resources
## involved, and the action involved.
## changes to the time
-a entry,always -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k time-change
-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k time-change
## system locale
-a exit,always -S sethostname -k system-locale
-w /etc/issue -p wa -k CFG_issue -k system-locale
-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k CFG_issue.net -k system-locale
## Audit 1, 1(b) Successful and unsuccessful logons and logoffs.
## This is covered by patches to login, gdm, and openssh
## Audit 1, 1(c) Successful and unsuccessful accesses to
## security-relevant objects and directories, including
## creation, open, close, modification, and deletion.
## unsuccessful creation
-a exit,always -S creat -S mkdir -S mknod -S link -S symlink -F exit=-13 -k creation
-a exit,always -S mkdirat -S mknodat -S linkat -S symlinkat -F exit=-13 -k creation
## unsuccessful open
-a exit,always -S open -F exit=-13 -k open
## unsuccessful close
-a exit,always -S close -F exit=-13 -k close
## unsuccessful modifications
-a exit,always -S rename -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-13 -k mods
-a exit,always -S renameat -F exit=-13 -k mods
-a exit,always -F perm=a -F exit=-13 -k mods
## unsuccessful deletion
-a exit,always -S rmdir -S unlink -F exit=-13 -k delete
-a exit,always -S unlinkat -F exit=-13 -k delete
## Audit 1, 1(d) Changes in user authenticators.
## Covered by patches to libpam
## Audit 1, 1(e) The blocking or blacklisting of a user ID,
## terminal, or access port and the reason for the action.
## Covered by patches to pam_tally
## Audit 1, 1(f) Denial of access resulting from an excessive
## number of unsuccessful logon attempts.
## Covered by patches to pam_tally
## Audit 1, 2 Audit Trail Protection. The contents of audit trails
## shall be protected against unauthorized access, modification,
## or deletion.
## This should be covered by file permissions, but we can watch it
## to see any activity
-w /var/log/audit/ -k audit-logs
-w /var/log/audit/audit.log -k audit-logs
#-w /var/log/audit/audit.log.1 -k audit-logs
#-w /var/log/audit/audit.log.2 -k audit-logs
#-w /var/log/audit/audit.log.3 -k audit-logs
#-w /var/log/audit/audit.log.4 -k audit-logs
## Put your own watches after this point
# -w /your-file -p rwxa -k mykey
18 years
[PATCH 0/2] signal audit (v3)
by Amy Griffis
Several changes since last version:
- use arch rule field to determine which signal class to check,
check both if arch is unspecified
- don't check AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32 if it doesn't exist
- group target pids in aux structs (initially 16)
- on syscall exit, initialize context's aux ptrs for re-use
- don't convert sid to string until we log a record
Applies on top of ptrace patch.
18 years, 1 month
Pull timestamp from audit event
by Kirkwood, David A.
How can I pull the timestamp from a particular audit event. For example:
I want to pull all /bin/su events from the audit log for the week with
when they occurred. How can I do this?
Thanks
David A. Kirkwood
18 years, 1 month
auditctl Question
by Khoa V. Nguyen
Hello,
I want to be able to audit failed access to /etc/inittab but I don't think the
current auditctl features able to accomplish it.
auditctl -a watch,always /etc/inittab -F success=no
This would be a syntax error..but
auditctl -a exit,always -w /etc/inittab -F success=no
How can I do it?
Thanks,
____________________________________________________________________________________
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18 years, 1 month
Syscall issues with Audit 1.0.14 and linux 2.6.9-42.0.10
by Walt Powell
All:
When using linux kernel-smp-2.6.9-42.0.10.EL and audit-1.0.14-1.EL
In the audit.rules files
-a entry, always -S chmod
errors out. Does not recognize 'chmod'.
It works in kernel-smp-2.6.9-42.EL given the same audit rpm
Is the syscalls list for 2.6.9-42.0.10.EL radically different, and if so, is there a list of the syscalls available for audit somewhere?
18 years, 1 month
audit 1.5.1 released
by Steve Grubb
Hi,
I've just released a new version of the audit daemon. It can be downloaded
from http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit It will also be in rawhide
tomorrow. The Changelog is:
- Updated autrace to monitor some *at syscalls in resource mode
- Add support in libaudit for AUDIT_BIT_TEST(&=) and AUDIT_MASK_TEST (&)
- Finish reworking auditd config parser
- In auparse, interpret open, fcntl, and clone flags
- In auparse, when interpreting execve record types, run args through unencode
- Add support for OBJ_PID message type
- Event dispatcher updates
Please let me know if there are any problems with this release.
-Steve
18 years, 1 month
Writtign to audit with an application
by geckiv
I was wondering if anyone had a good example of how to write to the
audit log on linux for a custom application wanting to log events. Also
how that would work. I found a little information but I have been unable
to get anything to work properly. Does it write to the demon then write
to the /var/log/auit/audit.log? Also how do yo set this up so not just
any one or any process write to that log?
Thanks,
Frank
18 years, 1 month
[PATCH 0/4] audit obj cleanups
by Amy Griffis
Re-posting patches to clean up auditing for syscall objects.
- stop logging bogus object labels
- handle edge cases for xattr and mqueue calls
- try harder to log only 1 PATH record per object
Rebased to current git and folded memory corruption fix from Al.
18 years, 1 month
