Hi, This is my first message to the list to please be indulgent, I might be mixing concepts here between auditd, selinux and pam. Any guidance much appreciated. For PCI-DSS, in order to be allowed to have a real root shell instead of firing sudo all the time (and it's lack of glob/completion), I'm trying to have any commands fired in any kind of root shell logged. (Of course it doesn't protect against malicious root users but that's off-topic). So, I've been able to achieve that purpose by using : $ grep tty /etc/pam.d/{su*,system-auth} /etc/pam.d/su:session required pam_tty_audit.so enable=root /etc/pam.d/sudo:session required pam_tty_audit.so open_only enable=root /etc/pam.d/sudo-i:session required pam_tty_audit.so open_only enable=root /etc/pam.d/su-l:session required pam_tty_audit.so enable=root /etc/pam.d/system-auth:session required pam_tty_audit.so disable=* enable=root Every keystroke are logged in /var/log/audit/audit.log which is great. My only issue is that I just realized that prompt passwords are also logged, eg MySQL password or Spacewalk, etc. I can read them in plain text when doing "aureport --tty -if /var/log/audit/audit.log and PCI-DSS forbid any kind of storage of passwords, is there a workaround ? Eg: don't log keystrokes when the prompt is "hidden" (inputting a password) I'd like very much to be able to obtain real root shells for ease of work (sudo -i) my only constraint beeing: log everything but don't store any password. Thanks, -- Cheers, Florian Crouzat -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit(a)redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

Le 12/07/2012 21:41, Thugzclub a écrit : > Florian, > > Did you get and answer for this? > > Regards. Not a single one.

> On 10 Jul 2012, at 08:29, Florian Crouzat <gentoo(a)floriancrouzat.net&gt;

>> Hi, >> >> This is my first message to the list to please be indulgent, I might be >> mixing concepts here between auditd, selinux and pam. Any guidance much >> appreciated. >> >> For PCI-DSS, in order to be allowed to have a real root shell instead of >> firing sudo all the time (and it's lack of glob/completion), I'm trying >> to have any commands fired in any kind of root shell logged. (Of course >> it doesn't protect against malicious root users but that's off-topic). >> >> So, I've been able to achieve that purpose by using : >> >> $ grep tty /etc/pam.d/{su*,system-auth} >> /etc/pam.d/su:session required pam_tty_audit.so enable=root >> /etc/pam.d/sudo:session required pam_tty_audit.so open_only enable=root >> /etc/pam.d/sudo-i:session required pam_tty_audit.so open_only enable=root >> /etc/pam.d/su-l:session required pam_tty_audit.so enable=root >> /etc/pam.d/system-auth:session required pam_tty_audit.so disable=* >> enable=root >> >> Every keystroke are logged in /var/log/audit/audit.log which is great. My >> only issue is that I just realized that prompt passwords are also >> logged, eg MySQL password or Spacewalk, etc. I can read them in plain >> text when doing "aureport --tty -if /var/log/audit/audit.log and PCI-DSS >> forbid any kind of storage of passwords, is there a workaround ? Eg: >> don't log keystrokes when the prompt is "hidden" (inputting a password) >> >> I'd like very much to be able to obtain real root shells for ease of work >> (sudo -i) my only constraint beeing: log everything but don't store any >> password. >> >> Thanks, >> >> -- >> Cheers, >> Florian Crouzat -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit(a)redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

Le 13/07/2012 15:27, Steve Grubb a écrit : Hmm...I thought I sent an answer. The problem from the kernel's > perspective is > that it has no idea what user space is doing. It can't tell a password > from > anything else being typed. There is a flag that can be set for the TTY to > hide > characters. But the issue then becomes that now you have a loophole that a > crafty admin could use to hide what he's really doing. > > If anyone has ideas on how to improve this, I think we should. > > -Steve > Yeah, I was afraid of that... At least, thanks for clarifying. I guess I'll stick with stating: don't fire any real root shell to all my sysadmins in the PCI-DSS scope. (as it's impossible to completely forbid all possible case , eg: forbid sudo -*, sudo sudo *, sudo su * but hell, you can't forbid sudo ./foo.sh where foo fires a shell, there is NOEXEC in sudo but then you can't do anything except reading...) Anyway, I'm getting away of the real matter, avoiding to audit-log passwords keystrokes. -- Cheers, Florian Crouzat -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit(a)redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/**mailman/listinfo/linux-audit<https://www.redh...

Wouldn't another option be to audit the exec of particular executables you are interested in knowing if someone runs? Obviously you won't know what they are typing into text documents and such, but is that really required? Most places don't allow key loggers at all and it sounds like that's what you've got.

Every keystroke are logged in /var/log/audit/audit.log which is great. My only issue is that I just realized that prompt passwords are also logged, eg MySQL password or Spacewalk, etc. I can read them in plain text when doing "aureport --tty -if /var/log/audit/audit.log and PCI-DSS forbid any kind of storage of passwords, is there a workaround ? Eg: don't log keystrokes when the prompt is "hidden" (inputting a password)