On Wed, 22 Oct 2014, Eric Paris wrote:
That's really serious. Looking now.
Indeed its serious. And it's even more serious as this masterpiece of
assembly wreckage was pulled in via your tree w/o having an acked-by
one of the x86 maintainers.
On Wed, 2014-10-22 at 16:08 -0200, Paulo Zanoni wrote:
> commit b4f0d3755c5e9cc86292d5fd78261903b4f23d4a
> Author: Richard Guy Briggs
> Date: Tue Mar 4 10:38:06 2014 -0500
> audit: x86: drop arch from __audit_syscall_entry() interface
>
> According to our QA, their i386 machine doesn't boot anymore. I tried
> to write my own revert for the patch, asked QA to test, and they
> confirmed it "solves" the problem.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S
index 0d0c9d4ab6d5..f9e3fabc8716 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S
@@ -449,12 +449,11 @@ sysenter_audit:
jnz syscall_trace_entry
addl $4,%esp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
- /* %esi already in 8(%esp) 6th arg: 4th syscall arg */
- /* %edx already in 4(%esp) 5th arg: 3rd syscall arg */
- /* %ecx already in 0(%esp) 4th arg: 2nd syscall arg */
- movl %ebx,%ecx /* 3rd arg: 1st syscall arg */
- movl %eax,%edx /* 2nd arg: syscall number */
- movl $AUDIT_ARCH_I386,%eax /* 1st arg: audit arch */
+ movl %esi,4(%esp) /* 5th arg: 4th syscall arg */
+ movl %edx,(%esp) /* 4th arg: 3rd syscall arg */
Bilndly overwriting the stack which holds the syscall arguments is
really a brilliant way to ensure security.
Thanks,
tglx