2:14 p.m.
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v23: Rebase to 5.10-rc4
Incorporate feedback from v22
- Change /proc/*/attr/display to /proc/*/attr/interface_lsm to
make the purpose clearer. (patch 0012)
- Include ABI documentation. (patch 0012, 0022)
- Introduce LSM documentation updates with the patches where
the interfaces are added rather than at the end. (patch 0012, 0022)
Include more maintainers and mail lists in To: and Cc: directives.
v22: Rebase to 5.10-rc1
v21: Rebase to 5.9-rc4
Incorporate feedback from v20
- Further revert UDS SO_PEERSEC to use scaffolding around
the interfaces that use lsmblobs and store only a single
secid. The possibility of multiple security modules
requiring data here is still a future problem.
- Incorporate Richard Guy Briggs' non-syscall auxiliary
records patch (patch 0019-0021) in place of my "supplimental"
records implementation. [I'm not sure I've given proper
attestation. I will correct as appropriate]
v20: Rebase to 5.9-rc1
Change the BPF security module to use the lsmblob data. (patch 0002)
Repair length logic in subject label processing (patch 0015)
Handle -EINVAL from the empty BPF setprocattr hook (patch 0020)
Correct length processing in append_ctx() (patch 0022)
v19: Rebase to 5.8-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v18
- Revert UDS SO_PEERSEC implementation to use lsmblobs
directly, rather than allocating as needed. The correct
treatment of out-of-memory conditions in the later case
is difficult to define. (patch 0005)
- Use a size_t in append_ctx() (patch 0021)
- Fix a memory leak when creating compound contexts. (patch 0021)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0013)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0020)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0021)
v18: Rebase to 5.8-rc3
Incorporate feedback from v17
- Null pointer checking in UDS (patch 0005)
Match changes in IMA code (patch 0012)
Fix the behavior of LSM context supplimental audit
records so that there's always exactly one when it's
appropriate for there to be one. This is a substantial
change that requires extention of the audit_context beyond
syscall events. (patch 0020)
v17: Rebase to 5.7-rc4
v16: Rebase to 5.6
Incorporate feedback from v15 - Thanks Stephen, Mimi and Paul
- Generally improve commit messages WRT scaffolding
- Comment ima_lsm_isset() (patch 0002)
- Some question may remain on IMA warning (patch 0002)
- Mark lsm_slot as __lsm_ro_after_init not __init_data (patch 0002)
- Change name of lsmblob variable in ima_match_rules() (patch 0003)
- Instead of putting a struct lsmblob into the unix_skb_parms
structure put a pointer to an allocated instance. There is
currently only space for 5 u32's in unix_skb_parms and it is
likely to get even tighter. Fortunately, the lifecycle
management of the allocated lsmblob is simple. (patch 0005)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0005)
- Improved commentary on secmark labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Reduced secmark related labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Replace use of the zeroth entry of an lsmblob in scaffolding
with a function lsmblob_value() to hopefully make it less
obscure. (patch 0006)
- Convert security_secmark_relabel_packet to use lsmblob as
this reduces much of the most contentious scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0006)
- Added BUILD_BUG_ON() for CIPSO tag 6. (patch 0018)
- Reworked audit subject information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use subj="?". (patch 0020)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0020)
- Reworked audit object information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use obj="?". (patch 0021)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0021)
- Enhanced documentation (patch 0022)
- Removed unnecessary error code check in security_getprocattr()
(patch 0021)
v15: Rebase to 5.6-rc1
- Revise IMA data use (patch 0002)
Incorporate feedback from v14
- Fix lockdown module registration naming (patch 0002)
- Revise how /proc/self/attr/context is gathered. (patch 0022)
- Revise access modes on /proc/self/attr/context. (patch 0022)
- Revise documentation on LSM external interfaces. (patch 0022)
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v12
- Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002)
- Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002)
- Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006)
- Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009)
- Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013)
- Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013)
- Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014)
- Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014)
- Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014)
- Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016)
- Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016)
- Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019)
- Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023)
- Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023)
- Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023)
v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1
Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text.
v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v10
- Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting
all use of the interface to the current process.
- Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check
v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
v9: There is no version 9
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common
append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The
availability of compound contexts reduces the need for
setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in
lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context
in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide
the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context
interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context
"display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more
meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with
otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor
stub, which does nothing useful.
Patch 0001 moves management of the sock security blob
from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 0002-0011 replace system use of a "secid" with
a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the
security modules to be held and reused later. At this
point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot"
for each of the security modules compiled into the
kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when
a security module requests one.
The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number
to pass the correct secid to or from the security module
hooks.
It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity
that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places
where it is used would have performance and/or locking
issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 0012 provides a mechanism for a process to
identify which security module's hooks should be used
when displaying or converting a security context string.
A new interface /proc/self/attr/interface_lsm contains the name
of the security module to show. Reading from this file
will present the name of the module, while writing to
it will set the value. Only names of active security
modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated
to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which
is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the
display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces
allow the transition. The interface LSM of other processess
can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases
for reading the interface LSM of a different process have race
conditions.
Patch 0013 Starts the process of changing how a security
context is represented. Since it is possible for a
security context to have been generated by more than one
security module it is now necessary to note which module
created a security context so that the correct "release"
hook can be called. There are several places where the
module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure
which contains the context string, its length and the
"slot" number of the security module that created it.
The security_release_secctx() interface is changed,
replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext
pointer.
Patches 0014-0016 convert the security interfaces from
(string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer.
The slot number identifying the creating module is
added by the infrastructure. Where the security context
is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures
instead of secids in Patch 0017. This is not strictly
necessary as there can only be one security module that
uses Netlabel at this point. Using a lsmblob is much
cleaner, as the interfaces that use the data have all
been converted.
Patch 0018 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify
that both ends of a transaction use the same interface LSM.
Patches 0019-0021 add addition audit records for subject
and object LSM data when there are multiple security modules
with such data. The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is
used in conjuction with a "subj=?" field to identify the
subject data. The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is used in
conjuction with a "obj=?" field to identify the object data.
The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record identifies the security
module with the data: "subj_selinux=xyz_t subj_apparmor=abc".
The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record identifies the security
module with the data: "obj_selinux=xyz_t obj_apparmor=abc".
While AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS records will always contain
an entry for each possible security modules, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
records will only contain entries for security modules for
which the object in question has data.
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1420]
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor==unconfined
subj_smack=_
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1421]
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
Patch 0022 adds a new interface for getting the
compound security contexts, /proc/self/attr/context.
An example of the content of this file is:
selinux\0one_u:one_r:one_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023\0apparmor\0unconfined\0
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks
removed, Patch 0023 removes the exclusive bit from
AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of
this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking
for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change
within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results
are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with
better performance being as common as worse. The
benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.10-rc4-v23
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
---
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++-----------
security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 66 ++++++++++++--------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++--
10 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 121 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index c503f7ab8afb..d8f492ed6ebf 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1563,6 +1563,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_task;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index 2431c011800d..5b6f52c62058 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ffeaee5ed968..f1c365905d5e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -766,33 +766,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct
kernel_siginfo
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -801,8 +783,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
if (new->label)
aa_put_label(new->label);
@@ -858,7 +840,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int
family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1043,7 +1025,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1056,7 +1038,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct
sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1140,7 +1122,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1150,7 +1132,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket
*parent)
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1167,6 +1149,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1203,7 +1186,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[]
__lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1754,7 +1736,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a28045dc9e7f..5da8b3643680 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -337,6 +339,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
/*
@@ -655,6 +658,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
* @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -2193,12 +2218,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6b1826fc3658..2748281a5cca 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4476,7 +4476,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4533,7 +4533,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int
family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4549,8 +4549,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int
family,
static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4565,7 +4565,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int
addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4700,7 +4700,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4879,9 +4879,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -4913,8 +4913,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4956,7 +4956,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct
sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4989,7 +4989,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct
sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -5057,13 +5057,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct
sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -5123,34 +5125,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -5164,7 +5159,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -5174,7 +5169,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket
*parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5189,7 +5184,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket
*parent)
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5340,8 +5335,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5358,7 +5353,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct
sock *sk,
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5379,7 +5374,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff
*skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5396,7 +5391,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5480,7 +5475,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5624,7 +5619,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5663,7 +5658,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5755,7 +5750,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5784,7 +5779,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -5849,7 +5844,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff
*skb)
unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
unsigned char *data = skb->data;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
u32 perm;
@@ -6874,6 +6869,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
};
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 330b7b6d44e0..9ca41988281f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -189,4 +189,9 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
return tsec->sid;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index abaab7683840..6a94b31b5472 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16
family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -370,8 +371,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock
*newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -581,7 +582,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index a9768b12716b..0f8d0feb89a4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -357,6 +357,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct
kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 5c90b9fa4d40..ca4a6c862732 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1444,7 +1444,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1826,7 +1826,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2233,11 +2233,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode
*inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2251,11 +2247,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family,
gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2264,7 +2259,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family,
gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2277,9 +2271,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2392,7 +2385,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6
*sip)
*/
static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
int rc;
@@ -2424,7 +2417,7 @@ static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
*/
static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Take the label off the socket if one is set.
@@ -2456,7 +2449,7 @@ static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
struct smack_known *skp;
int rc = 0;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2529,7 +2522,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr
*address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2618,7 +2611,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6
*address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2711,7 +2704,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char
*name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2759,7 +2752,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int
family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2784,8 +2777,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int
family,
static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2848,7 +2841,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr
*sap,
if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
if (rsp != NULL) {
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
SMK_CONNECTING);
@@ -3576,9 +3569,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3624,8 +3617,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3662,7 +3655,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr
*msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3875,7 +3868,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(struct sock *sk, u16
family,
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
if (sk)
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
@@ -3897,7 +3890,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(struct sock *sk, u16
family,
*/
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -4001,7 +3994,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -4050,7 +4043,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -4099,7 +4092,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket
*parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4119,7 +4112,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff
*skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
struct smack_known *hskp;
@@ -4205,7 +4198,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff
*skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4697,6 +4690,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
};
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4806,7 +4800,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init =
{
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index fc7399b45373..635e2339579e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
security modules built into the system that would
use secids if active. The system assigns the module
a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
compiled in but not registered there will be unused
slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
security module data rather than a single instance.
Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is
affected as well.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: <bpf(a)vger.kernel.org>
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
Cc: linux-security-module(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux(a)vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/audit.h | 4 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 24 +++++-----
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 ++++-
security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 +++++++++++-----
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
security/security.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
17 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index b3d859831a31..ba1cd38d601b 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
@@ -65,8 +66,9 @@ struct audit_field {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
struct {
+ bool lsm_isset;
char *lsm_str;
- void *lsm_rule;
+ void *lsm_rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
};
};
u32 op;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index d8f492ed6ebf..fe9203f15993 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1545,6 +1545,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
#undef LSM_HOOK
} __randomize_layout;
+/*
+ * Information that identifies a security module.
+ */
+struct lsm_id {
+ const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
+ int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
+};
+
/*
* Security module hook list structure.
* For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -1553,7 +1561,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct hlist_node list;
struct hlist_head *head;
union security_list_options hook;
- char *lsm;
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid;
} __randomize_layout;
/*
@@ -1588,7 +1596,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
extern char *lsm_names;
extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm);
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid);
#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index bc2725491560..fdb6e95c98e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -132,6 +132,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ *
+ * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
+ */
+#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
+
+struct lsmblob {
+ u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
+#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
+#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
+ * @secid: The initial secid value
+ *
+ * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
+ */
+static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ blob->secid[i] = secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
+ * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ struct lsmblob empty = {};
+
+ return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
+ * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
+ * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
+{
+ return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1833,8 +1892,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char
**_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule);
+void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1850,12 +1909,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule
*krule)
}
static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ void **lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 333b3bcfc545..45da229f9f1f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
kfree(f->lsm_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rules);
}
}
@@ -519,9 +519,10 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data
*data,
goto exit_free;
}
entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
+ f->lsm_isset = true;
f->lsm_str = str;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -774,7 +775,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct
audit_krule *b)
return 0;
}
-/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -788,9 +789,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
return -ENOMEM;
df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
- (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
+ df->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
@@ -842,7 +843,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1358,10 +1359,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
+ f->type, f->op,
+ f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
@@ -1388,7 +1390,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
return ret;
}
-static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
+static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
{
struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1420,7 +1422,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
return err;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1435,7 +1437,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
- int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
+ int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
if (!err)
err = res;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 8dba8f0983b5..16e3430f7d07 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -667,14 +667,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
if (need_sid) {
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -684,21 +684,21 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(
n->osid,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule)) {
+ f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule))
+ f->lsm_rules))
++result;
}
break;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index f1c365905d5e..432915c1d427 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1152,6 +1152,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
+static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "apparmor",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1852,7 +1857,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
goto buffers_out;
}
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
- "apparmor");
+ &apparmor_lsmid);
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index 788667d582ae..a1a5032a4d87 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -14,9 +14,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init =
{
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, bpf_inode_storage_free),
};
+/*
+ * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
+ * supplied by this module require a slot.
+ */
+struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "bpf",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
{
- security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
+ security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
+ &bpf_lsmid);
pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 59bf3c1674c8..959a9f96b7f1 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1341,6 +1341,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "capability",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1365,7 +1370,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[]
__lsm_ro_after_init = {
static int __init capability_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
- "capability");
+ &capability_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 9b5adeaa47fc..cd393aaa17d5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
int pcr;
struct {
- void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
+ void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /* LSM file metadata specific */
char *args_p; /* audit value */
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
@@ -88,6 +88,22 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
struct ima_template_desc *template;
};
+/**
+ * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
+ * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check.
+ *
+ * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
+ */
+static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (rules[i])
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
@@ -326,9 +342,11 @@ static void ima_free_rule_opt_list(struct ima_rule_opt_list
*opt_list)
static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
int i;
+ int r;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ for (r = 0; r < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; r++)
+ ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rules[r]);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
}
@@ -379,8 +397,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry
*entry)
ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
- if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rules[0]);
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(nentry->lsm[i].rules))
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
@@ -545,7 +563,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode
*inode,
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
- if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
continue;
else
@@ -558,14 +576,14 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct
inode *inode,
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rules);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rules);
default:
break;
}
@@ -952,7 +970,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
{
int result;
- if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules))
return -EINVAL;
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
@@ -962,8 +980,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
- if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[0]);
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules)) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1733,7 +1751,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[i].rules)) {
switch (i) {
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool
contents)
return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
}
+static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "loadpin",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
enforce ? "" : "not ");
parse_exclude();
- security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
+ &loadpin_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init =
{
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
};
+static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "lockdown",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
#endif
security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
- "lockdown");
+ &lockdown_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 8a176b6adbe5..7c7ac9bfe5cd 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -244,6 +244,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
return -EACCES;
}
+static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "safesetid",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
@@ -253,7 +258,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
- ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+ ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
+ &safesetid_lsmid);
/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
safesetid_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5da8b3643680..d01363cb0082 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -341,6 +341,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -468,21 +469,36 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ */
+static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
* @count: the number of hooks to add
- * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ * @lsmid: the the identification information for the security module
*
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
+ * for it in the lsmblob.
*/
void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm)
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid)
{
int i;
+ if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
+ if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
+ panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
+ init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
+ lsmid->slot);
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
}
@@ -491,7 +507,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int
count,
* and fix this up afterwards.
*/
if (slab_is_available()) {
- if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+ if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
}
}
@@ -2005,7 +2021,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
char *name,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
@@ -2018,7 +2034,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void
*value,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
@@ -2510,7 +2526,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ bool one_is_good = false;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int trc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ one_is_good = true;
+ else
+ rc = trc;
+ }
+ if (one_is_good)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
@@ -2518,14 +2551,31 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
}
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2748281a5cca..52a50d7ca534 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6933,6 +6933,11 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
}
#endif
+static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "selinux",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7244,7 +7249,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
hashtab_cache_init();
- security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
+ &selinux_lsmid);
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ca4a6c862732..f96be93d1a75 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4693,6 +4693,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
};
+static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "smack",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4892,7 +4897,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Register with LSM
*/
- security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
smack_enabled = 1;
pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 1f3cd432d830..22f62c67f2ec 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -523,6 +523,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
}
}
+static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "tomoyo",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
@@ -575,7 +580,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
- security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
+ security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
+ &tomoyo_lsmid);
pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
return rc;
}
+static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "yama",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
static int __init yama_init(void)
{
pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
- security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
yama_init_sysctl();
return 0;
}
--
2.24.1
11:54 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
Hi Casey,
On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
security modules built into the system that would
use secids if active. The system assigns the module
a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
compiled in but not registered there will be unused
slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
security module data rather than a single instance.
Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is
affected as well.
This patch is quite large, even without the audit rule change. I would
limit this patch to the new lsm_id structure changes. The audit rule
change should be broken out as a separate patch so that the audit
changes aren't hidden.
In addition, here are a few high level nits:
- The (patch description) body of the explanation, line wrapped at 75
columns, which will be copied to the permanent changelog to describe
this patch. (Refer Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.)
- The brief kernel-doc descriptions should not have a trailing period.
Nor should kernel-doc variable definitions have a trailing period.
Example(s) inline below. (The existing kernel-doc is mostly correct.)
- For some reason existing comments that span multiple lines aren't
formatted properly. In those cases, where there is another change,
please fix the comment and function description.
thanks,
Mimi
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: <bpf(a)vger.kernel.org>
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
Cc: linux-security-module(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux(a)vger.kernel.org
---
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index bc2725491560..fdb6e95c98e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -132,6 +132,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ *
+ * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
+ */
+#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
+
+struct lsmblob {
+ u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
+#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
+#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
Only this kernel-doc brief description is suffixed with a period.
Please remove.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
+ * @secid: The initial secid value
+ *
+ * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
+ */
+static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ blob->secid[i] = secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
+ * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ struct lsmblob empty = {};
+
+ return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
+ * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
+ * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
+{
+ return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 9b5adeaa47fc..cd393aaa17d5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
@@ -88,6 +88,22 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
struct ima_template_desc *template;
};
+/**
+ * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
+ * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check.
Nor do kernel-doc variable definitions have a trailing period.
+ *
+ * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
+ */
+static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (rules[i])
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
1:22 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
On 12/28/2020 9:54 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
Hi Casey,
On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> When more than one security module is exporting data to
> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
> structure to be used instead.
>
> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
> security modules built into the system that would
> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
> slots.
>
> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>
> The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
> security module data rather than a single instance.
> Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is
> affected as well.
This patch is quite large, even without the audit rule change. I would
limit this patch to the new lsm_id structure changes. The audit rule
change should be broken out as a separate patch so that the audit
changes aren't hidden.
Breaking up the patch in any meaningful way would require
scaffolding code that is as extensive and invasive as the
final change. I can do that if you really need it, but it
won't be any easier to read.
In addition, here are a few high level nits:
- The (patch description) body of the explanation, line wrapped at 75
columns, which will be copied to the permanent changelog to describe
this patch. (Refer Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.)
Will fix.
- The brief kernel-doc descriptions should not have a trailing
period.
Nor should kernel-doc variable definitions have a trailing period.
Example(s) inline below. (The existing kernel-doc is mostly correct.)
Will fix.
- For some reason existing comments that span multiple lines
aren't
formatted properly. In those cases, where there is another change,
please fix the comment and function description.
Can you give an example? There are multiple comment styles
used in the various components.
thanks,
Mimi
I don't see any comments on the ima code changes. I really
don't want to spin a new patch set that does nothing but change
two periods in comments only to find out two months from now
that the code changes are completely borked. I really don't
want to go through the process of breaking up the patch that has
been widely Acked if there's no reason to expect it would require
significant work otherwise.
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
> Cc: <bpf(a)vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
> Cc: linux-security-module(a)vger.kernel.org
> Cc: selinux(a)vger.kernel.org
> ---
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index bc2725491560..fdb6e95c98e8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -132,6 +132,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>
> extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
>
> +/*
> + * Data exported by the security modules
> + *
> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
> + */
> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
> +
> +struct lsmblob {
> + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
Only this kernel-doc brief description is suffixed with a period.
Please remove.
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
> + * @secid: The initial secid value
> + *
> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
> + */
> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + blob->secid[i] = secid;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + struct lsmblob empty = {};
> +
> + return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
> +{
> + return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
> +}
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 9b5adeaa47fc..cd393aaa17d5 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
> @@ -88,6 +88,22 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> struct ima_template_desc *template;
> };
>
> +/**
> + * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
> + * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check.
Nor do kernel-doc variable definitions have a trailing period.
> + *
> + * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
> + */
> +static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + if (rules[i])
> + return true;
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
> * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
1:43 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 11:22 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
On 12/28/2020 9:54 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Casey,
>
> On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> When more than one security module is exporting data to
>> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
>> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
>> structure to be used instead.
>>
>> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
>> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
>> security modules built into the system that would
>> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
>> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
>> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
>> slots.
>>
>> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
>> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
>> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
>> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>>
>> The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
>> security module data rather than a single instance.
>> Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is
>> affected as well.
> This patch is quite large, even without the audit rule change. I would
> limit this patch to the new lsm_id structure changes. The audit rule
> change should be broken out as a separate patch so that the audit
> changes aren't hidden.
Breaking up the patch in any meaningful way would require
scaffolding code that is as extensive and invasive as the
final change. I can do that if you really need it, but it
won't be any easier to read.
Hidden in this patch is the new behavior of security_audit_rule_init(),
security_audit_rule_free(), and security_audit_rule_match(). My
concern is with label collision. Details are in a subsequent post.
Can an LSM prevent label collision?
> In addition, here are a few high level nits:
> - The (patch description) body of the explanation, line wrapped at 75
> columns, which will be copied to the permanent changelog to describe
> this patch. (Refer Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.)
Will fix.
> - The brief kernel-doc descriptions should not have a trailing period.
> Nor should kernel-doc variable definitions have a trailing period.
> Example(s) inline below. (The existing kernel-doc is mostly correct.)
Will fix.
> - For some reason existing comments that span multiple lines aren't
> formatted properly. In those cases, where there is another change,
> please fix the comment and function description.
Can you give an example? There are multiple comment styles
used in the various components.
Never mind. All three examples are in tomoyo.
I don't see any comments on the ima code changes. I really
don't want to spin a new patch set that does nothing but change
two periods in comments only to find out two months from now
that the code changes are completely borked. I really don't
want to go through the process of breaking up the patch that has
been widely Acked if there's no reason to expect it would require
significant work otherwise.
Understood.
1:24 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
Hi Casey,
On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5da8b3643680..d01363cb0082 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2510,7 +2526,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ bool one_is_good = false;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int trc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >=
lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ one_is_good = true;
+ else
+ rc = trc;
+ }
+ if (one_is_good)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
}
So the same string may be defined by multiple LSMs.
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
@@ -2518,14 +2551,31 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
}
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >=
lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
If one LSM frees the string, then the string is deleted from all LSMs.
I don't understand how this safe.
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void
*lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >=
lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if one
LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
integrity verification to be skipped.
Sample policy rules:
dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
Are there any plans to prevent label collisions or at least notify of a
label collision?
Mimi
+ }
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
2:06 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
On 12/28/2020 11:24 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
Hi Casey,
On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 5da8b3643680..d01363cb0082 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
>
> @@ -2510,7 +2526,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>
> int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + bool one_is_good = false;
> + int rc = 0;
> + int trc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot
>= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
> + &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (trc == 0)
> + one_is_good = true;
> + else
> + rc = trc;
> + }
> + if (one_is_good)
> + return 0;
> + return rc;
> }
So the same string may be defined by multiple LSMs.
Yes. Any legal AppArmor label would also be a legal Smack label.
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> @@ -2518,14 +2551,31 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
> }
>
> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
> {
> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot
>= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + }
> }
>
If one LSM frees the string, then the string is deleted from all LSMs.
I don't understand how this safe.
The audit system doesn't have a way to specify which LSM
a watched label is associated with. Even if we added one,
we'd still have to address the current behavior. Assigning
the watch to all modules means that seeing the string
in any module is sufficient to generate the event.
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot
>= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if one
LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
integrity verification to be skipped.
Yes, that is correct. Like the audit system, you're doing a string based
lookup, which pretty well has to work this way. I have proposed compound
label specifications in the past, but even if we accepted something like
"apparmor=dates,selinux=figs" we'd still have to be compatible with the
old style inputs.
Sample policy rules:
dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
Are there any plans to prevent label collisions or at least notify of a
label collision?
What would that look like? You can't say that Smack isn't allowed
to use valid AppArmor labels. How would Smack know? If the label is
valid to both, how would you decide which LSM gets to use it?
Mimi
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 12:06 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
On 12/28/2020 11:24 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Casey,
>
> On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index 5da8b3643680..d01363cb0082 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>>
>> @@ -2510,7 +2526,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char
**_buffer)
>>
>> int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
>> {
>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> + bool one_is_good = false;
>> + int rc = 0;
>> + int trc;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
{
>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> + continue;
>> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
>> +
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> + if (trc == 0)
>> + one_is_good = true;
>> + else
>> + rc = trc;
>> + }
>> + if (one_is_good)
>> + return 0;
>> + return rc;
>> }
> So the same string may be defined by multiple LSMs.
Yes. Any legal AppArmor label would also be a legal Smack label.
>> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>> @@ -2518,14 +2551,31 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule
*krule)
>> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
>> }
>>
>> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>> +void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
>> {
>> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list)
{
>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> + continue;
>> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> + }
>> }
>>
> If one LSM frees the string, then the string is deleted from all LSMs.
> I don't understand how this safe.
The audit system doesn't have a way to specify which LSM
a watched label is associated with. Even if we added one,
we'd still have to address the current behavior. Assigning
the watch to all modules means that seeing the string
in any module is sufficient to generate the event.
I originally thought loading a new LSM policy could not delete existing
LSM labels, but that isn't true. If LSM labels can come and go based
on policy, with this code, could loading a new policy for one LSM
result in deleting labels of another LSM?
>
>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
>> {
>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> + int rc;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match,
list) {
>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> + continue;
>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
>> +
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> + if (rc)
>> + return rc;
> Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if one
> LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
> integrity verification to be skipped.
Yes, that is correct. Like the audit system, you're doing a string based
lookup, which pretty well has to work this way. I have proposed compound
label specifications in the past, but even if we accepted something like
"apparmor=dates,selinux=figs" we'd still have to be compatible with the
old style inputs.
>
> Sample policy rules:
> dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
> dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
IMA could extend the existing policy rules like "lsm=[selinux] |
[smack] | [apparmor]", but that assumes that the underlying
infrastructure supports it.
>
> Are there any plans to prevent label collisions or at least notify of a
> label collision?
What would that look like? You can't say that Smack isn't allowed
to use valid AppArmor labels. How would Smack know? If the label is
valid to both, how would you decide which LSM gets to use it?
As this is a runtime issue, when loading a new policy at least flag the
collision. When removing the label, when it is defined by multiple
LSMs, at least flag the removal.
>
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> }
>> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
5:20 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
On 12/28/2020 2:14 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 12:06 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 12/28/2020 11:24 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> Hi Casey,
>>
>> On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>>> index 5da8b3643680..d01363cb0082 100644
>>> --- a/security/security.c
>>> +++ b/security/security.c
>>>
>>> @@ -2510,7 +2526,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char
**_buffer)
>>>
>>> int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void
**lsmrule)
>>> {
>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr,
lsmrule);
>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>> + bool one_is_good = false;
>>> + int rc = 0;
>>> + int trc;
>>> +
>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init,
list) {
>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>> + continue;
>>> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
>>> +
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>> + if (trc == 0)
>>> + one_is_good = true;
>>> + else
>>> + rc = trc;
>>> + }
>>> + if (one_is_good)
>>> + return 0;
>>> + return rc;
>>> }
>> So the same string may be defined by multiple LSMs.
> Yes. Any legal AppArmor label would also be a legal Smack label.
>
>>> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>>> @@ -2518,14 +2551,31 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule
*krule)
>>> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
>>> }
>>>
>>> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>>> +void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
>>> {
>>> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>> +
>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free,
list) {
>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>> + continue;
>>> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>> + }
>>> }
>>>
>> If one LSM frees the string, then the string is deleted from all LSMs.
>> I don't understand how this safe.
> The audit system doesn't have a way to specify which LSM
> a watched label is associated with. Even if we added one,
> we'd still have to address the current behavior. Assigning
> the watch to all modules means that seeing the string
> in any module is sufficient to generate the event.
I originally thought loading a new LSM policy could not delete existing
LSM labels, but that isn't true. If LSM labels can come and go based
on policy, with this code, could loading a new policy for one LSM
result in deleting labels of another LSM?
No. I could imagine a situation where changing policy on
a system where audit rules have been set could result in
confusion, but that would be true in the single LSM case.
It would require that secids used in the old policy be
used for different labels in the new policy. That would
not be sane behavior. I know it's impossible for Smack.
This is one of the reasons I'm switching from a single secid
to a collection of secids. You don't want unnatural behavior
of one LSM to impact the behavior of another.
>>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
>>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
>>> {
>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op,
lsmrule);
>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>> + int rc;
>>> +
>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match,
list) {
>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>> + continue;
>>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
>>> +
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>> + if (rc)
>>> + return rc;
>> Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if one
>> LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
>> integrity verification to be skipped.
> Yes, that is correct. Like the audit system, you're doing a string based
> lookup, which pretty well has to work this way. I have proposed compound
> label specifications in the past, but even if we accepted something like
> "apparmor=dates,selinux=figs" we'd still have to be compatible with
the
> old style inputs.
>
>> Sample policy rules:
>> dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
>> dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
IMA could extend the existing policy rules like "lsm=[selinux] |
[smack] | [apparmor]", but that assumes that the underlying
infrastructure supports it.
Yes, but you would still need rational behavior in the
case where someone has old IMA policy rules.
>> Are there any plans to prevent label collisions or at least notify of a
>> label collision?
> What would that look like? You can't say that Smack isn't allowed
> to use valid AppArmor labels. How would Smack know? If the label is
> valid to both, how would you decide which LSM gets to use it?
As this is a runtime issue, when loading a new policy at least flag the
collision. When removing the label, when it is defined by multiple
LSMs, at least flag the removal.
To what end would the collision be flagged? What would you do with
the information?
>>> + }
>>> + return 0;
>>> }
>>> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
7:53 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 15:20 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
On 12/28/2020 2:14 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 12:06 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 12/28/2020 11:24 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>> Hi Casey,
>>>
>>> On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>>>> index 5da8b3643680..d01363cb0082 100644
>>>> --- a/security/security.c
>>>> +++ b/security/security.c
>>>>
>>>> @@ -2510,7 +2526,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key,
char **_buffer)
>>>>
>>>> int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void
**lsmrule)
>>>> {
>>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr,
lsmrule);
>>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>>> + bool one_is_good = false;
>>>> + int rc = 0;
>>>> + int trc;
>>>> +
>>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
&security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
>>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>>> + continue;
>>>> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
>>>> +
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>>> + if (trc == 0)
>>>> + one_is_good = true;
>>>> + else
>>>> + rc = trc;
>>>> + }
>>>> + if (one_is_good)
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> + return rc;
>>>> }
>>> So the same string may be defined by multiple LSMs.
>> Yes. Any legal AppArmor label would also be a legal Smack label.
>>
>>>> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>>>> @@ -2518,14 +2551,31 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule
*krule)
>>>> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>>>> +void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
>>>> {
>>>> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
>>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>>> +
>>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
&security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
>>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>>> + continue;
>>>> +
hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>>> + }
>>>> }
>>>>
>>> If one LSM frees the string, then the string is deleted from all LSMs.
>>> I don't understand how this safe.
>> The audit system doesn't have a way to specify which LSM
>> a watched label is associated with. Even if we added one,
>> we'd still have to address the current behavior. Assigning
>> the watch to all modules means that seeing the string
>> in any module is sufficient to generate the event.
> I originally thought loading a new LSM policy could not delete existing
> LSM labels, but that isn't true. If LSM labels can come and go based
> on policy, with this code, could loading a new policy for one LSM
> result in deleting labels of another LSM?
No. I could imagine a situation where changing policy on
a system where audit rules have been set could result in
confusion, but that would be true in the single LSM case.
It would require that secids used in the old policy be
used for different labels in the new policy. That would
not be sane behavior. I know it's impossible for Smack.
This is one of the reasons I'm switching from a single secid
to a collection of secids. You don't want unnatural behavior
of one LSM to impact the behavior of another.
>
>>>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void
*lsmrule)
>>>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void
**lsmrule)
>>>> {
>>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op,
lsmrule);
>>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>>> + int rc;
>>>> +
>>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
&security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
>>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>>> + continue;
>>>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
>>>> +
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>>> + if (rc)
>>>> + return rc;
>>> Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if one
>>> LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
>>> integrity verification to be skipped.
>> Yes, that is correct. Like the audit system, you're doing a string based
>> lookup, which pretty well has to work this way. I have proposed compound
>> label specifications in the past, but even if we accepted something like
>> "apparmor=dates,selinux=figs" we'd still have to be compatible
with the
>> old style inputs.
>>
>>> Sample policy rules:
>>> dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
>>> dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
> IMA could extend the existing policy rules like "lsm=[selinux] |
> [smack] | [apparmor]", but that assumes that the underlying
> infrastructure supports it.
Yes, but you would still need rational behavior in the
case where someone has old IMA policy rules.
From an IMA perspective, allowing multiple LSMs to define the same
policy label is worse than requiring the label be constrained to a
particular LSM.
>
>>> Are there any plans to prevent label collisions or at least notify of a
>>> label collision?
>> What would that look like? You can't say that Smack isn't allowed
>> to use valid AppArmor labels. How would Smack know? If the label is
>> valid to both, how would you decide which LSM gets to use it?
Unfortunately, unless audit supports per LSM labels, the infrastructure
needs to detect and prevent the label collision.
> As this is a runtime issue, when loading a new policy at least
flag the
> collision. When removing the label, when it is defined by multiple
> LSMs, at least flag the removal.
To what end would the collision be flagged? What would you do with
the information?
LSM label collision is probably an example of kernel integrity critical
data (yet to be upstreamed).
>
>>>> + }
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> }
>>>> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
7:53 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 20:53 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 15:20 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 12/28/2020 2:14 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 12:06 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> On 12/28/2020 11:24 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> >>>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32
field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> >>>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void
**lsmrule)
> >>>> {
> >>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op,
lsmrule);
> >>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> >>>> + int rc;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
&security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> >>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> >>>> + continue;
> >>>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field,
op,
> >>>> +
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> >>>> + if (rc)
> >>>> + return rc;
> >>> Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if
one
> >>> LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
> >>> integrity verification to be skipped.
> >> Yes, that is correct. Like the audit system, you're doing a string
based
> >> lookup, which pretty well has to work this way. I have proposed compound
> >> label specifications in the past, but even if we accepted something like
> >> "apparmor=dates,selinux=figs" we'd still have to be
compatible with the
> >> old style inputs.
> >>
> >>> Sample policy rules:
> >>> dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
> >>> dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
> > IMA could extend the existing policy rules like "lsm=[selinux] |
> > [smack] | [apparmor]", but that assumes that the underlying
> > infrastructure supports it.
>
> Yes, but you would still need rational behavior in the
> case where someone has old IMA policy rules.
From an IMA perspective, allowing multiple LSMs to define the same
policy label is worse than requiring the label be constrained to a
particular LSM.
If allowing multiple LSMs to define the same label is only an IMA
issue, then have security_audit_rule_init() return the number of LSMs
which define the label. IMA is already emitting a warning when an LSM
rule is not defined. Emitting an additional warning would be the
first step.
In addition, ima_parse_rule() could detect policy rules containing non
LSM specific labels. Based on policy, IMA would decide how to handle
it.
thanks,
Mimi
12:46 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
On 12/28/2020 5:53 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 15:20 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 12/28/2020 2:14 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 12:06 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> On 12/28/2020 11:24 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>> Hi Casey,
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>>>>> index 5da8b3643680..d01363cb0082 100644
>>>>> --- a/security/security.c
>>>>> +++ b/security/security.c
>>>>>
>>>>> @@ -2510,7 +2526,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key,
char **_buffer)
>>>>>
>>>>> int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void
**lsmrule)
>>>>> {
>>>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr,
lsmrule);
>>>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>>>> + bool one_is_good = false;
>>>>> + int rc = 0;
>>>>> + int trc;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
&security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
>>>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>>>> + continue;
>>>>> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op,
rulestr,
>>>>> +
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>>>> + if (trc == 0)
>>>>> + one_is_good = true;
>>>>> + else
>>>>> + rc = trc;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> + if (one_is_good)
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> + return rc;
>>>>> }
>>>> So the same string may be defined by multiple LSMs.
>>> Yes. Any legal AppArmor label would also be a legal Smack label.
>>>
>>>>> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>>>>> @@ -2518,14 +2551,31 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct
audit_krule *krule)
>>>>> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>>>>> +void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
>>>>> {
>>>>> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
>>>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
&security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
>>>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>>>> + continue;
>>>>> +
hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>>>> + }
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>> If one LSM frees the string, then the string is deleted from all LSMs.
>>>> I don't understand how this safe.
>>> The audit system doesn't have a way to specify which LSM
>>> a watched label is associated with. Even if we added one,
>>> we'd still have to address the current behavior. Assigning
>>> the watch to all modules means that seeing the string
>>> in any module is sufficient to generate the event.
>> I originally thought loading a new LSM policy could not delete existing
>> LSM labels, but that isn't true. If LSM labels can come and go based
>> on policy, with this code, could loading a new policy for one LSM
>> result in deleting labels of another LSM?
> No. I could imagine a situation where changing policy on
> a system where audit rules have been set could result in
> confusion, but that would be true in the single LSM case.
> It would require that secids used in the old policy be
> used for different labels in the new policy. That would
> not be sane behavior. I know it's impossible for Smack.
>
> This is one of the reasons I'm switching from a single secid
> to a collection of secids. You don't want unnatural behavior
> of one LSM to impact the behavior of another.
>
>
>>>>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void
*lsmrule)
>>>>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void
**lsmrule)
>>>>> {
>>>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op,
lsmrule);
>>>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>>>> + int rc;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
&security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
>>>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>>>> + continue;
>>>>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
>>>>> +
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>>>> + if (rc)
>>>>> + return rc;
>>>> Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if one
>>>> LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
>>>> integrity verification to be skipped.
>>> Yes, that is correct. Like the audit system, you're doing a string based
>>> lookup, which pretty well has to work this way. I have proposed compound
>>> label specifications in the past, but even if we accepted something like
>>> "apparmor=dates,selinux=figs" we'd still have to be compatible
with the
>>> old style inputs.
>>>
>>>> Sample policy rules:
>>>> dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
>>>> dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
>> IMA could extend the existing policy rules like "lsm=[selinux] |
>> [smack] | [apparmor]", but that assumes that the underlying
>> infrastructure supports it.
> Yes, but you would still need rational behavior in the
> case where someone has old IMA policy rules.
From an IMA perspective, allowing multiple LSMs to define the same
policy label is worse than requiring the label be constrained to a
particular LSM.
Just to be sure we're talking about the same thing,
the case I'm referring to is something like a file with
two extended attributes:
security.apparmor MacAndCheese
security.SMACK64 MacAndCheese
and an IMA rule that says
dont_measure obj_type=MacAndCheese
In this case the dont_measure will be applied to both.
On the other hand,
security.apparmor MacAndCheese
security.SMACK64 FranksAndBeans
would also apply the rule to both, which is not
what you want. Unfortunately, there is no way to
differentiate which LSM hit the rule.
So now I'm a little confused. The case where both LSMs
use the same label looks like it works right, where the
case where they're different doesn't.
I'm beginning to think that identifying which LSMs matched
a rule (it may be none, either or both) is the right solution.
I don't think that audit is as sensitive to this.
>>>> Are there any plans to prevent label collisions or at least notify of a
>>>> label collision?
>>> What would that look like? You can't say that Smack isn't allowed
>>> to use valid AppArmor labels. How would Smack know? If the label is
>>> valid to both, how would you decide which LSM gets to use it?
Unfortunately, unless audit supports per LSM labels, the infrastructure
needs to detect and prevent the label collision.
That would be a massive performance hit.
>> As this is a runtime issue, when loading a new policy at least flag the
>> collision. When removing the label, when it is defined by multiple
>> LSMs, at least flag the removal.
> To what end would the collision be flagged? What would you do with
> the information?
LSM label collision is probably an example of kernel integrity critical
data (yet to be upstreamed).
>>>>> + }
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> }
>>>>> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
1:16 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
On Tue, 2020-12-29 at 10:46 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid,
u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
>>>>>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
void **lsmrule)
>>>>>> {
>>>>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field,
op, lsmrule);
>>>>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>>>>>> + int rc;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
&security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
>>>>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 ||
hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>>>>>> + continue;
>>>>>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field,
op,
>>>>>> +
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>>>>>> + if (rc)
>>>>>> + return rc;
>>>>> Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if
one
>>>>> LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
>>>>> integrity verification to be skipped.
>>>> Yes, that is correct. Like the audit system, you're doing a string
based
>>>> lookup, which pretty well has to work this way. I have proposed
compound
>>>> label specifications in the past, but even if we accepted something
like
>>>> "apparmor=dates,selinux=figs" we'd still have to be
compatible with the
>>>> old style inputs.
>>>>
>>>>> Sample policy rules:
>>>>> dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
>>>>> dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
>>> IMA could extend the existing policy rules like "lsm=[selinux] |
>>> [smack] | [apparmor]", but that assumes that the underlying
>>> infrastructure supports it.
>> Yes, but you would still need rational behavior in the
>> case where someone has old IMA policy rules.
> From an IMA perspective, allowing multiple LSMs to define the same
> policy label is worse than requiring the label be constrained to a
> particular LSM.
Just to be sure we're talking about the same thing,
the case I'm referring to is something like a file with
two extended attributes:
security.apparmor MacAndCheese
security.SMACK64 MacAndCheese
and an IMA rule that says
dont_measure obj_type=MacAndCheese
In this case the dont_measure will be applied to both.
On the other hand,
security.apparmor MacAndCheese
security.SMACK64 FranksAndBeans
would also apply the rule to both, which is not
what you want. Unfortunately, there is no way to
differentiate which LSM hit the rule.
So now I'm a little confused. The case where both LSMs
use the same label looks like it works right, where the
case where they're different doesn't.
I'm more concerned about multiple LSMs using the same label. The
label's meaning is LSM specific.
I'm beginning to think that identifying which LSMs matched
a rule (it may be none, either or both) is the right solution.
I don't think that audit is as sensitive to this.
If the label's meaning is LSM specific, then the rule needs to be LSM
specific.
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
Cc: linux-integrity(a)vger.kernel.org
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++--
security/security.c | 10 ++++++++--
6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fdb6e95c98e8..89c538aa283e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1892,7 +1892,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char
**_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void **lsmrule);
void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1908,8 +1909,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule
*krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void **lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void **lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 45da229f9f1f..e27424216159 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1331,6 +1331,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1361,8 +1362,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_isset) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 16e3430f7d07..7dd6b815a9eb 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -672,7 +673,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
}
@@ -687,15 +690,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rules)) {
@@ -707,7 +712,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules))
++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 6ebefec616e4..6bae2ee9b251 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -429,8 +429,8 @@ static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
{
}
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index cd393aaa17d5..3e47cc9b7400 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -562,6 +562,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode
*inode,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmdata;
if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -574,14 +575,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct
inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid);
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rules);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid);
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rules);
default:
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d01363cb0082..4ecbef074809 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2558,11 +2558,14 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
+ if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
}
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void **lsmrule)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc;
@@ -2570,7 +2573,10 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void
**lsmrule)
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ field, op,
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its only caller, set_security_override,
to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
parameter type.
The security module hook is unchanged, still taking a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
lsmblob_init() is used to fill the lsmblob structure, however
this will be removed later in the series when security_secctx_to_secid()
is updated to provide a lsmblob instead of a secid.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 18639c069263..03ae0182cba6 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsmblob;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 89c538aa283e..948d12a5eb25 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
@@ -1061,7 +1061,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 421b1149c651..22e0e7cbefde 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -733,14 +733,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @blob: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -756,6 +756,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -763,7 +764,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char
*secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4ecbef074809..3a88a90ddba6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1693,9 +1693,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
Change the security_secctx_to_secid interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its callers to do the same.
The security module hook is unchanged, still passing back a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel(a)vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org>
---
include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 ++++----
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +++++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++-------
security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 948d12a5eb25..0766725a6b21 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -191,6 +191,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct
lsmblob *blobb)
return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
}
+/**
+ * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data
+ *
+ * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
+ * it is appropriate are rare.
+ *
+ * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
+ * There should only be one.
+ */
+static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (blob->secid[i])
+ return blob->secid[i];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -508,7 +529,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void
*value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1335,7 +1357,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char
**secdata, u32 *secle
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 22e0e7cbefde..848306c7d823 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -757,14 +757,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
struct lsmblob blob;
- u32 secid;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index b37bd02448d8..f1b9b0021414 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -811,21 +811,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX +
1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
- u32 tmp_secid = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
if (err)
return err;
- if (!tmp_secid)
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return -ENOENT;
- err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(lsmblob_value(&blob));
if (err)
return err;
- priv->secid = tmp_secid;
+ priv->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 75625d13e976..9845d98e6b77 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -43,13 +43,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ &blob);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -57,6 +58,10 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
+ /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
+ * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
+ * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
+ info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index fc55c9116da0..3b7a3e0ae8af 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -906,13 +906,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
+ * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
+ * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
+ * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
+
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -933,7 +938,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -955,13 +960,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
+ * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3a88a90ddba6..eac7c10b8cfa 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2081,10 +2081,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32
*seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -2235,10 +2247,26 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char
__user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32
*secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+ /*
+ * Only one security module should provide a real hook for
+ * this. A stub or bypass like is used in BPF should either
+ * (somehow) leave rc unaltered or return -ENOPROTOOPT.
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+ if (rc != -ENOPROTOOPT)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
possibility that more than one module may be called upon
to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
audit code.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel(a)vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org>
To: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +++++++++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++-
kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 ++++++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 11 +++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 ++---
security/security.c | 11 +++++----
12 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index b5117576792b..55f3fa073c7b 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3088,10 +3088,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ /*
+ * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
+ * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
+ * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * which means that the one expected by
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 0766725a6b21..fad361bf320e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void
*value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1350,7 +1350,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..23a35ff1b3f2 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,12 +92,17 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr
*msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie
*scm)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* There can only be one security module using the secid,
+ * and the infrastructure will know which it is.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 68cee3bc8cfe..4cd6339e513d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1442,7 +1442,16 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr
*nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
+ * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
+ * happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2128,12 +2137,19 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
+ * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
+ * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7dd6b815a9eb..5f9bdd62f78d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -673,6 +673,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to sid. This is temporary until
+ * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
+ * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type,
@@ -690,6 +697,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
+ * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
+ * until name->osid is converted to a
+ * lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
@@ -995,6 +1009,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t
pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -1004,7 +1019,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context,
pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1247,7 +1263,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int
*call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1397,9 +1416,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct
audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index ec6036713e2c..2f089733ada7 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff
*skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
int err;
@@ -138,7 +139,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff
*skb)
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 3d0fd33be018..8627ec7e13fb 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -333,8 +333,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct
nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -647,8 +652,13 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 46c5557c1fec..54da1a3e8cb1 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn
*ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index d1d8bca03b4f..a6dbef71fc32 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -305,13 +305,20 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in
+ * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
+ * module to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 3b7a3e0ae8af..18749705a862 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -438,7 +439,11 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -475,6 +480,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -494,8 +500,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -537,6 +548,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -555,8 +567,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1082,6 +1099,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1136,7 +1154,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 3ed4fea2a2de..893301ae0131 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index eac7c10b8cfa..ea927a00de18 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2062,17 +2062,16 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc;
- /*
- * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
- * LSM hook is not "stackable").
- */
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
return rc;
}
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++-
security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fad361bf320e..be8db737da74 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long
arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1228,9 +1228,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5f9bdd62f78d..35d6bd0526a2 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2341,11 +2341,16 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
+ /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
+ * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
+ * labels associated with the ipc object. */
+ context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ea927a00de18..9c1098ecea03 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1882,10 +1882,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short
flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
Change the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible secids for possible reporting.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
Cc: netdev(a)vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +-----
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++--
kernel/audit.c | 16 +++-----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 56 +++++++++++++++------------
security/security.c | 12 ++++--
10 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 55f3fa073c7b..08737a07f997 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3087,20 +3087,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->priority = task_nice(current);
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
- security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- /*
- * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
- * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
- * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
- * which means that the one expected by
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index be8db737da74..6b9e3571960d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1155,9 +1155,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 4cd6339e513d..9e3eec0a9c29 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2136,19 +2136,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- if (!sid)
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
- * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
- * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
@@ -2356,6 +2349,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2366,7 +2360,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
+ audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index e27424216159..9e73a7961665 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1330,7 +1330,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
switch (f->type) {
@@ -1361,8 +1360,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_isset) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 35d6bd0526a2..8916a13406c3 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -473,7 +473,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -670,17 +669,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
logged upon error */
if (f->lsm_isset) {
if (need_sid) {
- security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &blob);
need_sid = 0;
}
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to sid. This is temporary until
- * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
- * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type,
f->op,
@@ -2440,12 +2431,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
+ context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2461,6 +2455,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2472,7 +2467,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2493,7 +2490,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 18749705a862..cabec85136e1 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1564,11 +1564,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
+ audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 3c67afce64f1..438b5db6c714 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -34,7 +34,11 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
+ audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 3dd8c2e4314e..2a18124af429 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -65,14 +65,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
*/
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
- IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], func,
+ mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2d1af8899cab..c9f1f6bddab5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -388,12 +388,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred
*cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
return 0;
@@ -419,9 +420,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
struct inode *inode;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int result = 0;
int action;
- u32 secid;
int pcr;
/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -429,9 +430,10 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long
prot)
!(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
return 0;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
- action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC,
+ /* scaffolding */
+ action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0,
MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
@@ -468,10 +470,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -492,10 +496,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -629,7 +634,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id
read_id,
bool contents)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/*
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -649,8 +654,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id
read_id,
/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL,
0, MAY_READ, func);
}
@@ -679,7 +685,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -692,9 +698,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
- MAY_READ, func);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
+ size, MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -809,7 +816,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
int size,
} hash = {};
int violation = 0;
int action = 0;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_policy_flag)
return;
@@ -822,9 +829,10 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
int size,
* buffer measurements.
*/
if (func) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
- &pcr, &template, keyring);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ 0, func, &pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9c1098ecea03..421ff85015da 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1799,10 +1799,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.task_getsecid(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +---
security/security.c | 11 +++++++++--
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6b9e3571960d..a7968dde27c6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool
alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value,
size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
@@ -963,9 +963,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode,
char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 8916a13406c3..b58b0048702a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1980,13 +1980,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
+ name->osid = blob.secid[0];
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3e47cc9b7400..bbf9fa79740a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -561,7 +561,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode
*inode,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
struct lsmblob lsmdata;
if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
@@ -574,8 +573,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode
*inode,
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &lsmdata);
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rules);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 421ff85015da..f3f6caae392f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1443,9 +1443,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements
in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob
to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 25 +++++++----------------
kernel/audit.h | 3 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++--------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++----
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++---
6 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a7968dde27c6..dacd64d2d141 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 9e3eec0a9c29..1f987ac23e90 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
static kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
static pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-static u32 audit_sig_sid;
+struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1441,29 +1441,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr
*nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
- * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
- * happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
@@ -2349,7 +2341,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2360,9 +2351,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
- audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_lsm);
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 3b9c0945225a..ce41886807bb 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b58b0048702a..b15222181700 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -993,14 +993,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context
*context)
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
- struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -1009,9 +1009,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context,
pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1582,7 +1581,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1591,7 +1590,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1769,7 +1768,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->aux = NULL;
context->aux_pids = NULL;
context->target_pid = 0;
- context->target_sid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(&context->target_lsm, 0);
context->sockaddr_len = 0;
context->type = 0;
context->fds[0] = -1;
@@ -2435,15 +2434,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
- context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_lsm);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2459,7 +2455,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2471,9 +2466,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2494,9 +2487,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c9f1f6bddab5..e2fd092a1023 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -469,7 +469,6 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
@@ -479,9 +478,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f3f6caae392f..78aeb2ae7010 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1693,10 +1693,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred
*old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 11/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
The IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy()
call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions
to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity(a)vger.kernel.org
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 ++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 +++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++----------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 16 +++++------
5 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 6bae2ee9b251..8812e9b9fc1d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -252,9 +252,9 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -280,8 +280,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring);
void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 4f39fb93f278..e83fa1c32843 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char
*filename,
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
* MAY_APPEND)
* @func: caller identifier
@@ -183,16 +183,16 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char
*filename,
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr,
template_desc, keyring);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 2a18124af429..7c4e43399269 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -71,10 +71,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks
func)
return 0;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], func,
- mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL,
- NULL);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &blob, func, mask,
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index e2fd092a1023..39ca17586c6c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -194,8 +194,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred
*cred,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr,
&template_desc, NULL);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
@@ -392,8 +392,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob,
NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -432,8 +431,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
- /* scaffolding */
- action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0,
+ action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), &blob, 0,
MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
@@ -472,16 +470,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
- NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
- NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
@@ -499,8 +495,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -655,8 +650,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id
read_id,
/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL,
0, MAY_READ, func);
}
@@ -699,9 +693,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
- size, MAY_READ, func);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size,
+ MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -830,9 +823,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
int size,
*/
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding */
- action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
- 0, func, &pcr, &template, keyring);
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), &blob, 0, func,
+ &pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index bbf9fa79740a..a95eb37937dd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* @rule: a pointer to a rule
* @inode: a pointer to an inode
* @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: the lsm data of the task to be validated
* @func: LIM hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
const char *keyring)
{
@@ -581,8 +581,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode
*inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid);
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type,
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(blob, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rules);
default:
@@ -624,7 +623,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks
func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
* being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -639,8 +638,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks
func)
* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring)
{
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32
secid,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask,
keyring))
continue;
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 12/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
Create a new entry "interface_lsm" in the procfs attr directory for
controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a
process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for
human readable data may be written to "interface_lsm" to set the
value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from
"interface_lsm". At this point there can only be one LSM capable
of display active. A helper function lsm_task_ilsm() is
provided to get the interface lsm slot for a task_struct.
Setting the "interface_lsm" requires that all security modules using
setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is
responsible for defining its policy.
AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-api(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc(a)vger.kernel.org
---
.../ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display | 22 +++
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 17 ++
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 ++++
security/security.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +
10 files changed, 259 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..afa7c60a7892
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+What: /proc/*/attr/lsm_display
+Contact: linux-security-module(a)vger.kernel.org,
+Description: The name of the Linux security module (LSM) that will
+ provide information in the /proc/*/attr/current,
+ /proc/*/attr/prev and /proc/*/attr/exec interfaces.
+ The details of permissions required to read from
+ this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
+ system.
+ A process cannot write to this interface unless it
+ refers to itself.
+ The other details of permissions required to write to
+ this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
+ system.
+ The format of the data used by this interface is a
+ text string identifying the name of an LSM. The values
+ accepted are:
+ selinux - the SELinux LSM
+ smack - the Smack LSM
+ apparmor - The AppArmor LSM
+ By convention the LSM names are lower case and do not
+ contain special characters.
+Users: LSM user-space
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index 6a2a2e973080..b77b4a540391 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -129,3 +129,17 @@ to identify it as the first security module to be registered.
The capabilities security module does not use the general security
blobs, unlike other modules. The reasons are historical and are
based on overhead, complexity and performance concerns.
+
+LSM External Interfaces
+=======================
+
+The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
+The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
+require.
+
+The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma
+separated list of the active security modules.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
+module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
+apply. This interface can be written to.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index b362523a9829..214a0503589d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2808,6 +2808,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index fe9203f15993..e19393b2b8b7 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1660,4 +1660,21 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list
*hooks,
extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+/**
+ * lsm_task_ilsm - the "interface_lsm" for this task
+ * @task: The task to report on
+ *
+ * Returns the task's interface LSM slot.
+ */
+static inline int lsm_task_ilsm(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ int *ilsm = task->security;
+
+ if (ilsm)
+ return *ilsm;
+#endif
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 1fbabdb565a8..b1622fcb4394 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
#define AA_CLASS_NET 14
#define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
+#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17
-#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM
/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 432915c1d427..0ef5d0b2dbdb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -612,6 +612,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char
*name,
return error;
}
+
+static int profile_interface_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM);
+ if (state) {
+ aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
+
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
@@ -623,6 +642,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of interface_lsm if allowed */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ aad(&sa)->info = "set interface lsm";
+ label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_interface_lsm(profile, &sa));
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+ return error;
+ }
+
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
/* null terminate */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 78aeb2ae7010..543d9b707fe5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -76,7 +76,16 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * The task blob includes the "interface_lsm" slot used for
+ * chosing which module presents contexts.
+ * Using a long to avoid potential alignment issues with
+ * module assigned task blobs.
+ */
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_task = sizeof(long),
+};
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
@@ -471,8 +480,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
/*
* Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -492,6 +503,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int
count,
if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
lsmid->slot);
@@ -621,6 +633,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
*/
static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
{
+ int *ilsm;
+
if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
task->security = NULL;
return 0;
@@ -629,6 +643,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
if (task->security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * The start of the task blob contains the "interface" LSM slot number.
+ * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
+ * default first registered LSM be displayed.
+ */
+ ilsm = task->security;
+ *ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1629,14 +1652,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
+ int *oilsm = current->security;
+ int *nilsm;
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
+
rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
- if (unlikely(rc))
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
security_task_free(task);
- return rc;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (oilsm) {
+ nilsm = task->security;
+ if (nilsm)
+ *nilsm = *oilsm;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -2054,23 +2089,110 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ /*
+ * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
+ */
+ if (lsm_slot == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Only allow getting the current process' interface_lsm.
+ * There are too few reasons to get another process'
+ * interface_lsm and too many LSM policy issues.
+ */
+ if (current != p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(p);
+ if (ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = ilsm;
+ *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*value)
+ return strlen(*value);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
}
+/**
+ * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc
+ * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: value to set the attribute to
+ * @size: size of the value
+ *
+ * Set the process attribute for the specified security module
+ * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set
+ * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process.
+ * The /proc code has already done this check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise.
+ */
int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *termed;
+ char *copy;
+ int *ilsm = current->security;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ /*
+ * Change the "interface_lsm" value only if all the security
+ * modules that support setting a procattr allow it.
+ * It is assumed that all such security modules will be
+ * cooperative.
+ */
+ if (size == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ copy = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ termed = strsep(©, " \n");
+
+ for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
+ if (!strcmp(termed, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
+ *ilsm = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
+ rc = size;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(termed);
+ return rc;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && *ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ *ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
@@ -2090,15 +2212,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
- if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
- return rc;
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
@@ -2109,16 +2231,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
- &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -2126,7 +2247,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ return;
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -2267,8 +2395,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- optval, optlen, len);
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ list)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
+ optlen, len);
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 52a50d7ca534..a37afbb159ab 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6334,6 +6334,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
/*
* Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
*/
+
+ /*
+ * For setting interface_lsm, we only perform a permission check;
+ * the actual update to the interface_lsm value is handled by the
+ * LSM framework.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm"))
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2,
+ PROCESS2__SETDISPLAY, NULL);
+
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 40cebde62856..1858aa47b32a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"execmem", "execstack", "execheap",
"setkeycreate",
"setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
{ "process2",
- { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
+ { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setdisplay",
NULL } },
{ "system",
{ "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
"syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load",
NULL } },
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index f96be93d1a75..3f96a7aaed6b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3509,6 +3509,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t
size)
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
+ /*
+ * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "interface_lsm"
+ * to be reset at will.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, "interface_lsm") == 0)
+ return 0;
+
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
return -EPERM;
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 13/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
Add a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information
about a "security context", including the string, its size and
which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is
necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the
lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys
them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry
in a list that never goes away.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel(a)vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org>
Cc: linux-nfs(a)vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++---
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++--
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++--
include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 5 +++-
kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++-
security/security.c | 11 ++++----
15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 08737a07f997..05266b064c38 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2838,6 +2838,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_sz = 0;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3140,7 +3141,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
secctx = NULL;
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3473,8 +3475,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx)
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ if (secctx) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
index 197cb1234341..5dfd08357dc3 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
@@ -1273,12 +1273,16 @@ int ceph_security_init_secctx(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t
mode,
void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->acl);
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->default_acl);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
- security_release_secctx(as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
#endif
if (as_ctx->pagelist)
ceph_pagelist_release(as_ctx->pagelist);
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 9e0ca9b2b210..4b03a3e596e9 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -139,8 +139,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- if (label)
- security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+
+ if (label) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 833a2c64dfe8..4ae7e156ea87 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2717,6 +2717,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
void *context = NULL;
int contextlen;
#endif
@@ -3228,8 +3229,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context)
- security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
+ if (context) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index dacd64d2d141..4ed7a0790cc5 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -132,6 +132,37 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * A "security context" is the text representation of
+ * the information used by LSMs.
+ * This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM
+ * it is useful for.
+ */
+struct lsmcontext {
+ char *context; /* Provided by the module */
+ u32 len;
+ int slot; /* Identifies the module */
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure.
+ * @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize
+ * @context: Initial context, or NULL
+ * @size: Size of context, or 0
+ * @slot: Which LSM provided the context
+ *
+ * Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
+ * This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when
+ * lsmcontext integration is complete.
+ */
+static inline void lsmcontext_init(struct lsmcontext *cp, char *context,
+ u32 size, int slot)
+{
+ cp->slot = slot;
+ cp->context = context;
+ cp->len = size;
+}
+
/*
* Data exported by the security modules
*
@@ -531,7 +562,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1366,7 +1397,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 23a35ff1b3f2..f273c4d777ec 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie
*scm)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
@@ -106,7 +107,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sc
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ /*scaffolding*/
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 1f987ac23e90..8867df3de920 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1192,6 +1192,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr
*nlh)
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1449,15 +1450,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr
*nlh)
}
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
@@ -2129,6 +2133,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
@@ -2142,7 +2147,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b15222181700..2b06171bedeb 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -998,6 +998,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t
pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
@@ -1015,7 +1016,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context,
pid_t pid,
rc = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1228,6 +1230,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct
audit_names *name)
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1261,7 +1264,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int
*call_panic)
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1407,6 +1411,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct
audit_names *n,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1415,7 +1420,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct
audit_names *n,
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 2f089733ada7..a7e4c1b34b6c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff
*skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
@@ -145,7 +146,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff
*skb)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 8627ec7e13fb..5d2784461798 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct
nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
@@ -354,7 +355,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct
nf_conn *ct)
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 54da1a3e8cb1..e2bdc851a477 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn
*ct)
u32 len;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn
*ct)
seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index a6dbef71fc32..dcc31cb7f287 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance
*queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
char *secdata = NULL;
u32 seclen = 0;
@@ -628,8 +629,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance
*queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -637,8 +640,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance
*queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index cabec85136e1..5b83967e3f27 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -447,7 +448,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -478,6 +481,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -509,7 +513,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -546,6 +552,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -576,7 +583,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -1095,6 +1103,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
@@ -1165,7 +1174,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
secctx_len,
secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 893301ae0131..ef139d8ae7cd 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
return audit_buf;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 543d9b707fe5..352c9eb98425 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2245,16 +2245,17 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
- if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
- hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
- return;
+ if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(cp->context, cp->len);
+ break;
}
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 14/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel(a)vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +++++++---------
include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
include/net/scm.h | 9 ++----
kernel/audit.c | 39 +++++++++++-------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++------------
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 18 +++++------
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 ++++++++-----------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++---
security/security.c | 10 +++++--
12 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 05266b064c38..a75ffcd0270a 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2836,9 +2836,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_sz = 0;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3092,14 +3090,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_get_secctx_failed;
}
- added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ added_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
extra_buffers_size += added_size;
if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
/* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
@@ -3126,24 +3124,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->buffer = NULL;
goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
}
- if (secctx) {
+ if (lsmctx.context) {
int err;
size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
- secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
if (err) {
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- secctx = NULL;
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3199,7 +3195,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
off_min = 0;
for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
@@ -3475,10 +3471,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmctx.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4ed7a0790cc5..c86c9870b352 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void
*value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1385,7 +1385,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index f273c4d777ec..b77a52f93389 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -94,8 +94,6 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sc
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
@@ -103,12 +101,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr
*msg, struct sc
* and the infrastructure will know which it is.
*/
lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (!err) {
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- /*scaffolding*/
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 8867df3de920..4e219d1c1781 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1190,9 +1190,6 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr
*nlh)
struct audit_buffer *ab;
u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1440,33 +1437,34 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr
*nlh)
kfree(new);
break;
}
- case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- len = 0;
+ case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO: {
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
+ int len = 0;
+
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
- &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
+ &context);
if (err)
return err;
}
- sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + context.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ len = context.len;
+ memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, len);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
kfree(sig_data);
break;
+ }
case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
struct audit_tty_status s;
unsigned int t;
@@ -2129,26 +2127,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext context;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
return 0;
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 2b06171bedeb..4af5861bcb9a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -998,9 +998,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t
pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -1011,13 +1009,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context,
pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1230,7 +1227,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct
audit_names *name)
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1254,17 +1250,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int
*call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
@@ -1408,20 +1402,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct
audit_names *n,
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
if (n->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index a7e4c1b34b6c..ae073b642fa7 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,8 +132,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff
*skb)
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 secid;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
@@ -141,12 +140,11 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff
*skb)
return;
lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (err)
return;
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 5d2784461798..e6fdcd87ab3e 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -331,8 +331,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct
nf_conn *ct)
static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
- int len, ret;
- char *secctx;
+ int ret;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
@@ -340,7 +339,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct
nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -349,13 +348,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct
nf_conn *ct)
if (!nest_secctx)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
@@ -655,15 +653,15 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
- /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return 0;
+ len = context.len;
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+
return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index e2bdc851a477..c6112960fc73 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
int ret;
- u32 len;
- char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return;
- seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+ seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index dcc31cb7f287..84be5a49a157 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -317,10 +318,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ *secdata = context.context;
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ seclen = context.len;
#endif
return seclen;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 5b83967e3f27..c423c7cdd095 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -444,12 +442,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
@@ -482,8 +477,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -510,11 +503,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -553,8 +544,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -580,10 +569,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -1106,8 +1094,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1167,15 +1153,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
- secctx_len,
- secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index ef139d8ae7cd..951ba0639d20 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
@@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 352c9eb98425..ab5d2c9770f1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2209,18 +2209,22 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
+ &cp->context, &cp->len);
+ }
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
--
2.24.1
2:14 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
This provides the information about which LSM created the
context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
correct hook.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-nfs(a)vger.kernel.org
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 4ae7e156ea87..3092568d5ed3 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2600,11 +2600,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32
layout_types)
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{
__be32 *p;
- p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
@@ -2614,13 +2614,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct
svc_rqst *rqstp,
*/
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
- p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
+ p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
return 0;
}
#else
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{ return 0; }
#endif
@@ -2717,9 +2717,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- void *context = NULL;
- int contextlen;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
#endif
bool contextsupport = false;
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
@@ -2777,7 +2775,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
- &context, &contextlen);
+ &context);
else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
contextsupport = (err == 0);
@@ -3207,8 +3205,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
- status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
- contextlen);
+ status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
if (status)
goto out;
}
@@ -3229,10 +3226,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c86c9870b352..20486380c176 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1413,7 +1413,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry,
void *ctx, u32
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ab5d2c9770f1..31c983a252b9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2281,9 +2281,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
ctxlen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
+ return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, (void **)&cp->context,
+ &cp->len);
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
--
2.24.1
2:15 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 16/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
pointers, and remove scaffolding.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel(a)vger.kernel.org
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 37 +++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 84be5a49a157..0d8b83d84422 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -301,15 +301,13 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock
*sk)
return -1;
}
-static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
+static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
{
- u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
- return 0;
+ return;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
@@ -318,14 +316,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
- *secdata = context.context;
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- seclen = context.len;
#endif
- return seclen;
+ return;
}
static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -398,12 +394,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance
*queue,
struct net_device *indev;
struct net_device *outdev;
struct nf_conn *ct = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- char *secdata = NULL;
- u32 seclen = 0;
size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nfqnl_msg_packet_hdr))
@@ -469,9 +463,9 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance
*queue,
}
if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
- seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
- if (seclen)
- size += nla_total_size(seclen);
+ nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
+ if (context.len)
+ size += nla_total_size(context.len);
}
skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -604,7 +598,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance
*queue,
nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
+ if (context.len &&
+ nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
@@ -632,10 +627,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance
*queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.len)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -643,10 +636,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance
*queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.len)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return NULL;
}
--
2.24.1
2:15 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 17/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and
the internal storage is used to pass information between
these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid
to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their
callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the
modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the
correct secid when using netlabel.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev(a)vger.kernel.org
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +--
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 26 ++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 79 +++++++++--------------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 1 +
security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 ++--
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 ++--
13 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 43ae50337685..73fc25b4042b 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
* @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
* @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data
*
* Description:
* This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
} attr;
};
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 471d33a0d095..1ac343d02b58 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag).
* Tag definition (may change between kernel versions)
*
- * 0 8 16 24 32
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | in (host byte order)|
- * +----------+----------+
- *
+ * 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob)
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data |
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ *
+ * All secid and flag fields are in host byte order.
+ * The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which
+ * Linux security modules are built in the kernel.
+ * The data is opaque.
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1469,7 +1471,11 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ /* Ensure that there is sufficient space in the CIPSO header
+ * for the LSM data. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN > CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX);
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.lsmblob,
+ sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1489,7 +1495,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi
*doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.lsmblob, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 5e1239cef000..bbfaff539416 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @family: address family
- * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ lsmblob, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c423c7cdd095..ab6375d952ea 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int
ifindex)
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int
ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -375,7 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -408,7 +407,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -438,11 +437,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -477,7 +472,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -497,13 +491,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -544,7 +533,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -563,13 +551,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -923,14 +906,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
- * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
- * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
- * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
-
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ &blob, &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -977,11 +954,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
- * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob,
+ &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -1093,8 +1067,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmblob *lsmb;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1132,7 +1105,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1146,14 +1119,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1512,7 +1481,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr4_list);
if (addr4 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -1525,7 +1494,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr6_list);
if (addr6 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#endif /* IPv6 */
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 058e3a285d56..168920780994 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a37afbb159ab..c670eb0a9515 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6944,7 +6944,7 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
}
#endif
-static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "selinux",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 3cc8bab31ea8..6a40b47307ca 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
extern int selinux_enabled_boot;
+extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;
/*
* type_datum properties
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 6a94b31b5472..d8d7603ab14e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 9704c8a32303..cdaff603153f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3789,7 +3789,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3865,7 +3865,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 0f8d0feb89a4..b06fc332a1f9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp);
* Shared data.
*/
extern int smack_enabled;
+extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index efe2406a3960..9acb83ce12a8 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp)
{
int slen;
- skp->smk_netlabel.attr.secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = skp->smk_secid;
skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
skp->smk_netlabel.cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skp->smk_netlabel.cache != NULL) {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3f96a7aaed6b..06629441b663 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3721,11 +3721,12 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct
netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
+ /*
+ * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+ */
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
- /*
- * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
- */
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(
+ sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
/*
@@ -4700,7 +4701,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
};
-static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "smack",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index e567b4baf3a0..139768a13d11 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1140,6 +1140,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
@@ -1271,10 +1272,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char
__user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmblob, 0);
+ lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
- &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET, &lsmblob,
+ &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
--
2.24.1
2:15 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 18/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
Verify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction
use the same "display" security module. This prevents confusion
of security "contexts".
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 31c983a252b9..8803347424d4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -791,9 +791,38 @@ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
}
+/**
+ * security_binder_transaction - Binder driver transaction check
+ * @from: source of the transaction
+ * @to: destination of the transaction
+ *
+ * Verify that the tasks have the same LSM "display", then
+ * call the security module hooks.
+ *
+ * Returns -EINVAL if the displays don't match, or the
+ * result of the security module checks.
+ */
int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
struct task_struct *to)
{
+ int from_ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(from);
+ int to_ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(to);
+
+ /*
+ * If the ilsm is LSMBLOB_INVALID the first module that has
+ * an entry is used. This will be in the 0 slot.
+ *
+ * This is currently only required if the server has requested
+ * peer contexts, but it would be unwieldly to have too much of
+ * the binder driver detail here.
+ */
+ if (from_ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ from_ilsm = 0;
+ if (to_ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ to_ilsm = 0;
+ if (from_ilsm != to_ilsm)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
}
--
2.24.1
2:15 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 19/23] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
Standalone audit records have the timestamp and serial number generated
on the fly and as such are unique, making them standalone. This new
function audit_alloc_local() generates a local audit context that will
be used only for a standalone record and its auxiliary record(s). The
context is discarded immediately after the local associated records are
produced.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++++
kernel/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/auditsc.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index ba1cd38d601b..786d065a64ef 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -289,6 +289,8 @@ static inline int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
/* Public API */
extern int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task);
extern void __audit_free(struct task_struct *task);
+extern struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags);
+extern void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context);
extern void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3);
extern void __audit_syscall_exit(int ret_success, long ret_value);
@@ -558,6 +560,12 @@ static inline void audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af,
extern int audit_n_rules;
extern int audit_signals;
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
++static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
+{ }
static inline int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index ce41886807bb..3f2285e1c6e0 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ struct audit_proctitle {
struct audit_context {
int dummy; /* must be the first element */
int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
+ bool local; /* local context needed */
enum audit_state state, current_state;
unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
int major; /* syscall number */
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4af5861bcb9a..5bfee5d0812d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -929,11 +929,13 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
}
}
-static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state,
+ gfp_t gfpflags)
{
struct audit_context *context;
- context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ /* We can be called in atomic context via audit_tg() */
+ context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), gfpflags);
if (!context)
return NULL;
context->state = state;
@@ -967,7 +969,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0;
}
- if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
+ context = audit_alloc_context(state, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!context) {
kfree(key);
audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -979,8 +982,27 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0;
}
-static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
+struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
{
+ struct audit_context *context = NULL;
+
+ context = audit_alloc_context(AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, gfpflags);
+ if (!context) {
+ audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc_local");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ context->serial = audit_serial();
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
+ context->local = true;
+out:
+ return context;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_alloc_local);
+
+void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+ if (!context)
+ return;
audit_free_module(context);
audit_free_names(context);
unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
@@ -991,6 +1013,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
audit_proctitle_free(context);
kfree(context);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_free_context);
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
@@ -2228,7 +2251,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
{
- if (!ctx->in_syscall)
+ if (!ctx->in_syscall && !ctx->local)
return 0;
if (!ctx->serial)
ctx->serial = audit_serial();
--
2.24.1
5:06 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 19/23] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on nf/master]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v5.10-rc4 next-20201120]
[cannot apply to nf-next/master security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url:
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Module-stack...
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf.git master
config: i386-randconfig-s001-20201120 (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-15) 9.3.0
reproduce:
# apt-get install sparse
# sparse version: v0.6.3-134-gb59dbdaf-dirty
#
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/3b464b0251cffe5ac73c81b701fd8d146...
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review
Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Module-stacking-for-AppArmor/20201121-044616
git checkout 3b464b0251cffe5ac73c81b701fd8d146664a7a3
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' ARCH=i386
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from include/linux/fsnotify.h:16,
from fs/remap_range.c:8:
> include/linux/audit.h:563:1: error: expected identifier or
'(' before '+' token
563 | +static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
| ^
--
In file included from fs/pipe.c:23:
> include/linux/audit.h:563:1: error: expected identifier or
'(' before '+' token
563 | +static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
| ^
fs/pipe.c:741:15: warning: no previous prototype for 'account_pipe_buffers'
[-Wmissing-prototypes]
741 | unsigned long account_pipe_buffers(struct user_struct *user,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:747:6: warning: no previous prototype for
'too_many_pipe_buffers_soft' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
747 | bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:754:6: warning: no previous prototype for
'too_many_pipe_buffers_hard' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
754 | bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:761:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'pipe_is_unprivileged_user'
[-Wmissing-prototypes]
761 | bool pipe_is_unprivileged_user(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:1230:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'pipe_resize_ring'
[-Wmissing-prototypes]
1230 | int pipe_resize_ring(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int nr_slots)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
vim +563 include/linux/audit.h
559
560 extern int audit_n_rules;
561 extern int audit_signals;
562 #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
563 +static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t
gfpflags)
564 {
565 return NULL;
566 }
567 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
568 { }
569 static inline int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
570 {
571 return 0;
572 }
573 static inline void audit_free(struct task_struct *task)
574 { }
575 static inline void audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0,
576 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
577 unsigned long a3)
578 { }
579 static inline void audit_syscall_exit(void *pt_regs)
580 { }
581 static inline bool audit_dummy_context(void)
582 {
583 return true;
584 }
585 static inline void audit_set_context(struct task_struct *task, struct audit_context
*ctx)
586 { }
587 static inline struct audit_context *audit_context(void)
588 {
589 return NULL;
590 }
591 static inline struct filename *audit_reusename(const __user char *name)
592 {
593 return NULL;
594 }
595 static inline void audit_getname(struct filename *name)
596 { }
597 static inline void audit_getcwd(void)
598 { }
599 static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
600 const struct dentry *dentry,
601 unsigned int aflags)
602 { }
603 static inline void audit_file(struct file *file)
604 {
605 }
606 static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name,
607 const struct dentry *dentry)
608 { }
609 static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
610 const struct dentry *dentry,
611 const unsigned char type)
612 { }
613 static inline void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
614 { }
615 static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
616 { }
617 static inline void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names,
618 const char *old_names, int res)
619 { }
620 static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
621 { }
622 static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,
623 gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
624 { }
625 static inline void audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
626 { }
627 static inline int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
628 {
629 return 0;
630 }
631
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
6:36 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 19/23] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on nf/master]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v5.10-rc4 next-20201120]
[cannot apply to nf-next/master security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url:
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Module-stack...
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf.git master
config: x86_64-randconfig-a011-20201120 (attached as .config)
compiler: clang version 12.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project
3ded927cf80ac519f9f9c4664fef08787f7c537d)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O
~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install x86_64 cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-x86-64-linux-gnu
#
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/3b464b0251cffe5ac73c81b701fd8d146...
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review
Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Module-stacking-for-AppArmor/20201121-044616
git checkout 3b464b0251cffe5ac73c81b701fd8d146664a7a3
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross ARCH=x86_64
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c:68:
In file included from include/net/xfrm.h:15:
include/linux/audit.h:563:1: error: expected external declaration
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
^
> drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c:6693:30: warning:
shift count >= width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
if
(!pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64))) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c:6695:43: warning: shift count >=
width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
err = pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64));
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~
2 warnings and 1 error generated.
vim +6693 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c
76f919ebffe2f66 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ayush Sawal
2020-09-09 6606
1dd06ae8db716e1 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2012-12-06 6607 static int init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id
*ent)
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6608 {
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6609 struct net_device *netdev;
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6610 struct adapter *adapter;
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6611 static int adap_idx = 1;
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6612 int s_qpp, qpp, num_seg;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6613 struct port_info *pi;
c8f44affb7244f2 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Michał Mirosław
2011-11-15 6614 bool highdma = false;
d86bd29e0b31f30 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-08-04 6615 enum chip_type chip;
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6616 void __iomem *regs;
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6617 int func, chip_ver;
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6618 u16 device_id;
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6619 int i, err;
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6620 u32 whoami;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6621
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6622 err = pci_request_regions(pdev, KBUILD_MODNAME);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6623 if (err) {
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6624 /* Just info, some other driver may have claimed the device. */
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6625 dev_info(&pdev->dev, "cannot obtain PCI
resources\n");
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6626 return err;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6627 }
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6628
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6629 err = pci_enable_device(pdev);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6630 if (err) {
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6631 dev_err(&pdev->dev, "cannot enable PCI device\n");
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6632 goto out_release_regions;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6633 }
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6634
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6635 regs = pci_ioremap_bar(pdev, 0);
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6636 if (!regs) {
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6637 dev_err(&pdev->dev, "cannot map device
registers\n");
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6638 err = -ENOMEM;
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6639 goto out_disable_device;
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6640 }
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6641
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6642 adapter = kzalloc(sizeof(*adapter), GFP_KERNEL);
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6643 if (!adapter) {
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6644 err = -ENOMEM;
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6645 goto out_unmap_bar0;
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6646 }
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6647
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6648 adapter->regs = regs;
8203b509c5b7aab drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-10-09 6649 err = t4_wait_dev_ready(regs);
8203b509c5b7aab drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-10-09 6650 if (err < 0)
e729452ec333042 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Christophe JAILLET
2018-02-06 6651 goto out_free_adapter;
8203b509c5b7aab drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-10-09 6652
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6653 /* We control everything through one PF */
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6654 whoami = t4_read_reg(adapter, PL_WHOAMI_A);
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6655 pci_read_config_word(pdev, PCI_DEVICE_ID, &device_id);
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6656 chip = t4_get_chip_type(adapter, CHELSIO_PCI_ID_VER(device_id));
286183147666fb7 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dan Carpenter
2019-09-25 6657 if ((int)chip < 0) {
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6658 dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Device %d is not supported\n",
device_id);
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6659 err = chip;
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6660 goto out_free_adapter;
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6661 }
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6662 chip_ver = CHELSIO_CHIP_VERSION(chip);
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6663 func = chip_ver <= CHELSIO_T5 ?
d86bd29e0b31f30 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-08-04 6664 SOURCEPF_G(whoami) : T6_SOURCEPF_G(whoami);
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6665
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6666 adapter->pdev = pdev;
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6667 adapter->pdev_dev = &pdev->dev;
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6668 adapter->name = pci_name(pdev);
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6669 adapter->mbox = func;
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6670 adapter->pf = func;
016764de8b0d17e drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-03-07 6671 adapter->params.chip = chip;
016764de8b0d17e drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-03-07 6672 adapter->adap_idx = adap_idx;
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6673 adapter->msg_enable = DFLT_MSG_ENABLE;
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6674 adapter->mbox_log = kzalloc(sizeof(*adapter->mbox_log) +
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6675 (sizeof(struct mbox_cmd) *
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6676 T4_OS_LOG_MBOX_CMDS),
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6677 GFP_KERNEL);
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6678 if (!adapter->mbox_log) {
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6679 err = -ENOMEM;
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6680 goto out_free_adapter;
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6681 }
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6682 spin_lock_init(&adapter->mbox_lock);
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6683 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&adapter->mlist.list);
aca06eafd09f48c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-09 6684 adapter->mbox_log->size = T4_OS_LOG_MBOX_CMDS;
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6685 pci_set_drvdata(pdev, adapter);
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6686
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6687 if (func != ent->driver_data) {
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6688 pci_disable_device(pdev);
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6689 pci_save_state(pdev); /* to restore SR-IOV later */
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6690 return 0;
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6691 }
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6692
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 @6693 if (!pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64))) {
c8f44affb7244f2 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Michał Mirosław
2011-11-15 6694 highdma = true;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6695 err = pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64));
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6696 if (err) {
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6697 dev_err(&pdev->dev, "unable to obtain 64-bit DMA for
"
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6698 "coherent allocations\n");
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6699 goto out_free_adapter;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6700 }
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6701 } else {
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6702 err = pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6703 if (err) {
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6704 dev_err(&pdev->dev, "no usable DMA
configuration\n");
baf5086840ab181 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-16 6705 goto out_free_adapter;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6706 }
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6707 }
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6708
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6709 pci_enable_pcie_error_reporting(pdev);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6710 pci_set_master(pdev);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6711 pci_save_state(pdev);
7829451c695e5b7 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2016-08-11 6712 adap_idx++;
29aaee65bc28cc7 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-08-20 6713 adapter->workq = create_singlethread_workqueue("cxgb4");
29aaee65bc28cc7 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-08-20 6714 if (!adapter->workq) {
29aaee65bc28cc7 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-08-20 6715 err = -ENOMEM;
29aaee65bc28cc7 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-08-20 6716 goto out_free_adapter;
29aaee65bc28cc7 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-08-20 6717 }
29aaee65bc28cc7 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-08-20 6718
144be3d9f72fca5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Gavin Shan
2014-01-23 6719 /* PCI device has been enabled */
80f61f19e542aed drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2019-03-04 6720 adapter->flags |= CXGB4_DEV_ENABLED;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6721 memset(adapter->chan_map, 0xff, sizeof(adapter->chan_map));
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6722
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6723 /* If possible, we use PCIe Relaxed Ordering Attribute to deliver
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6724 * Ingress Packet Data to Free List Buffers in order to allow for
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6725 * chipset performance optimizations between the Root Complex and
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6726 * Memory Controllers. (Messages to the associated Ingress Queue
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6727 * notifying new Packet Placement in the Free Lists Buffers will be
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6728 * send without the Relaxed Ordering Attribute thus guaranteeing that
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6729 * all preceding PCIe Transaction Layer Packets will be processed
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6730 * first.) But some Root Complexes have various issues with Upstream
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6731 * Transaction Layer Packets with the Relaxed Ordering Attribute set.
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6732 * The PCIe devices which under the Root Complexes will be cleared the
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6733 * Relaxed Ordering bit in the configuration space, So we check our
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6734 * PCIe configuration space to see if it's flagged with advice
against
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6735 * using Relaxed Ordering.
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6736 */
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6737 if (!pcie_relaxed_ordering_enabled(pdev))
80f61f19e542aed drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2019-03-04 6738 adapter->flags |= CXGB4_ROOT_NO_RELAXED_ORDERING;
b0ba9d5fded9590 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2017-08-15 6739
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6740 spin_lock_init(&adapter->stats_lock);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6741 spin_lock_init(&adapter->tid_release_lock);
e327c225c911529 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-10-29 6742 spin_lock_init(&adapter->win0_lock);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6743
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6744 INIT_WORK(&adapter->tid_release_task,
process_tid_release_list);
881806bc155c0d5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Vipul Pandya
2012-05-18 6745 INIT_WORK(&adapter->db_full_task, process_db_full);
881806bc155c0d5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Vipul Pandya
2012-05-18 6746 INIT_WORK(&adapter->db_drop_task, process_db_drop);
8b7372c101a5f9f drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-03-16 6747 INIT_WORK(&adapter->fatal_err_notify_task, notify_fatal_err);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6748
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6749 err = t4_prep_adapter(adapter);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6750 if (err)
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6751 goto out_free_adapter;
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6752
1dde532dd0520a9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2018-05-02 6753 if (is_kdump_kernel()) {
1dde532dd0520a9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2018-05-02 6754 /* Collect hardware state and append to /proc/vmcore */
1dde532dd0520a9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2018-05-02 6755 err = cxgb4_cudbg_vmcore_add_dump(adapter);
1dde532dd0520a9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2018-05-02 6756 if (err) {
1dde532dd0520a9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2018-05-02 6757 dev_warn(adapter->pdev_dev,
1dde532dd0520a9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2018-05-02 6758 "Fail collecting vmcore device dump, err: %d.
Continuing\n",
1dde532dd0520a9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2018-05-02 6759 err);
1dde532dd0520a9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2018-05-02 6760 err = 0;
1dde532dd0520a9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2018-05-02 6761 }
1dde532dd0520a9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2018-05-02 6762 }
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6763
d14807dd8e7eaa4 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2013-12-03 6764 if (!is_t4(adapter->params.chip)) {
f612b815d75b054 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-01-05 6765 s_qpp = (QUEUESPERPAGEPF0_S +
f612b815d75b054 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-01-05 6766 (QUEUESPERPAGEPF1_S - QUEUESPERPAGEPF0_S) *
b261272276777f0 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-05-27 6767 adapter->pf);
f612b815d75b054 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-01-05 6768 qpp = 1 << QUEUESPERPAGEPF0_G(t4_read_reg(adapter,
f612b815d75b054 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-01-05 6769 SGE_EGRESS_QUEUES_PER_PAGE_PF_A) >> s_qpp);
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6770 num_seg = PAGE_SIZE / SEGMENT_SIZE;
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6771
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6772 /* Each segment size is 128B. Write coalescing is enabled only
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6773 * when SGE_EGRESS_QUEUES_PER_PAGE_PF reg value for the
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6774 * queue is less no of segments that can be accommodated in
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6775 * a page size.
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6776 */
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6777 if (qpp > num_seg) {
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6778 dev_err(&pdev->dev,
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6779 "Incorrect number of egress queues per page\n");
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6780 err = -EINVAL;
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6781 goto out_free_adapter;
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6782 }
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6783 adapter->bar2 = ioremap_wc(pci_resource_start(pdev, 2),
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6784 pci_resource_len(pdev, 2));
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6785 if (!adapter->bar2) {
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6786 dev_err(&pdev->dev, "cannot map device bar2
region\n");
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6787 err = -ENOMEM;
d6ce2628f32271c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2014-09-16 6788 goto out_free_adapter;
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6789 }
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6790 }
22adfe0a85ca380 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Santosh Rastapur
2013-03-14 6791
636f9d371f70f22 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Vipul Pandya
2012-09-26 6792 setup_memwin(adapter);
86e8f2988786cb7 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Vishal Kulkarni
2019-11-05 6793 err = adap_init0(adapter, 0);
5b377d114f2b9ce drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-05-27 6794 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
5b377d114f2b9ce drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-05-27 6795 bitmap_zero(adapter->sge.blocked_fl, adapter->sge.egr_sz);
5b377d114f2b9ce drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-05-27 6796 #endif
636f9d371f70f22 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Vipul Pandya
2012-09-26 6797 setup_memwin_rdma(adapter);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6798 if (err)
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6799 goto out_unmap_bar;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6800
2a485cf7db2815c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-09-08 6801 /* configure SGE_STAT_CFG_A to read WC stats */
2a485cf7db2815c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-09-08 6802 if (!is_t4(adapter->params.chip))
676d6a753066e9b drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-12-23 6803 t4_write_reg(adapter, SGE_STAT_CFG_A, STATSOURCE_T5_V(7) |
676d6a753066e9b drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-12-23 6804 (is_t5(adapter->params.chip) ? STATMODE_V(0) :
676d6a753066e9b drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-12-23 6805 T6_STATMODE_V(0)));
2a485cf7db2815c drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-09-08 6806
b539ea60f5043b9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2018-11-20 6807 /* Initialize hash mac addr list */
b539ea60f5043b9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2018-11-20 6808 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&adapter->mac_hlist);
b539ea60f5043b9 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2018-11-20 6809
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6810 for_each_port(adapter, i) {
ab0367ea42217d4 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2019-11-07 6811 /* For supporting MQPRIO Offload, need some extra
ab0367ea42217d4 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2019-11-07 6812 * queues for each ETHOFLD TIDs. Keep it equal to
ab0367ea42217d4 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2019-11-07 6813 * MAX_ATIDs for now. Once we connect to firmware
ab0367ea42217d4 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2019-11-07 6814 * later and query the EOTID params, we'll come to
ab0367ea42217d4 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2019-11-07 6815 * know the actual # of EOTIDs supported.
ab0367ea42217d4 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2019-11-07 6816 */
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6817 netdev = alloc_etherdev_mq(sizeof(struct port_info),
ab0367ea42217d4 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2019-11-07 6818 MAX_ETH_QSETS + MAX_ATIDS);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6819 if (!netdev) {
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6820 err = -ENOMEM;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6821 goto out_free_dev;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6822 }
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6823
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6824 SET_NETDEV_DEV(netdev, &pdev->dev);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6825
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6826 adapter->port[i] = netdev;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6827 pi = netdev_priv(netdev);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6828 pi->adapter = adapter;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6829 pi->xact_addr_filt = -1;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6830 pi->port_id = i;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6831 netdev->irq = pdev->irq;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6832
2ed28baa7076083 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Michał Mirosław
2011-04-16 6833 netdev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | TSO_FLAGS |
2ed28baa7076083 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Michał Mirosław
2011-04-16 6834 NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM |
012475e3c59cbe4 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2019-02-28 6835 NETIF_F_RXCSUM | NETIF_F_RXHASH | NETIF_F_GRO |
d8931847488d250 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2016-09-20 6836 NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_RX |
c8729cac2a11e4b drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Vishal Kulkarni
2020-06-19 6837 NETIF_F_HW_TC | NETIF_F_NTUPLE;
d0a1299c6bf7d80 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-10 6838
e8d452923ae6cdc drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-24 6839 if (chip_ver > CHELSIO_T5) {
c50ae55e41ee226 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-11 6840 netdev->hw_enc_features |= NETIF_F_IP_CSUM |
c50ae55e41ee226 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-11 6841 NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM |
c50ae55e41ee226 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-11 6842 NETIF_F_RXCSUM |
c50ae55e41ee226 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-11 6843 NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL |
64f40cdd07e19b5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2019-02-28 6844 NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM |
c50ae55e41ee226 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-11 6845 NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_TSO6;
c50ae55e41ee226 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-11 6846
1435d9970378999 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Atul Gupta
2019-01-17 6847 netdev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL |
64f40cdd07e19b5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2019-02-28 6848 NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM |
1435d9970378999 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Atul Gupta
2019-01-17 6849 NETIF_F_HW_TLS_RECORD;
ad166a8ec26521a drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Jakub Kicinski
2020-07-14 6850
ad166a8ec26521a drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Jakub Kicinski
2020-07-14 6851 if (adapter->rawf_cnt)
ad166a8ec26521a drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Jakub Kicinski
2020-07-14 6852 netdev->udp_tunnel_nic_info = &cxgb_udp_tunnels;
c50ae55e41ee226 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-05-11 6853 }
d0a1299c6bf7d80 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-01-10 6854
c8f44affb7244f2 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Michał Mirosław
2011-11-15 6855 if (highdma)
c8f44affb7244f2 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Michał Mirosław
2011-11-15 6856 netdev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_HIGHDMA;
c8f44affb7244f2 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Michał Mirosław
2011-11-15 6857 netdev->features |= netdev->hw_features;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6858 netdev->vlan_features = netdev->features & VLAN_FEAT;
a8c16e8ed624f24 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rohit Maheshwari
2020-09-10 6859 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHELSIO_TLS_DEVICE)
a3ac249a1ab5755 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rohit Maheshwari
2020-06-01 6860 if (pi->adapter->params.crypto & FW_CAPS_CONFIG_TLS_HW) {
a3ac249a1ab5755 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rohit Maheshwari
2020-06-01 6861 netdev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_HW_TLS_TX;
a3ac249a1ab5755 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rohit Maheshwari
2020-06-01 6862 netdev->tlsdev_ops = &cxgb4_ktls_ops;
a3ac249a1ab5755 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rohit Maheshwari
2020-06-01 6863 /* initialize the refcount */
a3ac249a1ab5755 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rohit Maheshwari
2020-06-01 6864 refcount_set(&pi->adapter->chcr_ktls.ktls_refcount, 0);
a3ac249a1ab5755 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rohit Maheshwari
2020-06-01 6865 }
76f919ebffe2f66 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ayush Sawal
2020-09-09 6866 #endif /* CONFIG_CHELSIO_TLS_DEVICE */
76f919ebffe2f66 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ayush Sawal
2020-09-09 6867 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHELSIO_IPSEC_INLINE)
76f919ebffe2f66 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ayush Sawal
2020-09-09 6868 if (pi->adapter->params.crypto &
FW_CAPS_CONFIG_IPSEC_INLINE) {
76f919ebffe2f66 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ayush Sawal
2020-09-09 6869 netdev->hw_enc_features |= NETIF_F_HW_ESP;
76f919ebffe2f66 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ayush Sawal
2020-09-09 6870 netdev->features |= NETIF_F_HW_ESP;
76f919ebffe2f66 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ayush Sawal
2020-09-09 6871 netdev->xfrmdev_ops = &cxgb4_xfrmdev_ops;
76f919ebffe2f66 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ayush Sawal
2020-09-09 6872 }
76f919ebffe2f66 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ayush Sawal
2020-09-09 6873 #endif /* CONFIG_CHELSIO_IPSEC_INLINE */
76f919ebffe2f66 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ayush Sawal
2020-09-09 6874
01789349ee52e4a drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Jiri Pirko
2011-08-16 6875 netdev->priv_flags |= IFF_UNICAST_FLT;
01789349ee52e4a drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Jiri Pirko
2011-08-16 6876
d894be57ca92c8a drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Jarod Wilson
2016-10-20 6877 /* MTU range: 81 - 9600 */
a047fbae23e1d94 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2017-10-03 6878 netdev->min_mtu = 81; /* accommodate SACK */
d894be57ca92c8a drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Jarod Wilson
2016-10-20 6879 netdev->max_mtu = MAX_MTU;
d894be57ca92c8a drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Jarod Wilson
2016-10-20 6880
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6881 netdev->netdev_ops = &cxgb4_netdev_ops;
688848b1493a0a5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-06-19 6882 #ifdef CONFIG_CHELSIO_T4_DCB
688848b1493a0a5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-06-19 6883 netdev->dcbnl_ops = &cxgb4_dcb_ops;
688848b1493a0a5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-06-19 6884 cxgb4_dcb_state_init(netdev);
ebddd97afb89cb1 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Ganesh Goudar
2018-08-10 6885 cxgb4_dcb_version_init(netdev);
688848b1493a0a5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Anish Bhatt
2014-06-19 6886 #endif
812034f11628aaa drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-04-06 6887 cxgb4_set_ethtool_ops(netdev);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6888 }
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6889
ad75b7d32f2517a drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2017-10-13 6890 cxgb4_init_ethtool_dump(adapter);
ad75b7d32f2517a drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Rahul Lakkireddy
2017-10-13 6891
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6892 pci_set_drvdata(pdev, adapter);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6893
80f61f19e542aed drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2019-03-04 6894 if (adapter->flags & CXGB4_FW_OK) {
060e0c752b5047e drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-08-02 6895 err = t4_port_init(adapter, func, func, 0);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6896 if (err)
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6897 goto out_free_dev;
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6898 } else if (adapter->params.nports == 1) {
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6899 /* If we don't have a connection to the firmware -- possibly
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6900 * because of an error -- grab the raw VPD parameters so we
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6901 * can set the proper MAC Address on the debug network
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6902 * interface that we've created.
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6903 */
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6904 u8 hw_addr[ETH_ALEN];
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6905 u8 *na = adapter->params.vpd.na;
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6906
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6907 err = t4_get_raw_vpd_params(adapter, &adapter->params.vpd);
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6908 if (!err) {
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6909 for (i = 0; i < ETH_ALEN; i++)
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6910 hw_addr[i] = (hex2val(na[2 * i + 0]) * 16 +
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6911 hex2val(na[2 * i + 1]));
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6912 t4_set_hw_addr(adapter, 0, hw_addr);
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6913 }
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6914 }
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6915
80f61f19e542aed drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Arjun Vynipadath
2019-03-04 6916 if (!(adapter->flags & CXGB4_FW_OK))
0eaec62a91ed9d5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2018-07-04 6917 goto fw_attach_fail;
0eaec62a91ed9d5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2018-07-04 6918
098ef6c28a956ba drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-06-05 6919 /* Configure queues and allocate tables now, they can be needed as
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6920 * soon as the first register_netdev completes.
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6921 */
0eaec62a91ed9d5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2018-07-04 6922 err = cfg_queues(adapter);
0eaec62a91ed9d5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2018-07-04 6923 if (err)
0eaec62a91ed9d5 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Casey Leedom
2018-07-04 6924 goto out_free_dev;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6925
3bdb376e6944134 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Kumar Sanghvi
2017-10-18 6926 adapter->smt = t4_init_smt();
3bdb376e6944134 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Kumar Sanghvi
2017-10-18 6927 if (!adapter->smt) {
3bdb376e6944134 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Kumar Sanghvi
2017-10-18 6928 /* We tolerate a lack of SMT, giving up some functionality */
3bdb376e6944134 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Kumar Sanghvi
2017-10-18 6929 dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "could not allocate SMT,
continuing\n");
3bdb376e6944134 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Kumar Sanghvi
2017-10-18 6930 }
3bdb376e6944134 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Kumar Sanghvi
2017-10-18 6931
5be9ed8d49754c2 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Hariprasad Shenai
2015-07-07 6932 adapter->l2t = t4_init_l2t(adapter->l2t_start,
adapter->l2t_end);
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6933 if (!adapter->l2t) {
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6934 /* We tolerate a lack of L2T, giving up some functionality */
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6935 dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "could not allocate L2T,
continuing\n");
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6936 adapter->params.offload = 0;
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6937 }
b8ff05a9c3237f6 drivers/net/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c Dimitris Michailidis
2010-04-01 6938
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
1:36 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 19/23] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on nf/master]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v5.10-rc4 next-20201120]
[cannot apply to nf-next/master security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url:
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Module-stack...
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf.git master
config: x86_64-randconfig-a015-20201120 (attached as .config)
compiler: clang version 12.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project
3ded927cf80ac519f9f9c4664fef08787f7c537d)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O
~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install x86_64 cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-x86-64-linux-gnu
#
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/3b464b0251cffe5ac73c81b701fd8d146...
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review
Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Module-stacking-for-AppArmor/20201121-044616
git checkout 3b464b0251cffe5ac73c81b701fd8d146664a7a3
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross ARCH=x86_64
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from drivers/net/gtp.c:30:
In file included from include/net/xfrm.h:15:
> include/linux/audit.h:563:1: error: expected external declaration
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
^
1 error generated.
--
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:40:
In file included from include/net/xfrm.h:15:
> include/linux/audit.h:563:1: error: expected external declaration
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
^
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8108:14: warning: division by zero is
undefined [-Wdivision-by-zero]
cmd_type |= IXGBE_SET_FLAG(tx_flags, IXGBE_TX_FLAGS_HW_VLAN,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8098:26: note: expanded from macro
'IXGBE_SET_FLAG'
((u32)(_input & _flag) / (_flag / _result)))
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8112:14: warning: division by zero is
undefined [-Wdivision-by-zero]
cmd_type |= IXGBE_SET_FLAG(tx_flags, IXGBE_TX_FLAGS_TSO,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8098:26: note: expanded from macro
'IXGBE_SET_FLAG'
((u32)(_input & _flag) / (_flag / _result)))
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8116:14: warning: division by zero is
undefined [-Wdivision-by-zero]
cmd_type |= IXGBE_SET_FLAG(tx_flags, IXGBE_TX_FLAGS_TSTAMP,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8098:26: note: expanded from macro
'IXGBE_SET_FLAG'
((u32)(_input & _flag) / (_flag / _result)))
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8120:14: warning: division by zero is
undefined [-Wdivision-by-zero]
cmd_type ^= IXGBE_SET_FLAG(skb->no_fcs, 1, IXGBE_ADVTXD_DCMD_IFCS);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8098:26: note: expanded from macro
'IXGBE_SET_FLAG'
((u32)(_input & _flag) / (_flag / _result)))
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8131:19: warning: division by zero is
undefined [-Wdivision-by-zero]
olinfo_status |= IXGBE_SET_FLAG(tx_flags,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8098:26: note: expanded from macro
'IXGBE_SET_FLAG'
((u32)(_input & _flag) / (_flag / _result)))
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8136:19: warning: division by zero is
undefined [-Wdivision-by-zero]
olinfo_status |= IXGBE_SET_FLAG(tx_flags,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8098:26: note: expanded from macro
'IXGBE_SET_FLAG'
((u32)(_input & _flag) / (_flag / _result)))
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8141:19: warning: division by zero is
undefined [-Wdivision-by-zero]
olinfo_status |= IXGBE_SET_FLAG(tx_flags,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8098:26: note: expanded from macro
'IXGBE_SET_FLAG'
((u32)(_input & _flag) / (_flag / _result)))
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8149:19: warning: division by zero is
undefined [-Wdivision-by-zero]
olinfo_status |= IXGBE_SET_FLAG(tx_flags,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:8098:26: note: expanded from macro
'IXGBE_SET_FLAG'
((u32)(_input & _flag) / (_flag / _result)))
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:10621:45: warning: shift count >=
width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
if (!dma_set_mask_and_coherent(&pdev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64))) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~
9 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c:33:
In file included from include/net/xfrm.h:15:
> include/linux/audit.h:563:1: error: expected external declaration
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
^
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c:4529:45: warning: shift count >=
width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
if (!dma_set_mask_and_coherent(&pdev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64))) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~
1 warning and 1 error generated.
vim +563 include/linux/audit.h
559
560 extern int audit_n_rules;
561 extern int audit_signals;
562 #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
563 +static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t
gfpflags)
564 {
565 return NULL;
566 }
567 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
568 { }
569 static inline int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
570 {
571 return 0;
572 }
573 static inline void audit_free(struct task_struct *task)
574 { }
575 static inline void audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0,
576 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
577 unsigned long a3)
578 { }
579 static inline void audit_syscall_exit(void *pt_regs)
580 { }
581 static inline bool audit_dummy_context(void)
582 {
583 return true;
584 }
585 static inline void audit_set_context(struct task_struct *task, struct audit_context
*ctx)
586 { }
587 static inline struct audit_context *audit_context(void)
588 {
589 return NULL;
590 }
591 static inline struct filename *audit_reusename(const __user char *name)
592 {
593 return NULL;
594 }
595 static inline void audit_getname(struct filename *name)
596 { }
597 static inline void audit_getcwd(void)
598 { }
599 static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
600 const struct dentry *dentry,
601 unsigned int aflags)
602 { }
603 static inline void audit_file(struct file *file)
604 {
605 }
606 static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name,
607 const struct dentry *dentry)
608 { }
609 static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
610 const struct dentry *dentry,
611 const unsigned char type)
612 { }
613 static inline void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
614 { }
615 static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
616 { }
617 static inline void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names,
618 const char *old_names, int res)
619 { }
620 static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
621 { }
622 static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,
623 gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
624 { }
625 static inline void audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
626 { }
627 static inline int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
628 {
629 return 0;
630 }
631
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
2:15 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
Create a new audit record type to contain the subject information
when there are multiple security modules that require such data.
This record is linked with the same timestamp and serial number
using the audit_alloc_local() mechanism.
The record is produced only in cases where there is more than one
security module with a process "context".
In cases where this record is produced the subj= fields of
other records in the audit event will be set to "subj=?".
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1420]
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor==unconfined
subj_smack=_
There will be a subj_$LSM= entry for each security module
LSM that supports the secid_to_secctx and secctx_to_secid
hooks. The BPF security module implements secid/secctx
translation hooks, so it has to be considered to provide a
secctx even though it may not actually do so.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
To: paul(a)paul-moore.com
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
Cc: rgb(a)redhat.com
Cc: netdev(a)vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
include/linux/audit.h | 24 +++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 18 ++++++-
include/net/netlabel.h | 3 +-
include/net/scm.h | 2 +-
include/net/xfrm.h | 13 ++++-
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 61 +++++++++++++++------
kernel/audit.h | 2 +
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c | 4 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 24 ++++-----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 16 +++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +--
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 10 ++--
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 20 +++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 7 +--
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 6 ++-
security/security.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++------
security/smack/smackfs.c | 3 +-
25 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index a75ffcd0270a..a4f0cd140612 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3090,7 +3090,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 786d065a64ef..ad1eda37166f 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ extern struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx,
gfp_t gfp
extern __printf(2, 3)
void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...);
extern void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern void audit_log_end_local(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct audit_context *context);
extern bool audit_string_contains_control(const char *string,
size_t len);
extern void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab,
@@ -188,6 +190,7 @@ extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern void audit_log_lsm(struct audit_context *context);
extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
@@ -226,6 +229,9 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
{ }
static inline void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{ }
+static inline void audit_log_end_local(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct audit_context *context)
+{ }
static inline void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{ }
@@ -252,6 +258,8 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{ }
+static void audit_log_lsm(struct audit_context *context)
+{ }
static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
@@ -291,6 +299,7 @@ extern int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task);
extern void __audit_free(struct task_struct *task);
extern struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags);
extern void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context);
+extern void audit_free_local(struct audit_context *context);
extern void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3);
extern void __audit_syscall_exit(int ret_success, long ret_value);
@@ -392,6 +401,19 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
__audit_ptrace(t);
}
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_for_lsm(gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+
+ if (context)
+ return context;
+
+ if (lsm_multiple_contexts())
+ return audit_alloc_local(gfp);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t
mode);
@@ -566,6 +588,8 @@ extern int audit_signals;
}
static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
{ }
+static inline void audit_free_local(struct audit_context *context)
+{ }
static inline int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 20486380c176..3335991e99cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "display" slot */
+#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the default "display" slot */
/**
* lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
@@ -243,6 +245,17 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
return 0;
}
+const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot);
+
+static inline bool lsm_multiple_contexts(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ return security_lsm_slot_name(1) != NULL;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -559,7 +572,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void
*value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int display);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1385,7 +1399,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- struct lsmcontext *cp)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp, int display)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 73fc25b4042b..9bc1f969a25d 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ struct calipso_doi;
/* NetLabel audit information */
struct netlbl_audit {
- u32 secid;
+ struct audit_context *localcontext;
+ struct lsmblob lsmdata;
kuid_t loginuid;
unsigned int sessionid;
};
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index b77a52f93389..f4d567d4885e 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sc
* and the infrastructure will know which it is.
*/
lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index b2a06f10b62c..bfe3ba2a5233 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -669,13 +669,22 @@ struct xfrm_spi_skb_cb {
#define XFRM_SPI_SKB_CB(__skb) ((struct xfrm_spi_skb_cb *)&((__skb)->cb[0]))
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(const char *op)
+static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(const char *op,
+ struct audit_context **lac)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
- audit_buf = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC,
+ context = audit_context();
+ if (lac != NULL) {
+ if (lsm_multiple_contexts() && context == NULL)
+ context = audit_alloc_local(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ *lac = context;
+ }
+
+ audit_buf = audit_log_start(context, GFP_ATOMIC,
AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return NULL;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index cd2d8279a5e4..2a63720e56f6 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 4e219d1c1781..554279cb1e20 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -386,10 +386,12 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old,
int allow_changes)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int rc = 0;
- ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return rc;
audit_log_format(ab, "op=set %s=%u old=%u ", function_name, new, old);
@@ -398,7 +400,7 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32
old,
if (rc)
allow_changes = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", allow_changes);
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ audit_log_end_local(ab, context);
return rc;
}
@@ -1072,12 +1074,6 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_context
*context,
audit_log_task_context(*ab);
}
-static inline void audit_log_user_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab,
- u16 msg_type)
-{
- audit_log_common_recv_msg(NULL, ab, msg_type);
-}
-
int is_audit_feature_set(int i)
{
return af.features & AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(i);
@@ -1349,6 +1345,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr
*nlh)
err = audit_filter(msg_type, AUDIT_FILTER_USER);
if (err == 1) { /* match or error */
+ struct audit_context *lcontext;
char *str = data;
err = 0;
@@ -1357,7 +1354,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr
*nlh)
if (err)
break;
}
- audit_log_user_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type);
+ lcontext = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
+ audit_log_common_recv_msg(lcontext, &ab, msg_type);
if (msg_type != AUDIT_USER_TTY) {
/* ensure NULL termination */
str[data_len - 1] = '\0';
@@ -1370,7 +1368,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr
*nlh)
data_len--;
audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, str, data_len);
}
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ audit_log_end_local(ab, lcontext);
}
break;
case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
@@ -1443,7 +1441,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr
*nlh)
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
- &context);
+ &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -1550,6 +1548,7 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sk_buff *skb)
/* Log information about who is connecting to the audit multicast socket */
static void audit_log_multicast(int group, const char *op, int err)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
const struct cred *cred;
struct tty_struct *tty;
char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
@@ -1558,7 +1557,8 @@ static void audit_log_multicast(int group, const char *op, int err)
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
- ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EVENT_LISTENER);
+ context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EVENT_LISTENER);
if (!ab)
return;
@@ -1576,7 +1576,7 @@ static void audit_log_multicast(int group, const char *op, int err)
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); /* exe= */
audit_log_format(ab, " nl-mcgrp=%d op=%s res=%d", group, op, !err);
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ audit_log_end_local(ab, context);
}
/* Run custom bind function on netlink socket group connect or bind requests. */
@@ -2135,7 +2135,19 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ /*
+ * If there is more than one security module that has a
+ * subject "context" it's necessary to put the subject data
+ * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
+ */
+ if (lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ if (ab->ctx)
+ ab->ctx->lsm = blob;
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
@@ -2271,6 +2283,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t
kloginuid,
unsigned int oldsessionid,
unsigned int sessionid, int rc)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
struct tty_struct *tty;
@@ -2278,7 +2291,8 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t
kloginuid,
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
- ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+ context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
if (!ab)
return;
@@ -2293,7 +2307,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t
kloginuid,
oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
audit_put_tty(tty);
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ audit_log_end_local(ab, context);
}
/**
@@ -2393,6 +2407,21 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
audit_buffer_free(ab);
}
+/**
+ * audit_log_end_local - end one audit record with local context
+ * @ab: the audit_buffer
+ * @context: the local context
+ *
+ * End an audit event in the usual way, then emit an LSM context
+ * record if approprite.
+ */
+void audit_log_end_local(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_context *context)
+{
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ audit_log_lsm(context);
+ audit_free_local(context);
+}
+
/**
* audit_log - Log an audit record
* @ctx: audit context
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 3f2285e1c6e0..624828a9a7e4 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kgid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
unsigned long personality;
int arch;
+ struct lsmblob lsm;
pid_t target_pid;
kuid_t target_auid;
@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@ struct audit_context {
extern bool audit_ever_enabled;
extern void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern void audit_log_lsm(struct audit_context *context);
extern int auditd_test_task(struct task_struct *task);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 9e73a7961665..2b0a6fda767d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1098,12 +1098,14 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
/* Log rule additions and removals */
static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
- ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (!ab)
return;
audit_log_session_info(ab);
@@ -1111,7 +1113,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule
*rule, int re
audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", action);
audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ audit_log_end_local(ab, context);
}
/**
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5bfee5d0812d..44b150432147 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -989,12 +989,11 @@ struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
context = audit_alloc_context(AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, gfpflags);
if (!context) {
audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc_local");
- goto out;
+ return NULL;
}
context->serial = audit_serial();
ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
context->local = true;
-out:
return context;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_alloc_local);
@@ -1015,6 +1014,13 @@ void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_free_context);
+void audit_free_local(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+ if (context && context->local)
+ audit_free_context(context);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_free_local);
+
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
unsigned int sessionid,
@@ -1032,7 +1038,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context,
pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1277,7 +1283,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int
*call_panic)
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1429,7 +1436,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct
audit_names *n,
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
@@ -1506,6 +1513,45 @@ static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
audit_log_end(ab);
}
+void audit_log_lsm(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
+ bool sep = false;
+ int error;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!lsm_multiple_contexts())
+ return;
+
+ if (context == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&context->lsm))
+ return;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
+ if (!ab)
+ return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (context->lsm.secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&context->lsm, &lsmdata, i);
+ if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_lsm");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=%s", sep ? " " : "",
+ security_lsm_slot_name(i), lsmdata.context);
+ sep = true;
+
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
+ }
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
static void audit_log_exit(void)
{
int i, call_panic = 0;
@@ -1630,6 +1676,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_proctitle();
+ audit_log_lsm(context);
+
/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
if (ab)
@@ -2635,10 +2683,12 @@ void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
- ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
+ context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
if (!ab)
return;
audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
@@ -2648,7 +2698,7 @@ void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int
nentries,
audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ audit_log_end_local(ab, context);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg);
@@ -2683,6 +2733,7 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
*/
void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
if (!audit_enabled)
@@ -2691,12 +2742,13 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
return;
- ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
+ context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_task(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ audit_log_end_local(ab, context);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index ae073b642fa7..5c0029a3a595 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff
*skb)
return;
lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index e6fdcd87ab3e..b63ecc7185fc 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct
nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index c6112960fc73..2cb3a8df7932 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn
*ct)
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 0d8b83d84422..f2dffeed4789 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext
*context)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
index dc8c39f51f7d..2690a528d262 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static void netlbl_domhsh_audit_add(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry,
break;
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result == 0 ? 1 : 0);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ audit_log_end_local(audit_buf, audit_info->localcontext);
}
}
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ int netlbl_domhsh_remove_entry(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry,
audit_log_format(audit_buf,
" nlbl_domain=%s res=1",
entry->domain ? entry->domain : "(default)");
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ audit_log_end_local(audit_buf, audit_info->localcontext);
}
switch (entry->def.type) {
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index ab6375d952ea..028670b72521 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -437,13 +437,14 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ audit_log_end_local(audit_buf, audit_info->localcontext);
}
return ret_val;
}
@@ -492,13 +493,14 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ audit_log_end_local(audit_buf, audit_info->localcontext);
}
if (entry == NULL)
@@ -552,13 +554,14 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ audit_log_end_local(audit_buf, audit_info->localcontext);
}
if (entry == NULL)
@@ -741,7 +744,7 @@ static void netlbl_unlabel_acceptflg_set(u8 value,
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf,
" unlbl_accept=%u old=%u", value, old_val);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ audit_log_end_local(audit_buf, audit_info->localcontext);
}
}
@@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1528,14 +1531,11 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
- struct lsmblob blob;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
- audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.lsmdata);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 951ba0639d20..4fb4c37cc4a7 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -83,14 +83,17 @@ int __init netlbl_netlink_init(void)
struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
+ struct audit_context *audit_ctx;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
- audit_buf = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, type);
+ audit_ctx = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ audit_info->localcontext = audit_ctx;
+
+ audit_buf = audit_log_start(audit_ctx, GFP_ATOMIC, type);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -98,12 +101,13 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
- lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
- if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (!lsm_multiple_contexts() && lsmblob_is_set(&audit_info->lsmdata)
&&
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->lsmdata, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
- }
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=?");
return audit_buf;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 438b5db6c714..bd4335443b87 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -34,11 +34,7 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
- audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->lsmdata);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index d622c2548d22..6aa4bcc08848 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -4205,30 +4205,32 @@ static void xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, bool task_valid)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
- audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SPD-add");
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SPD-add", &context);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(task_valid, audit_buf);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(xp, audit_buf);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ audit_log_end_local(audit_buf, context);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_policy_add);
void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
bool task_valid)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
- audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SPD-delete");
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SPD-delete", &context);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(task_valid, audit_buf);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(xp, audit_buf);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ audit_log_end_local(audit_buf, context);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_policy_delete);
#endif
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index a77da7aae6fe..23bcf0bc9e40 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -2742,29 +2742,31 @@ static void xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, u16
family,
void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, bool task_valid)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
- audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SAD-add");
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SAD-add", &context);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(task_valid, audit_buf);
xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo(x, audit_buf);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ audit_log_end_local(audit_buf, context);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_add);
void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, bool task_valid)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
- audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SAD-delete");
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SAD-delete", &context);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(task_valid, audit_buf);
xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo(x, audit_buf);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ audit_log_end_local(audit_buf, context);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_delete);
@@ -2774,7 +2776,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
u32 spi;
- audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-replay-overflow");
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-replay-overflow", NULL);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(skb, x->props.family, audit_buf);
@@ -2792,7 +2794,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_replay(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
u32 spi;
- audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-replayed-pkt");
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-replayed-pkt", NULL);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(skb, x->props.family, audit_buf);
@@ -2807,7 +2809,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple(struct sk_buff *skb, u16
family)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
- audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-notfound");
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-notfound", NULL);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(skb, family, audit_buf);
@@ -2821,7 +2823,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_notfound(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
u32 spi;
- audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-notfound");
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-notfound", NULL);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(skb, family, audit_buf);
@@ -2839,7 +2841,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(struct xfrm_state *x,
__be32 net_spi;
__be32 net_seq;
- audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-icv-failure");
+ audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-icv-failure", NULL);
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(skb, x->props.family, audit_buf);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index e83fa1c32843..8b6f8402703d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *hash;
const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
@@ -356,8 +357,8 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash->digest[i]);
hash[i * 2] = '\0';
- ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
- AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+ context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
if (!ab)
goto out;
@@ -366,7 +367,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
audit_log_format(ab, " hash=\"%s:%s\"", algo_name, hash);
audit_log_task_info(ab);
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ audit_log_end_local(ab, context);
iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
out:
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index 29220056207f..b38163c43659 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -38,13 +38,15 @@ void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const char *cause, int result, int audit_info,
int errno)
{
+ struct audit_context *context;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */
return;
- ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
+ context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
task_pid_nr(current),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),
@@ -63,5 +65,5 @@ void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
}
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d errno=%d", !result, errno);
- audit_log_end(ab);
+ audit_log_end_local(ab, context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8803347424d4..cef9c20ce0aa 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -483,7 +483,31 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
* Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
-static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * security_lsm_slot_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
+ * @slot: index into the interface LSM slot list.
+ *
+ * Provide the name of the security module associated with
+ * a interface LSM slot.
+ *
+ * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
+ * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
+ */
+const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot)
+{
+ if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = 0;
+ else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
+}
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -2193,7 +2217,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void
*value,
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
list) {
rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc < 0 && rc != -EINVAL)
return rc;
}
@@ -2238,13 +2262,31 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int ilsm)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+ /*
+ * ilsm either is the slot number use for formatting
+ * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
+ */
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
+ ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ else if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ else if (ilsm < 0) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true,
+ "LSM: %s unknown interface LSM\n", __func__);
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ } else if (ilsm >= lsm_slot) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true,
+ "LSM: %s invalid interface LSM\n", __func__);
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ }
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
@@ -2274,7 +2316,7 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
}
- return 0;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -2767,23 +2809,17 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- bool one_is_good = false;
- int rc = 0;
- int trc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
- &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
- if (trc == 0)
- one_is_good = true;
- else
- rc = trc;
+ if (ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID && ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
}
- if (one_is_good)
- return 0;
- return rc;
+ return 0;
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
@@ -2815,6 +2851,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32
op,
continue;
if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
continue;
+ if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
field, op,
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 139768a13d11..17391258e896 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ lsmblob_init(&nap->lsmdata, 0);
+ nap->lsmdata.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = skp->smk_secid;
}
/*
--
2.24.1
4:51 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on nf/master]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v5.10-rc4 next-20201120]
[cannot apply to nf-next/master security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url:
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Module-stack...
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf.git master
config: sparc64-randconfig-s032-20201120 (attached as .config)
compiler: sparc64-linux-gcc (GCC) 9.3.0
reproduce:
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O
~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# apt-get install sparse
# sparse version: v0.6.3-134-gb59dbdaf-dirty
#
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/5214e557315977360cc15d57d0622591d...
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review
Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Module-stacking-for-AppArmor/20201121-044616
git checkout 5214e557315977360cc15d57d0622591dc5805c5
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-9.3.0 make.cross C=1
CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' ARCH=sparc64
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c:25:
include/linux/audit.h:585:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before
'+' token
585 | +static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
| ^
> include/linux/audit.h:261:13: error: 'audit_log_lsm'
defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
261 | static void
audit_log_lsm(struct audit_context *context)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
vim +/audit_log_lsm +261 include/linux/audit.h
216
217 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
218 static inline __printf(4, 5)
219 void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type,
220 const char *fmt, ...)
221 { }
222 static inline struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx,
223 gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
224 {
225 return NULL;
226 }
227 static inline __printf(2, 3)
228 void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
229 { }
230 static inline void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
231 { }
232 static inline void audit_log_end_local(struct audit_buffer *ab,
233 struct audit_context *context)
234 { }
235 static inline void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab,
236 const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
237 { }
238 static inline void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab,
239 const char *buf, size_t n)
240 { }
241 static inline void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab,
242 const char *string, size_t n)
243 { }
244 static inline void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab,
245 const char *string)
246 { }
247 static inline void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
248 const char *prefix,
249 const struct path *path)
250 { }
251 static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
252 { }
253 static inline void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation)
254 { }
255 static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
256 {
257 return 0;
258 }
259 static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
260 { }
261 static void audit_log_lsm(struct audit_context *context)
262 { }
263
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
6:02 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on nf/master]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v5.10-rc4 next-20201120]
[cannot apply to nf-next/master security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url:
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Module-stack...
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf.git master
config: nios2-randconfig-r012-20201120 (attached as .config)
compiler: nios2-linux-gcc (GCC) 9.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O
~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
#
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/5214e557315977360cc15d57d0622591d...
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review
Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Module-stacking-for-AppArmor/20201121-044616
git checkout 5214e557315977360cc15d57d0622591dc5805c5
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-9.3.0 make.cross ARCH=nios2
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from security/integrity/integrity_audit.c:12:
include/linux/audit.h:585:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before
'+' token
585 | +static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
| ^
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c: In function 'integrity_audit_message':
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c:48:12: error: implicit declaration of function
'audit_alloc_for_lsm'; did you mean 'audit_log_lsm'?
[-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
48 | context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| audit_log_lsm
> security/integrity/integrity_audit.c:48:10: warning: assignment
to 'struct audit_context *' from 'int' makes pointer from integer without
a cast [-Wint-conversion]
48 | context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
| ^
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
--
In file included from net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c:20:
include/linux/audit.h:585:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before
'+' token
585 | +static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(gfp_t gfpflags)
| ^
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c: In function 'netlbl_audit_start_common':
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c:93:14: error: implicit declaration of function
'audit_alloc_for_lsm'; did you mean 'audit_log_lsm'?
[-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
93 | audit_ctx = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_ATOMIC);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| audit_log_lsm
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c:93:12: warning: assignment to
'struct audit_context *' from 'int' makes pointer from integer without a
cast [-Wint-conversion]
93 | audit_ctx = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_ATOMIC);
| ^
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
vim +48 security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
35
36 void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
37 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
38 const char *cause, int result, int audit_info,
39 int errno)
40 {
41 struct audit_context *context;
42 struct audit_buffer *ab;
43 char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
44
45 if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */
46 return;
47
48 context = audit_alloc_for_lsm(GFP_KERNEL);
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
2:15 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object LSM attributes
Create a new audit record type to contain the object information
when there are multiple security modules that may require such data.
This record is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1421]
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
Not all security modules that can provide object information
do so in all cases. It is possible that a security module won't
apply an object attribute in all cases.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
To: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 7 ++++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/audit.h | 4 +--
kernel/auditsc.c | 73 +++++++-------------------------------
5 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index ad1eda37166f..af9403ba8a8a 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern void audit_log_lsm(struct audit_context *context);
@@ -256,6 +258,11 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
return 0;
}
+static inline int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{ }
static void audit_log_lsm(struct audit_context *context)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 2a63720e56f6..dbb1dce16962 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM object contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 554279cb1e20..1257c1787f3c 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2164,6 +2164,59 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+ int error;
+ bool sep = false;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
+ struct audit_buffer *lsmab = NULL;
+ struct audit_context *context = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is more than one security module that has a
+ * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
+ * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
+ */
+ if (lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
+ context = ab->ctx;
+ if (context)
+ lsmab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmdata, i);
+ if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ if (context) {
+ audit_log_format(lsmab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
+ sep ? " " : "",
+ security_lsm_slot_name(i),
+ lsmdata.context);
+ sep = true;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmdata.context);
+
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
+ if (!context)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (context)
+ audit_log_end(lsmab);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
+
void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 624828a9a7e4..3be4b03e5cb5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob oblob;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
umode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob oblob;
int has_perm;
uid_t perm_uid;
gid_t perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 44b150432147..c314533dd220 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -688,14 +688,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
- * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
- * until name->osid is converted to a
- * lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
f->type,
@@ -703,7 +695,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
f->type,
@@ -717,8 +708,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
- if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oblob,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules))
++result;
@@ -1027,7 +1017,6 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context,
pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -1037,15 +1026,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context,
pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
- rc = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob))
+ rc = audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1272,26 +1254,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int
*call_panic)
context->socketcall.args[i]);
break; }
case AUDIT_IPC: {
- u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+ struct lsmblob *oblob = &context->ipc.oblob;
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
- if (osid) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
- *call_panic = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(oblob) &&
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, oblob))
+ *call_panic = 1;
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
audit_log_end(ab);
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
@@ -1431,20 +1402,9 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct
audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
-
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
- if (call_panic)
- *call_panic = 2;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->oblob) &&
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->oblob) && call_panic)
+ *call_panic = 2;
/* log the audit_names record type */
switch (n->type) {
@@ -2047,17 +2007,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
- name->osid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->oblob);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
@@ -2403,16 +2359,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
- /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
- * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
- * labels associated with the ipc object. */
- context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.oblob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
--
2.24.1
2:15 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
process security "context" in compound format:
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
A security module may decide that its policy does not allow
this information to be displayed. In this case none of the
information will be displayed.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-api(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc(a)vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-context | 14 ++++
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 +-
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 +++---
security/security.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
10 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-context
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-context
b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-context
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4c0462136aac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-context
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+What: /proc/*/attr/context
+Contact: linux-security-module(a)vger.kernel.org,
+Description: The current security information used by all Linux
+ security module (LSMs) that are active on the system.
+ The details of permissions required to read from
+ this interface and hence obtain the security state
+ of the task identified is dependent on the LSMs that
+ are active on the system.
+ A process cannot write to this interface.
+ The data provided by this interface will have the form:
+ lsm_name\0lsm_data\0[lsm_name\0lsm_data\0]...
+ where lsm_name is the name of the LSM and the following
+ lsm_data is the process data for that LSM.
+Users: LSM user-space
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index b77b4a540391..070225ae6ceb 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -143,3 +143,17 @@ separated list of the active security modules.
The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
apply. This interface can be written to.
+
+The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
+case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
+This is provided in compound context format.
+
+- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
+
+The `lsm` and `value` fields are NUL-terminated bytestrings.
+Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
+The NUL bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
+The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
+context of the identified process.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 214a0503589d..e8b079d15194 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2809,6 +2809,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index e19393b2b8b7..32a266d22c0c 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1372,6 +1372,12 @@
* @pages contains the number of pages.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
+ * @getprocattr:
+ * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
+ * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
+ * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
+ * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
+ * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
* @ismaclabel:
* Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
* represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 0ef5d0b2dbdb..36be7bdc917b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+ bool newline = true;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
@@ -600,11 +601,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char
*name,
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
- else
+ else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
+ newline = false;
+ } else
error = -EINVAL;
if (label)
- error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
+ error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
aa_put_label(label);
put_cred(cred);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index c929bf4a3df1..be3b083d9b74 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
* aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
* @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
* @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
+ * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
*
* Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure
*
@@ -30,20 +31,21 @@
*
* Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
*/
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
{
struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+ int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
int len;
if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return -EACCES;
}
+ if (newline)
+ flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
- len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
AA_BUG(len < 0);
*string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -52,19 +54,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
if (len < 0) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return len;
}
- (*string)[len] = '\n';
- (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
+ if (newline) {
+ (*string)[len] = '\n';
+ (*string)[++len] = 0;
+ }
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
- return len + 1;
+ return len;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index cef9c20ce0aa..e33c8ccc06a0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -757,6 +757,57 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
+ * @ctx: the existing compound context
+ * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
+ * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
+ * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
+ * @newlen: maximum size of @new
+ *
+ * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
+ * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
+ * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
+ */
+static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
+ int newlen)
+{
+ char *final;
+ size_t llen;
+ size_t nlen;
+ size_t flen;
+
+ llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
+ /*
+ * A security module may or may not provide a trailing nul on
+ * when returning a security context. There is no definition
+ * of which it should be, and there are modules that do it
+ * each way.
+ */
+ nlen = strnlen(new, newlen);
+
+ flen = *ctxlen + llen + nlen + 1;
+ final = kzalloc(flen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (*ctxlen)
+ memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
+
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, nlen);
+
+ kfree(*ctx);
+
+ *ctx = final;
+ *ctxlen = flen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
* can be accessed with:
@@ -2142,6 +2193,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *final = NULL;
+ char *cp;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int finallen = 0;
int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
int slot = 0;
@@ -2169,6 +2224,30 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
char *name,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL)
+ continue;
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
+ cp, rc);
+ kfree(cp);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *value = final;
+ return finallen;
+ }
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c670eb0a9515..5fd738c73449 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6292,7 +6292,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
goto bad;
}
- if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
sid = __tsec->sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
sid = __tsec->osid;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 06629441b663..8da72353e94e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3478,7 +3478,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char
**value)
char *cp;
int slen;
- if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context")
!= 0)
return -EINVAL;
cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.24.1
2:15 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH v23 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
With the inclusion of the interface LSM process attribute
mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
"exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
interferes in the multiple LSM case.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +-------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 36be7bdc917b..29e8bbdba37c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1129,22 +1129,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
- * @sock: the peer socket
- * @skb: packet data
- * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
- *
- * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
* @sk: child sock
@@ -1248,8 +1232,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[]
__lsm_ro_after_init = {
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1918,7 +1900,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
.init = apparmor_init,
--
2.24.1
1453
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1492
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linux-audit@lists.linux-audit.osci.io
39 comments
3 participants
participants (3)
-
Casey Schaufler -
kernel test robot -
Mimi Zohar